SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE EU'S SECURITY GOVERNANCE THROUGH TRIAL AND ERROR

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Abstract. *In light of the current significant milestones in the relationship between the European Union and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Reauthorisation of EUFOR Altea on November 3rd last year and the European Council decision to grant candidate country status to Bosnia-Herzegovina on December 15th 2022, we see an accelerated dynamics giving impetus towards addressing decisive reforms in the country. Western Balkans states have been an important security complex for the European Union, both in terms of stabilizing efforts, agenda setting as well as mechanisms to export security governance. The European Union`s interest in pacifying the area grew in conjunction with its own identity in terms of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).*

We intend to explore the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in terms of how the concept of security sector reform (SSR) was designed and implemented, especially tracing the pedigree of reforms starting from EUFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina Military Operation Althea to the present day. Using process tracing and content analysis we want to examine to what extent European Union`s "positive offer" has managed to reset political priorities in Bosnia Herzegovina and what role security sector reform play in fixing the caveat to this process.

Keywords: *Security sector reform (SSR), CSDP, ESDP, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)*

1. Historical background of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Since World War II, a violent military war in Europe has taken place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Soviet Empire and its repressive rule over Eastern Europe ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a non-aligned country, began to exhibit fractures in its internal organization while the Soviet Union was disintegrating and its satellite nations were eradicating the last remnants of Communist control (Bassuener 2017, pp. 216-255). Yugoslavia, which was made up of six republics and two independent areas, had a positive reputation as a role model for multicultural states.

In 1992 and 1998, respectively, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo—the Western Balkans—became important early test cases for the new state-building strategy. It is

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crucial to remember that in the early years of the post-Cold War era, state-building initiatives were frequently referred to as nation-building initiatives because they aimed to promote the creation of new nations in regions where internal strife was rife.

Four of the six republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia—separated from Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1992 through a convoluted sequence of diplomatic and political moves. Each secession was disputed, with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is situated in the centre, seeing the worst carnage and bloodshed.

The civil war that raged from April 1992 to November 1995 immediately impacted at least half of the population or more than two million individuals. Civilians were massacred, cease-fires were broken, entire towns were devastated and the United Nations and the European Union's efforts were disregarded. The nation was torn apart by ethnic cleansing that resisted all control and accountability (Sherwell and Petric, 2000).

For 44 months, Sarajevo was under suppression by Bosnian Serb troops. More than 10,000 people lost their lives as a result of the bombardment, sniping and blockade-related hardship, most of them citizens (Ibrahimagic 1998, pp. 115-116).

Bosnian Croats and Serbs battled alongside paramilitary groups from the two neighbouring countries of Croatia and Serbia, some of which allegedly had connections to their governments. Bosnian Serb troops received assistance from the Yugoslav National Army, which was dominated by Serbs, providing them with a tactical edge.

2. The Importance of The Dayton Agreement and its Consequences on BiH

An important moment regarding the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was when President Slobodan Milosevic's military-backed ethnic Serbs opposed the declarations of independence and started an armed conflict to seize separate Serb-controlled territories in both areas and prevent the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, the possibility of a peaceful transition was eliminated. In this sense, the Dayton Peace Agreement was an outrageous accomplishment, which established the legislative framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina's foreseeable future (BiH).

After the establishment of the Dayton Agreement, which ended the Bosnian War, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a multi-ethnic and religious state, has been the subject of study into peace and war (1992 – 1995) as Asimovic Akyol (2015) points out. The international community is trying to scale back its involvement in BiH several years after the end of a bloody war that is regarded as the paradigm of the so-called "New Wars". The nation itself, however, does not appear to be prepared to establish itself as a viable, independent state, not least because it appears that none of the country's three major ethnic groups—Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats—accepts BiH in the current configuration.

The Dayton Agreement asked for the complete respect of each state's sovereign equity as well as the respect of human rights and refugee rights. Additionally, all involved nations were required to work in tandem with the UN Security Council to implement the peace agreement and help the International Criminal Tribunal of The Hague investigate, prosecute and find guilty war criminals (Clinton. 2013).

Heavy foreign military participation was necessary for the Dayton Agreement's implementation. A 60,000-strong International Peacekeeping Force (IFOR) under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command was stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995–1996 to carry out and oversee the agreement's armed provisions. A smaller (32,000-strong) NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) took over from IFOR

to stabilise the peace and prevent the outbreak of fresh conflicts, as was stated in OSCE (2020).

A completely new type of governance was established by the DPA. Due to the direct election of three designated Presidents, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a semi-presidential republic. On all of Bosnia-Herzegovina's land, they execute their legal authority. Therefore, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state made up of two entities and the Brcko District, according to the state's administration and framework. (Bjorkdahl 2012, p.294)

Practically, the Dayton Peace Agreement served as the foundation for Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-war political growth. Bosnia and Herzegovina have distanced itself from the reality of the conflict over the past years, but it has still not found solutions to the key issues surrounding its economic and societal growth.

How efficient is the DPA considering the situation in BiH? On one hand, regarding its organization, balance and effectiveness, DPA is the subject of significant discussion and critique. Many contend that the DPA led to unfair agreements between ethnic groups in conflict, as Juncos (2018, pp. 95-118) underlines. Serbs from Bosnia who carried out acts of racial cleansing and genocide received a "republic" that had been ethnically cleared, while Bosniaks and Croats had to share a "federation", according to Glenny (1999, pp.636-638). As a result, the Bosniaks were kept in check officially and militarily by the Croats, whereas the Serbs had an autonomous position where authority pertains to them.

On the other hand, the DPA has also been poorly implemented in terms of freedom of movement, the immigrant repatriation procedure, the demand for pre-war suffrage rights and the prosecution of war criminals. In reality, some claim that the DPA was a factor in Bosnia-Herzegovina's division into ethno-nationalist entities that recognized and successfully rewarded the practice of ethnic cleansing, as Robinson and Pobric (2006, pp. 237-252) underline.

How it is perceived the DPA nowadays? It is noteworthy that the Dayton Agreement is now more closely linked to chaos than peace. That is partly because Dayton was more of an armistice than a resolution. The warring groups (Republika Srpska and the Federation) were kept in position by the complex political structure established at Dayton, which also recognized and rewarded their dedication to ethnically-based territorial control (Morrison 2009, p.8). Since then, kleptocratic ethno-nationalists have used the terms of Dayton to consolidate their power at the cost of the nation's future.

Bosnia and Herzegovina run the risk of degenerating into a catastrophe on the threshold of the American administration and for the remainder of the European Commission if Dayton is not drastically revised. The collapse of Bosnia raises the possibility of fresh bloodshed, refugee flows, boundary changes and extensive economic disruption, which could increase Russian and Chinese power in the area and weaken NATO. It could also jeopardize American relations with the European Union, as mentioned by Schake (1999).

Then, what is the future of the Dayton agreements for Bosnia and Herzegovina? In 2014, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe issued a very stern warning in its assessment of the elections in BiH, stating that "the lack of political will to move beyond the Dayton Agreement prevents the country from moving away from the current inter-ethnic divides and towards real progress for the country.", according to OSCE Press Release (2014).

However, a German-British Initiative statement from November 2014 that, on paper, appears to give a chance to advance toward EU entry indicates a shift in European views. Politicians in BiH would still be required to enact several substantial changes as part of the conditionality. Minority rights concerns, coordination methods, economic reforms, bolstering the rule of law and reducing government spending are just a few of the changes that have been suggested, as Jukic (2014) underlines.

The US continues to emphasize the great benefits brought about by the Dayton Accord while also acknowledging that its provisions have frequently acted as a barrier to wider reform that has been required for Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the EU. The US is unwilling to allow any significant changes without its direct control. As a result, it could be said that, given the social and political climate in BiH today, the Dayton Agreement is no longer justified. The "Dayton Agreement essentially became an infamous trademark of failed international involvement in state (re)construction and peacebuilding practices", as Cretu (2015, pp.1-7) underlines.

3. The integration of the SSR and its principles within the framework of the current situation of BiH

Regarding the necessity of a strong security area in BiH, then the characteristics of SSR must be illustrated. The Security Sector Reform is a comparatively new idea in state development, peacebuilding after the war and state transformation. Human security, decent administration with accountability and openness, non-violent social change and poverty alleviation initiatives have all gained traction in security thinking, according to Hans, Caparini and Fluri (2003). The idea of state security, or even more specifically the security of the political establishment is contrasted or competed with by the people-centred concept of human security. These conceptual shifts in the security discussion have mainly occurred in emerging nations, but not as frequently in transitory ones, as was mentioned by Hans, Caparini and Fluri (2003).

Reforms to the security sector aim to handle issues with security and make improvements through structural changes. Security and tranquillity are regarded as societal goods. A rise in security helps both societies as a whole and their individuals. Reforming the security sector is a wide idea that also involves making better use of limited resources to increase security. It aims to coordinate the efforts of security, economic and diplomatic players. The supply of security in the interests of the populace requires democratic, civilian authority over security services.

After having a look at the situation of the countries in the Western Balkans, what are the current challenges for the SSR? Extending the norm-setting and programming process beyond the states and organizations that have already endorsed the SSR idea is crucial here, as Allan and Hänggi (2005) underline. Although there is a general desire to back and finance SSR, the most effective course of action is still up for discussion. It also emphasized the political sensitivity of the security sector, particularly about the transformation of the armed forces and intelligence agencies and is careful in their involvement.

The resources that have been made accessible are still insufficient in light of the extensive need for security sector change in many nations. Reforming the security sector has been acknowledged as a prerequisite for growth and democratization, though. Security forces can act with impunity in the lack of democratic civilian supervision, which has detrimental effects on both security and human development. Donors have acknowledged the significance of security problems for growth. Attempts to use

development aid for military and geopolitical objectives have also emerged in response to discussions on failing states, post-conflict rebuilding and the "war on terror", according to Dziedzic (2020, pp. 618-635). There is a chance that development aid will become "securitized" or abused for war objectives, as Buzan (2007) underlines. NGOs have voiced concerns about governments' propensity to incorporate them and their development initiatives into a military structure. Thus, there is a problem: will SSR result in the democratization of the security sector and thereby support development, or will development aid be twisted to serve as a military force multiplier?

Regarding the SSR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it cannot be precisely spoken about as an enabling climate for a powerful security system. Even though it is difficult to tolerate moral principles, it must be acknowledged that violent conflict and wars are typically unable to be halted or avoided in the short term. Despite significant efforts, chronic violent strife has persisted in several areas.

Furthermore, the security sector in Bosnia has experienced issues with inadequate political oversight, responsibility and openness, just like in other post-communist nations. In the case of Bosnia, these issues have been made worse by the country's complicated governance system, a large number of veto parties and the lasting effects of conflict. A great number of security force personnel have been accused of taking part in war crimes or war profiteering. Additionally, police have typically been seen as political tools used by their various racial groups.

4. What about the actors involved in ensuring security within BiH?
In the early 2000s, the EU started to participate in SSR in Bosnia. The EU created the Police Mission (EUPM) in 2003 as a result of the UN's departure. The EU began its military action EUFOR Althea in 2004 after the NATO military operation ended. Furthermore, the EU appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2002 in addition to the regular representative of the European Commission. This EUSR would simultaneously serve as the UN High Representative to Bosnia in a "double hatting" setup, according to Jeffrey, A. (2008, pp. 428– 443). The first-ever EU police force started operations in January 2003 and in December 2004, EU Force (EUFOR) Althea, the EU's largest military mission, was established, replacing the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), as Welfens (2001, p. 9) underlines. Through the EU's involvement in police reform and help with defence reform, the transformation of Bosnia's security sector rapidly became a major EU goal. (the latter under the leadership of NATO).

Concerning the situation of BiH the strategy was especially clear in the restructuring of the police. The EU's primary goal in Bosnia at the time was to complete the 2005-started police reform process. Even before completing the crucial Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Bosnia, the EU made it a requirement, according to Juncos (2011).

Between the Bosnian political elites and the EU negotiators, there was a political impasse regarding the centralization of the police forces and the reorganization of the nation's police forces based on functional criteria rather than ethnic ones (including the police forces crossing the Inter-Entity Boundary Line). Only the Mostar Agreement, signed in October 2007, which brought all Bosnian political groups to consensus on the reform's core principles and a strategy for implementing them, was able to break the impasse. However, the signing of the SAA between the EU and Bosnia in June 2008 was made possible thanks to the passage of two new statutes on police restructuring and the development of new state-level police institutions.

This fact has consequences for the situation in BiH. Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the so-called three "European principles"—all legislative and budgetary authority resting with the state; no political meddling with operational policing; and the designation of functional police areas based on technical policing standards—was one of the primary causes of the impasse between 2005 and 2007, as was mentioned by the European Commission (2006). Local Bosnian lawmakers, for their part, rejected the imposition of these principles by citing the variety of models in the different EU member states. Bosnian Serbs were anxious to point out differences from European norms and practices to defend their opposition to EU conditions.

Local players can use these tactics to position themselves as "European" as opposed to the non-European "other" by embracing Europeanist ideologies, according to Jeffrey (2008, pp. 428-443). Bosnian Serbs in particular believe that they are defending a Christian European identity from more liberal and mixed conceptions of Europe. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs have employed a complementary strategy, claiming that the Dayton Peace Agreement's constitutional framework would be violated by implementing the police reform (or any other reforms in the security and justice sectors requiring a centralization of authority, as Vandemoortele (2012, pp. 202-218) points out.

The reality that the High Representative and the Bonn powers are still in existence in Bosnia and that many Bosnian policymakers still depend excessively on outside assistance when developing their strategies and programs further exacerbates this issue. From all these, it can be understood that Bosnians have used the rhetoric of local ownership to oppose efforts to enforce top-down changes while the EU has used it to support and modify its strategy there.

Another important aspect concerning the situation in BiH is the discourse of gradualism and progress that underpins the EU's relations with its neighbours. It is used in this instance, as it was in previous instances of opposition, to work within the discourses and technologies of the EU. The instance of military reform is an additional noteworthy illustration of the simulation of reforms. In this instance, the EU has supported defence reform by giving capacity-building through EUFOR Althea, whereas NATO and the High Representative assumed a leading position in defence matters by establishing the Defence Reform Commission in 2002.

Additionally, while opposition to police reform has been more outspoken, resistance to military reform was primarily covert but has recently become more overt. After the defence reform talks that resulted in the dissolution of the entity's armed forces and the establishment of a new state-level Ministry of Defence and a joint command organization, the Bosnian army appeared to be united on paper. However, keeping mono-ethnic regiments and brigades as well as ensuring an ethnic equilibrium in an appointment made this arrangement only feasible.

The ownership disagreement over defence property has not been resolved, however, and this has caused the defence changes to stagnate over the past few years. All movable military property, such as barracks or depots, should be listed at the state (rather than an entity) level, according to one of NATO's main membership action plan criteria. Additionally, reports from the European Commission have discussed the necessity of making success with the defence reforms, especially regarding defence property, according to the European Commision (2006).

Furthermore, there is evidence that some of the reforms are being undone due to the army ranks becoming more politicized, as shown by the officers' closer ties to ethnic parties, the number of people who publicly display their religiosity to advance their

careers and the army's increased ethnic segregation. There is no anticipation that the Bosnian army will cause instability or start interethnic conflict, according to a recent evaluation undertaken by Bassuener, (2015).

The example of Bosnia also demonstrates how locals have been able to "lower the bar"—that is, to alter and lessen the requirements set by EU policymakers—by working within the frameworks of the EU. This approach is based on some of the aspects of EU governmentality that were previously discussed. As an example, some of the European SSR principles are ambiguous and open to interpretation, making it possible to modify them to fit a specific situation or reality. This also results from the concept of local ownership and the requirement to take into account local requirements in the process, which calls into question the notion of strict conditionality as it is typically known in other policy areas.

5. The Role of the Berlin Process Summit towards BiH

Since 2014, various EU member states and the nations of the Western Balkans have participated in a succession of activities and gatherings known as the Berlin Process. It varies from other EU projects in that it involves both specific EU states and organizations from the international financial community, as Donika (2018) underlines. The format was developed by Germany and it focuses on problems of regional and economic cooperation. Although the Berlin Process has already generated several ambitious ideas, such as the shared regional market, the Western Balkan states' execution of the deals has frequently stalled.

The Berlin Process mainly focuses on problems of regional and industrial cooperation. In terms of organization, it entails a succession of sessions where representatives of Governments and representatives of local civic society from the Western Balkans interact with officials of the EU institutions and specific EU member states. For the approval of new agreements and the execution of existing ones, the cooperation format creates suggestions and strategies. Additionally, it discusses how the Western Balkans can gain shortly, even without complete EU participation, as Nicić, Nechev, and Mameledžija (2016) pointed out.

The establishment of the Common Regional Market is the Berlin Process's most ambitious accord to date (CRM). At the Sofia Summit in November 2020, all six Western Balkan countries endorsed the agreement, according to Flessenkemper (2017). The CRM was created to guarantee the "four freedoms" of unrestricted trade in goods, services, capital and people. This included elements of digital trade, investment, innovation and industry policy.

Therefore, it seems evident that the Berlin Process sought to affirm the EU's ongoing commitment to the WB to maintain the possibility of the region joining the EU as well as to strengthen regional cooperation among the WB by concentrating on a variety of areas to implement investment projects that effectively address the majority of the region's needs, as MarjanovićRudan (2017) underlines.

Even the expectations that the Berlin Process might encompass and address all the difficult problems in the region were not very high, given that it was a time-limited effort planned to take place over four years (2014-2018). It is evident from a careful examination of the Berlin Process agenda that there are many factors at play, making it challenging, if not impossible, to address regional issues in such a limited amount of time and the complex multilateral environment, according to Donika (2018).

Practically, what are the effects of the Berlin Process on the security sector in BiH? The stepping stone of the SSR in Bosnia-Herzegovina begins during the period when the Balkan subcomplex served as a focal point for regional strife. Before the conflict, Yugoslavia's larger security system included Bosnia's security sector. Because the JNA was in charge of defence, BiH was left without a force. However, the country also had a Territorial Defence Force, which served as the foundation for the creation of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH) in May 1992, as Kaldor (2012) points out.

Typically, there are three types of groups in the security sector. Operational players, or teams of armed and uniformed employees who interact directly with the populace, come first. These institutions, which include the police, military, jail and customs officials and border control are in charge of defending residents from security threats. The second group consists of the organizations that oversee these players, such as the interior, defence and justice ministries. Above these institutions, in the third group, are institutions that serve as watchdogs, such as the administration or the parliament, which are, ideally, chosen through democratic processes and tasked with making sure that the security sector benefits the people rather than the other way around.

Policymakers in Brussels view BiH as one of the key "experiments" for evaluating its crisis management skills. The EU's participation in the nation is one of its most ambitious to date and with the employment of several tools under the European Security and Defence Policy, the Union has moved beyond its traditional position as a civil power toward a more robust role.

Despite this, it is important to mention here that working with Western Balkans countries has two main components from the viewpoint of the EU: the first is capacity-related and the second is more political in character. Partnerships help EU peacekeeping operations in terms of capacity by providing people, resources and experience that the EU may lack, according to Minard (2016).

Yet, it is fair to state that the BiH's three most important ethnonational groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) do not have a common outlook on its future, leaving room for the influence of superpowers. The Balkans have long served as a testing ground for superpowers looking to increase their sway in the area. Still, the country was introduced to a security framework thanks to the US and its allies' active engagement and its armed troops, according to Beridan, Smajić and Turčalo (2018). The Bosnian question has once more come into prominence as Bosnia-Herzegovina deals with its worst political crisis since the end of World War II and future events are unpredictable.

BiH indicated its desire and willingness to align its economic objectives with those of the EU by signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008 and bringing it into force in 2015. Achieving these objectives significantly boosts BiH's economy and helps it move up from its current status as a prospective EU candidate country. Bosnia-Herzegovina's single donor, the financial and economic partner, is the European Union despite BiH's slow progress toward European integration. The European Union has invested more than 3.2 billion euros in various industries in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the war's end up to the present.

Formerly, Bosnia-Herzegovina considered EU accession to be the most crucial political process that would determine the destiny and prosperity of the nation. Nonetheless, public support for EU membership and accompanying reforms is dwindling in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the rise in Europhilia during the first phase of entry. Intriguingly, this is not the result of traditional Euroskepticism, but rather of the

widespread belief that the issues in BiH are so severe that even membership in the EU could not help with their resolution.

The Foreign Policy Initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina researched the public's perception of EU membership among the population of BiH in 2012 and their findings reveal that citizens see EU membership as a remedy for the nation's main issues, a means of relieving tension, preserving the nation's peace and stability and raising standards of living. Even though the bulk of the population has a strong ethnic identification, people exhibit a strong feeling of European identity and believe that these two do not preclude one another.

6. What next in BiH?

The majority of current SSR situations have extremely unfavourable conditions for reform. As a result, the SSR model has encountered several recurring implementation obstacles that have persistently reduced its impact. For SSR practitioners, the thorny question of ownership, which plagues the whole development industry, has been particularly challenging. It has been challenging to fulfil the necessity of manufacturing ownership when local leadership, capability, and political will for change are constrained, as Ball (2002) underlines.

Civil society engagement is a difficult problem. The major issue is that, like the state, civil society tends to be weak and divided in fragile, post-conflict contexts. Furthermore, the connection between civil society and the state is frequently strained and marked by mistrust on both sides.

A definitional problem exists as well: who exactly belongs to civil society, and who among them should be included in the SSR process?

According to Knight (2009), there will always be winners and losers when the security environment in a post-conflict or transitional state change. With a combination of incentives and disincentives, some of those losers may be persuaded to cooperate with the process, but others will inevitably reject reform initiatives and steadfastly resist change. SSR procedures have a limited ability to prevent spoiler behaviour, which can take many different forms, from political sabotage to open violence.

The issue of time frames may be the most persistent and pervasive difficulty the SSR model currently faces. SSR's guiding principle is that long-term interventions are necessary for the process. Nevertheless, donor assistance systems and architectures frequently do not allow for that level of dedication. Many factors, including donor electoral cycles and frequently changing donor priorities connected to the news cycle, can be linked to the issue. This conundrum highlights one of the underlying inconsistencies of the SSR idea: donors just lack the perspective, political connections, and institutional resources necessary to put the model's ideas into practice in the complicated reform environments of today, as Chanaa (2002) points out.

The creation of departure strategies for the intervening party, which frequently names a democratic election as the final aim, predominates during state-building. Even while technocrats might assert that this is how democracies can be established, having elections does not signify the achievement of state construction. A fundamental misunderstanding of what the enterprise of state-building truly entails in practice may exist, in addition to the difficulties in establishing a multiparty democracy in a post-conflict setting.

Building civil servants' competence to oversee defence ministries in particular has grown more intertwined with the advancement of public service reform in recent

years. From the perspectives of both individual residents and the international community, however, that may be defined, security has remained important to the entire state-building method, according to Garrasi, Kuttner and Wam (2009). Also, SSR is increasingly recognized as a crucial component of the international community's conflict management strategy. The assumption that relatively affordable investments in civilian security through police, judicial and rule of law reform can considerably aid long-term peacebuilding has led to the centralization of the reconstruction and reform of security institutions following the conflict.

An examination of the alternatives is overdue if we admit that state creation as social engineering has failed. It is not a good idea to simply let states develop according to some sort of historical logic choice if the population's immediate security is a worry. Fischer and Schmelzle (2009) mention that politically, economically and morally, it would be very challenging to isolate a region of the world and declare it to have failed. This necessitates a new approach that builds on pluralistic responses to various situations and a conception of the state that does more than simply recreate medieval Europe. However, modern approaches to development and security frequently omit saying this.

This inquiry undoubtedly causes Pandora's box to open. Nevertheless, there have been discovered several feasible, practical future directions, but it can be said that any external actors' activities should be thoroughly contextualized, paying particular attention to the politics of security. The second requirement is for some level of reality to guide our interactions with hybrid institutions.

Regarding the security sector in BiH, the situation is not as optimistic as it should be, as it was previously presented. The security sector must be completely reformed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The situation necessitates the assistance of organizations from the international community that are in charge of carrying out the Dayton Peace Accords. As of right now, international professionals have been the primary reform pioneers, with minimal support from domestic experts within the nation (BiH).

The state's exclusive use of force across its territory is therefore established, regardless of the capability or efficacy of the Bosnian security sector. Bosnia's security situation is largely steady and has significantly normalized, according to Stiftung (2020). After the brutal fighting in the early 1990s, such accomplishment stands on its own. But Bosnia's continuous inability to successfully administer and guarantee the security of all its residents is hampered by the intricacy of vertically and horizontally divided competencies and persistent politicization.

The existence of parallel power structures, which was identified as the primary issue impacting the legitimacy of the Bosnian security sector, is another significant factor worth addressing. All facets of the security sector were proven to be burdened by political interference, rampant corruption, and stalemate between the three competing ethnic structures. There is much need for improvement in the Bosnian security sector's accountability, transparency, and responsiveness.

The provision of security support for the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina served as a powerful illustration of the critical role that security sector reform plays in the realization of peace. At the end of the war, there was a security gap that involved both military and civilian security. While the civilian security gap had to be closed over a longer period and had to become self-sustaining, the military security gap was quickly covered.

Complete self-sustainability always entails having access to sufficient financial resources to carry out lofty concepts, and it was in this area that the international

community's security aid in the form of financial support would be needed for some time to come. Filling the gap was crucial, even though the method had to be incremental; failure might be fatal. The unfilled security gap would operate as a conflict-generator and erode the authority of law and order, rather than increasing public security and the populace's trust in its law enforcement institutions, as Bildt underlines (1998, p. 392)

In a nutshell, the Bosnian populace was likely to take issues into its own hands, whether it be against another person, another ethnic group, or the government, if it found no relief in local police forces and other institutions of the court system. Any of these activities has the potential to shift the fragile balance from peace to conflict. Additionally, a military confrontation was imminent given that ethnic tensions caused the last significant security gap, according to Bardos (1999, p.2).

In conclusion, the fact that the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace process started to move forward in late 1998 was a result of the international community's long-overdue acceptance that it was necessary to work together in undertaking and carrying out obligations and responsibilities. The international community made significant financial contributions to the process of bringing about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially when compared to other conflict-affected regions of the world. Similarly, as other crises, such as the one in Kosovo, worsened, funding was bound to decline, as was mentioned by Knaus and Martin (2003, pp. 60-74). This was especially true when it was tempting for the international community to rest on its honours after the remarkable successes of three years of peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1998.

However, a lack of resources for reform in the security sector prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from permanently consolidating civil security. Choosing how to allocate a few resources is never simple, but persistent lawlessness essentially halted the whole transition from conflict to peace and the difficulty of overcoming the paralysis of fear remains.

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