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I. History and Theory of International Relations

Ioan HORGĂ ⇔ *The perception of the traditional international relations schools representatives on the evolution of World Order after the Post-Cold War*

César García ANDRÉS ⇔ *Territorial Changes on the Romanian-Ukrainian Border between World Wars*

Emilia Nicoleta SCHIOP ⇔ *The Path Toward EU of Serbia*

Dan-Ionuț PETRICA ⇔ *South Africa's Mediation Surrounding the 2008 Elections in Zimbabwe*

THE PERCEPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOOLS REPRESENTATIVES ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD ORDER AFTER THE POST-COLD WAR

*Ioan HORGA**

Abstract. *After 1990 the international society knows two contradictory phenomena, political-military instability, the expansion of the market economy on a global scale, which contributed to the forging of the Post-Cold War Order in which the tendency towards a unipolar and hegemonic system with global dimensions was inevitable in our opinion, entering the first stage of what we called during the study the Global World Order (GWO-1). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these contradictory evolutions are amplified, on the one hand, by the rising of strong global economies, which compete with the USA (China, India, EU, Japan, Brazil, South Africa) and on the other, by the signs of returning to the international scene of Russia, which claimed the legacy of the place occupied in the great international politics by the Soviet Union, to which are added the political-military ambitions of China and India. To all these are added the challenges that climate change has on the whole of international relations.*

Or this stage of the evolution of Post-Cold War Order as a global order no longer responds to the characteristics of the first stage (GWO-1), based on unipolarity, so it is necessary to introduce a new concept, which reflects these evolutions, namely the second stage- the Global World Order (GWO-2).

In this research we tried to see how these evolutions are perceived by the main representatives of the traditional schools of international relations - realists and liberals: first, how are these transitional evolutions perceived from GWO -1 to GWO-2, and secondly, how GWO -2 is perceived and finally what are the options regarding GWO -2.

Keywords: *Post-Cold War Order, Global Word Order (GWO- 1; GWO -2), realists, liberals, unipolar, multilateral, Post-Cold War Order, international agenda*

The fall of the Berlin Wall not only ended bipolarism in international relations, the specific feature of international relations after WWII, but also marked the rise of the international order built after World War I, that is, the Old World Order (OWO).

The international order is understood according to the theoretical movement to which the author belongs. For example, for an appreciated theorist of liberalism, G. John Isenberg, the international order is “explicit principles, rules, and institutions that define the core relationship between the states that are party to the order” (Ikenberry, 2001: 23). Instead, for realists, the international order is “an organized group of international

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institutions that help govern the interactions among the member statesan order does not necessarily include every country in the world” (Mearsheimer, 2019: 9).

In an attempt to give a comprehensive definition of the international order, but at the same time dynamic and functional, Charles L. Glaser, believes that "any international situation could be qualified as an international order, as long as its members accept the sovereignty norm” (Glaser, 2019: 55).

The last decade of the twentieth century marked the entry at large-scale of the international society into the era of globalization, characterized, on the one hand, by the state of turbulence, called by James Rosenau "a situation of uncertainty and great tension" (Rosenau, 1999: 50), and on the other, expecting international stability to come from a single center of power; International society enters into a period of contradictory evolutions: anarchy and order, globalization and fragmentation, globalization and heterogeneity, complexity and interdependence.

Most specialists in international relations believe that after 1990 the world became very complex. This change was felt strongly in the years 1990-1991, with the disintegration of the USSR and the Gulf War (1991). But the complexity of today's international society has its origins in the transformations that took place in the world during the seventies (the economic revival of Europe and Japan, as well as the rise of transnational actors) and the eighties (the modification of the economic processes, derived from globalization and the emergence of the problem of the environment). These transformations took the form of variables, which influenced the bipolar relations between the USA and USSR. The disappearance of this bipolarity has led to important changes in the international agenda, especially in the military field and later in other areas, such as the economic, global and environmental agenda.

First, the end of the Cold War, which ended bipolarism, represented a favorable framework for the emergence of an area dominated by chaos, unsafe areas, or gray areas. These spaces resulted as a consequence of the evolution of the modern state towards decentralization, the disappearance of the monopoly of violence and the disintegration of states by creating structures on ethnic criteria. For example, the erosion of the state in Africa has made some authors to talk about failed states (Cooper, 2000). The disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, both federal states, created, at the end of the war, an ample space of conflicts, which amplified the meaning of the notion of failed states.

Secondly, globalization has influenced the new wars. The impact of globalization was evident in the actors of the wars - foreign soldiers, expatriate volunteers, officials of United Nations agencies, peacekeeping troops - as well as their economic factors - the illegal trade in weapons, drugs, valuables or human beings. The impact of globalization has led to the change of the international rules established previously, these rules not protecting the civilian population, but being involved in conflicts - paramilitary groups or mafia groups.

Third, globalization has led to the formation of "gray areas", areas that have become very important in the evolution of international relations. These gray areas have maintained violence in the conflict zone, at the base of which are illegal trafficking and terrorist movements. The areas in the vicinity of potential outbreaks of new conflicts, such as the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Andean America and Africa (Moreau Defarges, 2002: 69), are strictly supervised through preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace stabilization.

This World Order entered after 1990 has an important attribute, it is global, becoming in our opinion the Global World Order (GWO). Only GWO becomes one with unipolar or hegemonic tendencies. In fact, these trends have been emphasized by a number of authors, even before 1990. As a result of the US rise after World War II, many authors believe that we are facing a new unipolar logic. Robert Gilpin considers that the US, after 1945, has acquired the status of "hegemonic power" (Galpin, 1981). Raymond Aron assigns the US the epithet of "imperial republic", with references to the left representatives of the American school of international relations, George Liska and Hary Magdoff (Liska, 1967; Mogdoff, 1969), but also the analysis of American diplomacy from 1945-1972 (Aron, 1973).

GWO, developed for two decades, shows- besides the concentration with unipolar tendencies- an increasingly visible fragmentation. If the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe was fundamental on the logic of continuity, this represented the disappearance of the fracture between East and West and a strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Instead the rise of South Africa, China, Brazil, India, Russia, South-East Asia, is perceived, on the one hand, as a sign of fragmentation, and on the other hand as a sign of regionalization. The rise of these states will increasingly mark the orientation of the GWO towards a multipolar world, which is getting the size of the emergence in the opinion of specialists and practitioners in international relations, to underline, on the one hand, the dissolution of the global power of the USA, and on the other hand the rise of other competitors.

Given that this second phase of the World Order is not only an alternative to the GWO, but the opposite of it, we are in a position to clarify the two stages of the GWO, so that conceptually they can be easily separated. Considering that GWO is related to the explosion of new information and communication technologies, we believe that we are not mistaken if we say that from 1990 until 2008/10 we have the GWO-1 stage. After 2008/2010 the world entered the GWO-2 stage.

Starting from the above-mentioned aspects, in this paper we will follow the way in which the perception of the representatives of the main traditional schools of international relations - the realists and the liberals - has evolved, in order to be able to respond theoretically to the dynamical changes produced in the world with the transition to GWO-2. In order to be able to answer the central question of the paper in the pages that follow, we will first review the global political changes produced after 2008; Secondly, we are looking to see how these mutations were perceived by the traditional IR theories.

1. From GWO1 to GWO2

In the context of the tensions between democracy and totalitarianism, most authors consider that globalization and fragmentation have manifested themselves especially after the end of the cold war (Clark, 1998). In fact, these globalization/fragmentation tensions appeared long before 1989. A first aspect of this phenomenon is the planetary expansion of values and technology, which stimulated the will of individualization, translated into the defense of their own identities, and in some cases it reached self-determination spurts, as in the USSR or Yugoslavia. As well, these globalization/fragmentation tensions also appeared in the context of the processes of regional economic integration, a fact illustrated by the multiplication of regional trade agreements.

In all directions of the planet, regionalism is present, from European economic and monetary integration, to the free trade area of North America, to similar processes in South America and Africa. But there is another reality - the regionalization of world trade is concentrated in the triangle of Western Europe, North America and East Asia, with China's admission to the World Trade Organization. In other words, trade between these regional blocks and within them represents more than $\frac{3}{4}$ of the world trade.

This planetary imbalance causes a large part of the world's population to be excluded from the benefits of globalization, which causes profound division and, consequently, a vigorous dispute. Therefore, we can say that globalization is a universal process, which is expressed in an irregular manner and which creates tensions, but also repositions.

The shift from the global order Post-Cold War (GWO-1), concentrated around the US, to the world order of the beginning of the second millennium (GWO-2) was made by the appearance on stage of phenomena and political events with major impact.

For example, the appearance of BRICS did not immediately mean a fact with an impact on the international scene. This block of the big emerging powers (Chatin, Gallarotti, 2018; Xing, 2016; Santino, et al. 2018) will enter the scene, on the one hand, against the backdrop of the American political scene during the Obama administration, and on the other, by trying to create economic-financial alternatives to the Bretton – Woods system and to the existing telecommunications system. Thus, in July 2014, in the context of the BRICS summit in Fortaleza (Brazil), the foundations of New Development Bank were set, and subsequently, in 2015, the initiative of creating the American IT monopoly challenge was launched, which was materialized in 2019, by signing the agreement of cooperation in the field of Information and Communication Technology.

Secondly, Russia puts an end to its decline as a Great Power, on the one hand, through interventions in the Near Abroad space by virtue of the principles - national self-determination, strategic needs based on geopolitics, and historical rights (Forsberg, Makinen, 2019: 214), here including intervention in favor of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Dombas and the annexation of Crimea, which sentimentally creates the idea of Russia as a great revisionist power. According to Richard Sakwa this neo-revisionism "is not the attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of international order but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms" (Sakwa, 2017: 131).

On the other hand, Russia is present in major crises with regional implications in the Middle East (war in Syria) and in Latin America (the crisis in Venezuela), but also in international agendas (influence in certain Central and Eastern European states and in the Balkans etc). For example, the intervention in Syria aimed to have an instrumental value for perception of Russia as an actor (rising power) in international system on the normative level (Pieper, 2019: 366).

In 2013, China launched the One Belt on Road Strategy, which is one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in history, covering more than 68 countries. In fact, the launch of this initiative has in our opinion a double meaning. On the one hand, it marks China's shift from regional power to global power, with the entry into a competitive tandem not only economically, but politically with the US. On the other hand, the project invites the USA to develop and manage projects of global scale. Moreover, by launching Asia Bank for International Investments in 2017, to which some European countries have joined, an alternative to the current financial system, which is based in the USA, is wanted.

This Chinese initiative has created uneasiness, on the one hand, among the states of East and South East Asia, allies of the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, but also among neighboring states, such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. On the other hand, the USA are surprised by this initiative and by China's military ambitions in the South China Sea, one of the busiest maritime areas of the globe.

The entry of India and Brazil into the top 10 of World Economic Power is another significant mutation within the GWO-1, which causes the political and economic scene to multiply beyond the traditional configuration - unipolar, bipolar or pentapolar .

After the end of the cold war and a short period of U.S. unipolarity, the international order is now believed to be gradually shifting towards an Asian-centric multipolar order (Wojczewski, 2016: 184). India promoting a vision Nonalignment 2.0, suggests that can lead by “the power of its example” (Wojczewski, 2016: 185; Satish, 2012), and the colonial subjugation serves for the Hyper-nationalist discourse as the most important source for the articulation of an Indian national identity (Wojczewski, 2016: 201). For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the ‘Western’ inclination towards expansionism and imperialism has not ceased with the end of colonialism, but it is said to continue to shape the policies of ‘Western’ societies and states, in particular of the United States as the dominant power in the world. Hyper-nationalist discourse demands must become militarily strong to stand its ground (Ibidem: 188).

In fact, the rise of Brazil, India and South Africa as the first power poles of the southern hemisphere came to fruition in 2003 when the IBSA group was created as an alternative far from the USA and the EU. IBSA, as one of the main platforms of South-South cooperation, is one of the most notable developments in international politics during the first decade of the twenty-first century (Della Costa Stuenkel, 2014).

These evolutions of these regional powers to the status of great powers come not only to challenge US supremacy, but to constitute alternatives not only to this, but also to the liberal democratic order model and the Atlantic power system (includes NATO and the EU). These emerging powers consider that the liberal democratic order destroyed the international legal order established after the Second World War by the UN, where the key element is sovereignty, and which is replaced with global order without borders.

In fact, the decline of the liberal democratic order in the world, in the stage we call GWO-1, is also due to the intra-Euro-Atlantic space developments, especially after the economic-financial crisis that affected this space having, especially on the economies of the emerging states, a limited impact or no impact.

For example, the EU, after the success of its expansion to the east, after which it became the third demographic pole of the planet, with over half a billion inhabitants and the second economy of the world, for a short period of time, plunged since the end of 2008 in the most complicated economic crisis in its history, after that of 1929-1933. The inability of Brussels to find community solutions to the problems brought by the crisis, especially of Greece's sovereign debt crisis, and also of Italy and Portugal, began to sow domestic mistrust, which weakened the international credibility of the EU. To these are added a succession of crises affecting the EU, the crisis of insecurity of Eastern Border (Ukraine and Moldova), refugee crisis, Brexit and sovereignty and illiberal movement (Hungary, Poland). These domestic issues have hampered the EU's ability to second the US in promoting democratic liberal order to a GWO, and at the same time being a strong alternative force for sound argument in favor of liberal democratic order.

The US elections in the fall of 2016 and Donald Trump's victory, on the one hand, will dig a growing gap between the US and its Western European allies, bringing the Euro-Atlantic system into crisis and giving emerging powers the opportunity to be increasingly dynamic in shaping a new international order which, in our opinion, will be a global order too, but in which more models will coexist, a multiple global world order.

Theorists and international relations analysts have not overlooked these developments, some of them have highlighted trends that will be confirmed over the years, others have had the power to pay close attention to what is happening, others have synthesized these developments in long duration, which gives consistency to these assertions. These above mentioned features are specific to traditional theorists in international relations. The way in which the traditional territories have perceived the changes of the international order in the GWO-1 stage and the GWO-2 rise will be discussed in the next chapter.

2. Perception of GWO-2 rise by traditional international relations theories

From the beginning of the twenty-first century it has become evident that the world is fragmented, on the one hand, into regional blocks, having in the European Union a coagulation model between the states in a geographical area, by creating increasingly obvious conditions of interdependence, and on the other hand, by the rise or returning to the international scene of some great powers - Russia, China, India, Brazil etc. This phenomenon which, on the one hand, tends to transcend the model of the Westphalian world order, based on recognized sovereignty and borders, on the other hand tends to create, in the ascending global order regional, entities that seek to preserve traces of the Westphalian model too, but also to ensure a limited level of supranationality.

2.1. The beginning of the challenge

Or these phenomena have come to the attention of many authors belonging to the traditional schools of International Relations. The first signal is given by the Copenhagen School, which conceptualises another architecture regarding International Security. Between the national and international levels of security, the members of this school distinguish the level of regional security. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever shape in *Regions and Powers. Structure of International Security* for the first time a global suborder, based on Regional Security Complexes (Buzan, Waever, 2003).

In a note similar to the one given by the Copenhagen School, but with arguments that come from the economic sphere, technology and foreign investment, domestic and international security, and cultural diplomacy and popular culture, Peter J. Katzenstein positions himself towards those that support the persistence of the nation-state, as well as towards those who support the inevitable march of globalization (Katzenstein, 2015; Payne, 2004). According to G. John Ikenberry, Katzenstein's work *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* claims that "world politics is built around regions that have been deeply influenced by the United States' postwar "imperium." Both Asia and Europe exhibit what Katzenstein calls "porous regionalism," an openness that is reinforced by growth in cross-border exchanges and global transformations in interstate relations" (Ikenberry, 2005).

The two above-mentioned works will pave the way for the rise of a new field of studies in International Studies-Regional Studies- which will reach a considerable explosion after 2003, both from the perspective of the studies regarding the evolution of different regions of the world, as well as of a new type of relations - interregional relations

(Manea, 2004: 369-396; Acharya, 2004: 239-275; Carrapatoso, 2011: 177-194; Rüländ, Bechle, 2010: 157-176) , which will strengthen the idea of fragmenting the global order (Hänggi, Rolloff, Rüländ, 2006; Baert, Scaramagli, Soderbaum, 2014), but also the coagulation of a network of regions that will be recognized as a voice in the new global order (Rüländ, 2014: 28).

Another perception that announces the transformation of GWO-1, the one dominated by American hegemony, comes from the realist theorists' area. On the one hand, we will see very active neorealist theorists. They are mainly representatives of defensive realism, Kenneth Waltz's faithful followers, with his Theory of International Politics, when he argues that the anarchic nature of the relationship system encourages states to undertake defensive and moderate policies, defensive realists - Robert Jervis (Jervis, 1997) or Stephan Walt offer a "cold"perspective on the international realities, in which affirmative powers exist and are emerging, which can reshape the balance of powers. For example, Stephan Walt, in Taming American Power: the Global Response to U.S. Primacy (Walt, 2006) raises the question that the assertion of new powers would question not only America's ability to meet its foreign policy goals, but would threaten American supremacy.

John Mearsheimer, theorist of offensive realism, offers in Tragedy of Great Power Politics a very clear perspective of the evolutions that took place on the international stage in the direction of transformations of the existing world order, considering that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power because international society creates multiple unforeseen situations. This is why Mearsheimer considers that "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 35).

The prospect of a new global international order, different from that of the years 1990-2008, where US supremacy is frankly discussed, can be found in the works of the younger representatives of classical neorealism, especially Fareed Zakaria with his work The Post-American World (Zakaria, 2008). Zakaria presents the perspectives of a world in which the United States will no longer dominate the global economy, orchestrate geopolitics, or overwhelm cultures. He considers the "rise of the rest" (China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey etc.) as a reset of the world. How should the United States understand and thrive in this rapidly changing international climate? What does it mean to live in a truly global era? These are the questions to which Zakaria gives very courageous answers.

Also from the same scale of classic neorealism are Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, with their World Outof Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008). The book is considered the most comprehensive analysis to date of the United States' use of power in pursuit of its security interests. The authors examine arguments from each of the main international relations theories - realism, institutionalism, constructivism and liberalism. They also cover the four established external constraints on the U.S. security policy - international institutions, economic interdependence, legitimacy, and balancing. The prevailing view is that these external constraints conspire to undermine the value of US primacy, greatly restricting the range of security policies the country can pursue. But, in their opinion, so far the international environment does not tightly constrain the U.S. security policy.

1.2. The turning period: 2005-2010

The international landscape knows a turning moment from the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century until the middle of the second decade. For a number of authors the year 2010 is an important milestone in this passage (Mearsheimer, 2019: 28).

On the one hand, there is a certain fatigue of the liberal order, dominated by American hegemonism in the context of the effects of the economic-financial crisis, of an American withdrawal in the face of international challenges under the Obama administration. The two pillars of the liberal order, the US and Europe, though embarked on an ambitious plan to have not only a solid security space through NATO, but also a trans-Atlantic market, by starting negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), will be on stand-by again. With the Trump administration's coming, all these steps have been blocked. In a succession of crises, the European Union can no longer support the US in the management of international affairs; The EU believes in multilateral solutions to solving international crises, as opposed to the American vision.

On the other hand, China's economic rise, its plans in the South China Sea and the launch of the One Belt One Road strategy, Russia's return to the international scene, the rise of India and Brazil and South Africa entering the scene as a great power on the African mainland, all come to question the model of the liberal international order, bringing back into the discussion the Westphalian order, but within a new framework.

These developments will undermine the consistency and image of the post-Cold War world order, but at the same time they will challenge GWO1, which has increasingly been challenged by the center or unipolar order by the rise of emerging powers.

Or all these evolutions will have an echo in the analysis of all Western schools of international relations. Their approaches will bring to light the need for a correction of the global international order to adapt to these evolutions, that is, the entry into a new phase of the global world order, namely GWO-2.

2.2.1 Realism announces the end of GWO-1 and the need to move to GWO-2

Not only does the school of realism maintain the same criticism of the Liberal International Order, as a challenge to American unipolarity emerges, but it becomes more and more dynamic. According to G. Ikenberry, a liberal analyst, realist authors have begun to focus on the rise of China, invigorating the debate on 'power transitions'. Generally speaking, realists offered relatively contingent theoretical accounts of the rise of China (Ikenberry, 2009: 215).

Of course we cannot avoid in this framework the perspective given by one of the most prominent realistic author, but also a practitioner, Henry Kissinger, who in the work *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (Kissinger, 2014), makes a solid analysis of the types of order in Europe, in the Islamic world, in the United States of America and Asia, with particular reference to China.

Henry Kissinger considers that the current world order must rely on the balance of power and competing national desires between status quo states, such as the US, EU, Russia, China and Islamic states.

He considers that "Asian regional order" is different from European order, and constantly requires "outside powers," especially the US as an "integral feature" (Ibidem: 209). Kissinger believes China's rise can cause disruption to the world order, when he states that "China explicitly states, and all other key players implicitly, the option of military force in the pursuit of core national interests. Military budgets are rising. National rivalries, as in the South China Sea and North Asian waters, have generally been

conducted with nineteenth-century European diplomacy methods"(Ibidem: 179). Therefore, in Kissinger's opinion, the rise of China is a potential threat to "world order." He compared the current situation with the one that emerged after World War II, when Japan from the US adversary became an ally of it " (Ibidem: 175).

The future world order, according to Kissinger, must rely on a subtle balance of restraint, force, and legitimacy. In relation to China, the US must combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership. A purely military definition of the balance will shade into confrontation. A purely psychological approach to partnership will raise fears of hegemony. Wise statesmanship must try to find that balance " (Ibidem: 233).

From what is seen Kissinger prefers to insist that US and China represent two pillars of the future world order, giving them the responsibility to work for their common interests, beyond the underlying divergences, related to the spread of democratic values, the situation in the South China Sea and North Korea.

The realists' perception of the current world order - seen either in the broad perspective of the Liberal International Order (Kundnani, 2017: 1-9), which is in effect since World War II, or in a narrower perspective, as the Liberal Hegemonic (Welton, 2019) (Unipolar) Order - is increasingly more critical.

John Mearsheimer and Stephan Walt, who at the beginning of the twenty-first century announced the inevitable changes in the liberal world order or GWO-1, as we all agree, have increasingly strong arguments for the decline of the US Primacy (Walt, 2018) or the failure of this Dream (Mearsheimer, 2018) nearly two decades after these forecasts.

Stephan Walt, in *The Hell of Good Intentions*, places the US decline externally in one of its repeated feuds and blunders of the foreign policy establishment, and its hegemonic liberalism promoted by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. Walt believes that US foreign policy failed because it lacked the best expertise or was the result of mistakes in understanding how the international world works in its dynamics. Since the end of the Cold War, Republicans and Democrats alike have tried to use the U.S. power to spread democracy, open markets, and other liberal values into every nook and cranny of the planet.

Walt asserts that their recurring failures are a big reason why Donald Trump was elected. He had promised to end the misguided policies of the foreign policy "Blob" . But his erratic and impulsive style of governing, combined with a deeply flawed understanding of world politics, are making a bad situation worse.

In Walt's opinion U.S. foreign policy should look like a return to the realist strategy of including offshore balancing in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which eschews regime change, nation-building, and other forms of global social engineering. It is necessary to bring back diplomacy, and making peace a priority. He addresses leading objections to these ideas and calls on politicians Republicans and Democrats to deliver the foreign policy that the majority of Americans want and deserve. In conclusion, Walt requires abandoning the futile quest for liberal hegemony and building a foreign policy establishment with a more realistic view of American power.

John Mearsheimer believes that US efforts to impose liberal democracy and a neo-liberal economy on all sovereign nation-states are "the best example of "liberal interventionism" (Mearsheimer, 2018) in the Global World Order (GWO-1). The great delusion of US foreign policy is that it is possible to function as a de facto form of world government (Welton, 2019). Mearsheimer thinks this delusory, perhaps insane, project

presses the liberal hegemonists to develop "deep-seated antipathy toward illiberal states" (Mearsheimer, 2018).

Mearsheimer believes that respect for sovereignty is the most significant norm in international politics and its purpose is to minimize war and facilitate peaceful relations between states. This means, fundamentally, that nation-state have "the ultimate authority" (Colgan, Keohane, 2017: 42) over events inside one's border and that foreign powers have no right to interfere in their politics (Mearsheimer, 2018: 158-159).

From the point of view of our analysis regarding the fact that after 2010 we witnessed the end of the post-Cold War, unipolar order, which we called the Global World Order (GWO-1) and at the beginning of a period of turning in the international order, in which there are several powerful states, John Mearsheimer's position is more systematic in the article *Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order* (Mearsheimer, 2019: 7-50).

According to Mearsheimer, the Liberal International Order put itself into question. On the one hand, it eroded by itself its actions, resulting in the development of hegemonic liberalism. On the other hand, the Liberal International Order not only created its own enemies, but strengthened and allied them.

First of all, intervening in the politics of countries to turn them into liberal democracies, considers Mearsheimer, "is extremely difficult, and attempting such ambitious social engineering on a global scale is virtually guaranteed to backfire and undermine the legitimacy of the enterprise itself" (Ibidem: 30). It is encouraged, on the one hand, nationalism in these target states, and on the other, states that fear regime change — or other forms of U.S. interference — will band together for mutual support and seek ways the United States' liberal agenda (Ibidem).

Second, through these evolutions in the Liberal International Order space, 'conditions that lead to serious political problems regarding sovereignty and national identity within the liberal democracies themselves' were created by amplifying nationalism, which is far from dead even in avowedly liberal societies' (Ibidem).

Finally, the globalization, which in Mearsheimer's opinion reaches the level of hyperglobalization, which is the economic product of the Liberal International Order, had very important economic costs, which affected large parts of the population within the liberal democracies, including the sole pole. Those costs, including lost jobs, declining or stagnant wages, and marked income inequality, have serious domestic political consequences, which further undermine the liberal international order. Moreover, the open international economy helped fuel China's rise, which, along with Russia's revival, eventually undermined unipolarity, an essential condition for creating a liberal international order (Ibidem).

And as a result of these developments with the rise of China and Russia's return, the international system has become multipolar, which is a death knell for the liberal international order (Ibidem: 42) and especially with the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House, who no longer wants to continue with liberal practices in the stability of the world, under these conditions the danger of American hegemonism continuing, in a unipolar agnostic modal order.

According to Mearsheimer, the order that can ensure, through the balance of powers, peace, stability and prosperity (where the problem of climate change must be a serious option) will be one in which three different realist orders in the foreseeable future will coexist: a thin international order and two thick bound orders - one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy work efficiently

[...] In essence, the institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. The two bound orders, in contrast, will be primarily concerned with waging security competition against each other, although they will call for promoting cooperation among the members of each order. There will be significant economic and military competition between those two orders that will need to be managed, which is why they will be thick orders (Mearsheimer, 2019: 44).

From what has been analyzed so far, it follows that the realistic authors unanimously agree that the post-Cold War international order in a broad sense (which we call the Global World Order–GWO 1), and which is dominated by hegemonic liberalism, is at an end (Wright, 2017).

The arguments of these scholars are multiple.

First, the post-Cold War Order does not include all of the major powers by inward looking. This order is only between the states that have members of the order and not the interactions between these states and those that are opponents of this order (Glaser, 2019: 64). In other words, the post-Cold War Order does not cover the whole world, but only the transatlantic area, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Second, China, India, Russia etc. are not part of this order. For example, China is not a democracy, and it is not a member of the United States' security alliances in Asia; indeed, China is now the target of these alliances. The binding and hierarchy arguments, therefore, do not apply to China. China was, however, increasingly integrated into the international economy, including the WTO, during this period; economic interdependence between the United States and China has grown dramatically (Ibidem: 65).

Finally, especially in the last three years, it is observed that crucial foreign policy challenges arise less from problems between countries than from domestic politics within them (Colgan, Keohane, 2017: 42). Under these conditions, there is increasing pressure for the US, on the one hand, to withdraw from various crisis theaters, and on the other, to re-evaluate the alliances, as is the case with US relations with the European Union.

Representatives of realism offer solutions to move to a new international order. We saw the international order model proposed by John Mearsheimer in which "three different realist orders in the foreseeable future" will coexist: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders- one led by China, the other by the US. In terms of future global order, it depends on the US having to rediscover the Grand Strategy, which means the broad policies - military, diplomatic, and economic - that have been pursued to achieve its vital interests (Silove, 2018: 27-57; Posen, 2014). Grand Strategy appeared with the beginning of the Cold War when the US introduced containment for protecting Western Europe from the Soviet Union (Glaser, 2019: 84). In this regard, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue, "The United States' ability to exercise leadership over the existing order is not a function of its economic size but also partly of its forward security position and associated alliances" (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2016: 159-165).

Adopting the Grand Strategy is driven by several factors. First, China and Russia have begun balancing, even though the Liberal International Order was open to them. For more than a decade, it has become increasingly clear that China is building conventional and nuclear forces designed to reduce the U.S. military capabilities (Glaser, 2019: 76).

Second, the Liberal International Order discourse is a source of significant confusion about both the evolution of global politics and U.S. policy (Ibidem: 82).

Third, the United States should be reconsidering whether to preserve its international commitments and exploring how best to achieve its fundamental interests in the decades ahead (Ibidem: 83; Friedman, Rapp-Hooper, 2018: 7-25).

Forth, by viewing the Liberal International Order as an unalloyed good, U.S. leaders risk failing to appreciate fully that adversaries of the United States view central pillars of the Liberal International Order - its alliances, in particular - as a source of competition and threat (Glaser, 2019: 83).

Finally, identify the full spectrum of broad options for achieving U.S. security and prosperity, ranging from neoisolationist policies that would terminate U.S. alliances to global hegemony that requires intense military and economic competition with China (Ibidem). If the United States retains its security commitments in East Asia and Chinese economic growth continues, then, for the foreseeable future, the world will not be the liberal hegemony. Instead it will be a non-liberal, non-hegemonic world (Ibidem: 85-86).

In conclusion, the representatives of realism carried out a broad criticism of GWO -1, by not adapting to the transformations of the international reality and offered solutions to assert a new, more comprehensive world order, which we designate as GWO- 2. This order has the same characteristic of being global, but in which a liberal order, an illiberal order and a revisionist order will coexist. The GWO-2 key in the opinion of the realistic school represented on the one hand, the balance of powers, the hierarchy and confrontation, and on the other, the economic interdependence and convergence arguments between the great powers.

2.2.2. Liberals defend the GWO-1

To the Liberal school, which theoretically constructed the ideas that underpinned the concept of the Liberal International Order in general, but especially the Post-Cold War liberal order, we owe after 2004-2005 an entire defense program not only to the Liberal International Order, but in our opinion, of the model we propose for the debate, the Global International Order -1.

Here it is appropriate to discuss a little bit about the relationship and difference between the Post-Cold War order and the Global International Order -1. The first is a stage of the Liberal International Order, characterized as liberal hegemonism or unipolar order by realists. In the vision of liberal thinking, the Post-Cold War order has evolved almost as a necessary imperative assumed to a unipolar world order (Nye, 2002) dominated by a great power by soft means (Nye, *Soft Power: The Means*, 2004; Nye, *Soft Power and American ...*, 2004: 255-270).

Regarding the Global International Order -1 we consider that it is a stage in the evolution of the world order from the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, in which the Post-Cold War Liberal Order coexists with remnants of the bipolar order in the transformation process, with political-economic dynamics in the EU, with great powers that are re/affirmed on the international stage, as competing poles (China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa etc). In addition, this order also responds to the economic, social and cultural effects of globalization and the impact of developing new communication and information techniques (Nye, *Power ...*, 2004).

Following the views of the creators of the new school of liberalism (neo-liberalism), Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. on the Post-Cold War global order (Keohane, Nye, 2004: 191-200), which, in our opinion, subsumes the idea of a global international order (GWO-1), the following aspects are to retain.

First, after 1990 we have to deal with a partially globalized international order (Keohane, 2002: 245-271) in which networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances (Keohane, Nye, 2004: 191) operate and which, unlike the previous period, in the opinion of the founders of neo-liberalism, knows a higher density of networks, the velocity of information flows (Ibidem: 196), the institutional velocity, transnational participation and complex interdependence.

Under the pressure of these elements, in the opinion of the neoliberal authors, the world order after 1990 has become more open, more interdependent and more confident. But with Keohane and Nye observing, this order is not uniform, as "the filters provided by domestic political and political institutions play a major role in determining what effects globalization really has and how well various countries adapt to it" (Keohane, Nye, 2004: 198). Therefore the system of sovereign states is likely to continue as the dominant structure in the world, which made the Post-Cold War a fragmented order.

Secondly, after 1990, a redistribution of powers began to occur in the world order, but this was misinterpreted, argues Joseph S. Nye Jr in *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, while if power distribution on military issues was unipolar, it made no sense to use traditional terms such as unipolarity and hegemony to describe the distribution of power on economic and transnational issues where the United States needed the help of others to achieve its preferred outcomes (Nye, 2002).

Third, the emergence of non-state actors, especially NGOs, but especially terrorist groups, has changed the liberals' view of unipolarity and hegemony. The successes achieved by the US in Afghanistan and in the uprising of Saddam Hussein, facing opposition from the UN Security Council and opposition from the great powers of the EU, France and Germany, have brought temptation into American politics for more control in the world. But the US, although compared to an imperial power, does not actually have the levers to be an imperial power and would not be desirable in the first place by the US itself (Nye, *Power ...*, 2004: 6-7). However, to clarify these metaphors about imperial power, in Nye's opinion "American preponderance of power will generally be more acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of other countries when its policies are embedded in multilateral frameworks. American success in dealing with the new challenges will depend not just on its military and economic might, but on the soft power of its culture and values, and on pursuing policies that make others feel that they have been consulted and their interests taken into account (Ibidem: 8).

Finally, with the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the founders of neoliberalism also seem to be aware of the reality of a crisis of American hegemony through the emergence of great competing powers. Joseph S. Nye Jr, in *The Future of Power*, believes that at the horizon of 2010, the powers are no longer identified in terms of nuclear missiles, industrial capacity, numbers of men under arms, and tanks lined up ready to cross the plains of Eastern Europe. Politics changed, and the nature of power-defined as the ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes you want-had changed dramatically. Power is not static; its story is of shifts and innovations, technologies and relationships.

From the same school of neo-liberalism, but from another perspective, G. John Ikenberry, considers that the Liberal International Order in its (unipolar) hegemonic form had an organizing logic, because the hegemonic factor of the international system "altered the anarchic character of international order, creating opportunities for more open and rule-based relationships" (Ikenberry, 2009: 203-219).

States have incentives and opportunities to overcome security dilemmas by 'binding' together in co-operative security pacts. In addition to these logic of order, the incentives for co-operation built into economic interdependence and democratic community, reinforce the liberal character of the system. Liberal states have opportunities and incentives to build non-realistic sorts of international order (Ibidem).

The liberal international order is based on three major pillars - democratic peace, economic interdependence and international institutions - which work together to reinforce and perpetuate stable peace (Ikenberry, 2001).

After 2010 in liberal thinking there is a repositioning, motivated, on the one hand, by an increasingly obvious crisis of American leadership, on the other, by China's entry as a political actor on the global stage, by a revival of Russia, and by autonomous European and South American forms.

The start in formulating critical opinions and proposing solutions is given by G. John Ikenberry in his article *Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order* (Ikenberry, 2009: 71-87) in 2009. Ikenberry raises the question of whether American arrangements can be made - particularly in security cooperation - that provide ways for the United States to remain at the center of a liberal international order. New forms of governance - networks and informal steering groups - will become more important in a post-American-centered liberal international order (Ibidem: 72)..

Ikenberry seeks to reassert liberal thinking from the perspective of international developments from the beginning of the twenty-first century, by re-evaluating the liberal discourse on the Post-Cold War Order, in the sense of a qualitative delimitation on the Liberal International Order, which after 1990 entered the 3.0 era. According to Ikenberry, this order (Liberal Internationalism 3.0) and especially the one that starts to form after 2010, in our opinion, depends, first of all, on universal scope, expanding membership in core governing institutions to rising non-Western states, which would impose a reformed liberal international order more universal and less hierarchical. According to Ikenberry, the United States will have to play a less central role in providing functional services - generating public goods, stabilizing markets, and promoting cooperation (Ibidem: 80).

Second, the new order international concerns legitimate authority and post-Westphalian sovereignty. It must find ways to reconcile more intrusive rules and institutions with legitimate international authority in which various groupings of leading states occupy governing institutions (Ibidem).

Third, the new order expanded rule-based system, coupled with new realms of network-based cooperation. On the one hand, this means that the US and Europe will accept to reduce their share in international institutions, making space for countries such as China, India, Brazil etc. On the other hand, the new international order based on rule of law also brings a review of norms of Westphalian sovereignty and the continuing rise in the notion of a "responsibility to protect" (Ibidem: 81).

Finally, Ikenberry wonders if non-Western countries such as China and India will seek to use their rising power to usher in a substantially different sort of international order (Ibidem: 83).

Ikenburry's forthcoming books and studies will deepen this turn in this perception of world order from different perspectives.

For example, *Liberal Leviathan* (Ikenberry, 2011) shows the connections between the emergence of a largely liberal international system and the concentration of global power in the United States, but Ikenberry shows that this concentration is also corrosive to

the created order. He believes the US must accept competition in the distribution of world power in order to face new challenges.

In Introduction (Ikenberry, 2014: 1-16) to the book *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics*, John Ikenberry brings new clarifications on the changing international order from unipolar (Ikenberry et al. 2011: 1-31) to multipolar (Posen, 2011: 317-341). He considers that "this order itself" is "wider and deeper" than past international orders. Nuclear weapons both determine global war and generate incentives for great powers to negotiate stability in the face of mutual vulnerability. China and other non-Western rising states are putting pressure on the old international order. But China and these other new powers have profoundly complicated and ambivalent relationships with the old American-led liberal order. They are both tied to it and constrained by it. They bring antagonist values and cultural orientations to the old liberal world order. They look at liberal order and, at least to some extent, see a Western-oriented imperial order" (Ikenberry, 2014: 16). Ikenberry concludes that "in all these ways, international order is continuously impacted by forces of continuity and change" (Ibidem).

The shift in the liberal perception of the global order, in which the US-China tandem begins to function, becomes more and more visible towards 2014-2015, when a number of publications appeared focusing either on the moment or on a perspective. Thus, John Ikenberry questions the relationship between the United States, China in the context of the Global Order (Ikenberry, 2015: 1-18) and is convinced that "for decades to come, the United States and China appear uniquely positioned to dominate world politics" (Ibidem: 1). The United States and China are destined to influence and shape the underlying rules and institutions of world order itself.

When Ikenberry states that "the transition away from American 'unipolarity' and growing Chinese capabilities ensure that the world will enter a new moment- perhaps not as dramatic as the one that appeared after World War II, but nonetheless a new moment - when the deep architecture of international order is again open for shaping and reshaping" (Ibidem: 2), we ask ourselves whether this transition has begun or we are in full swing. In our opinion, we are at the beginning of this transition in what we consider to be GWO-2, because, on the one hand, the unipolar American power has to get used to sharing the power and responsibilities with someone else (Mastanduno, 2015: 189-210), and on the other, China, although it is the number one competitor in the economic field for the US, it still does not seem willing to change the status of secondary power with that of main power in the balance of power. Also other great powers will also seek to influence and shape these underlying rules and institutions.

What future international order will look like in the new landscape seems to Ikenberry very clear, because just as the United States and China are uniquely powerful, so too are they uniquely positioned to lead the struggle over the organizing principles and logic of world order in the twenty-first century (Ibidem: 3). Here, in our opinion, things should be more nuanced, given the historical experience of the twentieth century, which has undergone at least three major transformations, so we cannot be sure that for a century the world will only be in bilateral balance, but there will be numerous times when multilateralism will not only be excluded by the two superpowers, but will also be desired for the reset of international order.

Of course, during the current century, Ikenberry considers, the United States and China might clash and compete simply because they have different interests at stake in the

organization of global rules and institutions. They also have different national traditions and values that have and will influence their views of global order.

The approach in the volume *America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions* was also a project to put forward the concept of six international relations theorists in the US and China, to see the divergent particularities and convergent similarities of thinkers in international relations from the two superpowers. Both countries want to be at the center of world politics and both want to remain as autonomous as possible within it (Ibidem: 14).

In the same context of the nuance of the perspective of the role that the US has to play in the new war order (GWO-2), Joseph S. Nye Jr. in the book, *Is American Century Over?* (Nye, 2015), brings arguments to explain why the American century is far from over and what the US must do to retain its leadership in an era of increasingly diffuse power politics. But the US will not be the same. According to Nye America's superpower status may well be tempered by its political dysfunction at home and China's economic boom. He supports his claims that the US remains a very important player in the global order through its military, economic and soft power capabilities that continue to deter its closest rivals for decades to come. He believes that the re-ordering of the world order will take place through two convergent processes, on the one hand through power shifts and on the other, through increasing global complexity, in the sense of interdependence, heterogeneity and fragmentation.

Almost in line with America's need to adapt to the type of leadership required by GWO-2, Ikenberry argues that although we are witnessing the opening of the new opportunities for rising states-China, India, and other non-Western developing countries-to reshape the global order, there are some problems: in what sense will reform or reorganize the rules and institutions of the post-western era; these emerging states will integrate into the existing international order or they will want to transform it into another order and if so, which- one of partner states or one of "revisionist" states (Ikenberry, 2018: 17).

Ikenberry believes that the international Liberal Order will remain intact and the US will remain at the forefront of the leadership, given that they are a "structural power" (Strange, 1988) because they have well-organized security ties, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments (Ikenberry, 2018: 19). The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states (Ikenberry, 2018: 20).

Ikenberry considers that " if the liberal international order endures, it will be because it is based on more than the American hegemonic order. The broader features of the modern international order are the result of centuries of struggle over its organizing principles and institutions. The struggles over the existing international order will reshape the rules and institutions in the existing system in various ways. But rising states are not simply or primarily "revisionist" states seeking to overturn the order; rather, they are seeking greater access and authority over its operation. Indeed, the order creates as many safeguards and protections for rising states as it creates obstacles and constraints (Ikenberry, 2018: 22).

Ikenberry is convinced that, on the one hand, the Liberal International Order will survive because it has the capacity of self-reinforcing due to: its integrative tendencies, offering opportunities for leadership and shared authority, the fact that the current economic gains from participation within the liberal order it is widely shared and not least because it accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development (Ikenberry, 2018: 24-25).

On the other hand, in Ikkenberry's opinion, this order he defends is the one that seems to promote not only a multilateral system of rules and institutions, but offers rising states some measure of protection and equal treatment.

3. Conclusions

Considering that after 1990 the international society entered the historical stage of the Post-Cold War, in which, on the one hand, the international order based on the bipolarity of two ideological systems - the liberal democrat and the communist - disappeared through the triumph of the liberal democratic model, but without essentially encompassing the whole world, and on the other hand, the economic dimension of international society is becoming more and more global, international society is entering a period of contradictory evolutions: anarchy and order, globalization and fragmentation, complexity and interdependence.

The instability in the international society from a politico-military point of view, in conjunction with the expansion of the market economy on a global scale, contributed to the forging of the Post-Cold War Order in which the tendency towards a unipolar and hegemonic system with global dimensions was inevitable in our opinion, entering in the first stage of what we called it during the study - the Global World Order (GWO-1).

But these contradictory evolutions of international society are amplified especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century, on the one hand, by the rise of strong economies at global level, which compete with the USA (China, India, EU, Japan, Brasilia, South Africa) and on the other hand, by the signs of returning to the international scene of Russia, as an heir not only of the military force of the USSR, but also as a claimant of the inheritance of the place occupied in the great international politics of the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the political-military ambitions of China, but also of India. Either in the face of these multiplied evolutions, the US can no longer cope with the position of unipolar power, being forced or to oppose - which is risky in the short term and tiring in the medium and long term - or to share the management of world affairs with these competitors. To all these are added the challenges that climate change has on the whole of international relations.

Or this stage of the evolution of Post-Cold War Order as a global order no longer responds to the characteristics of the first stage (GWO-1), based on unipolarity, so it is necessary to introduce a new concept, which reflects these evolutions, namely the second stage of Global Order (GWO-2), which in our opinion will initially involve the characteristics of a pigmented unipolarity more and more often than multilateral resets.

In the present research we first tried to see how these transition evolutions from GWO-1 to GWO-2 are perceived, secondly, how GWO-2 is perceived and finally what are the options of the main representatives of the schools of traditional international relations - realists and liberals- regarding GWO-2.

Regarding the transition from GWO -1 to GWO-2, Stephan Walt and John Mearsheimer, both critics of unipolarism believe that a new international order that responds to global political realities and which can make space to other great powers must be accepted quickly. By comparison, the representatives of liberalism, especially the founders of neoliberalism Robert O. Kheoane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., consider that the world order after it has become more open, more interdependent and more confident, or precisely this global interdependence, given on the one hand, by the multitude of networks

and, on the other, by the soft way of America to manage business in the world will ensure the continuity of the developed world order Post Cold War, that is GWO-1.

Regarding the perception of GWO-2, for example, Henry Kissinger considers that the present world order must rely on balance power and competing national desires between status quo states, like the US, EU, Russia, China and Islamic states. The same view is shared from a realistic defensive perspective by Stephan Walt, who believes that the U.S. foreign policy should look like a return to the realistic strategy of including offshore balancing in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which eschews regime change, nation-building, and other forms of global social engineering. Even more trenchant is John Mearsheimer, who argues that the Liberal International Order is a failure and must return to the principles of sovereignty in the international order. This order has the same characteristic of being global, but in it will have to co-exist a liberal order, an illiberal order and a revisionist order. The GWO-2 key, in the opinion of the realistic school, represented, on the one hand, the balance of powers, the hierarchy, confrontation, and on the other, the economic interdependence and convergence arguments between the great powers.

For liberals, although the impulse to defend the post-Cold War international order is still felt, G. John Ikenberry's voice greatly clarifies things about the perception of global order since the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Ikenberry believes that the relationship between the United States and China in the context of the Global Order is the key to influence and shape the underlying rules and institutions of world order itself. Even if he accepts that American order is over, Joseph S. Nye Jr believes that America's super power status will be intact for a long time, but that status may well be tempered by its political dysfunction at home and China's economic boom.

Finally, when we stop at the options of the representatives of the traditional schools of international relations about what we have called GWO-2, that is, of an intranational order of the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century and we notice some common elements at these authors, irrespective of the school they come from: USA must give up (realists) to temper (liberals) superpower role; USA to accept (relays) or share (liberals) the management of world affairs with one of the competitors (China - liberals) or with several competitors (realists); the new order will be global in the economic, technological, communication, cultural spheres, but will return to governance in security and political affairs (support the realists); there will be a global order in all spheres of society by continuing to promote democratic values (liberals) etc.

But there are also many interesting shades in GWO-2 management. In the view of the realistic authors, the management of the international affairs goes from the need to combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership from the US with the competitors, especially China (Kissinger), to the need of abandoning the futile quest for liberal hegemony and building a foreign policy establishment with a more realistic view of American power (Stephan Walt) and to coexistence of three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders - one led by China, the other by the United States (Mearsheimer) .

As for the liberals, they believe that the international liberal order will continue, with different shades. For example, in Nye's opinion, it will have to reset itself to respond to two convergent processes: power shifts and increasing global complexity, in the sense of interdependence, heterogeneity and fragmentation. Ikenberry believes that the Liberal International Order will survive because it has the capacity of self-reinforcing due to integrative tendencies, offering opportunities for leadership and shared authority, the fact that the current economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely

shared and not last because it accommodates a diversity of growth and development models and strategies.

Finally, in this analysis, we consider that the stage of the global order in which we find GWO-2 is in the opinion of all the leading representatives of the traditional schools of International Relations a different order of Post-Cold War Order or GWO-1, as we have called it, since everyone believes that American unipolarism must be amended to make space for a new order. The new order that is set up at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century is an order in which not only the promotion of the multilateral system of rules and institutions must take place, but one that offers to a rising state some measure of protection and equal treatment. In a word, GWO-2 will become a Multiple Global World Order.

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TERRITORIAL CHANGES ON THE ROMANIAN-UKRAINIAN BORDER BETWEEN WORLD WARS

*César García ANDRÉS**

Abstract. *This paper will carry out a detailed study related to the change of borders that occurred in Romania and Ukraine from the end of the First World War to the Second World War. In order to understand the territorial changes, the proposal will focus on examining how the borders of both territories with the main Peace treaties were left after the First World War. But undoubtedly the most important issue in this paper is the analysis of the border situation between the two countries after the Second World War. In this sense it is of vital importance to know the contacts that took place with the great powers of the war for the development of the events.*

Keywords: *Ukraine, Romania, borders, First World War, Second World War*

Introduction

From the beginning of the First World War until the end of the Second World War, there were major changes in the borders of most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In this paper we will focus on the case of two neighbouring countries: Romania and Ukraine, in order to see how these two global conflicts affected their current territorial formation. To begin with this historical review, it is necessary to consider the different situation from which each of these countries started at the beginning of the First World War in 1914.

On the one hand, there was Romania, a kingdom ruled by Carol I, and formed at that time by the great regions of Wallachia, Moldavia and Dobrogea. Before the outbreak of the First World War, and as a consequence of the Balkan Wars, the situation with the neighbouring countries was quite complicated, as large territories were disputed with them: with Bulgaria, the Dobrogea¹ area; with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Transylvania; and with the Russian Empire, the region of Bessarabia. Thus, at the start of the war, Romania was in a difficult situation to support both the Triple Entente or Allies —France, Great Britain and the Russian Empire— and the Triple Alliance or also known as Central Powers —Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italy—. Even though, in 1883, under pressure from Bismarck, King Carol I had signed a secret defensive alliance

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¹ After the end of the Russian-Turkish War that took place between 1877 and 1878 and the consequent peace, the former Dobrogea region belonging to the Ottoman Empire was divided into two parts: the northern region was for Romania, while the southern area was established for Bulgaria. After the end of the Second Balkan War with the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913 the southern area belonging to Bulgaria was annexed by Romania.

with the Austro-Hungarian Empire; but only he and a couple of ministers knew of its existence (MacMillan, 2013: 568).

On the other hand, Ukraine, which did not exist as an independent country, since it was divided into two major empires: the western part —Galicia, western Volhynia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia or Transcarpathia and Bukovina— as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and its central and eastern part integrated into the Russian Empire. This separation began in 1773 with the first partition of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, also known as the Republic of the Two Nations. The Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire retained the most populated part, Galicia; Russia with the largest portion of territory and important acquisitions in Polish Livonia and White Russia; and Frederick II obtained Polish Prussia (Black, 2001: 361). Although the part that belonged to the Republic of Two Nations was annexed by the Russian Empire because of the second partition in 1793. However, despite this fragmentation, the declaration of war in 1914 had equal importance for national life on both sides of the Austro-Russian border (Doroshenko, 1962: 568), as it will be detailed in the following sections.

1. Territorial Changes in Romania and Ukraine at the end of First World War

1.1. Romania: from First World War to Greater Romania

Already with the war started and despite the existing alliance between Austria-Hungary and Romania for the mutual defence of these countries in case they were attacked by any of their enemies, Romania declared neutral. Moreover, both within Carol's government and Romanian society, the division between entering the conflict on either side was very resilient. All this together with the temptations they were receiving to enter the war both from the Central Powers, which offered the region of Bessarabia —at that time in the hands of the Russian Empire—, and from the Allies, who promised Romania the territory of Transylvania —with a large Romanian population, but under the domination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—. Therefore, a declaration of neutrality was the only rational choice in view of the situation and the Romanian public opinion, incensed over Transylvania and with Francophile inclinations (Jelavich, 1992: 451).

However, in October 1914 the death of King Carol I took place, and his successor, King Ferdinand I, showed greater sympathy for the Allies influenced by the tendencies of his wife, granddaughter of Queen Victoria and Alexander II of Russia (Lozano, 2011: 233). Thus, after two years of Romanian neutrality in the conflict, on 17 August 1916, the treaty of alliance and the military convention were signed; Romania committed to enter in the war ten days later (Renouvin, 1990: 319). Thus, on 27 August 1916, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary, Germany declared war on Romania on 28 August, and between 30 August and 1st September both Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire joined against the new enemy (Baccaglioni, 2014: 168).

After good initial results in the Transylvania region, the situation in Dobrogea, that is in the southern border with Bulgaria worsened. All this, together with the terrible economic situation that was taking place in Romania, resulted in the Treaty of Bucharest, which was signed on 7 May 1918 and was never be ratified (Renouvin, 1990: 452).

Despite this Treaty, Romania re-entered the war shortly before its end, on 10 November 1918, once again declaring war on the Central Powers by joining the Entente forces advancing from Bulgaria, occupying Wallachia and crossing the Carpathians into Hungarian Transylvania (Lozano, 2014: 514). The first world conflict ended with the victory of the Allies, the disintegration of the Russian Empire and the first steps towards

the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With this outcome, Romania claimed from the Allies the territories that had been promised to it to enter the war on their side.

Thus, the initial incorporation of the territory of Bessarabia into Romania on 27 March 1918 was followed after the end of the armed confrontation: Bukovina on 28 November, through the vote of the Romanian National Council of Bukovina, and finally Transylvania on 1st December, through the Resolution of the Great Assembly of Alba Iulia (ABC, 2018)², as well as part of the Banat region. In this way, all the provinces considered Romanian by the Government became part of Greater Romania, which was supported by the following Peace Treaties:

- Saint-Germain-en-Laye, took place on 10 September 1919 between the victorious Allied Powers in First World War and Austria-Hungary. In which the Kingdom of Austria on the one hand and the Kingdom of Hungary on the other were recognized. In addition, the bases were laid for the cession by Hungary of the regions of Transylvania, part of Banat and the province of Bukovina to Romania—to be confirmed in the Treaty of Trianon.

- Neuilly-sur-Seine, signed on 27 November 1919. In this case the agreement was between the victorious powers and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. By means of this Treaty the region in dispute with Romania, Southern Dobrogea, was to be returned and recognized as an integral part of this country.

- Trianon, was held on 4 June 1920 between the Allies and the Kingdom of Hungary. In this Treaty, the cessions of Hungary to Romania were confirmed and the transfer of Transylvania was made official. A historical moment that the Romanian people considered as an expression of their yearnings and their consciousness of unity, the formation of a single State bringing together all Romanians (Pascu, 1977: 196).

- Paris, in 1920, by which the annexation of Bessarabia to Romania was recognized by the Allies.

Therefore, as a consequence of the Balkan Wars and after the First World War, Romania obtained not only the totality of Dobrogea and Bessarabia, but also Bukovina and Transylvania, with a large part of Eastern Hungary and Banat, thus becoming one of the most important second-order States [...] (Machatschek, 1993: 203).

1.2. Ukraine: from a division between Empires to a division between countries

In the case of Ukraine, the situation was completely different. As seen above, each region of the present state was within one of the great European empires, so they had no choice but to choose sides to enter the war. Thus, during the First World War the current Ukraine fought at the same time on the side of the Central Powers and the Triple Entente (García Andrés, González Martín, Martín de la Guardia, 2017: 67). With the unfolding of the war and after the disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917, the central and eastern parts of Ukraine saw the possibility of achieving independence. For this reason, in November of the same year, the fourth and last universal declared the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic and demanded the convocation of elections to the constituent assembly (Applebaum, 2019: 49). After which, in January 1918, came the Bolshevik

² ABC., <Rumania en la Primera Guerra Mundial> desde este jueves en el Museo del ejército, 22/01/2018, in https://www.abc.es/espana/castilla-la-mancha/toledo/ciudad/abci-rumania-primera-guerra-mundial-desde-este-jueves-museo-ejercito-201801221316_noticia.html, accessed: 13 July 2019.

attack to control the whole territory, but the Ukrainians got the help of the Central Powers. Thus, on 9 February 1918, a first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by Germans, Austro-Hungarians and Ukrainians (Pérez Sánchez, 2016: 507). However, as the war unfolded, this aid declined until January 1919, when a new attack by the Bolsheviks took place.

The same claim had the western region of Ukraine controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but after the beginning of the disintegration of this Empire, the National Council of Ukraine was formed of October 1918 in Lvov. With this institution, the People's Republic of Western Ukraine was created at the end of that year (García Andrés, 2018: 87).

However, both attempts at independence from the central and eastern People's Republic of Ukraine and People's Republic of Western Ukraine were ineffective for a diverse of reasons. Among them, in the central and eastern part due to the situation of Civil War that was living inside the old tsarist territory to impose the Bolshevik authority; and, later, in the western zone, the war that took place between the newly created Poland, —by means of the Treaties of Peace that put an end to the First World War— and the Russian revolutionaries to extend their dominions in the Ukrainian territory.

Thus, an independent Poland prevented the creation of an autonomous Ukraine: it did not seem possible that either of the two Ukrainians visible in 1919 could prosper. Neither the National Republic of Ukraine nor the Western Ukrainian National Republic (Pérez Sánchez, 2016: 508).

In this way, after the signing of the Peace Accords, the situation in Ukraine was reflected as follows in two of the previous Treaties:

- Saint-Germain-en-Laye, through which the old Austrian province of Galicia and western Volhynia passed into Poland. And as mentioned earlier, the region of Bukovina became part of Romania.

- Trianon, in which the Transcarpathian region was handed over to the newly created Czechoslovakia under the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

In the case of Ukraine, account should be taken of the Peace Agreement signed between the Bolsheviks and Poland, which put an end to the conflict, through the 1921 Treaty of Riga, which established the borders between the two States. It was agreed that the so-called Curzon line³, which fixed the border between the two States, should be removed from the Polish border further east, enlarging the Polish territory by a third part (Palmowski, 2002: 177).

2. The Inter-War Period in Romania and Ukraine

2.1. Political situation in Romania (1918-1939)

When the First World War ended, and after the aforementioned Declaration of Alba Iulia of 1st December 1918, the situation to give continuity to the newly formed Greater Romania was affected by the policy of Hungary.

After the beginning of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on 16 November 1918 the People's Republic of Hungary was proclaimed, and on 30 November power was handed over to a National Council presided over by Count Mihály Károlyi (González Calleja, 2017: 167), as a result of the formation of this territory. However,

³ This line of separation left out of the new Poland all the territory that marked the line that went from Grodno, passing through Brest until the south, and arriving at the Carpathians, leaving inside part of the region of Galicia, including Lviv. However, after the Soviet defeat, the imaginary line moved several kilometres to the east, including these regions.

because of to the difficult economic and territorial situation —due to the losses of large regions mainly in favour of Romania— in March 1919 a radical turn in the country's politics took place. At that moment, a socialist government was established in Hungary under the leadership of Bela Kun, whose Hungarian aspirations to recover the lost territory in Romania was maintained until its end in August of the same year (Lozano, 2014: 527). For this reason, in April, Romanian military troops, with the help of others from neighbouring countries, intervened to ensure that these territorial cessions were carried out as soon as possible. Thus, for instance, the process of transferring authority from Hungarian to Romanian in Bihor began with the entry of the Romanian army into Oradea on 20 April 1919 (Zainea, 2019: 27). This confrontation lasted as long as Bela Kun's attempt at a socialist government in Hungary, until August 1919 when Romanians entered in Budapest to evict him from power.

Finally, the territory that had been fixed for the new Romania at the end of the war came under the administration of King Ferdinand I, and was confirmed in the peace treaties. Thus, Romania represented, after 1918, the most important vector of the South-East, given the territorial and international by right situation extremely circles favourable, as well as the extraordinary view, in the political, diplomatic and media of the Royal family (Citiriga, Anghel, 2009: 173). From that moment on, the main problems presented to the Romanian State have been to straighten the economy, to consolidate the State internally, firstly, by the unification of legislation in the whole territory of the country, and externally, the defence of territorial integrity, the maintenance of the post-war status quo (Botar, 1976: 20).

During the 1920s, Romania entered a moment of acceleration in both the industrial and economic fields, and in 1923 a new Constitution was promulgated to support the new State and its rulers. Ferdinand I continued to reign in Romania until 1927 when he died, at which time his grandson, who at that time was a minor, was proclaimed king as Mihai I. This happened because in 1926 Ferdinand's son and heir, Carol, renounced his dynastic rights to the throne. Due to Mihai's minority his grandfather before his death he had prepared a Regency Council to govern until such time as Mihai could accede to the throne. However, this fact generated amongst population some degree of uncertainty, for that reason and with the support of certain sectors of society, Carol returned to Romania and gained power under the name of Carol II, naming his son Mihai as heir to the throne. The situation in Romania in the 1930s suffered a worsening in all economic and political sectors, when in 1938 the civil rights of Jews were annulled and later political parties were outlawed (Rejmer, 2019: 129). Moreover, in order to combat the fascist and Hitlerian danger threatening the national independence and territorial integrity of Romania (Botar, 1976: 21), the so-called Royal Dictatorship was proclaimed in February of the same year, with short-lived and even less effective governments. It was in this situation that Romania found itself on the verge of the outbreak of the Second World War.

2.2. Political situation in Ukraine (1918-1939)

After the new separation of the Ukrainian regions into new states, the situation was completely different in each of them. It should be remembered that, in the 1920s, the present territory of Ukraine was divided into four different countries: Bukovina in Romania, Transcarpathia in Czechoslovakia, Galicia and part of Volhynia in Poland, and the central and eastern part as Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic —Ukrainian SSR—

within the Soviet Union. So, it is necessary to see how was the position of each parts into which was divided the current territory of Ukraine.

Firstly, as for the region of Bukovina during the interwar period, it was immersed in a process of assimilation of the new policies being followed by the newly created Greater Romania, whose situation has already been commented on in previous lines.

Secondly, the Transcarpathian region had been integrated after the peace agreements within the state of Czechoslovakia, which emerged in 1918. Throughout this period until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Czechoslovak government tried to improve the reality of life in this territory. But the situation became more complicated at the end of the 1930s after the German invasion of Austria and the Sudetenland region in Czechoslovak. For this reason and at the request of the Axis powers —Italy and Germany— an agreement was possible between Hungary and Czechoslovakia in order not to reach a conflict between them over territorial possessions. Thus, the first arbitration was reached in Vienna —1938—, by which Hungary recovers a strip inhabited by the Magyars in the south of Slovakia and incorporates Transcarpathia —1939— within its borders (Marín González, 2000: 306). In such a way that this region, before the beginning of the second world conflict was part of Hungary again.

Thirdly, the part that Poland had achieved after the peace treaties, that is to say the region of Galicia and a large part of Volhynia was in a process of assimilation by the population into the Polish lifestyle. However, it was in this territory that certain resistance movements against the Polish government, whose main objective was the independence of Poland, were created during the 1920s. Although these groups initially fought separately and with differentiated actions, from the first Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists held in Vienna in 1929 they agreed to merge, as the delegates voted in favour of the creation of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists —OUN: *Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv*— (Satzewich, 2003: 67). Organization that during the 1930s carried out certain actions against the Polish government and it was be of great importance for the Ukrainian resistance during the Second World War.

Finally, mention should be made of the part in which Ukraine's SSR was created, in which the situation during the interwar period was quite complicated. After the end of the Polish-Bolshevik War and the near end of the Russian Civil War, Ukraine formed, together with other republics —Russia, Belarus and Transcaucasia— a federal state called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics —USSR— (Bilyk, 1958: 175-176), on 30 December 1922. For some time, but especially from then on, Ukrainian SSR was subjected to an intense process of *Ukrainianisation*⁴. During the first moments of the arrival of this new policy by Lenin's government, the population understood it as an attempt to maintain some aspects clearly identified with Ukrainian society. However, little by little the inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR saw that it only represented the need to consolidate socialism in this territory without causing the complaints and demonstrations of the population. This policy came to an end with Lenin's death in 1924, the moment of Stalin's rise to power, with the consequent change in Soviet policies towards Ukraine's SSR. In one way or another, the repression against Ukrainian nationalism and, in general, against Ukrainian national culture intensified especially from 1928 onwards (Cucó, 1999: 276). With the implementation of collectivisation and five-year plans, Stalin's new policy turned to a fierce process of forced sovietisation, which in the 1930s was reflected in a

⁴ Term used to designate certain policies proposed by Lenin's Soviet government to promote certain aspects related to Ukraine such as: culture, language, education...

terrible famine that took place in the country, called *Holodomor*, and in the continuous purges that were carried out among different classes of the population.

3. The Ukrainian-Romanian Border During Second World War

As can be seen from the previous section, during the interwar period the situation was complicated both for Romania and for the Ukrainian population living in different countries to which it belonged. However, the situation worsened with the outbreak of the Second World War.

3.1. Romania: from neutrality to war (1939-1945)

Despite its initial neutrality, Romania was an objective from the first moment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, since Bessarabia was nominated and commercialized by article 3 of the additional secret protocol of the abominable document, the most catastrophic in the entire history of the 20th century (Buzatu, Dumitrescu, 2011: 14), signed days before Germany's invasion of Poland on 1st September 1939. With the beginning of the war, King Carol II tried to maintain Romania's impartiality as much as he could, however, a series of events precipitated his involvement in the war. At the beginning of 1940, the Soviet government continued with its interest in recovering the old territories that had belonged to the Russian Empire, or with a majority of Ukrainian population, therefore issued an ultimatum to the Romanian government demanding the immediate cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of the province of Bukovina. As a result of the request made by the Soviet government through a note addressed in June 1940 to the Romanian government, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina entered the composition of the USSR (Botar, 1976: 22). After this event Romania's neighbours and Germany's allies also presented their territorial claims. As for Hungary, after the Second Vienna Arbitration, —1940— it occupies northern areas of Transylvania and some districts inhabited by the Magyars in the former Yugoslavia —1941— (Marín González, 2000: 306). Meanwhile, Bulgaria obtained the cession by the Romanians of the southern region of Dobrogea, after making the Craiova Agreements effective on 7 September 1940.

As a result, Carol's regime was left in a compromised situation by accepting, from 1940 onwards and without a military response, territorial cessions to its neighbours —the Soviet Union, Hungary and Bulgaria— while Romania was isolated from Europe (Stefanescu, 2004: 227). These concessions were not well seen on Romanian territory, so a dictatorial cabinet was created to form a new government with the main figure of Ion Antonescu. The same general forced the abdication of the monarch, on 6 September, seconded by a massive pronouncement of the Army and the political forces of the country. The monarch [...] transferred power to his son Mihai, who would be the last king of Romania (Veiga, 1989: 197). However, the power was exercised by General Antonescu by establishing a military-fascist dictatorship from September 1940 to August 1944, while his approaches to Hitler's Germany brought Romania into the Second World War. On 22 June 1941 the so-called Operation Barbarossa against the USSR was launched, and from the beginning of the offensive, the Romanian Army took an active part together with the Germans. Romania contributed 585,000 Romanian troops during the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union between June and October 1941 (Kaplan, 2016: 198).

With this operation, the situation returned to its origin, as Romanian troops with the help of Nazi Germany managed to recover the lost territories of Bukovina and Bessarabia during much of the Second World War. However, the situation took a new turn with the German defeat at the beginning of 1943 at the Battle of Stalingrad which meant

the beginning of the Soviet advance throughout Eastern and Central Europe, and the recovery of the previously lost territories.

With the entry of the Soviet Army into Romania, Antonescu was overthrown on 23 August 1944, and a decree was signed that marked Romania's return to the 1923 Constitution and a parliamentary system (Stefanescu, 2004: 233). Following these events, on 12 September 1944, an armistice took place between King Mihai I and the Soviets, with regard to their borders, in Article 4 agreed to re-establish the State border between the USSR and Romania on 28 June 1940 (Neagoe, 1996: 54) —that is, before the beginning of the Romanian occupation of the territories that the USSR had previously obtained— which was confirmed in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaties.

Later, in March 1945, a government linked to the Soviet world was established with the figure of Petru Groza in power, who would change political, economic and social life towards the ideals advocated by Stalin in the USSR. These progressive changes were completed on 30 December 1947 when King Mihai I was forced to abdicate and a Romanian People's Republic under the dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed (Bideleux, Jeffries, 2007: 137).

3.2. Ukraine: again invaded (1939-1945)

The situation in Ukraine at the beginning of the Second World War was different, as after the 1939 Pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov dividing Poland, the part of Galicia and western Volhynia that belonged to that country would become part of Soviet rule. Therefore, as of 17 September 1939, in the still Polish Ukraine, the USSR forces promoted the sovietisation of the territory (Pérez Sánchez, 2016: 510). With the conquest of various territories by the USSR, as mentioned above, the regions of Bukovina and Bessarabia became part of the Soviet Union, but Bukovina and the southern part of Bessarabia —the region bordering the Black Sea— became part of Ukraine's RSS. In the other part of Bessarabia, in August —1940— the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was created —RSS of Moldavia—, which included Bessarabia and part of the former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia —concretely the current Transnistria— (García Andrés, González Martín, Martín de la Guardia, 2017: 23). This situation changed the following year with the invasion of the USSR by Germany and its allies, with Romania taking control of the entire region, including Transnistria, which had never been under Romanian power before.

The outlook in Eastern Europe changed as a result of the aforementioned Operation Barbarossa, launched at the end of June 1941, in which the USSR began to be defeated by Hitler's Germany. Thus, the territory of Ukraine was occupied by the Nazis, and shortly thereafter, specifically on 17 July 1941 Hitler promulgated instructions on the administration of the occupied territories on the Eastern Front (Doroshenko, 1962: 649). The so-called *Reichskommissariat Ukraine* was established in most of the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR, which was the body responsible for handling matters relating to this area. Although Germany's military advance through Ukraine was fast and spectacular, —Kharkov was achieved on 29 August 1941—, it took very little time until the roles were changed (Toynbee, 1985: 427). The end of this occupation began after the Soviet victory at the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943. From this moment the Ukrainian territory was again occupied by Soviet troops, recovering the territories that had also reached the Romanian forces. Finally, and after Germany's unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945 —for the purposes of the USSR on 9—, Stalin became the new "owner" of all central and south-eastern Europe, while regaining control of Ukraine (Pérez Sánchez, 2016: 511).

4. Current Formation of Ukrainian-Romanian Borders

As can be seen after the end of the Second World War, both Romania —as a satellite state of the USSR under the command of Petru Groza— and Ukraine —which was once again part of the Soviet Union as Ukraine's SSR— came under the orbit of Soviet power. With this end for both countries, all that was left was to sign the peace treaties in order to establish the new border limits that we know nowadays. The final point of the negotiations took place on 10 February 1947 with the signing of the Treaties of Paris, where delegates from twenty-one nations met to decide on the peace agreements with Germany's five allies in the Second World War: Bulgaria, Hungary, Finland, Italy and Romania (Palmowski, 2002: 613). There, the definitive borders and the territories that would integrate each country after the war were established.

4.1. Romania

The text of the treaty with Romania said:

On 10 February, the Peace Treaty between Romania and the Allied and Associated Powers was signed, in which it was established: in part 1 dedicated to borders:

Article 1

The borders of Romania, as indicated on the map annexed to this Treaty —Annex I— shall be those existing on 1st January 1941, except for the Romanian-Hungarian border, as defined in Article 2 of this Treaty.

The Soviet-Romanian border is established in accordance with that between the Soviet-Romanian countries on 28 June 1940 and with the Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement of 29 June 1945.

Article 2

The decisions of the Vienna Arbitration Court of 30 August 1940 are declared null and void. The border between Romania and Hungary is hereby restored as it existed on 1 January 1938 (Neagoe, 1996: 435).

Thus, this treaty confirmed for Romania, on the one hand, the recovery of the northern Transylvania region that had been ceded to Hungary during a major part of the conflict through the Second Vienna Arbitration; and, on the other hand, the cession of the northern part of the region of Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, and the cession of the southern Dobrogea territory for Bulgaria, officially assigned to Romania after the end of the First World War.

4.2. Ukraine

In the case of the new SSR of Ukraine that emerged after the conflict, the formation of its borders was carried out through the territories that the Soviet Union gradually obtained from the cessions of those defeated in the Second World War.

First of all, and even before the end of the war, the Yalta Conference took place in February 1945, at which the leaders of the countries that were defeating in the Second World War —Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt— met to decide on the establishment of the new order in the territories that were being liberated from the Nazis. At this meeting, the borders of some of the new states coming out of the war were decided. Thus, in the case of Poland, the territory of Galicia and western Volhynia was lost to the USSR. Despite Lvov's belonging to the Galician region, the Allies finally accepted the Soviet purpose of

diverting the "Curzon Line" to include that city and its region in the USSR (Ruiz González, 2014: 103), unlike the previous time with the 1921 Riga Peace between Poland and the Bolsheviks, in which the former managed to keep that region in their power.

Secondly, since the end of the First World War Subcarpathian Ruthenia or Transcarpathia, had been part of Czechoslovakia. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Hitler's Nazi army, this region was occupied by Hungary, as it had an alliance with Germany. In 1944 and with the Red Army starting its way to Berlin, it entered in Hungary and it ended the control exercised over Transcarpathia. Later the Czechoslovaks tried to reorganize their state again, however, they had to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union. Hence, on 29 June 1945, Czechoslovakia's provisional Parliament ceded Subcarpathia Ruthenia —Transcarpathia— to Soviet Union (Magoscsi, 2010: 688).

Thirdly and finally, we must talk about the regions of Bukovina and Bessarabia, which have already been mentioned in the section on Romania. With the Paris Peace Treaty, the Soviet-Romanian border was confirmed, as it was on 28 June 1940. In other words, the northern part of Bukovina became part of Ukraine's SSR again, as did the southern part of Bessarabia; while the rest of Bessarabia reinstated Moldova's SSR. In such a way that at the end of the Second World War all the lands of the Ukrainian ethnic group were grouped within the USSR.

Conclusions

As we have seen throughout this paper, the changes in the borders suffered by both Romania and Ukraine were very important for the definitive formation of the two countries.

In the case of Romania, it can be said that, after the initial period of neutrality, its entrance into the First World War was determined by the aspiration to realise its national idea with the territories it considered linked to the country. It was because of this desire, and after the end of the conflict, that he succeeded in creating Greater Romania. The first years of this new territorial entity were marked by the government of Ferdinand I and his interest in making Greater Romania a powerful state in Eastern Europe. However, with the arrival to power of Carol II the situation in the country took a radical turn and led to the difficult situation that Romania lived during the Second World War. Because of the territorial losses by the designs of Germany and the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War, Romania found itself in the necessity after the arrival to the power of Antonescu to enter the war of the hand of Germany to recover the lost territories. However, with the unfolding of the war and the tremendous of the victory of the USSR after the battle of Stalingrad, the loss of some of the territories that had been part of Greater Romania for more than twenty years will finally be confirmed: Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia and Southern Dobrogea.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, the First World War began separately and integrated within two Empires —Austro-Hungarian and Russian—, so it did not have the option of choosing sides autonomously. This, together with the brief attempt to achieve independence in the two parts of Ukraine —the People's Republic of Ukraine and the People's Republic of Western Ukraine— and the wars fought within those territories —the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Bolshevik War— led to the separation of Ukrainian territory into four different states: Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland. During the interwar period, each of these parts experienced different situations that ended during the Second World War. For this reason, and as seen in this paper, the definitive territorial

formation of Ukraine's SSR was completed with the territories that were ceded in peace treaties to the Soviet Union.

Thus, the period from the First World War to the end of the Second World War and its peace treaties shows the different end of the Romanian-Ukrainian borders. In the case of Ukraine, the new borders since 1947 included all territories considered ethnically populated by Ukrainians. Whereas, in the case of Romania this fact was achieved in 1918 with the creation of Greater Romania and the establishment within the same State of the population and regions considered ethnically Romanian. However, almost thirty years later, the dream of this great union faded with the loss of three of its regions.

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THE PATH TOWARD EU OF SERBIA

*Emilia Nicoleta SCHIOP**

Abstract. *Europe faces major crises. One of the main challenges towards integrating migrants, especially between how is state's security seen in the XXI century and how minority issues can influence the agenda setting process. It is to see how the management of borders and internal policies can cope with an increasing pressure upon citizens welfare. Also, the European governance is ready to provide solutions to all these problems in different ways. For this, the emphasis should be placed on lobby and advocacy technics for future trends in migration security. Beside the area of EU's Liberty, Justice and Security Area, limitations and challenges upon migration security, the European governance, lobby and advocacy for sustainable migration policies and other perspectives in the relationship between EU institutions and migration security, it is important to take into consideration the relation with third countries.*

Before those challenges for European Union the enlargement in the West Balkans was a priority, but for now this objective is postponed. Serbia, as a candidate country for European integration can not be part of it in the near future, even if its most negotiation chapters are advanced. Migration crisis also affects the periphery of Europe, not only the important centers of power. West Balkans must face the migratory population crisis as well, but it does not have so many instruments like central Europe. Serbia and other countries from that area must face the migration problem and it also needs to continue development for the future integration, which is a double effort.

The main objective is to show the connection between the accession negotiations between Serbia and the European Union and the migrations crisis. In this way, the document analysis is helpful. There could be seen the differents from the European reports before the migration phenomenon and after. Also, the conflictual context that started in Syria is an important factor.

Keywords: *Serbia, migration, accession negotiations, enlargement, progress.*

1. Introduction

Before these problems for the European Union, enlargement in the Western Balkans was a priority, but this goal has been postponed to be achieved in the future. Even if it is not part of the European structure, the Balkan states have also faced the migration phenomenon and must continue to develop for future integration, which is a double effort.

In most cases, Syrian migrant populations and surrounding areas as a result of the Syrian conflict have traveled to South East Europe to establish themselves in developed European countries. The main targets were Germany, Britain and France.

Serbia has had an open approach for finishing migratory crisis. As a candidate country for European integration, it can not be part of the EU in the near future, even if it has made

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efforts in this regard. The migration crisis also affected the security of Europe's periphery, not just the major power centers. Among the other countries in this part of the continent that began drafting the negotiations can be mentioned Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Croatia is a member of the European Union in June 2013. These countries have had a different approach to the migration crisis compared to EU countries.

In order to better observe Serbia's approach to migration, first of all the paper analyzes the context in order to observe the state of development of this country in order to comply with European rules. Observing the level of development, we can better understand the migration phenomenon. The historical and political context and the European Union's enlargement action are important. It will also be the beginning of the Syrian conflict, which is the cause that has transformed part of the population into refugees.

The evolution (from 1990s) and the actions of the European Union:

In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council endorsed the principle of EU enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and set out the criteria that these countries must meet in order to become members of the EU. The political requirements refers to the institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities. The economic criterion refers to the market economy and competition. The community *acquis* criterion includes the obligations of the member state. The European Council in Essen in December 1994 adopted the pre-accession strategy to prepare the signatory states of the association agreements. Among the important points of the strategy, the Phare program can be mentioned as a pre-accession instrument. The European Council in Cannes in June 1995 adopted the White Paper. It ensures the preparation of Central and Eastern European countries for the single market. In Madrid in December 1995 it was decided that six months after, the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, conditions would be created for the integration of states. In June 1996, Florence adopted a calendar for negotiations with the Central and Eastern European states. At the Dublin meeting in December 1996, the pre-accession strategy was strengthened. The detailed analysis of the Commission's opinion was adopted in Amsterdam in June 1997. Agenda 2000 was published in December 1997 in Luxembourg. It contained the future of EU policies, the enlargement of the Union and the financial options until 2006.

At Cardiff in June 1998 initial assessment reports were made. The financial framework was implemented in Berlin in March 1999. In December 1999 European Council in Helsinki acknowledged the importance of the enlargement process.¹ In June 2000, Feira countries that are part of the Stabilization and Association Process are considered potential candidate countries for the European Union.² In Nice in December 2000 a new negotiating strategy was established. Progress in the negotiations was highlighted in Gothenburg in June 2001. In December of the same year, Laeken decided the countries that would become members since 2004, and in Seville in June 2002 the negotiations entered into the final phase. Copenhagen in December 2002 saw the accession of candidate countries Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the

¹ The European Commission, „Extinderea spre est pe agenda Consiliului European” in *Infoeuropa*, nr. 10, 2007, p. 1 http://ec.europa.eu/romania/documents/eu_romania/tema_10.pdf, accessed in 30.11.2018.

² Idem, *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations – Serbia*, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm, accessed in 30.11.2018.

Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary on 10 May 2004. These countries signed the Accession Treaty in Athens in April 2003. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey could participate as observers as a result of the Thessaloniki meeting in June 2003.³ Also, the stabilization and association process was confirmed as a European policy for the Western Balkans.⁴ In Brussels in October the new neighborhood policy was established, and in December the extension was meant to be done in a straight line. The last preparations for the 10 states that were to become members of the European Union were made in March 2004. In June 2004, a new candidate country was established in Brussels: Croatia. In December the negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria were closed.⁵

The EU reopened its Serbian textile market. On 16 December 2004 the Serbian government adopted information on the conclusion of an agreement on the export of Serbian textile products to the EU market. At that session, the government decided to set up a board for pension insurance reform and gave its agreement to the decision on postal prices in domestic traffic.⁶

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been given the opportunity to become a candidate country, in line with the conclusions of Brussels in June 2005, and at the end of that year, it was granted candidate status.⁷ In Belgrade on 29 June 2005, the Serbian and Montenegrin Parliament adopted a resolution on the state's accession to the EU in an emergency procedure. The resolution was adopted on a proposal by the European Parliament's European Integration Committee, with votes in favor of the resolution by 59 Serbian MPs and 23 in Montenegro.⁸ Also in June 2005 the negotiations for the Stabilization and Association Agreement were concluded. In May 2006, these negotiations were blocked due to Serbia's inadequate cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

According to the European Council in Brussels in June 2006, enlargement is becoming a historic opportunity. In December, the same year a debate was held on enlargement. 2007 is characterized by the resumption of Stabilization and Association Agreement negotiations, after Serbia fully co-operated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. At the end of 2007, Serbia was initiated.⁹

The independence of the state of Kosovo was declared on February 17, 2008, the Serbian province in the past. In the summer of 2011, the situation in the north of this

³ Idem, „Extinderea spre est pe agenda Consiliului European” in *Infoeuropa*, nr. 10, 2007, pp. 4-5 http://ec.europa.eu/romania/documents/eu_romania/tema_10.pdf, accessed in 30.11.2018.

⁴ Idem, *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations – Serbia*, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm, accessed in 30.11.2018.

⁵ Idem, „Extinderea spre est pe agenda Consiliului European” in *Infoeuropa*, nr. 10, 2007, pp. 5-6 http://ec.europa.eu/romania/documents/eu_romania/tema_10.pdf, accessed in 30.11.2018.

⁶ The Serbian Government, *EU to reopen its market to Serbian textile products*, 2004, <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=7457>, accessed in 30.11.2018.

⁷ The European Commission, „Extinderea spre est pe agenda Consiliului European” in *Infoeuropa*, nr. 10, 2007, p. 6 http://ec.europa.eu/romania/documents/eu_romania/tema_10.pdf, accessed in 30.11.2018.

⁸ The Serbian Government, *Serbia-Montenegrin parliament adopts Resolution on EU accession*, 2005 <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=13808>, accessed in 30.11.2018.

⁹ The European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations – Serbia*, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/_index_en.htm, accessed in 30.11.2018.

province, populated by about 100,000 Serbs, has worsened, and the European Union and the Kosovo-led forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needed action. Province of Kosovo has proclaimed its independence. It is recognized as a state of over 80 countries.¹⁰

September 1, 2013 was the date of entry into force of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Serbia and the EU, and in December 2013 the Council adopted the Negotiating Framework with Serbia and established the organization of the first Intergovernmental Conference with Serbia next January. On January 24, 2014, the scheduled conference took place.¹¹

Croatia is currently a member of the EU, Montenegro, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are candidate countries, with accession negotiations being under way with Montenegro and Serbia. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidates.¹²

Serbia's analysis of membership criteria:

The paper is studying the reports of the European Commission on Serbia and the negotiating chapters relevant to the subject of migration.

In the chapter: free movement of goods: 2013: Serbia has made reforms for contacts with neighboring countries, including with Kosovo, and has made a positive contribution to international cooperation. The first agreement on regulatory principles and normalization of relations took place on 19 April 2013.¹³

Points of agreement: the Serbian Standardization Institute adopted approximately 94% of European standards. In the field of conformity assessment, a number of bodies have been designed in line with EU directives. Multilateral Agreements and Mutual Recognition Agreements have been signed. New areas of accreditation have been established for several directives. There has been a national certification recognized by the European Commission for Organic Products in line with the *acquis*. Serbia has been able to export its products freely to the EU market.

Points of disagreement: harmonization of horizontal legislation with the *acquis communautaire* was to take place by January 2014. Administrative capacity and cooperation between the institutions had to increase.

Conclusions: progress has been made in this area, with the need for Serbia to continue with the development of horizontal legislation. Various multilateral agreements have been signed. Most European standards have been adopted. The instutcs' positions had to be strengthened. Overall, progress in this area has moderately advanced.¹⁴

2018: as agreements, the legal basis for technical regulations, standards, conformity assessment, metrology and accreditation is realized with the purpose of

¹⁰ P. Iskenderov, „Independența Kosovo și sfidările la adresa Europei” în *Vocea Rusiei*, 2012, http://romanian.ruvr.ru/2012_02_17/66293458/, accessed in 30.11.2018.

¹¹ The European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement negotiations – Serbia*, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/serbia/index_en.htm, accessed in 30.11.2018.

¹² André De Munter; Benjamin Rey, *Balkanii de Vest*, 2014 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/ro/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.5.2.html, accessed in 30.11.2018.

¹³ The European Commission, *Serbia 2013 Progress report*, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 21-22.

aligning with the acquis. “On standardisation, the Serbian Institute for Standardisation (ISS) became a full member of the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC) in January 2017. Concerning accreditation, the Accreditation Body of Serbia (ABS) was re-evaluated successfully in a peer evaluation by the European Co-operation for Accreditation Association in 2017, enabling ABS to maintain its status in the European Accreditation Multilateral Agreement.”

As disagreements, but the administrative bodies and financial resources need further improvement in the domains of market surveillance, metrology, accreditation and standards. It haven't adopted an action plan with the articles 34-36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Conclusions: Serbia is moderately prepared in the field of free movement of goods, but it should adopt a strategy and an action plan for the implementation of the EU, for both approaches (old and new) and horizontal legislation and organisations and it should provide adequate administrative bodies for the implementation of the European regulation on registration, evaluation, authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals.¹⁵

The chapter: free movement of labor: 2013: implementation was present and there are also the necessary international instruments. There have been binding rules on international trade.¹⁶

Points of agreement: Serbia's objectives have been defined for the National Employment Service. Implementation of the bilateral agreements with Austria, Bulgaria and Slovakia on the coordination of security systems are realized.

Points of disagreement: on access to the labor market, the law on the employment of foreigners was to be approved by parliament. The National Job Seeking Database was still incomplete and employers were under no obligation. Collaboration with Slovenia has been difficult. Institutions needed to be strengthened. Preparations for the European Health Insurance Card have not been made.

Conclusions: little progress has been made in this area, and preparations have been moderately advanced.¹⁷

2018: for agreements, relating to coordination of social security systems, a new agreement with Romania has been ratified and the agreement with Greece has been signed. “Preparations for agreements on electronic exchange of social security data with Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy have started. Electronic exchange of social security data is operational with Slovenia, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro.”

On the other hand, no new legislation on access to the labour market was adopted and procedures for working permits to EU citizens, who are currently covered by rules for third country nationals, need to be further simplified. EU citizens will have fully free access to the labour market without a work permit just from the date of Serbia's accession

¹⁵ *Idem, Serbia 2018 Progress report*, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, pp. 52 - 53.

¹⁶ *Idem, Serbia 2013 Progress report*, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, p. 10.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

to the EU. “There has been no progress on preparations for joining EURES (the European network of employment services).”

Conclusions: Serbia is moderately prepared, but it has to continue cooperation with member states on for social security systems.¹⁸

The chapter: the right of establishment and provision of services: 2013: as part of the follow-up mechanism following the liberalization of visas, the Commission periodically assessed the progress made by the country in implementing the reforms introduced in the Visa WP.¹⁹

Points of agreement: in the field of postal services, the postal strategy for 2013-2016 was adopted in April 2013. The public postal service has been modernized.

Points of disaffection: there has been no progress for the right of establishment. It was necessary to adopt a general law on harmonization regarding the freedom to provide cross-border services. The capacity of departments in this sector had to be strengthened. Administrative capacity was not enough. Operational progress had to be corporatist. Legislation on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications has not been adopted.

Conclusions: little progress has been made on the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services. It was necessary to develop administrative capacity in line with the *acquis communautaire*. Preparations were moderately advanced.²⁰

2018: in September 2017 the government adopted the 2017-2020 strategy for postal services and the law on it, aiming to align with the second and third Postal Directives. This implementation should help to further liberalise the market and increase the powers of the postal services regulator in line with the *acquis*.

From things that were done, it can be seen that on freedom to provide cross-border services, the umbrella law on services has not been adopted. It should continue to harmonise sectoral regulation and establish a single contact as a one-stop-shops for service providers for obtaining information and complete administrative formalities online. Also, it has to adopt a new law on mutual recognition of professional qualifications and implement the adopted strategy and action plan. In the end, it must adopt the law on postal services and relevant implementing legislation to further open up the postal market; increase the capacity for postal services inspection.

Conclusions: Serbia is moderately prepared.²¹

The chapter: free movement of capital: 2013: cross-border cooperation has been used to promote the capacity to create dialogue between local and regional authorities in neighboring countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro.²²

Points of agreement: the Foreign Exchange Act was adopted in December 2013. Long-term capital transactions have been liberalized. Serbia initialized the national risk assessment process in the fight against money laundering. The Agency for the Prevention

¹⁸ *Idem, Serbia 2018 Progress report*, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, p. 54.

¹⁹ *Idem, Serbia 2013 Progress report*, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, p. 4.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

²¹ *Idem, Serbia 2018 Progress report*, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, pp. 54 - 55.

²² *Idem, Serbia 2013 Progress report*, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, p. 5.

of Money Laundering signed the Memorandum of Understanding with Argentina, Andorra, Panama, Denmark and Portugal, with the total number of signatures being 42.

Points of disagreement: there were limitations on short-term transactions and residents' deposits were partially liberalized. There were restrictions on agricultural capital. Payment system legislation had to be aligned with the *acquis communautaire*. The Agency for the Prevention of Money Laundering did not have the necessary prerequisites for the recruitment and training of the personnel.

Conclusions: overall, there has been limited progress. There was a need to harmonize Serbian legislation on short-term capital, agriculture and payment systems with the *acquis*. The alignment of the other subdomains was considered moderately advanced.²³

2018: “Amendments to the law on foreign exchange operations, aimed at lifting restrictions on non-resident borrowers, have been agreed.” About the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing, a new law was adopted in December 2017 to align the legislation with the EU Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. There were no developments in payment systems, even if Serbia’s legislation is already mostly in line with the *acquis* in this domain. It was needed for liberalizing the capital movements in line with its obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and for aligning its legislation with the latest *acquis* on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, increase the capacity of the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and enhance cooperation between all stakeholders to improve investigation and reporting.

Conclusions: the Serbian state is moderately prepared on free movement of capital, but no progress was made on meeting the recommendations set out in 2016.²⁴

The conflicting context:

Muhammad, the prophet of the Sunni, represents reflection and consensus. The majority of the Muslim population of the world follows Sunni Islam and about 10-15% follow Islam. The Shiites live in several countries but form the majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. There is also a significant number in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Though the Sunnis and Shiites follow the same religious principles, the differences of them sometimes led to religious intolerance, political struggles and violent confrontations.²⁵

The geographical area at which the Caspian Sea is located has a different value compared to the Mediterranean Sea; in the first case, the dominant is economic, the Caspian Sea area being one of the richest in energy resources, and in the second is dominant strategic, thanks to the commercial road linking the complementary economic areas, Europe and Asia.²⁶

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

²⁴ *Idem*, *Serbia 2018 Progress report*, 2018, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/sr_rapport_2013.pdf, accessed in 01.12.2018, p. 55.

²⁵ Forțele terestre române, *Primăvara arabă în Siria*, 2011, <http://www.forter.ro/>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

²⁶ Claude Raffestin, *Geopolitică și istorie*, w.y., https://books.google.ro/books?id=1Ec_PKWejWcC&pg=PT110&lpg=PT110&dq=claudio+raffestin+geopolitica+si+strategie&source=bl&ots=1QjBbh1-cw&sig=cx3iCOHFpSPderMrNDDQzk7c9so&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKE

Conflicts began with the beginning of the Arab Spring in Syria, when the population began protests in the streets and continued as residents in the northern Syrian city of Ras Al-Ain crossed a border fence in the Turkish city of Ceylanpinar to escape the bombing rebels. Despite the fact that they are neighbors, the political relationship between Syria and Turkey historically was not very good, but things were being normalized until the Arab Spring. For most of the last century, the relationship between Turkey and Syria was extremely bad, Turkey was an imperial power since 1517 - known as the Ottoman Empire - and its nationalism. As time began to catch roots in Syria, and in the twentieth century, the Turks began to be seen as oppressors. By the end of the First World War, the Turks were defeated, but they killed a lot of Syrians who joined the Arab uprising against them, and "this left a very bitter taste," said Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Studies in the Middle East.

In 2004, Bashar al-Assad was the first Syrian president to go to Turkey after the First World War, and the two nations began to talk about how to settle their disputes. They opened the borders for trade, the Syrians and the Turks began to visit their countries for shopping and vacations, and a common cultural connection was discovered in the process. Turkey's role in supporting the opposition has made things more difficult within the country, Landis said. Also, Landis also specified that the border between Turkey and Syria is 530 miles. The Turkish government made a request to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to deploy PATRIOT anti-missile systems on its territory. The request blamed for a period of bombing at the Turkish-Syrian border and destabilizing regional security due to Syrian civil war. This request has been prioritized, member states holding such anti-missile systems have had to decide in parliament whether or not they support this request. Syrian president, Bashar Assad, said he will not surrender internal but also external pressures against him. The international community has attempted to pass through the Security Council a resolution that would condemn violence against civilians, but it also came up with some measures to resolve the situation. The resolution has not passed, states like the Russian Federation and China have turned to veto. The escalation of the internal conflict has led to the destabilization of security throughout the region. Neighboring countries like Turkey record a large number of Syrian refugees. Initially, over 3,000 people were forced to leave their homes to save their lives.²⁷

In response to the non-adoption of the measures, Turkey bombed several border areas a few days later. Turkey said the border with Syria is extremely uncertain, some border points being controlled by rebels, and others by the Damascus government. Bombships worsened the day before. Turkey has not invoked Article 5 of the Treaty, but has repeatedly called for Article 4, which provides for consultations with member states where one of the members anticipates some dangers to its security. The danger for Turkey was the Syrian use of the chemical and biological weapons they held. The government of Damascus has publicly stated that it will use these weapons against states that will try to intervene in the domestic affairs of the state, even if they deny that there are such weapons and missiles capable of transporting them.²⁸

wiei43O94TQAhUBrywKHW63BwYQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&q=claude%20raffestin%20geopolitic a%20si%20strategie&f=false, accessed in 01.12.2018.

²⁷ ***, *Syria and Turkey: A Complex Relationship*, 2011, <https://www.phs.org/newshour/rundown/syria-and-turkey>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

²⁸ Smaranda Toader, *Analiza conflictului dintre Turcia și Siria*, 2013, <http://www.slideshare.net/smarandatoader/conflictul-siria-turcia-relatii-internationale>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

Tensions at the border between the two countries intensified in 2012 when Syrian air force defeated a Turkish military reconnaissance aircraft. Erdogan, who was then prime minister, said the revolt against Bashar al-Assad was very close to victory and warned that Turkey would respond firmly to any hostility from Syria.²⁹

Bashar al-Assad's spy chief, General Ali Mamluk, arrested and accused of plot by the Damascus regime, was dissatisfied with the rise in Iran's influence. Its elimination is the hand of Tehran defending its interests and controlling Syria. Ali Mamluk, the head of the Syrian intelligence services and one of the few officials who still had access to President Bashar al-Assad, was accused of having secret talks with countries that would support rebel groups and exiled members of the Syrian regime. Assad had difficulties in keeping the regime's "inner circle" united.

General Rustum Ghazaleh, the head of the Public Security Department, died in the hospital after the apple had been beaten by loyal people to Rafiq Shehadeh, his rival and counterpart in military intelligence, who was dismissed.

The fact that Ghazaleh was the last witness to prove the involvement of the Damascus authorities in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, investigated by the Special Court for Lebanon, his death was considered suspicious, a way to escape a dangerous witness to President Assad and various sources have evoked plutonium poisoning.³⁰

The Serbian approach:

At the beginning of the migratory phenomenon from 2015, compared to most EU states, Serbia was open to receiving refugees. Aleksandar Vucic, the prime minister, said: "Serbia is ready to be part of a European solution to the migration crisis." „It's not a big deal. It can even create a new value in economic terms.”³¹ Serbia is ready to be part of a European solution to the migration crisis, assume some of the obligations of the EU Member States, and accept a quota of refugees, although it is not in the EU.

"European states should agree to take up to two million real asylum seekers and share them fairly,"³² Vucic said during a recent visit to London.

"It's nothing for Europe ", Vucic estimated, stating that the figure is less than half of 1% of the EU population. "It's not a big deal. It can create even new value in economic terms",³³ the Serbian Prime Minister said.

According to Vucic's statements, the EU should provide more assistance to improve conditions in countries ravaged by conflict in the Middle East and to strengthen borders, otherwise Europe will risk being overwhelmed by migrants coming from more remote areas.

²⁹ NATO, *Conflictul Turcia-Siria*, 2015,

<http://nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news90447htm?selectedLocale=ennNAC>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

³⁰ Gabriela Anghel, „Mamluk, umbra misterioasă a lui Assad”, în *România liberă*, 2015, <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/international/mamluk--umbra-misterioasa-a-lui-assad-378185>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

³¹ Angela Sârbu, „Aleksandar Vucic: Serbia este gata să fie parte a unei soluții europene privind criza migrației” in *Agerpres*, 2016, <http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/02/25/aleksandar-vucic-serbia-este-gata-sa-fie-parte-a-unei-solutii-europene-privind-criza-migratiei-18-27-05>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*.

In 2015, Belgrade stopped sending migrants to Hungary from September 16, a country that closed its 175-km border with Serbia with a barbed-weight fence. Since then, Croatia has become the new way to access Western Europe.³⁴

Subsequently, in 2016 due to the large migratory waves, the Western Balkans developed a more modest view of refugee reception, Croatia being skeptical and even considering the option of closing borders for the surplus of migrants. Serbia did not have such a radical vision but focused its attention on other issues (domestic, etc.) Until then, the scepticism in relation with migratory flows grown.

Conclusions:

In terms of negotiation criteria, Serbia has made efforts by creating specialized institutions for each field or by empowering existing authorities to meet the challenges of future integration.

Analyzing the report published by the European Commission on the negotiation chapters, we can notice that, in general, the preparations made by the Serbian state are not advanced, and continuous efforts are needed in this regard. Most preparations for alignment with the *acquis* in the negotiation chapters have been termed moderately advanced. However, in some areas, such as the free movement of goods, advanced progress has been reported. Consequently, it takes time to make progress in closing the chapters by the Commission.

In order to integrate, Serbia has made efforts both by adopting legislative measures to bring it into line with the *acquis communautaire* and through various projects and actions in cooperation with the EU. There is still a need to develop many issues that are currently being adopted or not yet underway. Serbia has political will for membership, but at the same time it must still make permanent efforts to get closer to the European Union.

Regarding migration, at the beginning, Serbia was determined to deal with refugees as well as important EU states. It does not think this crisis is a big one. It was estimated that it will not affect the substantial Serbian economy. After some years, this perception has changed and Serbian state started to become less open to the idea of hosting refugees.

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³⁴ *** „Refugiații înfierbântă din nou Balcanii: Serbia ia o măsură radicală împotriva Croației” in *Ziare.com*, 2015, <http://www.ziare.com/inviazie-imigranti/serbia/refugiatii-infierbanta-din-nou-balkanii-serbia-ia-o-masura-radicala-impotriva-croatiei-1383969>, accessed in 01.12.2018.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S MEDIATION SURROUNDING THE 2008 ELECTIONS IN ZIMBABWE

*Dan-Ionuț PETRICA**

Abstract. *The question of free and democratic elections in Zimbabwe is core to our present endeavour. We have analysed how South Africa mediated agreements between the political parties in Zimbabwe, resulting in a series of electoral reforms, decreased violence during the electoral process and, ultimately, a government of national unity. While the creation of an inclusive government formalized the success of South Africa as a mediating power, Zimbabwe was plagued by a struggle for power inside its central apparatus, whereby good governance principles were cast aside. Our research details the entire situation, ultimately providing an assessment based on several strings of IR theory and practice.*

Keywords: *theory of international relations, national unity, governance, inclusiveness, political conflict*

1. Introduction and short framework

Our paper focuses on the situation in which South Africa was called upon to intervene in Zimbabwe's national politics, as two opposing parties could not reach common ground before, during and after the elections taking place in 2008. Although this research piece is reliant on both liberalism and realism (in their classical and 'neo-' iterations), we have chosen to not put emphasis on the said theories of international relations (IR) at play, but rather provide a description of the events as they have unfolded and encourage readers to draw their own conclusions as to which paradigm can offer these events the most suitable interpretation. As what we have presented is not a matter of classical international relations, having quite a strong national component, rendering it in the light of IR theories might seem a stretch. However, one distinct element allows us to present the facts in this light: the presence of two states and the umbrella of an international organization the two are a part of. In addition, we feel compelled to note that several other IR theories could equally be accommodated in the present analysis. A Marxist interpretation, for example, would delve on the centre-periphery (or semiperiphery-periphery) relations at play in the struggle to reinforce democracy in Zimbabwe; another, reliant on critical theory would have us question how the power relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe came to existence – either through colonialist theories or those of hegemony. To provide another example: a social constructivist interpretation – belonging to the discourse theory string – could have us deconstruct how hegemonic discourses shift under the impetus of superimposed, external narratives.

That being said, we will not diverge any longer - rather we will briefly present some theoretical aspects, which can be used to guide any reader through this piece of literature, namely: what international (governmental) organizations and mediation are, and what liberalism and realism entail.

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International organizations are both stake-holders in the democratization of global spaces and normative institutions in charge of shaping and sometimes enforcing the rules of the political game for their members, both regionally and globally. They are reliant on their member states for their mandates and the power they yield, and, in return, offer clear rules of engagement to those members, concomitantly answering calls for good or effective governance. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is one of these entities.

Realism as a theory of IR is tributary to self-help, statism and survival. By overly simplifying, one might say realism argues that states are the only important actors in an anarchic and threatening international system, and that they can only rely on their own power in order to ensure their survival. Neorealism was created as an adaptation of classical realism, in order to make the latter fitting to the global situation of the late 1970's. It was developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979) and many other theoreticians, and, contrary to the first, incorporates liberalism's view that power can be attained through non-military means. For realists, the focus is mostly on relative gains, albeit neorealism also takes into consideration absolute ones.

Liberalism, on the other hand, sees the world with different eyes, arguing for state interdependence as a way for ensuring perpetual peace and the presence of international institutions as regulators of anarchy. It fathoms that the ultimate goal of nation-states and other actors is not mere survival in solitude, but achieving a common good from which all can benefit. For liberalism, absolute gains are the only ones states should take into consideration in their interaction with counterparts. Both classical and neoliberalism have three forms: internationalism, idealism and institutionalism.

Mediation is a way of dealing with conflict resolutions, with a long-standing history in both its formal and informal strains. Moore (1996: 15) defines mediation as:

"the intervention in a standard negotiation or conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power but who assists the involved parties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute".

In other words, mediation is a form of arbitration, in which an impartial third party is called upon to ensure that negotiations succeed. The particular mediation process, in which a country's leader is mandated by an international governmental organization to help conflicting counterparts reach an agreement in the realm of national politics is not entirely fitting to the practice of liberalism, nor can it fully be accommodated and explained by realist theories.

2. The birth of SADC backed mediation between Zimbabwean parties

Free and fair elections not only represent the core of democracy, but are the true litmus test for determining regional security and peace. In Zimbabwe, another condition needs to be added to the mix: that of lack of violence, granted that since the early 2000's, the electoral process had been disrupted by violent outbreaks. In pursuit of the ideal of free and fair elections, the SADC Heads of States codified the prerequisites of such an endeavour in the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections during a 2004 Summit in Mauritius. Although the said principles were not binding, being seen as something to draw inspiration from and, moreover, were subject to domestic law, Zimbabwe introduced new electoral laws shortly after their creation. The Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) Act, for example, gave the ZEC exclusive rights regarding voter education and issues related to the electoral process (The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, 2004: Chapter 2.12). The Electoral Act repelled a previous piece of

legislation with the same name and introduced a number of noteworthy reforms such as same-day voting or ballot counting in voting stations (Ibid., Chapter 2.13). The Electoral Act also took away the President's powers "*to suspend or amend any provision of any law in so far as it applied to an election*" (Sibanda, 2014: 34), which was hailed as a great leap forward, especially given past incidents. While the SADC had been invaluable in setting guidelines, in this research piece we will refer to something equally important: ensuring that these guidelines, alongside other prerequisites for a democratic election process are met, through mediation.

3. The need for mediation to resolve internal political conflict

The SADC had been involved in informal mediation in Zimbabwe since 2000, previously culminating with the vexed 2002 presidential elections¹. In the case of this particular SADC-mandated mediation, we will refer to attempts to resolve election- and governance-related conflicts in Zimbabwe. In 2007, a series of events sparked the interest of SADC, which had already been attacked by critics for its failure to tackle the systematic decline in Zimbabwe. On March 11, members of the 'Save Zimbabwe' campaign – renowned Robert Mugabe critics, mostly comprising opposition leaders and civil society representatives – were getting prepared to participate in a prayer alongside supporters gathered in Harare. Police forces intervened violently, beating numerous people present at the gathering, after the former had failed to stop the entire event from taking place. Although freedom of speech and of gathering had been enshrined in Zimbabwe's democratic constitution, Mugabe's inner circle and his loyalists have never shun away from using undemocratic practices to silence their critics and force them into submission. This had been yet another of those instances. As a result of the wave of violence, the SADC organized a special summit in Tanzania, later that month, to discuss the governance crisis that was unfolding in Zimbabwe. Overwhelmingly, the SADC members' leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the situation and a decision was taken to mandate South Africa to intervene. The decision was a result of two factors: South Africa wielded enough power inside the SADC, being the regional hegemon; and, respectively, it was perceived as both interested and benign enough to intervene in the very delicate situation of Zimbabwean national politics. South Africa's interest resided in the fact that restlessness across its North-Eastern border could affect its security, the interests of its economic actors deployed on Zimbabwean territory and its overall plans for the region. The government in Pretoria had a good reputation in Harare for it had stayed relatively silent to the numerous slippages of the Mugabe regime at times when other international players would have taken decisive actions against the latter.

4. South Africa accepting its mediation duties

In May 2007, South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki received his official mandate from the SADC to mediate an agreement between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and the political opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which had previously split into two factions, namely MDC-M

¹ Before the incident of 11 March 2007, SADC's efforts were part of the AU's broader approach to identify political solutions through surreptitious work done by former presidents Mbeki, Obasano, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and some former AU chairs.

and MDC-T². Mbeki was to report to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Troika. The result of successful negotiations would inevitably lead to alleviating some pressure from both the political and economic environments in Zimbabwe, which had been in turmoil for some time. The negotiations that were going to take place had two main objectives, quintessentially relating to the upcoming election: the election needed to be harmonized - combining the parliamentary, the presidential and the local government elections - and a consensus needed to take shape on the steps to be taken for the ballot to run smoothly for all those involved, so that results would be representative of and accepted by Zimbabweans (Solidarity Peace Trust Staff). Upon receiving the mandate from SADC, Mbeki (2007) also declared that his personal objective in the issue is to:

“begin the process leading to the normalisation of the situation in Zimbabwe and the resumption of its development and reconstruction process intended to achieve a better life for all Zimbabweans on a sustained and sustainable basis.”

The three parties involved agreed on negotiations, albeit for different reasons and despite grave mistrust both in one another and in Mbeki. ZANU-PF had deflected the continuous criticism of the international community for a decade, whilst traditional allies from the SADC had supported the Mugabe reign. In recent times however, the SADC had gradually shifted its views and policies on Zimbabwe and had started insisting that negotiations be carried out successfully. The MDC-M saw this as an opportunity to remain relevant in national politics, for it had been cast aside by its stronger sibling, the MDC-T, run by Morgan Tsvangirai. The latter viewed negotiations as a facile route towards obtaining power, on the one hand hoping that Mugabe would make strategic mistakes during the negotiations, and, on the other, because pre-election polls were showing that it would overtake ZANU-PF. Relating to trust, the two MDC factions didn't see Mbeki as a particularly credible mediator, for he had opposed Western intervention in Zimbabwe on every possible occasion and had never taken into consideration a more forceful approach from behalf of South Africa or international institutions in subjects dealing with their country. Furthermore, the historic links between the African National Congress (ANC), Mbeki's political party and ZANU-PF were infamous and provided another reason for mistrust.

In Mugabe's case, one might argue that a SADC mandate could have meant the realization that even his regional peers had reached a tipping point with regards to his governmental actions.

5. Brokering the for the alleviation of violence

Under Mbeki's mediation, painstaking negotiations took place, ultimately resulting in a tripartite agreement, which provided that a series of electoral reforms were required. It is our firm belief that the level of violence in the elections was greatly reduced due to these negotiations – especially if we were to refer to the run-off stage. However, that's when a second wave of problems started to surface: the results of the 29 March 2008 elections were only announced after five weeks since the vote had been cast, allowing many critics, both international and domestic, to speculate that the delay was used to manipulate the outcome (McGreal, Tran: 2008). While this may have been the case, we consider the possibility that the delays were caused by the ZEC's realization that the ZANU-PF party would be angry with the results, and it needed preparing, as not to further escalate violence. The ZEC had been under strong pressure, both internally and

² In 2005 the MDC split in two distinct opposition parties: MDC-N(cube), later MDC-M(utambara), led by Arthur Mutambara, and a larger entity, the MDC-T(svangirai), presided by Morgan Tsvangirai.

from international actors. At the SADC summit in Lusaka, in April, which Tsvangirai attended whilst Mugabe did not, Zimbabwean authorities had been urged to release the result expeditiously, and the SADC even offered to send observers, if needed ('Communique', 2008). Tsvangirai (cited in The Independent Staff, 2008) claimed that the elections had not been free, nor fair and that even if MDC wins, he believes that ZANU-PF was trying to subvert popular will. Mugabe, on the other hand, boldly stated on the day of the vote "*We are not in the habit of cheating. We don't rig elections*", further adding that the guilt of such actions would cause him insomnia (Mugabe cited in 'A Report on the Harmonized', 2008: 59). Mbeki remained non-confrontational and, after meeting Mugabe, said there was "*no crisis*" (Mbeki cited in Russell, 2008) in Zimbabwe over the delayed announcements of election results.

The released results showed that Morgan Tsvangirai of MDC-T won 47.9% of the presidential vote, topping the incumbent president Robert Mugabe, whom accumulated 43.2%. (Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, 2008)

In its preliminary report issued on 30 March, the SADC observer mission assessed the election positively, despite some concerns being raised. The mission's head, Jose Marcos Barrica (cited in Reuters Staff, 2008), recounted the election as "*a peaceful and credible expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe*", adding that the elections had been free of violence.

The MDC was 2.11% shy of a historic victory, being defeated in the majority of rural districts – despite the electorate was expecting ZANU-PF to lose by a wide margin (ZESN Staff, 2008). Yet again, the rural communities, in which the land restitution issue was weighing heavily and which were receptive to Mugabe's rhetoric had pulled through and had secured the president a second chance. Mugabe's second chance in the 2008 presidential ballot came in the form of a run-off. Initially, the MDC dismissed any potential run-off, arguing that the vote had been rigged, particularly to award Mugabe another chance.

The international community, whilst overwhelmingly observing that the election process had been carried out in (far) better conditions than in the past, was not satisfied with the result. This second round was held on 27 June 2008, amid allegations of widespread electoral flaws and institutionalised violence. It ended with a regression to the pre-29 March era and the infringements of several rights, such as that of choosing one's leaders. Tsvangirai announced on April 15 that he was willing to participate in the run-off only if certain conditions were met: the SADC was to oversee the election, the election was to be conducted "*transparently, freely and fairly*", and all international observers were to be allowed to monitor it (Tsvangirai cited in Sibanda, 2008). Two days later, while in Johannesburg, Tsvangirai said that Mbeki should be "*relieved of his duties*" (Tsvangirai cited in Russel, 2008) as mediator, and asked the Zambian President to "*lead a new initiative ...that will expand beyond that of Mr Mbeki*" (ibid.).

In the pre-run-off stage, violence erupted and, as a result, Tsvangirai decided not to run anymore. On 22 June 2008, he made a formal announcement, motivating his withdrawal on the escalation of political violence and intimidation. As a result, Mugabe ran unchallenged and was declared the winner within 48 hours, in time to participate to an AU summit in Egypt. At the summit, the elephant in the room needed to be addressed, thus the AU mandated the SADC to resume its mediation, noting that the crisis had not ended. In 2002, Mbeki had tried to foster a government of national unity (GNU), heading straight to Harare after Mugabe was sworn-in as president. He asked Mugabe for a GNU

and to appoint Tsvangirai vice-president, an honorary position such as that received by F. W. de Klerk in Mandela's government (Bond, 2002). While Mbeki's proposal was inspired by South Africa's 1994 elections, it seems that Mugabe found no such inspiration in the historical events of its neighbouring state and refused to reward the MDC in any way. Tsvangirai, for his part, was reluctant to push for such a position, knowing that a victory in this battle could mean a loss of trust from his electorate and, consequently, demobilization in the war against ZANU-PF. This time, the situation was different and Tsvangirai knew another chance could not be wasted.

6. The idea(l) of national unity

After the results of the 2008 elections, the SADC was compelled to mandate South Africa, as to allow for a solution to be attained with regards to the key political actors in Zimbabwe. Compromise needed to be reached in order to prevent a political conflict with unforeseeable repercussions, hence Mbeki proposed an inclusive government that, in his mind, would satisfy everyone and put an end to the political standstill. The environment in Zimbabwe had been polarized to such a degree that bridging political opponents, no matter how difficult, seemed the only sustainable solution. Nonetheless, what Mbeki set out to do was not going to be an easy task, as each party had its own distinctive interests and its own apparatus that needed to be taken into consideration. ZANU-PF had to accommodate the needs of an oppressive apparatus encompassing militias, the police, the military and secret services. Each faction of the MDC needed to represent labour unions and the power structures from law and order, the judiciary and CSOs that had not been co-opted by ZANU. Furthermore, there were distinctive economic elites backing each party, whom needed something in return for their support³.

It is our opinion that Mbeki could have drawn inspiration for his proposal from the GNU formed by the ANC, the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party in 1994, which capitalized by creating South Africa's first truly democratic constitution. Mugabe, on the other hand could have agreed, remembering the past experiences involving unity arrangements. In 1987, amongst civil turmoil, ZANU and ZAPU had signed the Zimbabwe National Unity Accord, a document which vastly favoured the former and ultimately lead to the formation of ZANU-PF. Mugabe knew that the MDC was a tougher nut to crack under the new political conditions than ZAPU had been in the past, still the president of Zimbabwe was more inclined to accept an inclusive cabinet than his opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai. Furthermore, after the independence of 1980, ZANU-PF constantly had to negotiate power with elites –Rhodesian settlers at first, business owner later - as arguably, even the liberation was won by negotiation, not by a full-fledged war. Mugabe had enough time to constantly accustom himself with the stratagems of staying in power. The MDC-T, however, fought the idea vocally from the get-go. One prominent member, went as far as saying *"We won't touch a government of unity – over my dead body, under no circumstances. The people will never accept a GNU"* (Bennet cited in Goodwin, 2009: 179). The will of the people, while constantly supportive of democracy, was nonetheless more tamed, or perhaps tameable. We argue that other reasons were taken into account by all actors when reaching a decision on the possible GNU. History has taught us that GNUs are not the most stable governance forms, or as one author puts it, *"GNUs are fragile, acrimonious, usually transitional arrangements with a high risk of*

³ ZANU-PF was mostly backed by black business owners, while the MDC had the support of the international business community.

disintegrating at the slightest opportunity" (Mwanaka, 2015: 15). This particularly worried the MDC factions which were willing to cede power, while they observed that Mugabe has no intention of sorts.

Obediah Mazombwe (2008), renowned Mugabe loyalist, wrote before the run-off in 'The Herald' newspaper – one of ZANU-PF's mouthpieces that SADC friends and neighbours must encourage a GNU and help create "*a new constitution for Zimbabwe, which would be adopted only after a national referendum*". Mazombwe's article was contested by ZANU-PF officials, which could lead one to believe that Mugabe was sending covert signals, manifesting his interest for a GNU, but only if allowed to keep his presidential seat. Another interpretation is that Mugabe had no such interest, but used Mazombwe to further confuse MDC leaders. We stand by the first, because it is consonant with Tsvangirai's claims that Mugabe had sent envoys immediately after the election, to propose the formation of a government of national unity, but talks had broken down because ZANU-PF hard-liners (Tsvangirai cited in BBC News Staff, 2008). Thus, the run-off, the murders and the multitude of outbursts of violence could have possibly been avoided if the SADC and South Africa's president were more inclined to acknowledge all available information. A tougher stance by either the regional hegemon's chief or the SADC could have led to avoiding the entire carnage. We consider that Mbeki, for his part, saw a personal victory in the way elections had been conducted and appraised his mediation as a closed case. If one round of the election went satisfactory – albeit only to some degree – he figured out that there was no reason for things to go worse in another stage. However, to use a modified phrase from one of Africa's most fierce past dictators, while freedom of choice was guaranteed, freedom after the initial choice was not (Amin Dada cited in Hadejia, 2007)⁴.

We will not provide a full description of what happened before the run-off, but we will summarize using the SADC observer mission's preliminary report, which argued that the period was characterized by politically motivated violence that resulted in property damage, serious injuries and deaths (SADC Election Observer Mission, 2008: 4). In addition, both candidates publicly acknowledged that they will not agree with, nor respect the results of the ballot, thus breaching the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Ibid.: 4-5).

7. The birth of a self-consuming political matrimony

After extensive negotiations, 11 February 2009 marked the inauguration of Zimbabwe's transitional IG. The festivities were pompous, for its birth represented the culmination of a long and difficult process that had commenced five months earlier, when the Global Political Agreement (GPA) was signed. Both of these occasions were considered historic moments, markedly returning the country to a climate of normality and towards democratic principles. Or at least that's what SADC leaders thought at the time. Finally, the West had been silenced on the Zimbabwe issue, but it did not have any reason to quarrel, as 'African solutions to African problems' had been identified and applied. Thabo Mbeki basked in the sun, for he had been appointed by the SADC to help mediate Zimbabwe's political crisis and it seemed he managed to do just that successfully.

⁴ The initial statement of Idi Amin Dada, President of Uganda throughout 1971-1979 goes as follows: "*There is freedom of speech but I cannot guarantee freedom after speech*".

In that GNU, however, ZANU-PF secured all the relevant ministries⁵, except for the Finance Ministry, where Tendai Biti had the power to push forth MDC ideals (Mwanaka, op. cit.). This was not the only ministry awarded to the MDC, but in most cases, even when the Minister belonged to the MDC, the core of the staff was still composed of ZANU-PF supporters or members, making it really difficult for ‘democratic change’ to be implemented. The weak implementation of the democratization processes heavily advertised by Tsvangirai prior to the elections was also due to his personal failure as a prime minister. The power arrangements had been tailored in such a way that the prime minister had to report directly to the president, and not to parliament, where his party had substantially more power (Ibid.). In doing so, Tsvangirai became more or less a ceremonial leader, seeking presidential approval for his cabinet’s policies. Mugabe was not a forgetful man; accordingly, he never buried the hatchet of war, nor did he intend to allow MDC to severely impact the country’s condition or its behaviour in international politics. When he was not fighting Mugabe, Tsvangirai had to fight the ZANU’s appointed ministers, whom theoretically had to respond, directly to him, but, in practice, were only taking orders and advice from their sending party. Thus, Tsvangirai used the part of the cabinet whom was responsive to his wishes to check and balance the other part of the cabinet - being involved in a constant struggle for power. The MDC continuously voiced its concerns with regards to several officials, from diplomats to provincial governors and senior public servants. ZANU-PF was strengthening its position, taking a firmer grip on financial institutions, by appointing Gideon Gono to be the Reserve Bank’s Governor, and on the judiciary, whom it had pushed into submission several times throughout recent history, thus wilfully breaching the separation of state powers principle. This time, ZANU-PF succeeded in appointing a new Attorney-General, without prior consultations with Tsvangirai or Mutamabara. The new appointee was seen as favourable to ZANU and to Mugabe, and represented a way to provide party members some form of immunity (David Coltart Staff Reporter, 2011). With the aid of the flawed judiciary - in which some justices get protection, while other get ousted and the power-structures it had shaped for decades, ZANU-PF got some MDC members of parliament arrested (The Zimbabwean Staff Reporter, 2017), proving that the struggle for power was far from over as the GNU was only in its cradle. ZANU-PF, on the other hand, was accusing the MDC of establishing parallel power-structures, especially through the office of the prime minister.

The SADC had retracted, leaving the three parties in power to monitor and evaluate if the GPA was being implemented, through a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). Instead of either monitoring externally or creating an independent structure to handle the chore, the SADC decided to let the coalition take care of the issue, essentially making them defendants and jury members concomitantly. As a result, the effectiveness of the JOMIC decreased with time. Furthermore, as one member of the committee announced, interaction with the SADC was limited, even if the latter relied on JOMIC to assess the situation in Zimbabwe (Mushonga cited in News Day Staff, 2011). Lack of communication implied that Zimbabweans were left to pursue their democratization and problem-solving processes. Here, the question of sovereignty comes to mind. Did the SADC want to be non-invasive and not to breach sovereignty? If this was the case, we consider that the institution should have learned from past mistakes. Surely, now it had the conditions to get involved more: Mugabe’s anti-imperialist discourse was

⁵ Ministries of: Defence, Security, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Mining, and, in part the Ministry of Home Affairs.

still strong, but not directed against the Development Community. All parties had allowed the involvement of the SADC and South Africa in mediation; in fact, MDC was still calling for aid, including with regards to this issue. Allowing ZANU-PF to pursue its own plans, without fear of retaliation, even if only verbal, was a clear path to disaster. ZANU-PF dragged issues and threatened to collapse the GNU and the GPA several times (Dzinesa, Zambara, 65). By 2011, South Africa observed what going on, and it approached the issue, but several occasions had already been missed.

8. Interpretation and conclusive remarks

Is what we have presented a story of failure or one of success? Is it a story of institutionalism or does it incarnate realist claims that institutions are just the cover in which pure statism unfolds? None of the two questions posed above has an easy, trenchant answer. On the one hand, this might be a story of success, albeit not a resounding one, for the initial situation was far worse than the outcome of the consecutive stages of mediation. The implication of the SADC did ensue some democratic progress, an alleviation of violence and a (somewhat) functioning government of national unity in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, possible failure resides in the inability to mediate the creation of a government for the people, rather than one that gets consumed by the constant pursuit of the forestalling and the maintaining of political power. It is a story of structural neoliberal institutionalism, inasmuch as a state of national political anarchy – in which political parties threaten to ignore the rules of engagement codified in national and international law – can be mediated through the usage of international regimes and institutions such as the SADC. It is a tale of realism, for under the framework of an institution, we see statism unfolding: one powerful state – arguably the regional hegemon, is mandated (somewhat by choice) to mediate between the opposing political forces in another. South Africa did so in pursuit of its own foreign policy objectives, which, amongst others included ensuring regional stability – vital for its own dominance or, better put, the survival of its position. It is a story of liberalism, for in the absence of one overarching institution to call it him to action, South Africa's president would have been surely accused of breaching sovereignty and acting as a neo-imperialistic power, if trying to tackle the internal power struggles of its neighbour. Furthermore, in its attempt to spread democracy to a space in which a democratic deficit was becoming apparent, South Africa worked for a stable social environment in Zimbabwe, which is a *sine qua non* condition for the stability and prosperity of the region. It is a story of liberalism, for absolute gain was the focus of South Africa in its interaction. Strong economic, cultural and political ties with Zimbabwe were determinant factors in how the mediation process was conducted.

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II. Public Policy. Economic and Social Cohesion

Diana GLIGOR ⇔ *The Cohesion Policy Post 2020 in Romania:
Proposed Programs and Simplification Measures in the Process
of Accessing EU Funding*

Christian BERGMANN ⇔ *Romania within the Realms of the EFTA*

POLGÁR István ⇔ *European Funds, Bargaining Tools and
Founding Targets for Migrant Integration*

THE COHESION POLICY POST 2020 IN ROMANIA: PROPOSED PROGRAMS AND SIMPLIFICATION MEASURES IN THE PROCESS OF ACCESSING EU FUNDING

*Diana GLIGOR**

Abstract. *Romania has been a net beneficiary of the Cohesion Policy, one of the main EU policies, since joining the European Union in 2007. Nowadays, Romania is still facing problems in the use and absorption of structural and cohesion funds, generated by the complex bureaucratic procedures, that are not imposed by the European Union. Simplification measures have been discussed and agreed between the European Commission and the European Parliament, inclusively for the 2014-2020 programming period. At the national level, the simplification measures proposed, in general, can lead to the reducing of bureaucracy, to facilitating the access of the beneficiaries to the non-reimbursable funds allocated to Romania, as well as to the balanced progress of the development regions.*

Keywords: *Cohesion policy, simplification, absorption, European funds, ERDF, ESF+, 2021-2027*

Romania has been a net beneficiary of the Cohesion Policy, one of the main EU policies, since joining the European Union. For all this, both in the 2007-2013 programming period and in the 2014-2020 programming period, the absorption rate of the European structural and cohesion funds has been and is a low one, being generated both by the lack of training of the authorities in charge with administering the allocated funds, as well as the difficult procedures imposed, on the one hand by the European Union and, on the other hand, by the Management Authorities.

The financial allocations granted by means of the Cohesion Policy have a major impact on Romania, representing approximately 60% of the public investments and generating notable results (results for the 2007-2013 programming period): 14,000 SMEs supported, that generated the creation of 51,000 jobs, 2,000 research projects supported, 299 closed landfills, 100 polyclinics and modernized hospitals. (*"Accesarea fondurilor europene, o slăbiciune pe care România a avut-o de la intrarea în Uniunea Europeană"*, Corina Cretu...).

During the programming period 2007 - 2013, Romania benefited from a financial allocation of 19 billion Euros, the absorption rate being 90 - 91% and during the programming period 2014 - 2020, it benefits from a financial allocation of 23 billion Euros (*"Absorbția de fonduri europene trebuie accelerată în 2017, întârzierile costă"*, Corina Cretu).

At present, Romania is still facing problems in the use and absorption of structural and cohesion funds, generated by the complex bureaucratic procedures, that are not

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
imposed by the European Union, fact acknowledged by European Commissioner Corina Crețu, who also emphasized the fact that the regions that are most successful in attracting non-reimbursable funds are those that have implemented simplified measures and support beneficiaries in accessing projects funded from non-reimbursable funds. (*"Corina Crețu despre accesarea fondurilor UE..."*).

Simplification measures have been discussed and agreed between the European Commission and the European Parliament, inclusively for the 2014-2020 programming period, with a series of regulation changes (*Corina Crețu a reprezentat Comisia Europeană ...*) being adopted, such as the use of estimates for certain cost categories, which generates an efficiency of the project implementation process and the reducing of bureaucracy.

In order to determine the causes that lead to delays in the implementation of the programs, both *ex post* and impact assessments were carried out, as well as a public consultation on the funds allocated by the EU through the Cohesion Policy (between January 10th - March 9th, 2018), the main simplification proposals being as follows:

- Reduction of the administrative burden, as it has been found that the administration and control mechanisms of the programs financed through the Cohesion Policy (especially the ERDF and the CF) are complex, generating administrative uncertainty, delays in the implementation of the programs and, implicitly, a low degree of absorption.
- Flexibility in the use of funds allocated to the programs;
- Reducing the administrative costs by simplifying the procedures and norms.

To reduce bureaucracy and make more efficient the use of post-2020 European structural and cohesion funds, a series of simplification measures have been proposed, as well as a unique regulatory framework for 7 funds, with shared administration.



The purpose of the present research aims on the one hand, at identifying the programs/financing lines proposed for the programming period 2021 - 2027 and, on the

other hand, at analysing the simplification measures proposed for the efficiency of the European structural and cohesion funds.

The proposed simplification measures are the subject of the present research, which aims at analysing them and determining the impact generated on Romania and on the potential beneficiaries regarding the use of the non-reimbursable funds allocated for the programming period 2021 - 2027, being known, on the one hand, the problems encountered so far, such as excessive bureaucracy, and on the other hand the fact that Romania will benefit from an increase of the allocated funds, compared to the programming period 2014 – 2020.

Irrespective of which category the simplification measures are destined to (managing authorities of the non-reimbursable funds or final beneficiaries), their purpose is to facilitate their use by the final beneficiaries, at the same time with the efficient development of the regions.

1. The Architecture of the Cohesion Policy in the Programming Period 2021 – 2027

1.1. Introduction

Generally speaking, the European Commission sets forth that the budget for the period 2021 - 2027 be simplified and be more transparent, result-oriented and leading to a reduction of bureaucracy, with a great emphasis as well on respecting the rule of law by all Member States.

From the point of view of architecture, the new programming period has a section of *Cohesion and Values* defined, that includes the following (*Communication from the Commission ...*):

Within this article the focus will be on the **Regional Development and Cohesion**, specifically on the *European Regional Development Fund* and the *Cohesion Fund*, respectively on the **Investments in people, social cohesion and values**, specifically on the *European Social Fund* +, these being at present the main programs of financing from Romania that contribute to reducing the economic, social and territorial disparities.

It is important to mention the fact that the Cohesion Policy of the European Union is the main investments policy of the EU aimed at reducing the gaps between the Member States.

1.2. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF)

During the programming period 2021 - 2027, the ERDF and FC will have 5 objectives, defined as follows (*Annex to the Commission communication ...*):

Although at present the financing programs for the programming period 2021 - 2027 are not defined, out of the objectives set, the domains that the Cohesion Policy will finance can be identified, and these are listed below (*EU Regions Week - Cohesion policy for 2021-2027 – PPT presentation*):

The European Fund for Regional Development shall have a financial allocation (*Annex to the Commission ...*) of 226,308 million de Euro, divided as follows:

- 215.172 million Euro for Investments for economic growth and work force occupancy;
- 9.500 million Euro for European territorial Cooperation;
- 1.637 million Euro for the ultra perriferal regiond and the areas with reduced density of population.

The Cohesion Fund shall have a financial allocation (*ibidem*) of 46,692 million Euro.





Table no. 1: Objectives of the Cohesion Policy post 2020

Smart Europe						
1. Research	2. Digital Services		3. SME competitiveness		4. Skills for RIS3	
Green, Low Carbon Europe						
5. Energy Efficiency	6. Renewable Energy	7. Smart energy grids	8. Climate Change + risks	9. Sustainable Water Mgmt	10. Circular Economy	11. Biodiversity, green Infra.
Connected Europe						
12. Digital networks		13. TEN-T (road, rail, +)		14. Other Transport		15. Sustainable multimodal urban mobility
Social Europe						
16. Labour Market Infra.		17. Education infra.		18. Housing + Social Infra.		19. Health infra.
Europe Closer to the people (Integrated development initiatives)						
20. integrated dev. in urban areas			21. integrated dev. in rural and coastal areas			

1.3 The European+ Social Fund


The objectives (*ibidem*) of the ESF+ in the programming period 2021 – 2027 are the following:



From a financial point of view, the ESF+ shall benefit from a financial allocation (*ibidem*) of 100,000 million Euros.

Upon a closer analysis, compared to the 2014-2020 programming period, the Cohesion Policy will have a higher allocation during the 2014-2020 programming period, but the funds allocated to the ERDF, ESF + and CF will decrease.

Figure no. 1: Financial allocation – Cohesion Policy



The author's own data processing, with data taken from <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/>.

With regard to the financial allocation from the ERDF and the CF for the less developed regions, the regions in the transition period and the more developed regions, the situation is presented in the table below, comparatively between the two programming periods:

Table no. 2. – Continued concentration on less developed regions

	2014-2020	2021-2027
Cohesion Fund	22%	13%
ERDF Less developed regions	53%	62%
ERDF Transition	10%	14%
<u>ERDF More developed</u>	<u>15%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Total	100%	100%
<i>Share CF + ERDF less developed</i>	<i>74%</i>	<i>75%</i>

Thus, it is necessary to ensure an optimal implementation of the programs financed through the Cohesion Policy, to ensure the efficient access and use of the funds, while reducing the excessive bureaucracy. In this respect, a number of 80 simplification measures have been proposed, that are to be implemented during the programming period 2021 - 2027 to ensure the most efficient use of the funds, reducing the administrative costs regarding their implementation in the Member States, as well as and facilitating beneficiaries' access to them.

The following are the main simplification measures proposed by the European Commission, as well as their possible impact at national level.

2. Simplification Measures Proposed and Their Impact

2.1. Reducing the number of regulations and funds (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027..."*):

- *A common regulation for the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund*
- *The European Fund for the Support of the Disfavoured Persons (FEAD), Youth Employment Initiative (EYI) and the European Social Fund – merged in ESF+*

Reducing the number of regulations and simplifying their use is a positive element in approaching the new programming period, as well as increasing the visibility of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union.

An easier understanding of the Cohesion Policy and the pursuit of the legislative provisions, in parallel with its compliance, the reduction of the excessive bureaucracy level and the consultation of a multitude of regulations or the correlation of information within them are the results expected by the European authorities in the new programming period 2021 - 2027.

Merging more funds into one reduces the bureaucracy and facilitates access and understanding of funding programs, this simplification measure a strong point for both funding applicants and Management Authorities who will no longer need to consult more documents and regulations for funding that have the same objectives.

Clarity on the timing of operations and more certainty with regard to the transition (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027..."*).


According to art. 111 of the *Regulation Proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council (Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council...)* provide clear information on the possibility that the Management Authorities to be able to select an operation which, in fact, represents the second stage of an operation

selected for support and that was started during the programming period 2014 - 2020 (according to the (EC) Regulation No 1303/2013) under certain conditions such as: existence of 2 clearly identifiable stages, with a value of over 10 million Euros, clear identification of the expenses included in the Payment Applications and their non-overlapping, the eligibility of the operation in the new programming period and its operationalizing according to the European regulations.

Among the main **effects** generated by this proposal there are the opportunity to finalize the projects started in the programming period 2014 - 2020, in the next programming period, as well as the possibility to start projects towards the end of the programming period, being ensured their financing under the conditions mentioned, in the future programming period.

From the point of view of the **effects** generated by this simplification measure in the case of Romania, an advantage is represented by the fact that, for Romania, this proposal is very beneficial, the problems encountered in the implementation of the projects, especially the major infrastructure projects being well known. However, there is the possibility that the projects that comply with the conditions of the above-mentioned regulation will not be phased by the Romanian authorities, respectively that the conditions imposed will not be taken into consideration, thus losing the opportunity to finalize them in the future programming period.

2.2. Flexibility, administrative capacity integrated with simpler sectoral and simpler objectives (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027"* ...).



Through the DRC, 5 policy (*Propunere de Regulament al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului ...*) objectives are proposed, compared to the programming period 2014 - 2020, which had 11 thematic (policy) objectives defined, thus being

simplified, on the one hand, their understanding and application by the Member States, and on the other hand by simplifying the reporting process and granting the possibility of a more flexible transfer of funds among established priorities.

The establishing of 5 thematic objectives also leads to the avoidance of long descriptions of the activities financed within them, providing, in fact, financing directions for the Member States.

A positive impact generated by this simplification measure, for **Romania**, is represented by the possibility to finance projects and activities that represent real needs for the population, which fall within the 5 policy objectives, without imposing predefined activities that, perhaps, do not fully reflect the existing needs.

From a negative point of view, however, there is a risk of over-bureaucratizing the process of accessing non-reimbursable European funds precisely because of the lack of predefined activities, thus making it difficult to access these funds on the one hand, and on the other hand, financing of activities that are not necessary for the communities from Romania to the detriment of other needs

2.3. Simplifying the norms for thematic concentration (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027" ...*):

The ERDF and CF regulation (NB: the proposal for regulation) provides for the maintenance of the conditions regarding the thematic concentration and the majority directing of the budgetary resources allocated (60-65%) to two of the most important policy objectives: OP 1 and OP 2, described above.

However, certain criteria with regard to the thematic concentration were established, thus being given flexibility to each Member State:

Table no. 3 – Thematic concentrations

For countries with:	Minimum percentage „OP 1”	Minimum percentage „OP 2”
VNB below 75 %	35%	30%
VNB between 75-100%	45%	30%
VNB over 100 %	60%	Not applicable OP 1 and OP 2 min. 85 %

The simplification of the norms regarding the thematic concentration leads to a more focused approach of the existing needs at the level of the Member States, giving them the necessary flexibility to define and identify solutions adapted to them, the main criterion considered being that of the level of development for each MS.

At present, it is well known that the existing European structural and investment funds at the level of Romania are useful, but they are granted without taking into account the gaps and specific needs pertaining to each development region, financing activities that in some regions are more than necessary but in other regions they no longer represent current problems, a good example being the discrepancies in the North West or West region with those in the south of the country (e.g. South West Oltenia), reflected both in the standard of living of population, as well as degree of accessing European structural and cohesion funds.

Thus, a question that arises is whether all Member States have the same level of development (and the answer is, of course, no) and whether the thematic concentration of non-reimbursable European funds should not be achieved depending on the level of development of each state and its development needs.

Thus, the main thematic concentration for the first two policy objectives (a smarter Europe and a greener Europe) seen from the perspective of the less developed Member States represents a channelling of funds to certain over-developed sectors, compared to the needs in the territory (e.g.: financing of smart specialization projects at the expense of financing basic infrastructure improvement projects - a necessity for small cities in Romania, as a support point in reducing the migration rate of the population to larger, more developed cities).

2.4. Simplification of programming documents (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027" ...*):

In order to streamline the use of funds, the proposed Regulation (DRC) eliminates the **Common Strategic Framework**. Simplification measures have also been proposed regarding the **Partnership Agreement**¹, as follows:

- Transmitting it for the approval of the Commission before OR together with the first program sent for certifying;
- Simplified structure, objective oriented;
- Sending the observations by the Commission to the Member State, within maximum of 3 months from the receipt of the Partnership Agreement and / or its approval within maximum 4 months after receiving it in final / revised form. If the Partnership Agreement is transmitted with a program, the approval period is 6 months.

In what concerns the **programs proposed for the new programming period**, these will have a more concise structure, being clearly established, according to Art. 17 of the DRC. the information and the way to achieve these programs. Thus, each program is made up of priorities which must meet a policy objective mentioned above and which in [their] turn are made up of specific objectives.

Also, at the time of carrying out the program, certain aspects and recommendations should be taken into account, such as: social and economic disparities at the level of each MS, country-specific recommendations, experiences from previous programming periods, etc.

Moreover, the **indicators** will be set at the level of specific objectives, without being further broken down at the level of investment priorities, thus streamlining the programming process.

Regarding the **modification of the programs** during the programming period, the transfer of amounts up to maximum 5% from the initial allocation of an investment priority shall be allowed, but maximum 3% of the total budget of the proposed program will be allowed to be made to another investment priority from within the same program without the need for Commission approval².

NB: for the ERDF and ESF + - the above condition only applies if the transfer is made within the same category of regions.

The evaluation of the performance and the technical adjustment are made concomitantly, in the year 2025, based on the latest statistical data, thus it is possible to propose, by each MS, the modification of the programs initially proposed. In correlation

¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/RO/COM-2018-375-F1-RO-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>, art. 9

² <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/RO/COM-2018-375-F1-RO-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>, art. 19, alin 5

with this condition, at the time of the proposal of the programs for the period 2021 - 2027, in the PA framework model the amounts related to the proposed programs are only until 2025.

According to article 88 din RDC, the Commission offers the possibility that the MS to use, as a **way of settlement**, the option of unit costs, lump sums and instalments.

In the case of **Romania**, this simplification measure may, again, have a positive impact materialized in the increase of the absorption degree and the more efficient use of the funds, oriented towards results, the simplification of the procedures for accessing them by the final beneficiaries, provided they do not impose additional conditions to those imposed by the European Commission and to reduce bureaucracy.

Reducing bureaucracy and of the additional conditions to those imposed by European authorities is a necessity, being a problem identified in both the 2007-2013 programming period and the 2014-2020 programming period, confirmed by European Commissioner Corina Crețu.

2.5. Elimination of rules on major projects, those on state aid and cost independent financing (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027"*...).

In the new programming period, major projects will no longer need the Commission's prior approval, thus being reduced the bureaucratic burden, on the one hand, and delays in project implementation, on the other hand.

The proposed measure may have a positive impact and may speed up their achieving and implementation, being eliminated a bureaucratic measure that, in some cases, would delay the implementation of projects.

Another measure aimed at reducing the bureaucratic burden is the elimination of the norms regarding the verification of income-generating projects, remaining only the state aid norms.

According to art. 61 of EU Regulation 1303/2013, the net revenues generated by the projects with non-reimbursable financing are defined as: *"net income" means the cash inflows paid directly by users for the goods or services within the operation, such as taxes directly borne by the users for the operation, the use of the infrastructure, the sale or rental of land or buildings or the payments for services, minus the possible costs of operating and replacing the equipment with short life, incurred during the corresponding period*³.

State aid is defined in accordance with Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as follows: *"State aid or through state resources, in any form, which distort or threaten to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or, are incompatible with the internal market the production of certain goods, insofar as they affect trade between Member States"*⁴.

This simplification measure can lead to positive effects as a result of the reduction of bureaucratic verification processes, but it can also produce negative effects by generating discrepancies between the private and public ones.

Thus, a public beneficiary whose co-financing rate is 2% (the case of most UATs that, for example, request financing through the Regional Operational Program) is advantaged by this simplification measure which gives it the possibility to charge fees for

³ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1303&from=ro>, accessed on 14.05.2019

⁴ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF, accessed on 14.05.2019

using the built infrastructure per project (thing which is not possible in the current programming period only in a percentage of maximum 50% of the value of the expenses generated by the infrastructure created by the project) as compared to a private beneficiary whose project, income generator, has a co-financing rate between 10% -50%.

Thus, there is a possibility that a non-reimbursable financing will not be considered as state aid but will create inequalities between different types of beneficiaries.

With regard to the *contribution of the European Union*, this will be divided into 3 broad categories:

- Financing that is not related to costs - reimbursements based on meeting certain objectives or achieving results;
- Reimbursement of the amounts spent by the MS based on the supporting financial documents;
- Reimbursement on the basis of unit costs, lump sums and rates, based on pre-established and approved mechanisms in the PA or later, by a Commission decision

One of the great benefits of the proposed reimbursement method is, in addition to reducing the administrative burden, the result-oriented approach and the achievement of objectives at the expense of cost verification.

With regard to the funds allocated for Technical Assistance, these will be reimbursed by MS proportional to the progress of the implementation of the proposed programs, 2.5% being allocated to the ERDF and 4% to the ESF +.

Regarding the eligibility of expenses, the Value Added Tax (VAT)⁵ is eligible for projects with a value of below 5,000,000 Euros (maintaining the conditions for deductibility / non-deductibility of VAT). For all projects with a higher value than the above, VAT represents a non-deductible expense, being borne by the beneficiary.

The impact will be, from my perspective, more negative, especially for the beneficiaries of the public authorities because the amounts will be borne out of the local budget, creating pressure on it.

Viewed from another perspective, this simplification measure aims to make the use of European money more efficient. Thus, the Value Added Tax, according to the legislation in force, in the case of beneficiaries that do not pay VAT, is reimbursed to the Ministry of Finance. It is understandable why such a decision on the ineligibility of VAT is proposed as a measure to simplify and streamline non-refundable funds. The only question that arises is why the 5,000,000 Euro threshold is set.

2.6. Reducing the number of checkings (*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027" ...*).

The *ex-ante* evaluation has been simplified, the number of elements contained being reduced and, moreover there being the possibility of updating the existing *ex-ante* evaluations. The responsibility for carrying out this activity lies solely with the Management Authority.

With regard to the financial instruments, each Member State has the right to decide, at the time of concluding the Partnership Agreement or during the implementation of the proposed programs, through a request for revising the Partnership Agreement, the

⁵ <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/RO/COM-2018-375-F1-RO-MAIN-PART-1.PDF>, art. 58

contribution to InvestEU of maximum 5% of the financial allocation of each fund. The contribution adds to reducing bureaucracy and ensuring a budgetary guarantee mechanism at European Union level.

In order to simplify the process as well, the financial instruments can be combined with the grants as a single operation and the norms on the reporting mechanisms have been simplified and are result oriented.

2.7. Streamlining the way of reporting and evaluation of the programs

(*"Manual de simplificări - 80 măsuri de simplificare în politica de coeziune 2021-2027" ...*).

An important aspect to be mentioned in the simplification process is the elimination of annual reports by the Management Authorities to the Commission. In this respect, the open data platform will be used and the management authorities have the obligation to send data every two months (the first reporting being on January 31st). Thus, it is aimed at, on the one hand, reducing bureaucracy and, on the other hand, at paying more attention to the efficiency of project implementation.

It should be borne in mind that although during the 2014 - 2020 programming period, the beneficiaries and the Intermediate Bodies / Management Authorities had to carry out all projects financed through the Cohesion Policy by the MySmis2014 platform, this, in November 2019, works only partially, only the modules intended for project submission and contracting can be used, without a workable module for project implementation. Thus, all the procedures for the implementation of projects, such as requests for reimbursement / payment, progress reports, submission of procurement files for approval are submitted in physical format.

Also, the performance reserve used in the previous programming period is eliminated. Moreover, the established indicators will be part of the performance evaluation without the need to establish some specific program indicators. They are set at the level of specific objectives.

2.8. Reintroducing the n + 2 rule, increasing national co-financing, maximizing the results, re-ensuring complementarity in the funds (*Anexă la Comunicarea Comisiei ..., 33*).

Reintroducing the n + 2 rule aims at a better financial administration by the Member States of the funds allocated through the Cohesion Policy and also at a faster beginning of the programming period, while ensuring a higher responsibility of the Member States in what concerns the funds allocated to them, by enhancing the national co-financing.

Also, in order to maximize the results obtained, a complementarity between the funds within the Cohesion Policy is proposed, according to their specificity.

Having in mind the proposed changes, the Romanian authorities must get mobilized in order to implement efficiently the Cohesion Policy 2021 - 2027 (having in mind the increase of the national co-financing), to start the implementation of the Cohesion Policy at the beginning of the new programming period (being known that Romania launched the calls for projects related to the programming period 2014 - 2020 rather late - after about 1-1.5 years) and to ensure a common implementation framework for complementary projects (more details in the case study in the next section).

However, it remains to be seen whether national co-financing will increase compared to the current programming period (this being one of the main topics currently negotiated between the Member States and the Brussels authorities). Viewed from a

different perspective, increasing the share of co-financing may lead to a better and more careful use of EU funds, but the allocation of larger amounts from national budgets is not an available option to all Member States.

3. Case Study: Complementarity of Erdf – Esf (Social Services Meant for Elderly)

One of the measures of efficiency, of maximizing the impact of the Cohesion Policy and of putting into practice the new regulations for the programming period 2021 - 2027 is represented by the combination of the support provided by the European Social Fund+ with the one from the European Regional Development Fund.

This simplification and efficiency-making measure is more than welcome, having as a main purpose correlating the hard components of the projects (the infrastructure part) with the soft components (human capital), the expected result being that by the end of implementing the projects, persons being in different situations of vulnerability should benefit from them, but also to bring added value to investments in infrastructure.

In Romania, the operational programs financed by the ERDF during the programming period 2014 - 2020 are partially administered by the Ministry of European Funds (POIM, POCU, etc.) or by the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration (ROP).

Although the simplification measure proposed for the programming period 2021 - 2027 exists at the present time as a provision in the applicant's guides related to ROP and POCU, the Management Authorities of the two operational programs do not have a common methodology or agreement for their administration, each of the two programs implementing the projects according to their own calendar, without taking into account the complementarity of the 2 programs.

The following describes a concrete example of the non-correlation of the 2 operational programs regarding the complementarity of the projects.

The call for projects for the elderly **POR / 8 / 8.1 / 8.3 / A / 1** was opened in March 2017, with the objective of increasing the coverage of social services, in particular the financing of the rehabilitation / extension / modernization and endowment of the infrastructure of social services without a residential component, intended for the elderly. It was open until 04.09.2017.

According to the applicant's guide, the call for projects was complementary to projects financed through the Human Capital Operational Program, in order to *"ensure / improve / pay staff who will provide social services in the infrastructure of the project"* (*Applicant's Guide ...*, 26.).

Moreover, in the same applicant guide the following was stated: "From this perspective, the complementary POCU project for ensuring the human resource to the standards required to obtain the license is very important and offers additional support for ensuring the provision of social services in the building that is the object of the ROP project" (*Applicant's Guide ...*, 27), being also a scoring criterion (5 points were awarded for assuming the submission of a complementary project, financed through POCU).

The submitted projects have entered the evaluation phase and starting from the end of 2018 - the beginning of 2019, the Financing Contracts have been signed in order to implement them, respectively to ensure the necessary infrastructure for the provision of social services.

In July 2018, the call for projects AP 4 / PI 9.ii / OS 4.4 was launched - Grandparents of the Community - Social and socio-medical services for the elderly,

financed through POCU, call complementary to the call for projects **POR / 8 / 8.1 / 8.3/A/1**, having as the deadline for submission of projects the month of October 2018.

The general objective of the call for projects was to support the provision of social services to the elderly, as well as facilitating their access to integrated services, financing the human resources needed to provide them, as well as all the related expenses (e.g. supplies, sanitary materials, etc.).

Also, within this guide the mentioning appeared: "Within this call, complementarity with the *Regional Operational Program and with the National Rural Development Program*" is encouraged, being also a scoring criterion.

The projects submitted within this call were evaluated and the list of the winning projects was published in April 2019, thus starting the pre-contractual stage in order to sign the financing contracts.

Thus, the beneficiaries who have submitted projects for both financing the infrastructure and ensuring the functioning of day centers for the elderly and who have signed financing contracts for both can be declared themselves as the happy beneficiaries of both the hard component of the investment and the soft component. But things are not really like that.

The projects financed by the Regional Operational Programme for the insurance of the infrastructure were actually started at the end of 2018 - the beginning of 2019, the first stage being the acquisition of the design services for the elaboration of the technical execution project or (for the projects with technical project carried out), the actual acquisition of the execution works. This process takes approximately 3-6 months depending on the type of beneficiary (public / private). To this term must be added the effective period of completion of construction / rehabilitation / modernization works of at least 12 months. By a simple calculation, the infrastructure needed to provide social services to the elderly will be completed by June 2020 at the earliest.

On the other hand, the financing contracts for the projects financed by POCU began to be signed starting with June 2019, the beneficiaries being "obliged" by the financing contract to start the implementation of activities immediately after its signing (or, in exceptional cases, they have the possibility to suspend the implementation of the project with 3 months).

The questions that arise in this situation are the following:

1. In what infrastructure the social services, financed by the POCU, will be provided, since the POR-funded works for this purpose will be completed at the earliest in June 2020?
2. Why is there no correlation between the Management Authorities of the two operational programs, since in both the applicant's guides there is a great emphasis on the complementarity of the two operations?

In order to identify a solution regarding the situation mentioned above, a point of view request was sent to both Management Authorities. We present below the essence of the answers received, with the mentioning that the identity of the person who requested of the point of view will not be divulged:

Answer I AM POR (Management Authority for ROP): *"Given the particularities of the two projects, their sequence is important too, so that for carrying out the " soft" activities, we consider that it is absolutely necessary to achieve the correlation with the fulfilment of the ROP project objective, namely the completion of the rehabilitation of the social centre. To the same extent, achieving the objectives of the ROP project depends on the accomplishment of the POCU project".*

ANSWER II AM POCU (Management Authority for Human Capital OP):

"... We cannot assume the responsibility for the implementation of a POR project, as long as we have not conditioned there is no way to grant the POCU funding from the funding received through the POR" and "We assure you that for every project in a similar situation, the conditions of implementation were analysed and together with the beneficiary of the financing there was identified the optimal solution for carrying out the grant agreement ...".

The lack of correlation between the two institutions leads to placing the beneficiary of the non-reimbursable financing into difficulty, the latter being forced, either to give up one of the non-reimbursable financing obtained, or the inefficient use of the funds by providing social services at a lower quality (due to a lack of optimal space for the provision of social services), neither of the two variants being beneficial to the target group aimed at, or to the beneficiary of non-reimbursable funds, nor to the Romanian authorities from the point of view of the results assumed within the Cohesion Policy.

Thus, although simplification measures are proposed, it is necessary to ensure their compliance by the European Commission or other relevant authorities, otherwise they do not produce the expected results.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

Reducing the administrative burden is a desired goal set by the European Commission, a series of measures having been taken over time in this respect.

The majority of the simplification measures proposed over time as well as for the programming period 2021 - 2027, aim at making the procedures for accessing the non-reimbursable funds more efficient, both for the authorities with powers and attributions in managing them and for the beneficiaries

At European level, the simplification measures proposed and analysed above are aimed at reducing bureaucracy, being proposed based on best practice examples from the regions with the highest absorption [rate]and which have demonstrated a good management of the allocated funds.

At the national level, the simplification measures proposed, in general, can lead to the reducing of bureaucracy, to facilitating the access of the beneficiaries to the non-reimbursable funds allocated to Romania, as well as to the balanced progress of the development regions.

In order to benefit to the maximum by the simplification measures, Romania should take some measures, such as:

- Reducing the administrative burden by imposing only those conditions existing in the European regulations, without imposing additional conditions that are not required by the Commission;
- Use of settlement through options of simplified costs made available by the European Commission;
- Financing some activities that fall within the policy objectives adapted to the specific needs of the development regions without imposing predefined activities for all regions.

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https://ec.europa.eu/romania/news/20171212_comisar_corina_cretu_simplificare_accesare_fonduri_europene_ro, accessed on 07.03.2019

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ROMANIA WITHIN THE REALMS OF THE EFTA

*Christian BERGMANN**

Abstract. *Romania entered the European Union in 2007 and from then on, two important countries outside of the European Union started to help with financial grants. Norway and Switzerland from the European Free Trade Association. Several programmes and projects have been founded since and are still in work. The aim of this article is to present briefly the EFTA and the financial aid programmes of the two countries. Also, at the end of the article, there will be a short and non-representative comparison of projects founded by the two countries. But the article also wants to show how well do the involved institutions inform the general public by means of websites and electronic documents, stats and data.*

Keywords: *EFTA, Swiss-Romanian-Cooperation-Program, Norwegian Grants to Romania, EEA-Grants to Romania, financial contribution and help.*

A brief introduction to the relation between Romania and the four countries of the European Free Trade Association. With a small comparison of projects in Romania financed by Switzerland and Norway.

Introduction

Before we go into the analysis, I would like to have a few words on the sources and method which helped develop following article. The method is simple content analysis, the aim is to describe and reproduce the content of official communication¹. The sources are all official, that means only those documents have been taken into account, which are emitted by the involved institutions like official government websites, statements and informations, treaties or statistics. The guiding question will be: How well does the sender, in our case the institution or organization, inform the recipient, in our case the broad public, about the matter at hand? But the endeavor is not only of analytical nature, you will notice there are no authors mentioned in the bibliography at the end. There are two reasons for that, one is I wanted to get a close and unbiased picture of the situation, no interpreted or second-hand information was consulted. Second, I wanted to see how much information can be obtained without having to rely on other authors and their research. More like a transparency check.

Also the article will be a description of the relations and implications, there will be no interpretation of the events nor a conclusion following the actions. It will be up to the reader to form an opinion and judge the happening. I will only summarize the quality of the analysis at the end. The article will start with a description of the EFTA, followed by illustrating the relations between Switzerland and Romania and the relations between

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¹ Diekmann, A. *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung* 2003 p. 482

Norway and Romania. At the end, there will be a small, non representative comparison of choosen projects. That will give us an idea of how the two countries handle comparable topics in Romania, especially from a financial point of view.

The European Free Trade Association²

As we all know the European Union (EU) is still made up of 28 member states; but if you take a closer look at the European political map, you will notice uncharted territory: Switzerland, Norway, Island and Lichtenstein. These four countries are not part of the EU but the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This association was founded 1960 in Stockholm and consisted of Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. In 1961 Finnland became an associated member, in 1970 Iceland became a full member, in 1986 Finnland became a full member and in 1991 Lichtenstein became a full member. But most of the founder members left the EFTA to join the European Economic Community (EEC), starting with Denmark and the UK in 1972, Portugal in 1985 and in 1995 Austria, Finnland and Sweden left to join the EU. Today (2019) there are only four members left: Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.

Since the inception of the EFTA, it agreed to several bilateral treaties, the most important is the Luxembourg Declaration of 1984 on broader cooperation between the EEC and EFTA and the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), signed in Porto, Portugal in 1992. Switzerland rejected the participation in the EEA though, by peoples referendum. In 1994 the EEA Agreement entered into force between the EU and the five EFTA states. But right after it, three countries left the association. Today there are only Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein left as full participants in the EEA Agreement. The EEA Agreement is regularly revised in order to bring it in line with developements in the relevant EU laws, the so called „acquis communautaire“. Switzerland did not take part in the EEA Agreement but it benefits from an observer status in the EFTA pillar of the EEA. This allows them to closely monitor and follow developements of the EEA and the EUs acquis communautaire. Since the early 1970s, Switzerland negotiated a series of bilateral sectoral agreements, first with the EEC and after with the EU³.

But what is the EFTA and what does it stand for? Unlike the EU, the EFTA is not a customs or monetary union although the original purpose was to remove customs duties on industrial products in trade among its member states. It is an intergovernmental organisation but the individual member states are basically free to set their own customs tariffs and arrange other foreign trade measures vis-a-vis non-EFTA states⁴. As stated, EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation and it was set up for the promotion of free trade and economic integration between its member states⁵. The main tasks of the association are threefold⁶:

- Maintaining and developing the EFTA Convention, which regulates economic relations between the four member states.

² [www.efta.int/About-EFTA/EFTA through the years](http://www.efta.int/About-EFTA/EFTA%20through%20the%20years) Website consulted November 2019.

³ www.seco.admin.ch/seco/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/internationale_organisationen/eftr/EWR.html Website consulted November 2019.

⁴ www.seco.admin.ch/seco/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/internationale_organisationen/eftr.html Website consulted November 2019.

⁵ www.efta.int/About-EFTA/european-free-trade-association Website consulted November 2019

⁶ Ibid.

- Managing the EEA Agreement, which brings together the member states of the EU and three of the EFTA states – Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway – in a single market, also referred to as the internal market
- Developing EFTAs worldwide network of free trade agreements

The EEA Agreement is the most important agreement for EFTA and therefore requires a short presentation. The EEA Agreement brings together the 28 EU member states and the three EEA EFTA states Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein in the internal market governed by the same basic rules⁷. Under the EEA Agreement, Norway and Norwegians (valid for Iceland and Lichtenstein too but not for Switzerland, they have the Bilateral Agreements I and II) have the same rights and obligations as other EEA countries citizens when it comes to trade, investment, banking and insurance, and buying and selling services. They also have the same right to work, study and live in other countries in the EEA⁸. It also guarantees the EU single market's four freedoms, as well as non-discrimination and equal rules of competition through the EEA area. But that's not all, it covers cooperation in other important areas such as research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism and culture⁹.

Now let us have a look at the important institutions of the EFTA. The institutional framework for the EEA Agreement is often described as having a two-pillar structure: the EFTA states and the EU. There are four joint EEA institutions in which representatives of the EEA EFTA states and representatives of the EU meet: the EEA Council and the EEA Joint Committee, which can be seen as forming a bridge between the two pillars, and the EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee and the EEA Consultative Committee, in which parliamentarians and social partners from the two pillars meet. The most important institutions in the EFTA pillar are the EFTA Standing Committee, the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court. There are also two advisory bodies: the EFTA Consultative Committee and the EFTA Parliamentary Committee¹⁰.

Another difference to the EU is the decision making process. The decision making process in the EEA Agreement is characterised by its two-pillar structure. Substantive decisions relating to the EEA Agreement and its operation are a joint venture with the EU and in the hands of common bodies. The EEA EFTA States have not transferred any legislative competencies to the EEA institutions and they are unable, constitutionally, to accept direct decisions by the Commission or the European Court of Justice. To cater for this situation, the EEA Agreement established EEA EFTA bodies to match those on the EU side. The EEA EFTA States take all decisions by consensus as opposed to the EU side where decisions related to EEA legislation are normally taken by majority vote¹¹. But there are also fields which are not covered by the EEA Agreement:

Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies (relevant especially for Norway and Iceland). Customs Union. Common Trade Policy. Common Foreign and Security Policy. Justice and Home Affairs. And the Economic and Monetary Union¹².

⁷ www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/eos/ Website consulted November 2019.

⁸ Ibid

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/eos/eea_bodies Website consulted December 2019

¹¹ www.efta.int/eea/eea-institutions. Website consulted December 2019

¹² www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/eos/agreement/ Website consulted November 2019

Just as a reminder, the *Acquis Communautaire* was mentioned and we should briefly have a look at it¹³. The A.C is a French term referring to the legal order of the European Union. It is the cumulative body of EU legislation consisting of primary and secondary legislation. The primaries are treaties and protocols and the secondaries are regulations, directives and decisions. It also consists of the case law of the EU Court of Justice, its most famous is the *Cassis de Dijon* principle. The *acquis* therefore comprises the objectives of the EU, its policies and rules governing these policies. All member states are bound to comply with the A.C because EU law has primacy over national law and candidate countries have to accept the *acquis* and integrate it into their own legal system. Another reminder are the four freedoms of the EU¹⁴. Thanks to the Single Market, people, goods, services and money can move around the EU almost as freely as within a single country. These four indivisible freedoms of movement have become an integral part of daily life in Europe, the Single Market is one of the EU's greatest achievements. The Norwegian government website goes deeper into details¹⁵:

The principle of free movements of goods ensures that products originating in an EEA state may circulate freely within the internal market. Customs duties and quantitative restrictions of trade on such products are prohibited within the EEA. Through the free movement of persons, all EEA nationals have the right to work in any other EEA state. Under the EEA Agreement individuals and companies enjoy freedom of establishment and the right to provide services across the EEA on equal terms. The free movement of capital enables cross-border investments by residents and companies in the EEA, without discrimination on grounds of nationality, place of residence or place of establishment.

With this more extensive explanation, we can see that the four freedoms are extended to the three countries of the EFTA, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. Switzerland has its own bilateral agreements with the European Union, with similar freedoms. After this brief overview, let us have a look at Switzerland and Norway and at their connection to Romania.

The Swiss-Romanian-Cooperation Program

The following chapter will depict the relations between the EFTA country Switzerland and Romania. But this will not be a history lesson about Swiss-Romanian-relations from the past, we will talk only about the relations since Romania entered the European Union in 2007.

In 2006, the Swiss Federal Council and the Council of the European Union signed the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Swiss financial assistance for the 10 Member States that acceded to the EU on May 1. 2004. Switzerland made an overall contribution of 1.302 billion CHF to support 210 projects in the EU-10 countries¹⁶. The aim of this financial mechanism is to reduce the economic and social disparities within the enlarged European Union and between different regions of development of the beneficiary

¹³ ec.europa.eu/agriculture/glossary/acquis-communautaire_en Official website of the European Commission, consulted November 2019

¹⁴ ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/factsheet_single_market.pdf. Document available from the European Commission website, under Publications: The Single Market: Europe's best asset in a changing world.

¹⁵ www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/european-policy/eos/agreement/ Website consulted November 2019

¹⁶ www.eda.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/documents/Publikationen/2017-jahresbericht-eb_EN.pdf. Document downloaded December 2019

countries. In 2008, the Swiss Federal Council has decided to increase the Swiss financial contribution for Romania and Bulgaria. Therefore, in 2009, the Swiss Parliament approved the additional contribution to Romania with a total amount of 181 million CHF for a payment period of 10 years. As a result, between the Government of Romania and the Swiss Federal Council, the Framework Agreement to implement the Swiss – Romanian Cooperation Programme was signed. The Framework Agreement was approved by the Government Decision no. 1065/2010¹⁷. The program ran until December 7. 2019, the ten years time frame was divided into two phases, one commitment phase until 2014 and one implementation phase from 2014 until 2019. That means project selection took place within the first five years and by the end of the commitment period, all of the projects had to be completed¹⁸.

Several federal agencies have taken on duties linked to the enlargement contribution. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) are responsible for the organisation and implementation of the enlargement contribution projects, while the Directorate for European Affairs (DEA) provides support in regard to Switzerland's policy with the EU¹⁹.

The distribution of the monetary contribution among the thirteen partner states is based on a formula established on the basis of population size and income per capita. Switzerland has concluded bilateral framework agreements with each partner state, which define the project supports after consultation with the partner countries and independently from the EU. The SDC and the SECO through the local offices in Bucharest, are in charge of the programmes' implementation from the Swiss side²⁰. On the Romanian side, the „Unitatea Nationala de Coordonare (UNC)“ or National Coordination Unit of the Public Finances Ministry is responsible for the coordination of the activities in regards of implementation²¹ and the „Directia Generala de Mecanisme si Instrumente Financiare Europene Nerambursabile“ of the Ministry of Regional Development, Public Administration and European Funds, has the payment authority concerning the founding of the projects²². As a sidenote, the Romanian institutions are also responsible for the management of other funds like the Norwegian Funds, detailed in the next chapter.

Now let us have a look at the fields where the projects had been chosen from. Part of Switzerland's activities in Romania are implemented by way of thematic funds. There are a total of seven thematic funds covering key areas: security, civil society, partnerships, Roma integration, health, research and scholarships²³. But there is more, integrated within the seven funds: stability and support for reforms, environment and infrastructure, promoting private sector and human resources²⁴. While the thematic funds

¹⁷ www.dpfb.ro/programul_de_cooperare_elvetiano_roman_en.html Website consulted December 2019

¹⁸ www.eda.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/Publikationen/jahresbericht-2018_EN.pdf. Document consulted December 2019

¹⁹ www.erweiterungsbeitrag.admin.ch/eda/en/foreign-policy/european-politics/contribution-enlarged-eu.html. Website consulted December 2019

²⁰ dominoproject.bg/en/swiss-contribution-to-the-enlarged-eu. Website consulted December 2019

²¹ www.swiss-contribution.ro/swiss/despreUNC_ro.html. Website consulted December 2019

²² www.mfinante.gov.ro/acp.html. Website consulted December 2019

²³ www.erweiterungsbeitrag.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/documents/Publikationen/jahresbericht-2018_EN.pdf. Document consulted December 2019

²⁴ www.swiss-contribution.ro/swiss/afisarePagina.html. Website consulted December 2019

are administered by Swiss fund managers (Swiss Intermediate Bodies), the projects supported by the funds are implemented and managed by local executive agencies. This approach also promotes partnerships with Swiss organisations in the relevant thematic area and ensures that the appropriate Swiss expertise is available. This is decisive for the success of the project because, in many cases, local institutions have not yet acquired the necessary expertise to properly fulfill the project²⁵.

The Swiss EDA provides a 2018 report where we can have a look at some achievements so far, so far because the final report will only be available in 2020²⁶.

- Promoting economic growth and improving working conditions
10 (sub-)projects CHF 53 352 250
- Improving social security
11 (sub-)projects CHF 24 257 382
- Protecting the environment
14 (sub-)projects CHF 52 169 669
- Improving public safety and security
22 (sub-)projects CHF 17 999 999
- Strengthening civil society
(sub-)projects CHF 21 166 970
- Project preparation and technical assistance
2 (sub-)projects CHF 3 003 730

Total CHF 171 950 000

(Not including the implementation costs on the Swiss side, 9 Million and 50 thousand Swiss Francs)

So much for the numbers, and now let us see who was eligible for the financial aid during the last ten years. The partners and beneficiaries included a broad range from the public and private sectors, also non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations like cities or communes or environmental agencies and associations but also the national institutions of Romania. The aim was to build partnerships between Swiss and Romanian bodies for enriching the relations between the two countries. Cooperation and institutional partnerships were strongly encouraged, especially in focus areas in which Switzerland contributes particular experience, know-how and technologies²⁷.

The Swiss Federal Council is deciding about a second 10 year cooperation programme with a total budget for Romania of 221.5 million Swiss Francs, 40 million more²⁸.

The Norwegian Funds

After the short presentation of the Swiss programme, let us have a look at the Norwegian one.

²⁵ www.erweiterungsbeitrag.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/documents/Publicationen/jahresbericht-2018_EN.pdf. Document consulted December 2019

²⁶ www.erweiterungsbeitrag.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/documents/Publikationen/jahresbericht-2018_EN.pdf. Document consulted December 2019

²⁷ www.eda.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/documents/Laender/Annex1-Rumaenien_en.pdf. Document consulted December 2019

²⁸ www.erweiterungsbeitrag.admin.ch/dam/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/documents/Publicationen/volks-wirtschaft-ungleichheiten-in-der-eu-verringern-2018_EN.pfd Document consulted December 2019

The history of the EEA and Norway Grants covers 25 years of European cooperation starting in 1994 with the EEA Agreement but here too, our focus lies on the time period starting in 2007, after Romania's accession to the EU. There are two relevant time periods, one is between 2009 and 2014 in which Romania received a total of 306 million Euros from both grants and the second is between 2014 and 2021 in which Romania received 777,7 million Euros from both grants²⁹. There are two mechanisms under the scheme, one is funded solely by Norway (the Norway Grants) and supports only 13 countries, which amounts to 179.1 million Euros per year for the 2014–2021 period. The other (the EEA Grants) supporting 15 countries amounts to 221.2 million Euros a year for the same period. The EEA Grants includes contributions from Iceland and Liechtenstein of around 4 % of the total funds³⁰. In this article, we take both programmes into consideration since 4% is a very small number and I will not exclude that programme from this presentation.

To ensure a more strategic and sustainable impact, a programme approach was introduced. With this approach, all funding was channelled through multi-annual programmes³¹. A total of 2.8 billion Euros was provided through the approach. The goal of the EEA and Norway Grants is to promote growth and development in Europe, Norway's most important export market. Norway will provide around 388 million Euros (NOK 3.3 billion) a year to 13 of the least prosperous countries in the EU. The EEA and Norway Grants will primarily be used to promote innovation and growth through research, education and increased mobility in the European labour market. This will in turn contribute to reducing the unacceptably high unemployment rate among young people in Europe³². We can see the first differences between the two programmes, the time period. The Norway and EEA Grants run seven years, the previous ran five years. But there are more differences, the EEA Grants support more countries than the Swiss funds, a total of 15 countries are beneficiary, Portugal and Greece are in it too³³.

In the next few lines, I want you to give an overview about the organizational structure of both grants. Public institutions in the donor and beneficiary countries share responsibility for the EEA and Norway Grants. These entities work closely together to achieve the objectives of the Grants. The programme approach of the EEA and the Norway Grants means that considerable responsibility is delegated to the beneficiary countries. Each beneficiary state has a National Focal Point, most often a ministry, which has the overall responsibility of the Grants. Each country also has several programme operators which are responsible for making the funding available to applicants through calls for proposals, appraising applications and selecting and monitoring projects. The committee consists of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Norway. The Financial Mechanism Committee draws up and passes policy, regulations and guidelines, approves all programmes and ensures monitoring, control and evaluations. As the beneficiary countries carry the main responsibility for implementation of the Grants, they likewise hold the responsibility for establishing the management and control systems. This includes a certifying authority and an audit authority. The donor Embassies in the

²⁹ eeagrants.org/countries/romania Website consulted December 2019

³⁰ www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/agreement-norway-eu-grants. Website consulted December 2019

³¹ eeagrants.org/about-us/history. Website consulted December 2019

³² www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/agreement-norway-eu-grants. Website consulted December 2019

³³ eeagrants.org/about-us/history. Website consulted December 2019

beneficiary countries, in particular those of Norway, take part in the dialogue between the donor and beneficiary countries and play an important role in communicating the results of the Grants. International Intergovernmental organisations and actors play an important role too, as they monitor compliance with international conventions and treaties across Europe. Furthermore, they assist in areas linked to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The International Partner Organizations (IPO) play a similar role to the Donor Programm Partners by providing expertise and strategic advice in their fields. The IPOs for the 2014-2021 funding period are the Council of Europe, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development³⁴.

The programmes support projects in areas such as environmental protection and management, climate change and renewable energy, justice and home affairs, research and scholarships, civil society, green industry innovation, culture, decent work, and human and social development. New features are introduced in the 2014-2021 programme, 34.5 million Euros of the EEA and Norway Grants Fund for Regional Cooperation and 65.5 million Euros of the EEA and Norway Grants Fund for Youth Employment³⁵.

Before we go on to the specific programmes, we have to take a look at the Romanian side of management, in Romania, the Ministry of European Funds through General Directorate for Mechanisms and Non-refundable Financial Instruments is designated as the National Focal Point (NFP), which has the overall responsibility regarding the achievement of general objectives of the EEA Financial Mechanism 2014-2021 and for implementing the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding³⁶.

To sum it up, we can see more significant differences between the two donor country programmes: The fields and programmes which are supported and the organization and coordination. The SRCP does not take a detour via EU bodies or institutions, Switzerland works directly with Romania and does not use any intermediate agencies.

So much for the administration, now let us have a look at the exact distribution of the grants and see which projects received how much founding. There are nine sectors or, like with the SRCP thematic funds³⁷:

- Environmental Protection and Management 33 181 250 Euros
- Climate Change and Energy 24 586 399 Euros
- Civil Society 36 330 000 Euros
- Human and Social Development 80 123 478 Euros
- Protecting Cultural Heritage 22 502 351 Euros
- Research and Scholarship 24 500 000 Euros
- Green Industry Innovation 29 700 000 Euros
- Decent Work and Tripartite Dialogue 1 152 000 Euros
- Justice and Home Affairs 25 300 000 Euros

Additionally around 5.6 million Euros for administrative costs and assistance and some reserves.

Totaling 305 950 000 Euros from the 2009-2014 founding

³⁴ eeagrants.org/about-us/organisational-structure. Website consulted December 2019

³⁵ eeagrants.org/about-us/history. Website consulted December 2019

³⁶ www.ro-cultura.ro/en/about/eea-grants. Website consulted December 2019

³⁷ www.eeagrants.org/grants/beneficiary=RO#programmes. Website consulted December 2019

And now for the 2014-2021 founding, there are 12 sectors although if you look closer, you will see that some sectors from the prior programme have been splited in two separate ones³⁸:

- Local Developement 82 352 941 Euros
- Energy 62 826 500 Euros
- Justice 52 941 176 Euros
- Health 47 058 824 Euros
- Research 47 058 824 Euros
- Active citizenship 46 000 000 Euros
- Business development 45 000 000 Euros
- Culture 29 015 294 Euros
- Home affairs 28 235 294 Euros
- Environment 23 529 412 Euros
- Education 14 117 647 Euros
- Social dialogue 2 273 000 Euros

Totaling 777.7 million Euros

So much for the numbers, now let us have a look at the eligibility for funding during the two programmes. The entities eligible for founding are basically the same as the ones from the SRCP, research organizations, companies (small, medium and large sized enterprises)³⁹, and any NGO or governmental institution related to one of the outlined topics. There is a call for proposals for every project within each programme and the call defines the framework of the project and what criteria each recipient has to fulfill. If an entity wants to receive foundings, they have to apply for the open calls and meet the respective criteria.

For example, an excerpt from one call for proposals:

„Eligible applicants: Romanian VET(vocational education and training) schools

Eligible Romanian partner: A Romanian Company which has signed an agreement for students` internship (practical stages) with the applicant institution. „⁴⁰

A comparison between the two countries programmes in Romania

After going through the legal framework and describing the fields of operation of each countries founding programmes, i would like to use this chapter for a comparison. We will have a look at a non-representative number of projects from similar fields and compare the financial efforts for that specific project and see what the differences are about.

Our first field is energy, more specific, renewable energy projects financed by both founds.

First the SRCP⁴¹:

The Swiss-Romanian Cooperation Programme aims to contribute to the sustainable energy management in Romanian cities by improving municipal infrastructure, building capacity and raising awareness about energy efficiency and renewable energy in

³⁸ www.eeagrants.ro. Website consulted December 2019

³⁹ uefiscdi.gov.ro/www.uefiscdi-direct.ro/resource. Website consulted December 2019

⁴⁰ www.eea4edu.ro/wp-content/uploads/2019. Document consulted December 2019

⁴¹ www.eda.admin.ch/erweiterungsbeitrag/en/home/countries/rumaenien/projekte-in-rumaenien.html. Website consulted December 2019

order to increase living standards, promote economic development and provide a response to climate change. The project was introduced in four pilot cities Arad, Brasov, Cluj-Napoca and Suceava. The direct beneficiaries of the project are municipalities of at least 24 medium to large Romanian cities (including Bucharest) and 20 small Romanian cities in poor/underdeveloped regions.

Activities contain elaboration of plans, small actions to enhance sustainable energy management like awareness campaigns, capacity building measures or consultancy and assistance services.

The projects involved investments of 300'000 to 700'000 CHF in thermal rehabilitation of public buildings, heating, energy supply including renewable energy, public lighting and urban planning in general.

The achieved results are: small scale projects in cities of less-favored regions were selected to receive financial support through this program. In these cities, three public buildings were rehabilitated with energy-efficient technologies. Old street lamps were replaced with 11,580 energy-efficient LED lights. It is estimated that thanks to Switzerland's support, the CO₂ emissions are reduced by around 1.000 tonnes per year.

The Swiss budget was 10 438 710 million Francs and the duration phase 11.05.2016 - 07.11.2019 (Completed)

Now something similar from the EEA Grants⁴²:

In 2013 the RONDINE Renewable Energy Program was launched in Romania. The aim of the RONDINE Program which is based on the EEA Grants 2009-2014, is sustainable use of natural resources and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases through the use of renewable energy -hydro and geothermal potential. The programme will increase the share of renewable energy in energy generation in Romania. This will be done by way of financially supporting the construction or refurbishment of three or more small scale hydropower plants in order to make them more efficient. Moreover, the programme will support the construction of one or more geothermal heat plants in areas where there already is a heat distribution system in place. The new or refurbished plants, will contribute to replacing fossil fuel with renewable energy. The programme will benefit local public administration, local institutions, enterprises and households.

The EEA budget was 31 million Euros and it is estimated to reduce 16.002 tonnes of CO₂ per year. The projects, five in total, started in March 2014 in Ilfov county, in Oradea, in the Somes Tisa region in northern Romania, in Tarcau and in Timis county.

Another topic of interest is the Roma inclusion and projects related to it.

Again, first the SRCP⁴³:

Economic Empowerment through Social Businesses in the community of Grădinari, in Olt county, is a project implemented by a consortium led by Social Economy Development Foundation and aims at developing social economy entities in Grădinari in order to improve the living conditions of the local residents. The involved parties are Heart to Heart from Sweden, the town hall from Grădinari and The Federation of Employers from Oltenia. The value is 300'000 Swiss Francs and duration was between 01.03.2016 and 30.11.2018.

⁴² orkustofnun.is/media/skyrslur/RENEWABLE-ENERGY-IN-ROMANIA-SUPPORTED-BY-EEA-GRANTS.pdf. Document consulted December 2019

⁴³ www.romainclusionfound.ro/en/SEDF_project/45. Website consulted December 2019

The goal is to empower the Roma people from Grădinari (who live in poverty) to improve the living conditions in their community by higher capitalizing of the vegetables they grow locally. To increase by the end of the project with at least 20% the added value of the products the Roma farmers from Grădinari are selling. To extend the market through increasing local associability of the farmers from Grădinari legalizing their businesses (as cooperatives or other business structures able to sign trade contracts and to issue required trade documents) appealing at the retailers' CSR (corporate social responsibility) policy to contract their vegetables in favourable conditions. To extend the validity period of the products by refrigerated storage. To salvage the huge quantities of unsold vegetables by processing/pickling them.

Results obtained in 2017:

In mid-2017 the EA (executive agency) finalised the building upgrade and instalment of the initial production line. This represented an important milestone in starting the activity of the cooperatives: 9,321 jars of vegetables were processed and sold, 9 tons were pickled, 30 tons were stored in the cold rooms and one contract was sold, committing to provide 14 tons of vegetables.

Results obtained in 2016:

In 2016, the EA has focused on three main aims: (a) to legally create two functional cooperatives of vegetables' producers and vegetables' processors, (b) to identify the location which is to host the vegetables' processing factories and upgrade the respective location in order to abide with the legal provisions and to serve the project's objectives and (c) to assist the co-operators in improving their techniques of vegetables production.

Next the EEA Grants⁴⁴

This programme responds to the need to promote increased social and economic cohesion in Romania by addressing local development, poverty reduction and enhanced inclusion of Roma communities. Social and economic cohesion are key to reducing poverty and promoting equality in society. Poverty and inequality remain high in Romania, with increasing regional disparities and numerous economic and social challenges.

There is still a high number of early school leavers and a high number of young people not in education, employment or training. Roma are the largest minority in Europe, and according to the Council of Europe an estimated 1.85 million Roma live in Romania (8.32% of the population). Many face barriers to social inclusion, in access to education, employment, healthcare and housing, as well as facing discrimination, racism and antigypsyism. Many are living at risk of poverty and in severe material deprivation. While significant investments are being made in Romania through national and European Union funds, some strategic areas are not covered. This provides an opportunity for the EEA and Norway Grants to help support the achievement of national strategy goals in combatting poverty and social exclusion and in contributing to Roma inclusion, provision of quality education, children's rights and youth policy, and in supporting administrative capacity to

⁴⁴ eeagrants.org/news/programme-agreement-signed-for-the-local-development-programme-in-romania. Website consulted December 2019

achieve local development. The main target beneficiaries include: persons belonging to vulnerable groups and communities in disadvantaged situations, Roma populations at risk of poverty and social exclusion, children and youth at risk (including children with disabilities, special educational needs, detainees, etc.), families, professionals, other community members, civil society, and public administration staff, county and local councillors.

The programme funding (excluding co-financing) amounts to 70 million Euros and is funded through the EEA Grants (25 million) and Norway Grants (45 million).

The external evaluation carried out by IRES showed that following the participation in the project activities⁴⁵:

- 8 out of 10 beneficiaries are convinced that projects have made a big contribution to increasing school attendance of children and young people, as well as promoting social inclusion;

- 85% of respondents believe that the project activities have greatly improved the interest in schooling for children and young people, and 9 out of 10 consider that their preparation for their life has been enriched;

- 2 out of 3 parents consider that the activities of the Programme have contributed much or very much to the decision of children and young people to continue their studies;

- As a result of the Programme, 8 out of 10 children intend to continue their studies at high school level, and 2 out of 3 will reach college

- 86% of the beneficiary students consider that they feel more attracted to the school after participating in the projects than they were before, and 82% of them appreciate that they have better learning outcomes than before.

Conclusion and final thoughts about the work

Do not get confused, this conclusion is not about the organizations or the relations between the countries or the programmes. In the introduction i mentioned there will be a conclusion and that was refering to the article and the research conected to it. As stated, for the whole work only official sources were used and only official documents consulted. The information is available abundantly, every involved country has several involved institutions and each of them has an official website providing informations about the programmes. Next to the governmental institutions, there are even more NGOs and they too provide plenty of data and stats and informations. But one source is not enough to get the whole picture, sometimes the references are well organized, the links are valid and the following site has a well organized presentation and you can easily obtain the needed informations. But sometimes the provided link was a dead end. That is of course not the fault of the provider of the link but still if somebody is running an information platform, the links to third party data should be checked from time to time. But after some detours, one was able to find most or almost all the informations and data needed and that is an overall positiv verdict for the information gathering proceedings. It is noteworthy to mention that all the subunits used the same standardised initial information and description provided by the main organizational institution, complemented with the necessary data. That led to the idea of why not combining all the information on one site and supplement the results together with the reference or origin. That would have facilitated the information gathering process for this article. But that is just a side note, overall the process is transparent and the necessary informations are available for the

⁴⁵ www.frd.ro/. Website consulted December 2019

public without restrictions. And that is an important feature of the whole enterprise, transparency and informations. Especially in a country like Switzerland where almost every decision is taken by the population by means of referendum, if the people lack necessary informations, they probably will not approve any monetary spending on foreign matters out of taxpayers money.

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www.efta.int/eea/eea-institutions

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Switzerland

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Norway

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EUROPEAN FUNDS, BARGAINING TOOLS AND FOUNDING TARGETS FOR MIGRANT INTEGRATION¹

*POLGÁR István**

Abstract. *The aims of the article is to present the existing obstacles, problems and tensions and proposed solutions in the integration process of the non EU migrants with a special regard on Central, South and Eastern Europe. Also, is focusing on a wide variety of European development and regional policies, which represents the solution for a permanent and harmonious development of the border regions.*

The issue of national minorities and the so called „new minorities” are, in the process of European construction, one of the most important aspects that European countries have had to manage. Learning about and researching minorities, for them to transmit knowledge and experience to young people through education, have become an essential pillar of European values on the construction of an intercultural society based on direct and indiscriminate cooperation and collaboration between ethno-religious communities. It is known that European legislation and practice promote the idea of living together in the sense of social value consisting in accepting otherness, good understanding of the various ethnic groups with in the same local communities and openness to communication and cooperation. Nowadays Europe is faced with the dilemma of to receive or to refuse non EU migrants. In the given circumstances European public space became a geopolitical environment that is experiencing a new institutional arrangement between nation states and a new paradigm of coexistence of the cultural differences. After a brief interpretation of the key terms, we will focus on the financial instruments, which aim is promote the integration of traditional and new minorities in the European society.

Mots-clés: *migration, integration, european funds, border, cooperation*

Demography issues and Migration issues are two of the key elements of modern society, bringing benefits and conflicts both to the receiving places and to the place of origin and raising issues of security, social measurements and multiculturalism in our globalised world.

One of the great challenges of contemporary Europe is related to migration and the need for European integration of minority communities, including immigrants. Evaluations conducted have shown that there is a great need for expertise and policies regarding the European integration of minorities in both their countries of origin and in the new host countries when we are dealing with migration (Polgar, 2016:9-11).

¹ This study is a revised and enlarged analysis of a study published in *Analele Universității din Oradea, seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, TOM X, 2018, Oradea, p. 121-130

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European Union and integration in the European Community developed itself on three basic ways, creation of a common market, development of common institutions and several common policies. Market integration has progressed a long way, although it stops and restarts again. The institutional integration is left behind, but the most difficult of all is represented by the common policies, especially where they have required founding.

With the reform of the Structural Funds, regions have gained a key role in the design and implementation of regional policy. Yet some of the weakest regions were not equipped with appropriate institutional structures and have struggled to benefit (Polgár, 2016:525).

As globalization reaches more and more places, international migration is starting to be at the centre of attention.

Cultural mixes are not only today's accomplishment due to an apparent melting pot or due to globalizing tendencies. Different cultures have coexisted for centuries in local communities, especially in smaller melting pots, such as Europe's greatest empires, such as the Austrian Empire, later the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or the Russian Empire. Due to their vast territories, different populations were either moved from one part of the empire to another, or they simply migrated to different locations. This enabled a meeting of cultures, civilizations and helped created new forms of cohabitation between the majority and the minorities (Mărcuț, 2016,47).

Nowadays, international labour mobility in the European Union is treated like a normal phenomenon, but it is viewed with rather negative than positive impact on the economies of Member States, because of the dilemma of implementing appropriate policies for the integration of migrants in the labour market. One of the top questions is: "how to prepare migrants to feel at home and make them and the human capital they carry from their countries of origin an integral and productive part of the host communities?" (Glystos, Bruno, 2010:3). It has been observed and it was generally accepted that even when employed, if economies slow down, minority unemployment rates will often increase more than average.

It can be stated that both migrants and minorities make a considerable contribution to the economy and the social cohesion of the EU Member States. Normally, this should result in a reduction of poverty and unemployment and an improvement of their social inclusion. Therefore EU integration policies should contribute towards eliminating these obstacles and promoting the social inclusion of migrants and minorities.

The concept of "Europe without borders" can provide the solution to the ethnic problem on the continent. Some politicians and political scientists consider that the model of the "nation state" has not been able to provide sustainable finality through the citizenship institution. Limited in its defining pattern, the classic citizenship offered only a kind of equality principle, abstract, to residents within the borders of a national state, but the same borders did split many ethno-cultural communities, dividing the population into two categories, the majority and the inhabiting minorities (Weber, 2001:53).

The issue of national minorities and the so-called „new minorities” are, in the process of European construction, one of the most important aspects that European countries have had to manage. Learning about and researching minorities, for them to transmit knowledge and experience to young people through education, have become an essential pillar of European values on the construction of an intercultural society based on direct and indiscriminate cooperation and collaboration between ethno-religious communities. It is known that European legislation and practice promote the idea of living together in the sense of social value consisting in accepting otherness, good understanding of the various ethnic groups within the same local communities and openness to communication and cooperation (Brie, 2016:13-14).

As the economy expands to become increasingly more global, society and workplaces are more diverse than ever before. To succeed in a multi-cultural workplace, it is essential that you are able to work with and adapt to the work styles and habits of people of varying ages and cultural identities. To be a successful job candidate you must be able to demonstrate a sensitivity and awareness to other people and cultures.

A theme that appears frequently in public debate, in recent years, concerns the future and destiny of a united Europe, from the cultural approach of the European integration, the relationship between national and European level, the relationship between the national cultures in the European space and the possibility of the emergence of a European cultural identity with supranational character (Shohat, Stam, 2014:7-11). After a brief interpretation of the key terms, we will focus on the financial instruments, which aim is promote the integration of traditional and new minorities in the European society.

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Funding for migrants and minorities varied considerably among the EU Member States. Targeting strategies also differed with a distinction between: “specific actions in which migrants and minorities alone were targeted; an ‘explicit but not exclusive’ targeting approach in which they were the main but not the only group targeted; a mainstreaming approach and, general European Social Fund measures in which they were among a series of disadvantaged groups targeted” (Centre for Strategy&Evaluation Services, 2011:40).

Some EU countries have placed a greater focus on NGOs as delivery organisations responsible for implementing ESF interventions targeted at migrants and minorities, others have relied on public employment services and local or regional state institutions.

One of the EU’s distinctive contributions to the conceptualisation of the integration of third-country nationals during the last 25 years has been an emphasis on the need to overcome past acculturation and assimilation discourses, and policies exclusively concerned with the obligation of third country nationals to integrate into the perceived ‘host society’s values, principles and way of lifes (Centre for Strategy&Evaluation Services, 2011: 55).

The European cultural model has a value-based framework, based on legality, freedom, equality, fraternity, solidarity and Christian sentiment of the sacred, which adds to the historical evolutions of the three major modern political revolutions. Europe is a conglomerate of national identities, whose ethnic, linguistic, mental, religious, etc. Diversity has determined a variety of cultures (Lentin, Titley, 2011: 4).

This problematic nature of the European project is encapsulated in the motto of the European Union: "unity in diversity". The concept of European identity expresses rather the idea of unity than real identity.

Europe is going through an identity crisis, especially because of the difficulties of the process of deepening the integration and reform of the community institutions. It is the crisis of legitimacy of the Community institutions, which would have its source and a crisis of communication between the European institutions and the citizens of the Member States.

If national identity confers to the individual national legitimacy, citizenship is the condition of a decent existence within a state. Nationality defines that the individual belongs to an ethnic group and it should not be confused with the meaning of citizenship (Lentin, Titley, 2011: 6).

Citizenship refers to all members of the respective state indifferent of the ethnic origin and the state has the obligation to equally protect all and to secure their rights and the freedoms implied by this status.

Although European Union politicians and leaders have increasingly emphasized the importance of culture in strengthening European solidarity and cohesion, European integration has, surprisingly, led to a resurgence of interest in local, ethnic, national and cultural identities.

Europe is a conglomerate of national identities, whose ethnic, linguistic, mental, religious, etc. diversity has determined a diversity of cultures. We can speak of a European culture as a sum of these cultures, but not of a self-sustaining culture, the latter presupposing a long-lasting process of merging the various individual cultures, combining different identities, and to homogenize them according to laborious principles and which would most likely come out of any institutional control.

Definitions

There is a different perception between countries with regard to the definitions of the terms: migrant, national minority and ethnic minority. In some cases, EU Member States are treating migrants and minorities like own citizens, in other cases like non-citizens - their migration or minority background is viewed as irrelevant in statistical terms. There are also differences in the way these people are viewed as having an ethnic minority background irrespective of how long they have been in that country. Consequently, a flexible definition was therefore adopted by the European Commission:

- "Migrants –non-EU born individuals from a third country legally-residing in EU28. Migrants can be of first, second or third generation;
- Ethnic Minority – individuals with a different cultural tradition or background from the majority of the population;
- National Minority – individuals from relatively well-established minority groups living in particular EU countries;

Indigenous minorities - ethnic groups, long-standing residents of a EU country" (Centre for Strategy&Evaluation Services, 2011:55).

Legal considerations

European Commission migration, integration and immigration policies are in charge of Directorate General Migration and Home Affairs. These policies were established by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997:13), entered into force in 1999. Basic principles like setting an EU policy framework for the integration of third-country nationals were then adopted in 2004 through the Hague Programme (Council of the European Union, Document 2004:16054). Further development of integration policies was done by choosing 2

of the 11 Common Basic Principles as relevant to migrants from third countries, “CBP 3 (Migration Management) and CBP 6 (Integration: The Positive Impact of Migration on our Society and Economy)” (Centre for Strategy&Evaluation Services, 2011:55).

In order to materialize the engagements made in the Common Agenda for Integration, the Commission has created the National Contact Points on Integration (Commission of the European Communities, *Document COM/2005/0389, 2005*) for fostering exchange of information and good practices between Member States. “Handbooks on integration for policy-makers and practitioners” were published in 2004, 2007 and 2010, respectively (Centre for Strategy&Evaluation Services, 2011:55).

A specific legal basis for integration was provided by the Lisbon Treaty, allowing the EU to further develop the Stockholm Programme (Council of the European Union, Document 2009:16484).

Other specific initiatives were determined by the necessity to reveal data concerning migrants and minorities, one of the most representative publications being the special Eurobarometer surveys (European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 2007: 263) on experiences of discrimination. The EU-MIDIS (EU Minorities and Discrimination Survey 2010:34) was the first EU-wide survey of immigrant and ethnic minority groups' experiences of discrimination and victimisation in everyday life.

European Funds for migrant integration.

Demographic aspects demonstrated that not only does the EU have a “rapidly ageing population, with relatively low birth rates, but there are increasing net migration flows into the EU” (Centre for Strategy&Evaluation Services, 2011:40). There has been a significant rise in the proportion of people with an immigrant background and ethnic minorities in the EU over the last decade.

It can be stated that the majority of migrants or minorities could deal with one or more of the following causes when living in an EU Member State, different of the country of origin: “lack of education and training; lack of language skills; lack of recognition of skills and qualifications; lack of access to professions; lack of access to citizenship; lack of integration policies; stereotypes, prejudices and negative attitudes; lack of mobility and concentration in certain areas; industrial change; disincentives through welfare systems; discrimination; lack of information; labour market competition; undeclared work” (Zimmermann, De Voretz, Kahanec, Gataullina, Anzelika Zaiceva, 2008:35).

While the situation varies across the EU and between different groups, it can be generalised that people from a migrant and minority background (including those of second and third generation) commonly have higher than average unemployment levels, lower participation rates and are at greater risk of social exclusion.

Across the European Union, data indicates that there are still significant, growing and multifaceted socio-economic gaps between people with a migrant background and mainstream society. At the same time, failure to realise the potential of people with a migrant background, including the most marginalised, represents a considerable waste of resources, both for the individuals concerned and more generally for the EU economy and society.

The European Commission is continuing to look at practical ways to assist Member States when it comes to further integrating people with a migrant background. In this respect, Member States have several EU funds at their disposal. These include funding instruments under shared management, including the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, and under direct management, for example, the EU

programme for Employment and Social Innovation, Rights, Equality and Citizenship programme, the Health for Growth programme².

To ensure a sustainable and credible policy approach to the management of migration flows, it is essential to address the problem of irregular migration. An effective return policy in conformity with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and based on the preference for voluntary return is key to this objective.

The European Union, through the public policies and financial instruments declared and sustained that the integration of people with a migrant background is an integral part of both European history and European future. The EU considers that people with a migrant background can offer an important contribution to the social and economic progress of Europe. Moreover, in the case of refugees there is strong moral reason and a legal obligation to offer them sanctuary and a place where they can rebuild their lives. The aim of fostering cohesive and inclusive societies regardless of ethnicity, nationality, legal status, gender, sexual orientation, religion and disability is reflected in the European Union's values and principles (Ibidem).

At the same time, the EU is facing demographic challenges. The share of people aged over 65 is rapidly growing. By 2050, almost a third of Europeans will be in that age group. This trend is echoed by a rapid shrinking of our active labour force; today, four working people support one pensioner. In 2060 this ratio will be two on one. Some sectors, such as information technology and social and healthcare services are already facing particular labour market shortages. Europe will need more talent from abroad, while further continuing to harness and invest in its existing work force (Ibidem).

Studies indicate that immigration is associated with a positive contribution to the public finances and welfare of the host Member State whereby all high-skilled and low-skilled people in the society benefit depending on the migrant's initial level of skills and the duration of their integration in the labour market (International Monetary Fund, 2016:12). Swift and successful integration is crucial to maximise the opportunities created by migration.

At the same time, data indicates there is still a significant and growing socio-economic gap between people with a migrant background and mainstream society. Labour market participation of people with a migrant background may be hindered by several associated challenges (Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri and Poutvaara, 2014)

Therefore, European officials believe that through public policies and different financial instruments attention must be focused towards improving the access of people with a migrant background and migrants to the labour market, including by recognising and updating their skills to the demand, and provide access to housing and mainstream services.

According to the data received from Eurostat, in the European Union we have 20.8 million people living in the EU third-country nationals which represents 4.1 % of the EU's entire population.

According to the same source, 35.1 million people are living in the EU who were born outside of it. This number represents 7 % the EU's entire population³.

European integration funds are supporting national and European initiatives that facilitate the integration of non-EU immigrants into European societies. Projects and funds are primarily targeted at newly arrived immigrants. These projects supports Member States and

² https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/themes/social-inclusion/integration-of-migrants/toolkit-integration-of-migrants.pdf, accessed in 03.12.19

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civil society in enhancing their capacity to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate integration strategies, policies and measures, as well as their exchanges of information and best practices and cooperation on integration issues(OECD, 2010).

The measures designed by the funding authorities, for instance in the programmes and calls for proposals, aimed at integrating people with a migrant background should take into account the following principles: non-discrimination, gender equality, individualising the response to needs, empowerment, integrated approach, long-term perspective, and contingency measures.

If the nature of EU-funding is understood it can be a valuable source for financial support and great projects can be implemented in order to support your work on migration and integration or any other field⁴.

An obstacle is represented by the existence, and the necessity of regular updating, of integration policy frameworks which varies across Member States. Differences include the guiding principles, measures, and monitoring and evaluation (Fundamental Rights Agency, 2017)

Member States have several EU Funds at their disposal to invest in the integration of people with a migrant background. These include funding instruments under shared management, including the European Structural and Investment Funds and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, and direct management, for example the EU programme for Employment and Social Innovation, Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme, the Health for Growth programme.

People with a migrant background may face a wide range of challenges which must be addressed simultaneously in order to achieve the best results. For the EU funds to best respond to these challenges, a number of steps should be followed. Firstly, it is essential that evidenced-based national/local strategic policy frameworks are in place. Secondly, in case Member States and/or regional authorities decide to use EU funds for people with a migrant background, the interventions should be in line with these strategic policy frameworks. Thirdly, the overlaps between the EU funding instruments call for a reinforcement of the coordination mechanisms and synergies among them. Furthermore, when devising integration policies and strategies to be supported through EU funds it is recommended to build upon research findings⁵.

Conclusion

One of the EU's distinctive contributions to the conceptualisation of the integration of third-country nationals during the last 25 years has been an emphasis on the need to overcome past acculturation and assimilation discourses, and policies exclusively concerned with the obligation of third country nationals to integrate into the perceived 'host society's values, principles and way of lifes (Carrera, 2011:39).

The amount of EU funds allocated for people with a migrant and minority background in 2014-2020 appears likely to significantly exceed that of 2007-2013 (Popescu, 2016:353). This is perhaps not surprising given improved reporting and an evolution in the demographic situation within the EU – in particular an increase in migration from third countries.

⁴ <https://www.eurodiaconia.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/FUND-11-17-Briefing-for-members-Migration-and-Funding-September-2017.pdf> accessed in 04.12.19

⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/return-fund_en accessed in 03.12.19

While integration policy remains a national competence, the Member States recognise that the ‘failure of an individual Member State to develop and implement a successful integration policy can have in different ways adverse implications for other Member States and the European Union’ (Popescu, 2016:353).

The dispute for imposing in the European cultural context one or the other of the two theories to designate the plea for affirmation diversity does not seem like a simple argument.

The European Union wants to build a European cultural identity but wishes to do so by preserving national and regional identities in Europe. This new European identity, which needs to be built will be based on the common cultural fund of the European states, preserving the variety and the national and regional cultural diversity. European identity is nothing but a continuation of national identity, another identity level, at the level of the continent and the European Union.

It is important to not forget, that Europe is above all a community of values, and the goal of European unification is to achieve, test, develop and preserve these values. The fundamental European values are based on tolerance, humanity and brotherhood.

Without a collective identity beyond the national borders and a common framework for projects in the European public space, Europeanization is not possible. In fact, citizens perceive their daily problems as being related to the national public space.

In addition, successful integration is seen as crucial for economic and social cohesion in the European Union.

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III. Intercultural Communication, Multiculturalism and Integration

Victoria GOREAINOV ⇔ *The Role of Intercultural Communication in Eastern Europe*

Michelle LIM, James CHUA, Cristian VLAD, Fumiaki TAJIRI, Ana DAMASCHIN ⇔ *Cultural Intelligence (CQ): From New Idea to Conceptual Model. What is it, and why is it a crucial factor in today's intercultural business negotiations?*

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Nataliya NECHAYEVA-YURIYCHUK ⇔ *The Challenge of Interethnic Coexisting in Europe at the Beginning of the XXI Century: the Political Dimension*

THE ROLE OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

*Victoria GOREAINOV**

Abstract. *Today the term "intercultural communication" is often used to refer to the wide range of communication issues that inevitably arise within an organization composed of individuals from a variety of religious, social, ethnic, and educational backgrounds. In an era of interference, intercultural communication is timely and advisable. The article analyzes the relation between communication, language and culture in the Republic of Moldova. In this way, it is necessary to emphasize that the language is a part of culture and that it plays a very important role in it, including in Republic of Moldova.*

Keywords: *Intercultural dialogue, Eastern Europe, Republic of Moldova, communication, culture, language.*

Definition of the concept "Intercultural Communication"

Communication is a form of interhuman behaviour that arises from the need to relate to and interact with others. The communication process is, in fact, the key to positive interpersonal relationships which in turn are the source of the psychosocial development of both individuals and society.

Intercultural communication is a concept that besides the actual communication also includes the cultural and intercultural element. Today, several definitions for the concept of intercultural communication are proposed, representing the interaction between members of the different cultural groups.

Intercultural communication is the direct interaction between people of different cultures. Intercultural communication involves much more than understanding the norms of a group, it involves accepting and tolerating differences. Globalization has made intercultural communication an inevitable fact. Today's world is undergoing rapid change, the interaction between people is gaining new dimensions. Contact and communication with other cultures are the dominant characteristics of modern life (Giorgi, 2018: 8).

The idea of the intercultural dialogue must have as a starting point the recognition of diversity and the multiple perspectives and dimensions of the world in which we live. These differences of opinion, points of view, and even values do not exist only within a culture, they are even more visible in the disputes between different cultures.

Dialogue, intercultural communication aims to analyze these diverse perspectives with a specific purpose, namely to understand and learn from different intercultural experiences. It is obvious that in other cultures, reality is perceived differently, the way people interact is different, visions are different.

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Professor Constantin Cuciș defines intercultural communication as “a value exchange or transaction, accompanied by an understanding of the adjacent meanings, between individuals or groups belonging to different cultures”. At the same time, exchanges can be made at the verbal, nonverbal, behavioral, physical, and object level (Cuciș: 2000: 136).

The emergence of the concept

For the first time, the phrase intercultural communication was used in 1959 by the American ethnologist T. H. Hall in “The Silent Language”. Hall is considered the founder of “intercultural communication”. The conceptualization of the intercultural communication process and his contribution to the respective field laid the foundations for further research.

According to the conception of the American researcher in the intercultural communication, the dialogue partners use not only the language, but also nonverbal expressions such as gestures, mimicry, tone. Thus, we can see that in every culture, affirmation, denial or permission are accompanied by special gestures and tones (Hall, 1959: 15).

The study of intercultural communication in Europe

Intercultural communication has existed since the earliest times of history when individuals and groups from different cultures interacted in different contexts. As for the European culture, such contacts have been made since the Greco-Roman antiquity, either in the form of economic, commercial, cultural and artistic exchanges, or in the more aggressive form of the wars of conquering territories, populations, foreign cultures. In these forms, intercultural contacts continued in the following historical eras.

If in the past the concrete acts of communication between representatives of different cultures involved a relatively small part of the world's population, in the contemporary era the realities of these communication processes have increased. This is possible due to the scientific and technical advances in the field of telecommunications, transport and, last but not least, the emergence and evolution of the “new media” of the 20th century: radio, television, the Internet.

The study of intercultural communication does not have its own history. Many researchers come from different fields and turn their attention to communication. Scientists from various disciplines, such as anthropology, psychology, communication, sociology and international relations, leave their field of research to venture into a new field that is at the “intersection of culture and human interaction”. (Hart, 1997: 2).

“Europe the continent of interculturality”

In terms of history, Europe has always been a multicultural area. In recent decades, the study of intercultural communication has aroused interest in scientific circles in Europe.

Today, the study of intercultural communication has a double trajectory: theoretical, research and application, intended for the preparation and practice of intercultural communication.

- The motivation for studying intercultural communication. In Europe, the research of intercultural communication has developed following the appearance of social and political changes caused by the influx of immigrants in the countries of industrialized Europe.

- At the center of attention is language. Among the reasons for the language emphasis is the situation of immigrants and their need to learn the language of the natives.
- The orientation towards language learning makes the field of intercultural communication in Europe become integrated into the language sciences.
- The dominant paradigm chosen by the European researchers of intercultural communication is the interpretive one. Culture is no longer seen as a reality outside the individual, but as a construction resulting from the social activity of individuals who communicate through the meanings. (Șerban, 2013: 7)

Factors influencing intercultural communication

Today there are several factors that have an influence on intercultural communication, among which we can list the following:

- Value systems, which are based on cultural evolution and determine the individual options that can generate tensions or conflicts impossible to mediate.
- Language - English internationally is the main language of communication in economic, diplomatic or cultural relations. Its influence stems from the fact that the countries in which this language is used as a mother tongue fundamentally influence the fields of use.
- Religion - the perception of the sacred, religious holidays, the influence of religion on the cuisine, daily practices, is a fundamental factor in intercultural communication. In countries where religion is clearly separated by state or politics, it has less influence, but in countries with no such separation, the influence on intercultural communication is decisive.
- Perception over time - the concept of “time is money” and an approach to punctuality totally influence communication in an intercultural context.
- Communication style - there are cultures in which the gestures that accompany the communication are of a complexity which serves as the key to decoding the verbal message (Băbuț, 2014: 8).

Barriers to intercultural communication

Difficulties in intercultural communication are caused by cultural differences. In the communication process individuals “face a culture different from their own in terms of habits, values, standards and expectations”.

One of the main problems of intercultural communication is miscommunication or even misunderstandings.

Barriers to intercultural communication:

- Misunderstandings due to language – translation errors, vocabulary, punctuation, pronunciation and inability to communicate in the respective language deepen intercultural differences.
- Language misunderstanding.
- Cultural shock – the inability to understand or accept people with different sets of values, standards and lifestyles different from ours. This is just as important as the first factor, moreover, it is acting even within the same culture. It is about the lack of recognition of what other individuals consider important to them.
- Belief in the superiority of one’s own culture and disdain for other cultures.
- Low listening ability – lack of concentration needed for critical listening. The result is the misunderstanding of the message or messages received. People who speak

English as a foreign language often tend to ignore words they do not understand if they listen to someone who speaks English. The influence of the accent in the use of a foreign language could also be mentioned.

- Ethnocentrism – the belief that one's own culture is superior to the others. This barrier occurs when oral or written communication leads to an attitude of superiority. Usually people do not like to be humiliated or to feel that their ideas are interesting but wrong.

- Insensitivity – lack of interest in the needs and feelings of others. For many of the receivers, the transmitters appear insensitive when the communication is abrupt and expresses an aggressive or selfish attitude of the transmitter.

- Lack of sincerity - the feeling when the climate is too formal and people do not feel free to express their opinions openly. This type of communication causes the appearance of distrust, people can even believe that the information is hidden. To avoid or overcome this barrier it is necessary to create a feeling of mutual acceptance by providing a relaxed environment for intercultural exchanges. (Pascu, 2011: 9).

Intercultural Communication: the case of the Republic of Moldova

The Republic of Moldova is no exception to the current trends of increasing social diversity, given the geographical, historical, and cultural context.

The Republic of Moldova is a multicultural state: 75.1% are Moldovans (2 068 058); 7% - Romanians (192,800); 6.6% - Ukrainians (181,035); 4.1% - Russians (111,726); 4.6% - Gagauzians (126,010); 1.9% - Bulgarians (51 867). (Population and Housing Census 2014, Republic of Moldova)

In the Republic of Moldova, multiculturalism is represented by traditional historical minorities, who live compactly (Gagauzians, Bulgarians) and minorities living throughout the country (Russians, Ukrainians).

The population speaks the following languages: 54.6% Moldovan, 24% Romanian, 14.5% Russian.

Religion - 96.8% Orthodox, 1% Baptists, 0.7% Jehovah's Witnesses. (Population and Housing Census 2014, Republic of Moldova)

In Moldova, the plurality of cultures is quite old. Thus, there are some problems attested in the historical context:

- the identity problem of the native people.
- the problem of communication language (minorities do not speak Romanian for the most part and are more oriented towards communication in Russian).
- the problem of naming the language of communication.
- the problem of segregating schools with instruction in the languages of national minorities.

Following the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of Moldova became an independent state. The transformation of the former union republic into an independent state meant, first and foremost, the transformation of former Soviet citizens from its territory into a community of citizens of a new state. However, the disintegration of the USSR was accompanied by the deep polarization of the population of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova on the basis of ethnolinguistic criteria. (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 8).

It should be mentioned that the Republic of Moldova was the first of the former Soviet states to adopt the transition of its national language from the Cyrillic to the Latin script. For Moldova, the transition to the Latin alphabet means reconfirming the Latin origin of the national language and its identity with the Romanian language, which was

confirmed in the Law on the functioning of languages on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. (Lege Nr. 3465 din 01.09.1989)

If the problem of the status of the national language served as a unifying factor for the Romanian-speaking population of the Republic of Moldova and managed to create a consensus among the new politicians and the intellectuals of the country, we cannot say the same thing about the problem of the name of the language, determined by that of the identity. This became the reason for a deep split within the political and intellectual elite of the country in two groups, one of “pro-Romanian” orientation, and the other of “Moldovenism”.

The sociolinguistic situation in contemporary Moldova is quite complicated and with many uncertain aspects. Legislation in the linguistic field is imperfect, there is an escalation of language problems by politicians through extreme attitudes such as Moldovanism and Romanophobia, on the one hand, or Russophobia, on the other, but also the linguistic insecurity of a considerable part of the speakers, caused by insufficient knowledge of the norms of the standard Romanian literary language, thus people associate themselves with each other according to the spoken language. (Condrea, 2017:123)

In Moldova we can see two trends: the attempt by the majority ethnic group to assimilate minorities and the segregation of minority ethnic groups to preserve their identity. As a result, education is increasingly separatist, with few lines of intercultural communication. Therefore, intercultural interactions are insignificant. Moldovan students separate themselves from the Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzians, Bulgarians, not only physically, but also culturally. Each of them learns their own culture, remaining indifferent to the culture of other ethnic groups.

Another problem in Moldova is the language of instruction for minorities. In the Republic of Moldova, an attempt has been made to protect the language of an ethnic minority through its territorialization. The officialization of the three languages in the territorial-administrative unit “Gagauz Yeri” only contributed to the perpetuation of the linguistic situation established in this region during the Soviet period. The solution of the three official languages could only be accepted for a transitional period, which would have allowed the derusification of Gagauzians.

In reality, however, the Russian language has not only retained its hegemony in the regional administration, but is still promoted within the education system, which is de facto the language of study not only of the Gagauz minority, but of all other minorities in the country.

De facto, studies in their native language are done only by Russian students. The Gagauzians, the Bulgarians, and most of the Ukrainians, did not choose the mother tongue as language of instruction, but they chose Russian instead. The reason for this choice lies behind the mentality of minority ethnic groups.

The percentage of students in higher education institutions, according to the language of teaching in 2018 is the following: 82.8% Romanian, 14.8% Russian, 1.5% English.

The law on the functioning of languages in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, which had the focus of attention on the problem of languages of national minorities, was supplemented by special decisions of the Parliament and the Government on measures to improve the study of Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian.

Respecting the cultural rights of minorities should not be an impediment to their integration into society, which can only occur if the representatives of these minorities

know the official language of the state. Knowledge of the official language is a factor of social cohesion and is able to offer the persons concerned the opportunity to exercise the whole of human rights, on an equal basis with the other citizens of the state. This is the reason why it is absolutely necessary for the students to study the official language as their second language, at all levels of the education system.

There are different ways to alternate the official language with the minority language in the education system:

- the minority language can be used as the language of study for all disciplines, while also studying the official language;
- the minority language can be the language of study only for some disciplines, others being taught in the official language (it is the case of bilingual education);
- the minority language can be used in the study of particular disciplines, such as language and literature, all other subjects being studied in the official language.

The situation in the Republic of Moldova is paradoxical, as the language of study in the schools of the Gagauz, Bulgarian, Ukrainian minorities is the language of another minority, and not the official one. Thus, the official language is reserved only third place in the succession of languages studied by these minorities, which creates difficulties in assimilating the official, state language.

In 2003, in the Republic of Moldova there was adopted “law no.546-XV regarding the approval of the Concept of the national policy of the Republic of Moldova”. The reason invoked was “the need to establish the principles and tasks of the national policy, in order to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the country and to create favourable conditions for the free development of the ethnic and linguistic communities of the Republic of Moldova”. (Law no.546-XV regarding the approval of the Concept of the national policy of the Republic of Moldova).

According to the authors of the Concept, this “represents all the principles, objectives and priority tasks regarding the integration and consolidation of the multicultural and multilingual people of the Republic of Moldova by harmonizing the general national interests with the interests of all the ethnic and linguistic communities in the country”. The basic idea of the Concept was to affirm the continuity of the Moldovan statehood, which, according to the authors, relies on the multisecular past of the Moldovan people and on its uninterrupted statehood in the historical and ethnic space of its national becoming. (Law no.546-XV regarding the approval of the Concept of the national policy of the Republic of Moldova).

The case of the administrative-territorial unit “Gagauz Yeri”

A special case is “Gagauzia”. On the territory of the administrative-territorial unit “Gagauz Yeri”, a trilingualism, the Gagauz, Moldovan and Russian languages being declared official, is adopted through the autonomy legislation. But in reality, the territory of the autonomy is a territory of bilingualism, only Russian and Gagauz languages being applied. Moreover, the contrast of the ethnic composition with the circulation of languages in the territory of the autonomy shows a strong disproportionality towards a massive use of the Russian language compared to the ethnic composition of the population.

According to the data of the study, carried out by researchers from the Republic of Moldova such as Oazu Nantoi, Andrei Iovu, Igor Boțan, Vasile Cantarji, Veaceslav Reabcinschi, Anatol Gremalschi in 2012, the Gagauz language is used in the family by 54% of the population of the region, although the Gagauz ethnic groups constitute 82% of

this population. The transition of the Gagauz ethnic groups throughout their lives from the Gagauz mother tongue to the Russian one is also evident, since the first language they learned was Gagauz in 62% of cases (compared to 54% currently spoken in the family). (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 108).

The Russian language is the mother tongue for 27% of the respondents and practically all the inhabitants of the region who currently speak a language other than their mother tongue “migrate” towards it. The Russian language is the language of communication in the families of 40% of the inhabitants of the autonomy. Reporting on ethnic composition shows the percentage of the population using it in the family is ten times bigger than the percentage of ethnic Russians in the region and twice as big as the one of ethnicities other than Gagauzians. (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 109).

Another comparison that would be of interest is that, according to the study, 21% of the respondents live in ethnically mixed families, a figure twice smaller than the families who communicate in Russian. Therefore, the degree of use of Russian in families in the region is caused by factors other than the need for interethnic communication. (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 109).

The languages circulating on the territory of the autonomy are very unevenly distributed among different socio-demographic categories. The state language is not used among any group in significant proportions. The highest percentage of respondents who speak this language in families register among the population of non-Gagauzian ethnicity, which is 5.4%. If we compare this percentage to the percentage of minority ethnic groups in the region, we find that the state language is spoken in families by over one third of the population belonging to an ethnicity other than Russian or Gagauzian. (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 109).

The Russian language is predominantly used among 18-29 year olds (49.6%), the population with higher education (56.5%), with a high socio-economic status (62%), in the urban environment (64, 7%) and among minority ethnic groups of the autonomy (65%). The Gagauz language is spoken more often by the population aged 46-59, 60 and older (57.2% and 64.6% respectively), with secondary education (66.6% and 57.3%), low and medium socioeconomic status (71.2% and 58.7%), rural population (68.2%) and Gagauzian ethnic groups obviously (65.4%). (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 109).

The state language is fluently spoken by only one in ten inhabitants of the Gagauz autonomy (11.6%). The Gagauz language is known by 80.8% of the inhabitants of the region, and Russian is known by the majority of the respondents (93.6%). (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 109).

The option of trilingualism is accepted by the population of autonomy, most of the respondents sharing the opinion that the youth in the region must know Russian (90.3%), Gagauz (84.3%) and the state language (79.1%). (Nantoi, Iovu, Boțan, Cantarji, Reabcinschi, Gremalschi, 2012: 112).

The Gagauz ethnic group is a very eloquent example. Being very compactly populated, with minimal contact with other ethnicities due to the way of populating (especially with the ethnic majority), a Gagauz ethnic is rarely mentioned under conditions when it loses competition due to the lack of knowledge of the state language. Only 5.7% of the respondents could not choose higher education institutions because of

not speaking the state language. Only 3.5% did not get a job, 3.4% were disadvantaged in choosing the specialty etc.

Conclusion

Intercultural communication plays an important role because it prevents misunderstandings or mistakes in communication. Intercultural communication involves much more than understanding the norms of a group, it involves accepting and tolerating differences. Globalization has made intercultural communication an inevitable fact. Today's world is undergoing rapid change and the interaction between people is gaining new dimensions. Contact and communication with other cultures are the dominant characteristics of modern life, as the world seems to be unable to live without the benefits of technology any more.

"Intercultural communication explores those elements of culture that most influence the interaction between members of two or more cultures, when individuals are in situations of interpersonal communication."

Today, the interaction between people from different cultures is an experience that almost every person goes through. Intercultural contact becomes functional only through communication, and communication takes place through languages.

At the same time, the importance of language and culture factors in analyzing intercultural problems should not be underestimated, because a harmonious cohabitation of different cultural and linguistic communities within a single state implies the mandatory presence of three components:

1. cultural identity
2. intercultural communication
3. a common political culture for all these linguistic and cultural communities.

It is important to mention that the identity discourse in the Republic of Moldova is focused on ethnic and cultural features. Identity arguments pervade around ethnic determinism: history, language, ethnicity, culture, territory.

Given that the Republic of Moldova is a multicultural state represented by traditional minorities, living compactly and throughout the country, the issue of interculturality and intercultural education is a priority within the sociocultural policies.

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CULTRAL INTELLIGENCE (CQ): FROM NEW IDEA TO CONCEPTUAL MODEL. WHAT IS IT, AND WHY IS IT A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN TODAY'S INTERCULTURAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS?

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Abstract. *We live and work in a very multicultural world, and it is reasonable to interact with people from different cultures and backgrounds, people with different values, norms, and beliefs. Cultural intelligence, new construction of the 21st Century, plays a prominent role in this increasing interaction. It is also relevant to consider and mention that cultural intelligence becomes an almost vital skill in a world where crossing the borders of a country has become a routine, and your workmate, your friend, or your professor can come from the farthest corner of the globe. The ability of individuals to work effectively across culture, but most importantly, as international practice demonstrate- the ability to negotiate with people from different cultures improve the relationship, build a long-lasting relationship and help to understand cross-cultural differences across the globe better.*

The main objective of the present research is to help develop a better understanding of the cultural intelligence concept. Secondly, based on the data provided by the international practice and recent research, this study aims to identify whether cultural intelligence is a factor in negotiation outcome and to determine the component of cultural intelligence that has the most significant influence on negotiation outcome.

Keywords: *Cultural intelligence, Emotional intelligence, cultural differences, intercultural negotiations, negotiation effectiveness*

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I. Introduction

Have you ever thought about the concept of cultural intelligence? Why do we need cultural intelligence? Why is cultural intelligence so crucial in the outcome of negotiation?

We are a conglomeration of many diverse communities, cultures, values and norms, backgrounds and beliefs, languages, and religions. Each of us seeks to have his personal view of the world—a proper way to receive information (be it human actions, someone's unfamiliar and ambiguous gestures or speech patterns a person encounters), processing, and making decisions. We call that cultural intelligence or CQ, defined as *“a person's capability for successful adaptation to new cultural settings”* (Caputo, Ayoko, 2016:1).

In a world where globalization has opened the way for human interaction, CQ becomes a vitally important aptitude and skill, and not just for leaders and international bankers, managers, and negotiation practitioners. However, for most of us, this concept is still unknown or foreign.

II. On Cultural Intelligence

Cultural intelligence is a new construct that was introduced and developed by Professors Christopher Earley and Soon Ang in their 2003 book of the same name as a researched-based way of measuring and predicting intercultural performance, and many practitioners later acquire it. According to researchers, the fundamental concept of cultural intelligence can be defined as “a person's capability to adapt as he interacts with others from different cultural regions,” and has behavioral, motivational, and metacognitive aspects. Today, the meaning of this concept is perceived, according to Julia Middleton (Founder and Chief Executive of Common Purpose Charitable Trust), as the ability to cross the divides that exist between people and thrive in multiple cultures. Fundamentally, CQ is a process or social attitude. It is about understanding our own culture, what it means to us, and the multiple sub-cultures we belong to. It is also fully aware of what makes us who we are and how our culture influences the way we work with other people.

The Cultural Intelligence Center defined the Cultural Intelligence (CQ) as a “globally recognized way of assessing and improving effectiveness in culturally diverse situations; is the capability to function effectively across various cultural contexts—national, ethnic, organizational, generational.”

From a theoretical point of view, the concept of cultural intelligence, as given in the business dictionary, means a measure of a person's capacity to function effectively in a multi-cultural environment. Employers and organizations apply CQ as a way to foster tolerance and enhance cross-cultural interactions.

After almost twenty years, the concept of cultural intelligence evolved from new idea to a must-have skill for our multicultural world, from an academic construct to a practical framework, from an analytical method/process to a social attitude, so it is challenging to identify the most relevant definition. In essence, Cultural Intelligence, also known as Cultural Quotient (CQ), which derives from the now well-established notion of Intelligence Quotient (IQ), is related to Emotional Intelligence (EQ), Cognitive Intelligence (IQ), and Social Intelligence (SQ) because it assumes familiarity with cultural context, but it goes a step further. It is likely a combination of all of these elements, which strives to assess the capability of individuals to adapt to new, unfamiliar cultural settings successfully.

In simple language, it measures how we behave in diverse situations. Hence, cultural intelligence is needed to function effectively in culturally diverse environments. Most recent studies show that cultural intelligence predicts vital outcomes in the real

world. For example, people with higher cultural knowledge can understand what makes us different, and they can exclude from the human behavior that is specific to a group or affiliation, which is neither universal nor personal. They make better decisions in intercultural situations, are more effective global leaders, achieve better results in cross-cultural negotiations and international business, build better rapport with people from around the world, are more creative and innovative, tend to develop more culturally diverse social networks, and experience less burnout when working globally (See more, Center For Creative Leadership: 2020).

III. Components of CQ

We conceptualize cultural intelligence into four factors and on four dimensions.

The four-factor model: Drive, Knowledge, Strategy, and Action, it is a practical approach to understand why some individual function more effectively than others in a diverse, multicultural situation. Together, these four capabilities make up your overall cultural intelligence quotient (Livermore, 2011:7) These factors of CQ are a critical component of CQ for several reasons. On the one hand, the drive is a person's motivation to cross cultures, and it is imperative. On the other hand, without the energy and willingness to channel the power, you cannot really attain the knowledge of different cultures, or strengthen awareness, planning and monitoring one's experience of crossing culture (what we call Strategy), or flex behaviors appropriately (Action) when crossing cultures (Ang, 2020).

For better understanding the Cultural Intelligence Map based on the four-factor model, we need to explore Figure 1 that establishes how to build a strategy or an action plan to measure your CQ or your team's CQ. Interpreting Fig. 1 based on international practice, one can see that compared to most cultural competency programs, cultural Intelligence begins with:

- CQ Drive—the curiosity and motivation needed to work well with others.
- Next is CQ Knowledge—understanding the kinds of differences that describe one group versus the next, without resorting to stereotyping specific cultures.
- The third is CQ Strategy—learning how to plan effectively in light of cultural differences.
- Furthermore, finally is CQ Action—being able to adapt to behavior when the situation requires it (Cultural Intelligence Center).

To demonstrate the effectiveness of this structure and to determine the impact of the cultural differences on peoples' cultural intelligence, we conducted research based on a real case study.

According to the data provided by the Cultural Intelligence Center, the University of Michigan was engaged in an impact study to establish students prepares for the global workplace. So, 169 students participated in a variety of faculty-led, study abroad programs in different locations around the world. The programs varied in length from 2-8 weeks, and the main goal was to determine the impact of the study abroad experiences on students' cultural intelligence. In the beginning, each student completed the Pre- and Post CQ Assessment. Based on Pre and Post CQ Assessment scores, students showed significant improvement in three of the four CQ capabilities (CQ Knowledge, CQ Strategy, and CQ Action).




Figure 1. The four-factor model of Cultural Intelligence
Source: (RedHead Communication 2020)

In conclusion, based on cultural intelligence research, the university can be confident that the students improved the following skills:

- Cross-Cultural Adaptation;
- Intercultural judgment, decision-making;
- Cross-border negotiation;
- Strategic leadership effectiveness.

We talked about the four dimensions of CQ.

CQ, as a multidimensional concept based on metacognitive, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral aspects. Interpreting the data from the studies Konanahalli et al. and presented in the research of MJ Ahn and L. Ettner, we came to base some practical aspects. First, high Metacognitive CQs constantly adjust and revise personal assumptions and mental maps of other cultures before and during intercultural interactions. Second, high Cognitive CQs have already gained a sound knowledge of other cultures and can quickly identify similarities and differences between them effortlessly. Motivational CQs show energy and enthusiasm toward learning about other people's cultures. Behavioral high CQs demonstrate the capacity to use culturally appropriate terminology, tone, and body language when communicating across cultures (Sutherland, David, Duncan, 2015:34).

Therefore, those individuals who repeatedly ask why do we need Cultural Intelligence must know that developing the CQ concept allow attuned to the values, beliefs, and attitudes of people from different cultures, and respond with informed empathy and real understanding. Moreover, with cultural intelligence, people will know how to strategically use cultural differences to come up with more innovative solutions.

IV. The importance of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) in negotiations

This research is aimed to study cultural intelligence as a factor for negotiation outcomes because it has been argued that successful interactions across cultures require

“cultural intelligence.” Negotiation is a fact of life. Every day we negotiate something. Negotiation outcome is categorized into two main domains, which are integrative and distributive negotiation. Integrative negotiation can also be known as a win-win or problem-solving approach. Distributive bargaining is known as win-lose negotiation, where one party gained a larger pie. Integrative is known as creating value, and distributive is value claiming. CQ increases understanding of nonverbal cues and raises awareness on motivating individuals of a different culture (Goh, 2014:3). The good news is that the negotiation outcome improves.

We know that cross-cultural negotiations can potentially be the most complex because cultural barriers can easily cause misunderstandings that impede effective interactions. Prior research suggests that international negotiations frequently fail due to an overall lack of understanding and knowledge of the multiple cultures involved in the transactions (but knowledge about different cultures is crucial in cross-cultural negotiations), an inability to communicate with persons from different cultural backgrounds, and limited behavioral flexibility to adapt to culturally unfamiliar contexts. (Grove, Feyerherm, Gu, 2014). This intriguing phenomenon drives us to explore the significant impact of cultural intelligence in contemporary cross-cultural negotiations, which become an increasingly important and essential capability for building long-lasting partnering relationships in today's increasingly globalized world market.

Cultural intelligence, a newly introduced term to the international business world and implemented during cross-cultural interaction, can be considered the key to success in the field of negotiation. It helps to understand better the significant differences between cultures and how to use them to provide benefits for all parties. Also, CQ can influence the negotiation process, strategies, approach, and outcome. Moreover, international practice has shown us that the ability of individuals to negotiate effectively across culture improve the business relationship and organizational performance.

Many practitioners have claimed that negotiators with higher CQ have more cooperative motives and will engage in more effective integrative negotiation processes, which will allow them to achieve higher joint profits. Without making quick judgments or falling back on stereotypes, they can interpret "what is happening in any cultural setting and adjust their behavior accordingly." Additionally, Livermore asserted that when faced with the ambiguity of intercultural communication, with high CQ, people are more likely to persist and invest significant effort in reaching a win-win despite the absence of cues that help to negotiate effectively in a more familiar environment. Heightened CQ gives a better understanding of how to read the nonverbal cues during the negotiation and makes people more aware and motivate. There are many reasons why CQ is a crucial factor in negotiations. Firstly, it helps to work effectively with people from different cultures and understanding of cultural differences. CQ can also give insights into the culture of every organization work with to explore opportunities for win-win solutions. Secondly, CQ allows being attuned to the values, norms, beliefs, and attitudes of people from different cultures to create a culturally intelligent perspective and to respond with informed empathy and real understanding. Finally, in intercultural negotiation is essential to avoid making assumptions or generalizations based on any single aspect.

For example, let's say you have multilateral business negotiation with an American, a Chinese, an Australian, a Norwegian, and an Arabian stockbroker. Do these persons behave the way they do because they are Americans or Chinese; because they're stockbrokers or because they come from different cultures and have their norms,

assumptions, or belief? Or is it because they are a millennial, or an introvert? For their tendency to be tough, canny negotiators, or almost the complete opposite? It is likely a combination of all of these elements, so aim to avoid making assumptions or generalizations based on any single aspect. Moreover, as Professor Zhenzhong Ma has mentioned in his unique research, it is essential” to put yourself in others’ shoes” to create a culturally intelligent perspective.

V. Conclusion

As we mentioned earlier, cross-cultural negotiations can be particularly challenging. When people from different cultures negotiate, they often feel uncertain about how to act and confused by one another’s statements and behavior. The potential for misunderstandings and conflict is usually high as a result. There is a need for a simple but powerful cultural (CQ concept) concept that will help to understand cultural differences and contribute to getting more at the negotiating table. Thus, cultural intelligence can be seen as the bedrock of securing a competitive advantage and a necessary strategic capability for successful and productive intercultural negotiations.

Goh Harn Jean, in his research “The impact of cultural intelligence on negotiation outcome,” consider that that cultural intelligence is a factor in negotiation outcome, and motivational cultural knowledge has the most substantial influence on negotiation outcome. Moreover, the influential level of every component is not distinctively different; thus, it can be said that each element (cognitive, metacognitive, behavioral, and motivational) is equally essential to each aspect in achieving higher cultural intelligence.

In this context, it is essential to note that Cultural intelligence :

- assesses the impact of people’s strategic capability of adaptation to different cultural settings;
- is a critical predictor useful as well as performance-related outcomes in culturally diverse situations, over and beyond several other constructs;
- Increases understanding of nonverbal cues and raises awareness on motivating individuals of a different culture. Thus, cultural intelligence can be seen as the bedrock of securing a competitive advantage and a necessary strategic capability for successful and productive intercultural negotiations (Zhenzhong Ma, 3);
- Help acquire the most beneficial skillsets for intercultural negotiations and facilitate cross-cultural interactions in the globalized world and work effectively with people from different cultural backgrounds.

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INSTALLING A CULTURE OF INNOVATION THROUGH ORCHESTRATED COMMUNICATIONS AND COGNITIVE TALENT OPERATIONS (NTT COMMUNICATIONS CASE STUDY)

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Abstract. *Starting with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and continuing with Machine Learning, Blockchain, IoT, Intelligent Learning Platforms, Quantum Computing, Deep Learning, Cognitive Solutions, Learning Management Systems (LMS), Intelligent Global Talent Databases, Prediction Machines and Robotic Process Automation (RPA), talent operators in the whole world are in search of implementing modern technology solutions for enhancing operational efficiency and for developing more engaged, collaborative and better connected organizations.*

Corporate Japan has seen an unprecedented need for revamping talent operations and organizational structures in order to incorporate modern technology and to enhance global competitiveness. Along with modern technology comes modern talent – a rapidly emerging generation of digitally native business practitioners who redefine the business landscape with their new skills, vision for the future of doing business, desires to connect and aspirations for growth.

In an effort to determine how modern technological solutions have changed the dynamics of traditional Japanese organizations and reshaped the architecture of their business, this paper reveals some of the most popular technologies and talent operation practices embraced by Japanese organizations ready to compete on the global market, as illustrated in the case of NTT Communications.

Keywords: *Talent, Communications, International, Business, Innovation, Culture, HR, Technology, Cognitive, Organization, Japan*

I. Introduction

The coalition between HR management and modern technology never mattered to businesses more than it does today; making it impossible to imagine one without the other. HR and HCM systems of today have a technical role at all stages of the hire-to-retire process, and enable managers to truly recover what they have invested in with smart talent technology. Corporate Japan has been going through continuous efforts to embrace

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emerging technology and to provide their employees with a modern, inclusive and agile working environment. Along with the implementation of modern technology, there has been an emerging need to reconsider, revisit and update existing regulations and business ethics across industries. Numerous Japanese organizations have embarked on the journey of re-defining their *raison d'être* and develop modern and relevant Customer Value Propositions (CVP) and Employee Value Propositions (EVP), with special focus on embracing modern technology and social innovation.

The use of modern technology for this purpose is nothing new. So is the way technology itself has evolved. As Sean Gerrish mentioned in his book “How Smart Machines Think”, interest and commitment to developing intelligent machines goes back to the late 1960s. “Back then, the field of AI felt like it was roaring ahead, with improvements in neural networks, development of algorithms to play games like chess and Go, excitement at conferences (where AI felt like it was bursting at the seams) and hardware that was growing exponentially with the advent of microprocessors – all just before the field of AI went into a dark period known as the AI Winter”¹. The AI Winter lasted until around the year 2000, when a cluster of US based technology companies announced their commitment to shift from hardware and software to the development and commercialization on smart machines. The main reason for this shift in strategy was the fact that traditional electronics were rapidly entering a fierce price competition, as both hardware and software were rapidly becoming commodities and manufacturing was taking place all over the world, with a group of Asian manufactures leading the manufacturing game.

International Business Machines (IBM) is one of the early initiators of this shift in technology focus. In 2005, the company sold its personal computer business to Chinese technology company Lenovo and, in 2009², it acquired software company SPSS Inc. Later in 2009, IBM's Blue Gene supercomputing program was awarded the National Medal of Technology and Innovation by U.S. President Barack Obama. In 2011, IBM gained worldwide attention for its artificial intelligence program Watson, which was exhibited on the US TV show *Jeopardy!*, where it won against game-show champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter. The company also celebrated its 100th anniversary in the same year on June 16. In 2012, IBM announced it has agreed to buy the employee engagement program *Kenexa* and a year later it also acquired SoftLayer Technologies, a web hosting service, in a deal worth around \$2 billion.

By 2016, IBM had reported earnings of \$21.8bn for the fourth quarter of 2016, as the company shifts from its traditional business to cloud and artificial intelligence (AI)-based products and services.

The company announced that its cloud revenue for the full year was \$13.7bn, up 35%, while revenue in its cognitive solutions business, which includes software and transaction processing software revenues, grew by 1.4% to \$5.3bn. Sales in this business were driven by demand in cloud, analytics and security, the Internet of Things (IoT), Blockchain, Robotic Process Operations (RPA), cognitive solutions and artificial intelligence (AI). By the end of 2016, IBM Watson – IBM's technology platform that uses natural language processing and machine learning to reveal insights from large amounts of unstructured data – was becoming one of the leading AI products in the industry.

¹ Gerrish, Sean (2018), “How smart machines think”, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, page 261, paragraph 2.

² IBM website, “*Lenovo Completes Acquisition Of IBM's Personal Computing Division*”

In a transcript of the 2016 earnings call posted on the *Seeking Alpha financial blogging site*³, senior vice-president and CFO Martin Schroeter, said: “For systems, our revenue and gross profit performance were driven by growth in z Systems, offset by power and storage declines. These results reflect the reinvention of our core systems for work in a new era of computing.

“We have optimised our systems to drive new types of workload, like Blockchain and instant payments. We are expanding our footprint, building new capabilities and solving new types of problems for our clients. And though we are facing some shifting market dynamics and product transitions in both power and storage, our portfolio overall remains optimised to address the demands of an era of cognitive and cloud computing.”

Schroeter further mentioned that the company was positioning itself to solve real world business problems by using advanced AI and its own cognitive solutions system. “The debate about whether artificial intelligence is real is over, and we’re getting to work to solve real business problems,” he said.

“As we move into this new era, it is important to understand what enterprise clients are looking for. They need a cognitive platform that turns vast amounts of data into insights, and allows them to use it for competitive advantage. They need access to a cloud platform not only for the capability, but for speed and agility. And they need a partner they trust, and who understands their industry work and process flows.”

Ginni Rometty, IBM chairman, president and chief executive officer, said that the company’s shift from its core business to so-called “strategic imperatives” accounted for 40% of the company’s earnings. Rometty said: “IBM Watson is the world’s leading AI platform for business, and emerging solutions such as IBM Blockchain are enabling new levels of trust in transactions of every kind. More and more clients are choosing the IBM Cloud because of its differentiated capabilities, which are helping to transform industries, such as financial services, airlines and retail.”⁴

In Japan, IBM is considered to be one of the most prestigious providers of modern technology and NTT Communications, along with many other telecommunications service providers, decided in early 2017 to partner with IBM to revamp talent operations and organizational architecture.

II Research Objective, Method and Objects

Objective

The main objective of this research is to illustrate the benefits for businesses to explore early, prototype and adopt modern technology in talent practices and organizational architecture development for NTT Communications in partnership with IBM (10/2017 – 12/2018).

Research Objects

NTT Communications and its major subsidiary companies

Research Methodology

We conducted research based on an actual business case study. Additionally, the authors of this research engaged in first-hand participant observation⁵ of this change management process. Therefore, we could observe the stages of corporate confusion, the

³ <https://seekingalpha.com/article/4038119-international-business-machines-ibm-management-q4-2016-results-earnings-call-transcript>

⁴ <https://www.computerweekly.com/news/450410768/World-Economic-Forum-warns-of-AI-business-risk>

⁵ Yin, Robert(2003), *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, SAGE Publications, Inc; Third ed

various stages of decision making and the whole procedures of organizational and cultural integration, with the eyes of in-house full-time team members, from the start of the project until the end.

III NTT Communications – From “HR as usual” to “Modern Technology Integrator”.

Ever since its inception in 1999 as a subsidiary of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Corporation (the largest telecommunications company in Japan and one of the largest in the world), NTT Communications has been providing network management, security and solutions services to consumers, corporations and governments. Upon her appointment as Senior Director of Human Resources and Global Head of Talent in 2015, Kyoko Yamamoto took it upon herself to promote Diversity and Inclusion and to help the organization embrace a wide range of modern technology. Yamamoto worked with her team of 68 talent operators and organizational architects to review existing HR technology and to determine opportunities for revamping people operations by onboarding modern technological practices.

Although NTT Communications is a relatively “young” organizations, most of its executives and core talent transferred from its parent company, NTT Corporation, an organization founded in 1952 as a state-owned enterprise. In 1985, NTT Corporation became a public shared-stock KK (*kabushiki-kaisha*) under the Companies Act of Japan, but the culture of the organization remained predominantly hierarchical, with frequent “job orders” (辞令 *irei*) and top-down communications. Ranked 55th in Fortune Global 500⁶, NTT is the fourth largest telecommunications company in the world in terms of revenue, as well as the third largest publicly traded company in Japan after Toyota and MUFG, as of September 2018. While NTT is listed on Tokyo, Osaka, New York, and London stock exchanges, the Japanese government still owns roughly one-third of NTT's shares, regulated by the NTT Law.

Confronted with a “business as usual” culture and “things will never change” employee mindset, Yamamoto decided in 2016 to change culture, mindsets and the way business was generally conducted by a combination of efforts: exploring modern technology and developing a work space environment based entirely on ontological design practices, convinced that modern experiences would impact, influence and change the way NTT Communications people thought and behaved.

IV. Discussions and Actions


In order to be able to remodel the organization and to create new systems, processes and tools that people would enjoy utilizing, Yamamoto decided to invite her team of talent operators and organizational architects into an IBM facilitated design thinking exercise. The team started with a general observation process, looking closely around to observe how employees utilize existing technology and to plot out where major pain points could be found.

Yamamoto considered that a proper observation of existing situations, the work environment and daily engagements would not only provide hints for improved synergies, enhanced efficiencies and operational improvements (改善 *kaizen*), but also give way to organizational innovation as well.

⁶ Forbes (2018-09-26), “The World’s Largest Companies”, Jersey City.

Social engineer, lawyer and art historian Amy E. Herman states in her book “Visual Intelligence” that “This is the true lesson of seeing what matters – that noticing the overlooked, the ordinary, or the seemingly unimportant can not only help solve our initial problem or cement our success, it can also produce unexpected, paradigm-shifting, and beautiful by-products. Side effects that impact us and the world around us more than we ever thought possible.”⁷

Throughout the IBM Design Thinking exercise, the NTT Communications team of talent operations recognized the need to revamping practices from the very beginning, in order to achieve ultimate efficiencies across the structure. First of all, the talent recruiting team recognized their limitation by working exclusively with pre-determined and pre-contracted talent search agencies, which were primarily scouting potential candidates within the local Japanese market and, sometimes, Japanese candidates working with other Japanese companies within the Asia Pacific region. After exploring various technological collaboration opportunities, NTT Communications talent acquisition officers showed high interest in having access to talent pools globally, without restrictions in terms of pre-determined talent acquisition pools and agreements with pre-contracted recruiting operators. Furthermore, access to and utilization of intelligent search engines would also contribute to increasing the speed and breadth of the talent search process itself. As a result, the team agreed to test *Watson Talent*, a cognitive talent search platform which enabled the Talent Acquisition team access talent beyond conventional structures and existing talent search conditions, both for new graduates and for mid-hires and executive search.



“Talent Operations Revamping Process”, IBM Modern Talent Foundations⁸

As a result, Talent Acquisition operations became an area of primary focus, starting with talent sourcing and continuing with on-boarding processes and early engagement.

However, the Talent Operations team soon recognized the need for revamping the Talent Management structure as well, in order to be able to provide a modern and engaging employee experience to the newly acquired talent and the existing employees alike. Learning and Development became an area of immediate concern, as most learning

⁷ Herman, Amy. E (2017), “Visual Intelligence – Sharpen Your Perception, Change Your Life”, Mariner Books, Boston, page 274, paragraph 7.

⁸ Internal material, “IBM Modern Talent Foundations”, NTT Communication applications

programs were centralized and delivered to groups of twenty or more participants at a time at various opportunities and throughout different career stages. The new culture Yamamoto's team was working to install was relying heavily on personalization, customization and "work from anywhere" office mentality.

After analyzing existing market offerings, the team decided to work with IBM explore generative deep learning platforms and to develop an NTT customized version of IBM's "Your Learning" cognitive learning platform⁹. The new learning platform enabled all NTT employees to have access to learning materials, in terms of pre-set organizational learning, such as compliance training, and also individual learning aligned with personal interests. The new platform provided employees with automated suggestions to possible learning opportunities, such as on-line and e-learning, public video talks on YouTube and other external sites, and also with access to institutional learning opportunities provided by educational institutions all over the world, as the algorithm would recognize personal interests from previous learning sessions, on-line activity, pre-set career goals and career conversations with the management.

Along with the implementation of the cognitive learning platform, Yamamoto and her team studied other intelligent learning solutions. As part of their efforts to upgrade the digital learning environment at NTT Communications, they considered the implementation of a deep learning tool. Starting with a generative modeling initiative, they explored the foundations of a basis probabilistic generative model and analyzed which deep learning techniques would need to be implemented by who, when and how. After a deeper study of the deep learning structure and the existing enterprise architecture, the team concluded that the complexity of the generative task required a higher level of digital literacy throughout their organization and decided to proceed with an initial program of re-skilling and up-skilling the employee population in order to equip internal talent with the technological capabilities necessary for introducing and implementing deep learning initiatives. The IBM Japan team was called in to support with implementation of fundamental generative deep learning training modules and to help create frameworks for building neural networks that could later be used to construct and train advanced deep learning systems.

As part of the offering, IBM proposed in March 2018 considering the introduction of Robotic Process Automation (RPA) programs throughout the enterprise, in order to enhance productivity and work efficiency. IBM introduced UiPath – a Romanian RPA developer and a global technology partner of IBM – and recommended the implementation of RPA solutions for HR, Accounting and Operations. Yamamoto's team decided to begin with an RPA initiative for back office HR, in order to mitigate input mistake risk and to eliminate repetitive work. As an immediate application, RPA was introduced for business trip expense report filing processes and, within the span of two months from implementation, the team witnessed a 680% increase in HR operation efficiency¹⁰.

In order to sustain the newly introduced initiatives, the team recognized the need to focus on developing and installing a common culture of innovation and growth. Yamamoto was keen at this stage to ensure that diversity of thought, aspirations and initiative is genuinely weaved globally into the emerging culture. As IBM Talent and Engagement Partner Hideki Ishida states on his interview on Globis Insights, "diversity a

⁹ IBM Your Learning <https://yourlearning.ibm.com/about/>

¹⁰ Comment extracted from the Focus Group Interview conducted with Yamamoto and her team on 2 July 2018.

core competency for innovation, for growth and meaningful transformation”¹¹ has the potential to engage and inspire growth.

Furthermore, Yamamoto worked with her team to ensure that diversity is weaved in every single layer of the organization, especially in internal learning activities. “Without a strong commitment to learning from diversity, we cannot talk about inclusion. It would merely be tolerance of differences, and that is not what we want at NTT.”¹²

In order to solidify the culture of innovation, Yamamoto and her team agreed to roll out a global initiative in 2019 to further encourage NTT Communications associates to act upon this culture in daily business operations. New leadership competencies were developed and rolled out globally in order to install Emotional Intelligence (EQ) and Cultural Intelligence (CQ) practices across the business. The successful implementation of the new leadership was monitored through a matrix of leadership evaluation activities, which indicated a shy 36% embracement of the competencies globally as of January 2019, but a higher percentage of 58% percent globally as of May 2019.

Yamamoto’s team of talent operators and organizational architects worked closely with Internal Communications associates and local HR and Communications teams in order to disseminate the global commitment to the development and full implementation of a culture of innovation at all layers of the business and in all regions of operations. The global HR and Communications teams soon recognized the need to “walk the talk” and to set new global standards through examples of success and to show concrete organization indications of the commitment to innovation and business transformation.

As a first set of initiatives, the teams agreed in May 2019 to apply ontological design transformative initiatives, such as re-creative office space and changing the atmosphere of the working environment in a visible and easily recognizable way to the business worldwide. They started with a combination of efforts, such as doing away with paper and moving to digital processes and continued with installing video messages through digital boards, projections and public screening in shared spaces, such as entrance lobbies, elevators, cafeterias and corporate display areas.

In order to prevent hedonic adaptation, Yamamoto’s team worked with NTT Communications around the world to change the work environment by introducing “free address” desks, offering the employees the opportunity to work from any part of the office, or any other location, at any time of the day.

V. Conclusion

Modern Technology is able to support organizational transformation in various ways, forms and patterns. This is not a new phenomenon either. Organizations all over the world, and, especially Japan based or Japan originated businesses such NTT Communications, are constantly exploring modern ways of engaging talent and creating sustainable organizational structures beyond cultural, linguistical and geographical boundaries.

Yamamoto’s team of talent operators and organization architects realized that the implementation of modern technology alone, though, does not guarantee the success of

¹¹ “IBM Japan: The Courage to Be Different”, Globis Insights (2018) <https://e.globis.jp/tech-innovation/ibm-japan-innovation-and-the-courage-to-be-different/>

¹² “Diversity at NTT: How to Manage a Japanese Global Business in a Changing Age”, Globis Insights (2019). <https://e.globis.jp/global-japan/diversity-at-ntt-how-to-manage-a-japanese-global-business-in-a-changing-age/>

global business transformation. It needs be combined with social engineering efforts and a commitment to developing, nurturing and sustaining a culture of innovation throughout the organization globally.

The following main results could be observed throughout the innovation culture installation process:

① The involvement of the whole teams of talent operators, organization architects and corporate communicators at an early stage in the process brought a diverse perspective on implementation initiatives and created early engagement and commitment of key players in the business transformation process.

② Early cross-divisional collaborations enhanced organizational buy-in and created a base for later roll-out initiatives and communications

③ Japan based talent operators can play key innovative roles in developing and deploying corporate culture and value penetration when diversity of thought is engaged at an early stage

④ An early involved of employees from all sides of the business in the culture dissemination process as well as in the process of on-boarding new technology helps with early acceptance and adoption of this technology throughout the organization.

⑤ The introduction of digital technology without a clear strategy for implementation intimidates employees and creates confusion in the organization. Oppositely, a phased approach to implementation combined with appropriate training and technological support leads to an early adoption of the new technology and the enhancement of creative confidence throughout the organization.

⑥ Although the series of organizational architecture development proposals and cultural integration projects were new to the company, projects which were visually engaging and simple to connect with were generating innovative ideas propelled the diversity of thought and aspirations of the participating associates.

The innovation culture development and implementation activities benefitted NTT Communications in their efforts to revamp talent operations and organizational innovation practices globally, through their focus on early engagement of key organizational players locally and regionally, as well as through their commitment to adopting and installing new technology and social engineering practices throughout the business. The new technology eased the way for organizational culture integration by enhancing the opportunities for cross-cultural communications and by automatically bringing down organizational silos through the enablement of innovative processes.

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ASPECTS OF THE INTEGRATION OF ROMANIAN EMIGRANTS IN ITALY, TORINO AREA. QUESTIONNAIRE BASED SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION

*Marius FLORICU**

*Floare CHIPEA***

Abstract. *The article proposes a brief presentation of the theses included in the theoretical models of migration, based on which several hypotheses have been formulated, tested through their own research. Chapter two presents the methodological aspects and results of a sociological survey based on a randomly applied questionnaire to the parishioners of the Orthodox churches "40 Saints martyrs" from Sevestia from Moncalieri and "Sfânta Cruce" from Turin, Piemonte area, aiming to identify some characteristics of the integration of Romanian migrants. in the socio-cultural environment specific to the country of destination.*

Keywords: *causes of migration, integration of migrants; country of origin, country of destination, social networks*

Introducere

The political events produced in post-communist Romania, in the context of the phenomenon of global globalization, have transformed the migration of Romanians into a process of a magnitude that is difficult to estimate even for the well-known researchers in the field. The aspiration for personal freedom and self-realization, limited by more than four decades by an oppressive regime, accompanied by objective factors generated by the transformations produced in the Romanian economy, which abolished jobs for millions of skilled workers in the jobs become obsolete in the new economic-social contexts. , the increasingly poor quality of the health system, education, pensions, lack of horizons for young people have increasingly motivated more Romanians to settle down and perform in other countries of the world.

A relatively recent study, commissioned by Romania during the presidency of the Council of the European Union shows that about 20% of Romanian citizens of active age, between 20 and 64 years old, live and work in a European state, that Romania has the highest percentage of citizens who work in a European state, 19.7%, in the context where the European average is 4%. For comparison, it is instructive that in other countries where the skilled population has migrated to another European state the percentages are much lower: Lithuania (14.8%), Croatia (13.9%) and Portugal (13.8%) . At the opposite end are Germany (1.0%), Great Britain (1.1%) and France (1.3%). (<http://www.ziare.com/diaspora/romani-munca/un-studiu-comandat-de-guvernul-dancila>); [https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU% 20Mobile% 20Workers.pdf](https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/EU%20Mobile%20Workers.pdf)

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The Statistical Yearbook of Italy shows that in 2017 the number of Romanian citizens living in Italy amounts to 1,190,091, Romanians representing the second population after Italians and the largest group of immigrants in Italy. <https://ro.sputnik.md/diaspora/20180821/21360>

The present study is motivated by the large extent of the phenomenon of migration of Romanians in Italy and by the opportunity given by the experience and the direct involvement of one of the authors, as doctoral student of the University of Oradea, in knowing the phenomenon.

Starting from this motivation from the introduction, the article is structured in two chapters, followed by conclusions. The first chapter proposes a brief overview of some theoretical models explaining the phenomenon of international migration, insisting on those theories that have provided us with hypotheses that have been tested through concrete research. The second chapter presents the methodological aspects and some conclusions drawn from his own research regarding the causes of the migration of Romanians to Italy and, in particular, how to integrate them in the new socio-cultural context offered by the country of destination.

1. Explanatory Theoretical models of the Phenomena of International Migration

International migration, viewed as a constant in the history of social life, gaining new dimensions and structures in contemporary society, is a very complex phenomenon, conditioned by multiple factors, which are located at the multilevel level, both at the macro level, as well as at the mezo and micro level. . Although migration as a phenomenon appeared with the deepening of the social division of labor, the beginnings of the concerns for the study of migration were manifested since the 19th century, but “the construction of theories in this area is practically a problem of the 20th century and, in particular, of the last third from the 20th century”(Arango, 2000: 283).

We mention that in the present study we do not intend to carry out a critical analysis of the existing theories or the way of classifying them according to different criteria, but to highlight some theoretical orientations, based on which we have extracted some scientific hypotheses that have been tested in own research framework.

In both the order of their occurrence and the frequency with which they were used in the explanatory approach, economic theories have occupied and still play an important role.

Centered around the question "why?", Consisting in the privileging of the role of economic factors in explaining both migration flows (at the macro level), and in explaining the individual decision to migrate (at the micro level), the neoclassical economy theory or the new theory of migration take into account the differences in the ratio between the demand and supply of labor force, reflected in the difference between the level of wages in explaining the migration. (Arango, 2000: 284)

In countries and geographical areas characterized by a relative poverty of the capital, including low demand for labor compared to the supply, the wage will be lower compared to that of the countries or spaces where the situation is the reverse, which is why the labor force will take advantage of its mobile character and will move to the areas of maximizing the economic profit. According to the proponents of these theories, international migration flows become mechanisms for balancing internal deficiencies in the global labor market.

Regarding the motivation of the individual (micro-level analysis), the decision to migrate is a rational one, the individual calculates, evaluates the monetary benefits of his action, respectively the wage, the possibility of obtaining an acceptable job at the

destination, to which one it also adds the benefits related to the quality of the environment (natural, cultural and social), as well as the structure of the opportunities to which the migrant will have access through migration, comparing them with those that they would obtain if they remained immobile, in the country of origin. At the same time, the individual takes into account the costs of travel, materialized in the cost of travel, of survival in the country of destination until finding a job, the difficulty of adapting to the new job, to a new labor market, and the effort to learn a new language and to adapt to a new culture, the psychological cost of breaking old relationships and establishing new relationships, as well as the losses suffered by one's own household by leaving the migrant. The decision to migrate is positive if the result of the calculation made by the individual is positive and will be oriented to the destination that will offer the highest reward in relation to the abilities of the individual. Migration thus becomes - Arango appreciates - a form of investment in human capital (Arango, 2000: 285)

The new theory of migration concerns the individual and his intention to migrate, in the larger context, taking into account his family, his position in the social structure and the prestige of the community. Thus, families or households make the decision to migrate some members adopting strategies to minimize the risk at home, counting on the money sent home by migrants. Second, the new theory introduces in the explanation of the decision to report the income of the household to the distribution of income within the community of origin, by introducing the concept of relative deprivation. Through the migration, in the communities of origin imbalances occur between the families with migrants, compared to the families without migrants who cannot cope with the constantly rising prices, as well as other economic factors. Therefore the factor that triggers the migration is constituted by the position that a household occupies from the point of view of the income in the structure of the community of origin and not the absolute income of the household (Constantinescu, 2002: 98).

The segmented (dual) labor market is the theory that introduces into the analysis a new concept, namely the dual labor market. It includes a primary sector, consisting of good working and promotion conditions and a secondary sector, with unskilled and unstable jobs, difficult or dangerous working conditions and poor upward mobility possibilities. The domestic workers avoid the jobs in the secondary sector due to the mentioned disadvantages, mainly of the low wages, preferring the unemployment. In these conditions immigrants become the most attractive workforce from the perspective of the employer, who no longer has to choose the strategy of increasing the salary, with negative consequences on inflation.

The development of the ethnic immigrant communities and the studies that were dedicated to them led to the identification of a third segment of the labor market: the ethnic (economic) enclave, "associated with the immigrant property firms". According to the mentioned theory, the particularity of the enclave is the combination of the characteristics of the primary and secondary sector, which creates new mobility opportunities for immigrants, as well as the possibility of using the previous investment in human capital, features present in the primary sector but absent in the secondary sector. (Doors, Wilson, 1996: 315)

The theory of migration networks and social capital was developed especially at the end of the last century and to overcome the reductionist theoretical perspective regarding the atomized migrant, broken by the context and the environment of origin. The

empirical evidence of kinship networks, those based on their common origin and their role, including in integrating individuals into the new destination environment, while maintaining them in relation to the old environment, the extent of clandestine forms of migration, the importance of family reunification, as and the inability of political factors to control migration flows has brought to the fore the issue of migrant networks (Gurak, Caces, 1992: 153-154; Faist, 1997; Massey, 1988: 396; Anghel and Horvath, 2009: 36).

The role of social and symbolic relationships in the community of origin consists in the fact that through them the links are established, the information is provided regarding the possibility of emigration for the potential migrants. Support is also provided for finding the safest and cheapest arrangements for overcoming entry bans in the country of destination. In addition, support is provided in order to find a job and a home and to provide livelihoods for a period of beginning of searches, but also to provide emotional and social support.

A more recent perspective on the approach and explanation of migration is represented by transnational theory, according to which transnationalism is a process during which migrants build social networks, which creates a link between the country of origin and the destination, the result of which is a new social figure, a new social actor, namely the "trans-migrant". Its main characteristics are the simultaneous participation in the two poles of the network (the country of origin and the destination) and the pendulatory movement of immigrants between them (Gluck, Basch, Szanton, 1995). This is why in this context a reassessment of the term migration or emigrant is needed, and a review of the idea that the migration process necessarily implies a place of origin and a place of destination. The trans-migrant lives a dual or parallel reality, gets to speak and think in two different languages and has constant and simultaneous residence in the country of origin and destination (Portes and Landolt, 1999).

The transnational process strengthens the relationship between the macro and micro levels of analysis, establishing the network in the complex of links that connect different countries. Three sectors of transnational activity were delimited: one economic, one political and one socio-cultural, each of these sectors showing different degrees of institutionalization. For example, from the economic point of view, from the commercial operators to the offices opened by banks in the countries of origin (see Western Union, Schmit&Smith, the bank of San Paolo, in Romania), from the political point of view, from the participation and financial support of the places. of origin and the election of their candidates in the elections in the country of origin, socio-culturally, from the traditional ethnic and cultural events in collaboration with the embassies of the countries of origin, etc. (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999; Ambrosini, 2008)


International migration is a complex process, which is modified and adapted to the changes that have taken place in all areas of society. Therefore, the process of analysis and explanation itself must be a dynamic one, none of the explanatory models developed at one point being sufficient for the explanation of a particularly complex and dynamic reality. However, each theoretical model introduces in the analysis certain concepts and perspectives that can be adapted to the concrete situations.

II. Sociological survey based on questionnaire applied in Turin, Italy

We will present below some of the conclusions drawn from a sociological survey based on a questionnaire, applied in Italy, the Turin area, by cars administered by a number of 206 parishioners of the "40 Saints martyrs" churches from the Moncalieri Sevestia and " Holy Cross "from Turin, between January and June 2018.

Starting from the information we obtained by researching foreign and Romanian literature on the topic of international labor migration, we formulated several hypotheses regarding the causes of migration, characteristics evaluated positively by subjects in relation to the job in the country of destination, the social networks of migrants and the process of integrating them into the new socio-cultural environment, which we tested using statistical analysis and calculation of the correlation index through the chi square test.


The first hypothesis, drawn in particular from the economic theories of migration, concerned the main cause that determined the migration of the investigated subjects. From this point of view the research data statistically confirmed the stated hypothesis, 60% of the investigated subjects stated that the main reason for their departure from the country was finding a job, followed, at a great distance by declaring other reasons (leaving as a tourist, for family reunification and, very few, for studies).



Graph. no. 1. Reasons for emigration


Hypothesis no. 2 which refers to the relationship between the type of job occupied by the migrant in the country of destination and the level of studies, starting from the assumption that people with longer-term studies will have the chance to occupy prestigious and better paid jobs, has not been statistically confirmed at the reference data level (Chi square = 0.66, $p = 0.717$). On the other hand, the deeper analysis of the research data attests that the highest degree of employability (100%) is registered among the graduates of the general school and those without studies, and they are the ones who declare, in the highest proportion, they work several hours a week. It is possible that the high degree of employment, as well as the provision of overtime, can be explained by the occupation of this category of unskilled, poorly paid, unattractive jobs for domestic workers.

On the other hand, although the relationship tested is not statistically significant, (probably due to the relatively small number of subjects), all persons who declare that they are employers / own employees have higher education. We consider that the reported issues can confirm, even partially, a relationship of determination between the mentioned variables, respectively the level of education and the type of job occupied.



Graph. no. 2. The relationship between the level of education and occupational status


Another hypothesis suggested by the economic theories of labor migration and which places the higher profit obtained in the countries of destination compared to the one of the country of origin, as the main cause of the migration was invalidated in our research data. (Bekesi & Bekesi, 2017; Ștefănescu, Bekesi& Bekesi, 2017.) In this sense, it is noted that in the hierarchy of favorite attributes in relation to the occupied work place, the gain obtained and the possibility of promotion occupy the last two places, the first attributes valued higher by subjects being those regarding the friendly work environment, respectively good relations with the direct boss and with work colleagues, which suggests that one of the basic reasons for the migration of Romanians is precisely the dissatisfaction with the way in which the human being is valued in Romania, the defective management style promoted in the work groups, in general, the unfriendly atmosphere, with totalitarian perception of the people who decided to migrate from Romania. I think that from this point of view, the attitude of the Diaspora to the November 2019 presidential vote, which was a massive expression of the desire to change a certain style of governance and leadership, is generally symptomatic.



Graph.no.3. The degree of satisfaction in relation to the conditions offered by the workplace in Italy

An interesting hypothesis derived from the theory of social networks, regarding the essential role of family networks, of relatives and friends in the decision to migrate was confirmed by the research data.

The data suggest in this case that an important reason for the migration of the interviewed subjects is precisely the reunification of the family, since 74% of the subjects had, at the date of the migration, the respective spouse in the country of destination. In order, the brothers and sisters of the respondents (37%) were reasons but also an opportunity for migration, the last place (19%) being the parents of the respondents. It is possible that in this case the migration refers to a nearer period, the spouses, siblings or parents mentioned being those who already have at least one migration experience. The largest share of the respondents' friends is represented by friends of Romanian origin (over 85%). In the same sense, the most frequent interactions are made by subjects with relatives outside the household, friends, service colleagues (mostly Romanians, for the most part) or with those who attend the church.




Graph. no. 4. Information on social networks in Italy, prior to migration

In the same theoretical framework of social networks theory, we formulated another hypothesis that was confirmed by the research data, regarding the support granted to Romanian migrants in Italy, the Turin area by family networks, relatives and friends of Romanian nationality. In this regard, most of the interviewed subjects (about 60%) stated that in finding a home and a job in the country of destination they were supported by relatives already established in Italy. On the second place in this support process to identify the home and a job are the friends and knowledge already established in Italy (invoked by about 33% of the subjects), on the last place (placed by 5-6% of the subjects) other Romanians who the subjects did not know in the country of origin, prior to the migration, were located.

The following hypotheses were initially formulated starting from the postulates of social capital theories, social system theories and transnational migration, targeting in particular the factors that favor the integration of migrants in the new socio-cultural contexts offered by the countries of destination, in the case of Italy, Turin area.

In this regard, we specify that we considered that the most relevant indicator for the expression of integration in the new community is the desire to remain permanently in the country of destination. Consequently, we will correlate the other variables, considered


as independent variables, with the expression of this intention, when we will test the hypotheses regarding the factors that contribute to the integration in the new community. In this regard, the research data showed that only a very small percentage of the subjects (6.06%) categorically express their intention to remain permanently in Italy. But if we add those who have not yet decided, the percentage increases to 27.27%, which is about one third. The other two thirds of the subjects express with certainty the intention to return to the country, in different time horizons (52.53%, yes, without knowing when; 14.14% - in, a few years and 6.06% in a few months)



Graph. no. 5. Aid received in Italy for finding a home and a job


By formulating hypothesis number six we tested the relationship between the degree of mastery of the Italian language and the level of integration in the new socio-cultural context, measured by expressing the intention to stay in Italy. The responses of the subjects indicated firstly a high level of proficiency in the Italian language, materialized in the fact that 70% of the respondents know Italian and very well, without registering statistically significant differences between those who consider that they will return to Romania or not. (Chi square = 5.29, $p = 0.071$). However, statistical measurements have shown that the share of those who know Italian and very well among those who have stated that they do not intend to return to Romania (a difference of over 20%) is higher; suggesting that concern to know the Italian language can be an important factor of integration in the new community.

The theories of social capital and social networks postulate the relationship of strong determination, not only between the objective characteristics (such as the desire to earn and hope for a quieter life) and the intention to leave the country of origin and settle down permanently in one developed country, but also between certain subjective characteristics and making such a decision.



Graph. no. 6. Degree of knowledge of the Italian language


By hypothesis number seven we set out to test the relationship between the declared pride of being Romanian and the desire to remain permanently in Italy. Analysis of the data on this topic shows that regardless of whether or not they intend to remain in Italy, over 90% of the subjects express their feeling of satisfaction in relation to belonging to the Romanian ethnicity, although most of those who are very proud to be Romanians, are those who intend to return to Romania (the differences observed by about 10% are also preserved for those who are proud to be Romanian). There were no significant differences between those who intend to return to Romania and those who do not intend to evaluate the satisfaction of ethnicity (Chi square = 1.99, $p = 0.368$). However, most of those who are very proud to be Romanian are those who intend to return to Romania.



Graph. no. 7. Expressing the pride of being Romanian and the intention to return to the country

Another hypothesis tested through the research data concerns the relationship between the values of the subjects and their intention to return or not to the country of origin, positing the idea that those who wish to return to the country would have more conservative values that is in their system of values the family and the orthodox religion. In this case, also, there were no statistically significant differences between the two

variables in relation to the intention to return to the country. A large majority, over 90% of the investigated subjects, place the family and the religion in the first place in their values system, the family even outpacing the religion by 4%, which is why, within the explanatory framework proposed by us, we could consider them conservative. On the other hand, even though the differences between those who intend to stay in Italy and those who wish to return to the country are not statistically significant, observational data show that those who want to stay in Italy are more attached to family values (the differences being from 8.0 to 2.9%). The explanation of the phenomenon may derive, on the one hand from the relatively small number of subjects in the sample, as well as from the fact that all subjects are orthodox believers.



Graph. no. 8. The importance of the family and the desire to return to the country

By the last hypothesis, which was confirmed statistically, we tested the relationship between the intention to return to Romania and the well-being perceived in the environment offered by the country of destination. Testing the hypothesis first of all allowed us to ascertain the existence of a much higher material situation of the Romanian migrants from Italy compared to the Romanians from Romania, in the sense of placing them for the most part in a consistent medium blanket (64.56%), compared to those in Romania which are predominantly placed in the poor blanket (65%).


Table no. 1. Estimating family income in relation to daily needs: %

* Poverty (the money does not reach the strict requirements)	
* At the limit, with the risk of poverty (the money comes only for the strictly necessary)	
* Decency, to the limit (the money comes for a decent living, but it does not allow something more expensive)	36
* Prosperity with effort (they manage to buy some more items expensive, but with effort).....	9
* Abundance (they can get everything they need, without too much effort)	1

Source: Mărginean,2010 .

On the other hand, the statistical data shows, confirming the initial hypothesis, that the subjects who express their intention to return with certainty to Romania are recruited from those with a lower material situation, which means that those who return are those who are not very satisfied with the welfare offered in the country of destination.

The limits of the research consisted mainly of the relatively small number of subjects (206) whose answers were validated for processing, although initially 500 questionnaires were distributed. The main reason for submitting questionnaires derives from the self-administration completion process. It would be advisable to administer the questionnaires by the survey operators, using a statistical sampling step, which could be an essential condition for ensuring representativeness, including by completing the answers to all questions. On the other hand, the fact that all the subjects are parishioners of the two Orthodox churches means that the results of the research can be generalized only to this category of migrants. However, we consider that it is necessary that the research results be complemented by others obtained through qualitative studies (interviews or focus groups).



Graph. no.9. Self-assessment of household financial situation

Conclusions

Of the nine hypotheses tested in this case we find that only three have been statistically confirmed. This is first and foremost the main cause of migration, which is finding a job in the country of destination. It is interesting, however, that, although according to the theses of economic theories on migration, the main characteristic of the workplace agreed by migrants is the higher wage in the country of destination compared to that obtained in the country of origin. The interviewed subjects placed in the first places in their preferences regarding the attributes of the workplace over those related to the friendly atmosphere at the workplace, respectively the relationships with the direct boss and with the colleagues, which may indicate just a strong dissatisfaction of the migrants for the authoritarian style and the cool atmosphere at work.

- Another confirmed hypothesis refers to the important role of networks of relatives and friends both in facilitating the migration process and in integrating into the new community through the support of finding a home and a job.

- With regard to the relationship between perceived well-being and the desire to return to the country, a strong statistical relationship was highlighted, in the sense that the vast majority of the subjects with reduced welfare in the country of destination express their desire to return to Romania.

- Although the other hypotheses were not confirmed statistically based on the reference data, trends were observed in the sense of the expectations formulated: all subjects occupying employer positions have higher education; the highest proportion of the subjects expressing the intention to stay in the country of destination know the language of the country well and very well; the family, considered a conservative value, is supported by all subjects who express their intention to remain in the country of destination; the feeling of satisfaction of being Romanian is more strongly expressed by the subjects who intend to return to the country.

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THE CHALLENGE OF INTERETHNIC COEXISTING IN EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XXI CENTURY: THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

*Nataliya NECHAYEVA-YURIYCHUK**

Abstract. *This article is dedicated to the problems of interethnic coexistence in contemporary European space. The author makes an attempt to analyze the scientific approaches to the defining the essence of the term „identity”, „national identity”, analyze the main peculiarities of social-political development of Ukraine in 2013-2014, Scottish and Catalan referendums and their influence on European stability.*

The special attention is payed to the Russian influence on political development of Ukraine; Russia's interference into domestic affairs of the EU member states.

Keywords: *identity, national identity, revolution, ethnic coexistence, referendum*

Introduction

Changes in geopolitics which has been started after the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist system seemed natural and inevitable. So, national confrontation in a number of former socialistic states needed special attention from politicians, scientists, journalists, civic activists etc. National question was expressed through various forms: from peaceful divorce in former Czechoslovakia to bloody events in former Yugoslavia. The level of involvement of different states and institutions into its solution in Central and Eastern European countries was different. And the problem was that no one actor could predict the further development of events. In two decades a number of Central and Eastern European states became members of the European Union (EU). It looked like national confrontation was something like misunderstanding of young democracies. All new EU member states adopted new rules and legal principles of the EU. Their development went by completely different direction than in previous decades. But a number of states couldn't decide on the vector of further political development. There were both objective and subjective reasons. On author's opinion, the double or even triple standards of former socialistic being transformed into so-called pseudo-democracy, where traditional democratic values were intertwined with the post-Soviet way of thinking and being. For author, the bordering states with the EU like Republic of Moldova and Ukraine are the best examples of such strategy. If Moldova faced with challenges to territorial integrity and national identity at the end of previous century, Ukraine clearly experienced the similar or even worse problems at the beginning of the XXI century.

The events of 2004 and 2013 played a huge role in political and national identity building of Ukrainians. Also, they influenced a lot the political preferences of the EU, especially Revolution of Dignity (2013) events. "Ukraine", as American historian

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Timothy Snyder wrote, “matters today as it has mattered for a century: as a signal of coming political trends” (Шп, 2020). From the beginning of XX century till nowadays Ukraine was and still is in the center of political confrontation of West and East attitudes of state building process. The attempts to transform Ukraine into Russia’s own sphere of influence have been started in medieval times. But as far as we could see the deep understanding of Ukraine’s role both in contemporary geopolitics and internal affairs of the EU member states came just in the turn of XX – XXI centuries. 2013 demonstrated the whole world that “Ukrainian question” is more than just Ukraine and Ukrainians. It’s also a question concerning contemporaneity and future of the EU and its member states.

The main aim of the article is to analyze the problem of interethnic coexisting in the EU on the example of such states as Great Britain and Spain through the prism of current geopolitical interests of leading political players, in particular, Russian Federation. To reach this aim it is necessary to give the explanation to such terms as “identity”, “ethnic identity”, “ethnic nation”, and “political nation”; to describe the essence of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and its implications for the world, particularly for the EU; to analyse the attempts to gain independence by Scots and Catalonians and to make conclusion on their importance for preserving the existing political system and borders within the EU.

The issue of the EU development is actual for contemporary studies. A great number of scientists and scholars from different countries are working on various aspects of the EU internal and foreign policy, cyber security and informational intervention into the EU member states internal life, and, of course, on interethnic tensions and relations within the EU etc. We can also find special researches dedicated to the media and information policy both Russia and the EU in light of the events in Ukraine as the catalyser of further changes. The common work of Ukrainian scholars Volodymyr Horbulin, Oleksandr Vlasiuk, Ella Libanova and Oleksandra Liashenko is dedicated to the contemporary vision of the world order in the light of the military conflict in Ukraine (Горбулін, Власюк, Лібанова, Ляшенко). Instead the work of Margarita Jaitner is dedicated to the changes and meanings of Russian information policy after the beginning its aggression in Ukraine (Jaitner, 2015: 87-94).

The beginning of XXI century proved that contemporary world is interdependent and events which occur in one dot of the world are inevitable influencing the rest political players. But the medieval ideas of state still can be used in nowadays Eurasia (by definite political players) which will be discussed further in our research.

1. Identity: Theoretical Foundations of Contemporary Political Processes

Interference in internal affairs of the state is often provided under the slogan of protecting the rights of national communities, certain-language speaking communities etc. The question is: is it possible to clearly define the members of such communities, especially in a language case? And why political players have so wide range of activity in this direction? As far as we could see during last decade a number of different events directly or indirectly related to the political stability issues in the EU have happened. And a number of them were aimed at provoking ethno-political instability within the EU.

But how is affiliation with a particular national community determined? Philosophers, scientists, journalists, politicians are working on this question for centuries. We can find a number of various attitudes to answer this question. And identity is the basis for all of them. The term “identity” is of Latin origin. It has roots in Latin word “idem” which meaning is “the same”. This term denotes sameness. Probably that’s why

the famous scientist S. Freud considered identification as assimilation of one “I” by another. The result is that individual is construction her/his own ideal image (in fact, identity) consciously choosing certain patterns and behaviours. And what is the most important for us, individual identity becomes the basis for group formation as the result of perception the other through own “I” (Гальченко, 2011: 110).

Identity was put in the centre of scientific researches by E. Erikson (Côté, Levine, 1987: 273-325). His works were dedicated to the different aspects of individual identity, identity crises etc. He viewed identity as the “ego-identity” (or as we named it individual / “I”-identity) and “social identity”. The first consists of organic and individual (or self-perception) components. Every individual has a given physical appearance and natural makings of man which seems unchangeable (NB: in previous century the special clinics of plastic surgery appeared and individuals got the possibility to change their appearance. So, the influence of such changes on identity can be the topic of other researches). Another important component is the awareness of a person’s own uniqueness, his/her desire to develop and realize his/her abilities and interests. Simultaneously, the social identity consists of group (personal involvement in different communities, feeling of inner unity with one’s social environment) and psychosocial (a sense of importance of being within certain society).

Every human is a bearer of a whole set of different identities – cultural, professional, gender, political, confession, and ethnic etc. The Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary gives several explanations to the term “identity”. Between them: “the fact or condition of being exactly alike”; “distinguishing character or personality” (Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1994: 493). So, in individual identity formation the self-personal attitude and vision plays defining role. The person feels her/himself as distinctive or similar with other individuals because of a number of different subjective and objective reasons. Here are the place and circumstances of birth, life conditions, studying and working places etc. But: it’s hard to find two identical individuals in one place even if they were born in the same conditions, went to the same school and got the job in the same place. They can speak the same language, celebrate the same holidays, and feel themselves as the part of one community but individually they are different. The factor which is uniting them is to the large extent, irrational perception of the ethnic or national roots of their origin. This thesis is controversial; can and should be discussed.

Nowadays the term “identity” is using in different context: in psychology, social and political sciences, philosophy, ethnology etc. The identity formation is going through confrontation of positive and negative elements of identity structure. There are people with positive identity, those who are aware of community with positively significant others (“we”) and without rigid opposition of “we” – so called “they”. People with negative identity are consolidating around total opposition to “they”. And in this case community “we” is existing thanks to the tough confrontation with the community “they”. The last type of identity (negative) is using by politicians in their political struggle more often, and especially when national feelings are involved.

The experience of socialistic system collapse demonstrated the crucial role of national factor. And national feelings found expression not only in independent national state-building process, but also (and in some cases, first of all) destructive ones. Thereby we came to the question of ethnic identity and national belonging. The ethnic identity is more than complicated question in contemporary world. Every person has to answer the question what does ethnic identity mean for me? Are the interests of the ethnic (or national) group more important than mine? Ethnic identity is given from birth, native

language, and cultural circumstance and so on. So, for many people this is a rhetoric question. They just “know who they are”. But the historical development of last several centuries opened a new page in this topic. There are people who can’t answer this question, because their parents or somebody of ancestors are of different national origin (so, they probably have double or multiple identities). Also, there are those who are carriers of a marginal ethnic identity, those who have weak connection with any ethnic identity. And that influences not only on personal life of concrete people, but also the political development of some states and even regions. For example, in some post-Soviet states where Russian element was really strong presented in all spheres of life (like Belarus, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine).

Ethnic identity is forming during centuries. Mainly it inherited. People’s awareness of their ethnicity depends a lot on a character of place they live: has it mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic environment? Differentiation signs are stronger in multi-ethnic environment. The differences between representatives of ethnic groups promote awareness of themselves as a member of particular group featuring certain culture, language, history etc. So, ethnic identity is based on awareness of yourself as a member of group differs from other by culture, language, territory, traditions, and everyday life. The ethnic feeling could be both eternal and situational. And understanding of that is the strong political weapon.

National identity has a lot in common with the ethnic one. That allowed developing the ethnic theory of nation which has deep historical roots. Investigations of J. Herder, J. Fichte and G. Hegel were followed up by contemporary scientists between whom the most famous is A. Smith. He defined the basic features of national identity: a homeland or historical territory; common historical memory and myths; common mass culture; common legal rights and duties for all; common economy with the territorial mobility (Smith, 1991: 4-8). In this case it seems possible to put a sign equal between ethnos and nation. But it is necessary to keep in mind that nation (even the ethnic one) is the community of people who realized their willingness to state building, already built national state or on their way to build it.

Another theory of nation which is noteworthy is political one. The first ideas on it appeared in ancient times. One of the first founders of it was H. Grotius, Dutch scholar. In his “The Right of War and Peace” he presented some ideas of political theory of nation (Grotius, 2005). After that they’ve spread all over Europe. And at the beginning of previous century the scientific discussions on the nature of nation were provided in different states with different political consequences. According to political theory, nation is the political community which is uniting all citizens of a certain state regardless of ethnic and social origin. This theory gives the understanding of the nature of contemporary citizenship and opens the possibilities for uniting people of different nationalities into one community. But since modern states have a national nature, the ethno-political relations can be strained by different factors from time to time. For last decade they are escalated in different parts of the EU because of different reasons, between which the external is almost decisive.

Nowadays there are a number of different attitudes toward the understanding the nation’s nature. We can state that it has to be analysed comprehensively. And contemporary political processes open the possibility to trace the connection between theory and practice, especially in the ethno-political plane.

2. On the way to Democracy: the Ukrainian Case

Where should we move: West or East? Due to the data of Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 64,2% of Ukrainian respondents have chosen the EU. For 12,7% entering the Custom Union of Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan should be in priority of foreign policy of Ukraine. And more than 23% couldn't answer this question (Європейський або Митний союз, 2020). So, even after several years of violation of territorial integrity of our state, permanent military actions on Eastern border, the deaths of hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers, social, economic, ecological disaster a certain percentage of population is still thinking that the best way is to "keep" or "restore" "good relations" with Russian Federation. The roots of such attitude are in the history. It's not necessary to analyse the development of Russian-Ukrainian relations from medieval times but to remind how they influenced on national self-perception of Ukrainians, primarily Soviet times.

From mid-XVII century Ukrainian lands partly became the sphere of Moscow (later – Russian) influence. Firstly, slowly, almost unnoticed, then more aggressively and open the process of the incorporation of Ukrainian lands into Russian space has begun. 1917 opened a new page in the world's modern history. It promised appearing of first social state which will care on working people, and a number of national states appeared on the ruins of Russian empire (probably with the same principles of state building). But the leaders of Russian (famous in post-Soviet space October) revolution were not ready to allow national communities to build their own states. Further military actions, war on post-Russian empire space allowed gathering most of the former imperial lands in one Soviet state. Of course, that's a schematic vision of history, but the fact is that the most part of Ukrainian lands became the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). They got a ghostly statehood in the form of Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR).

Ukrainian SSR in fact was the phantom state. Formally it had government, territory, other attributive features of the state, but it couldn't provide the independent policy either internal, or foreign. All decisions were adopted by Moscow. And the main one was to create a state of so-called new type – with completely new type of citizen who has first of all the social identity which has to become the basis for a Soviet identity of every citizen of the USSR. For next decades the policy of denationalization was provided in Ukraine. The Soviet authorities used "whip and gingerbread method". Repressions, holocaust of 1932-1933, from one side, so-called "rooting policy" or the policy of Ukrainization demonstrated multilateralism and power of new regime. It worked for the destruction of even potential opposition and the "education" of loyal to regime citizens. Very soon all citizens were involved in building socialism through the different institutions and "thanks" to leading role of the Communist party. The individual identity was formed from kindergartens through school, universities and other education institutions. But becoming adult didn't protect against the interference in private life of local Communist party structures. Special child and youth organization of Communist party were organized to manage the education process on all levels and on all stages of identity formation. Not everybody become the member of the Communist party but the Soviet ideas, myths, principles were familiar to everybody. The path to the formation of Soviet identity was paved. It seemed that in several decades the Soviet identity will prevail on 1/6 of world space. But deformation of socio-economic development has led to the impetus for national awakening and further disintegration of the USSR.

The end of 1980-s was the starting point for further EU-Ukraine relations. The first agreement on trade and economy collaboration was signed in 1989 between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Agreement..., 1989). In August, 1991 the protocol on technical, law and administrative assistance in the frame of TACIS was added to the agreement. The collapse of the USSR at the same year brought the changes to TACIS in 1992. And Ukraine became the second (in order of importance) recipient of TACIS loans on post-Soviet space. However for next several years Ukraine didn't signed any additional agreements with the European institutions. Only in 1994 bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine was signed (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement..., 1994). Next year the first meeting of the EU – Ukraine Joint Committee was held.

In 1996 the Council of Europe adopted the Action plan for Ukraine, the main objectives of which were: “giving the Ukrainian authorities a political signal of the stepping-up of EU support and exploring ways to improve the development of existing aid and possibilities for strengthening EU and Member State cooperation in this area” (European Union Action Plan..., 1996). After that two parties agreed on strengthening collaboration. In 1998 the Decree of the President of Ukraine approved the Strategy of integration of Ukraine into the EU (Про затвердження Стратегії..., 1998). That Strategy defined the main directions of executive authorities work in order to achieve the status of associate and in the future – the full member of the EU. Next year the European Council adopted the Common Strategy on Ukraine (European Council Common Strategy..., 1999) were the main directions of further collaboration have been identified. On our opinion, most of them left actual for settling effective collaboration till now despite the fact that they are partly implemented.

So, as far as we could see the 1990-s gave the start for bilateral EU – Ukraine relations. Both sides declared the willingness for deepening cooperation. But the uncertainty of Ukraine on main vector of development both in internal and foreign policy complicated that process. The desire to sit on two chairs at once – deepened cooperation with the EU and Russian Federation – has led to a radical turn in internal policy of Ukraine and its relations with the EU.

The more than close cooperation with Russian Federation led to the internal rebellion which got unusual form. During Presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 incumbent President L.Kuchma tried to impose pro-Russian V.Yanukovich as a new one. The reaction of people on announced results was unpredictable. The bigger part of Ukraine supported pro-European candidate V.Yushchennko. The readiness to defend their candidate has grown into a mass gathering and rally on the central square of the State (Maidan in Kyiv). The demonstration was peaceful, but people demonstrated their readiness to stay till the victory. The decision of Constitutional Court was to provide III tour of Presidential elections on December 26, 2004. The winner was V.Yushchenko (Якубова, 2017).

The events of Orange Revolution of 2004 attracted attention to Ukraine from the whole world and the EU was no exception. It congratulated Ukraine with the democratic choice. After that the European Community demonstrated that that choice can positively influence on EU-Ukraine relationship. Next year (2005) the new Action Plan which had to witness the strengthening of Ukraine – EU relations (EU – Ukraine Action Plan, 2005). The possibilities which were opened by the EU have not been used by Ukraine. The policy of V.Yushchenko wasn't successful, especially in socio-economic sphere. The

proclamations of EU orientation were not supported by effective reforms inside the state. People were disappointed by their choice in 2004. The rating of V.Yushchenko and his party "Our Ukraine" fell dramatically. The results of Presidential elections of 2010 were the "step back": V.Yanukovich earned the position of President. After 2010 Ukraine moved to closer relation with Russian Federation and reduced interaction with the EU.

At that moment of time for European Community became obvious that Ukraine again found itself in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation. The loyalty of Ukrainian authorities to Russian presence in business, energy, military, cultural, media sectors confirmed that Ukraine made 180 degree turn toward the Russian Federation.

In 2013 Ukraine was suggested by the European Union to sign the Association Agreement. The preparations to that were conducted during several months. All over Ukraine were gathered pro-authority demonstrations in favour of signing the Agreement. For example, in Chernivtsi the traditional Bykovinian Viche of November, 3 was dedicated to the necessity of signing it. It was initialized by regional authority. Its participants supported the European integration of Ukraine (Дідух, 2013). But that was unrespectable for many representatives of Ukrainian opposition who couldn't believe the authorities initiated such actions. And further events confirmed that there should not be any trust to so-called pro-European position of Ukrainian central and regional authorities.

A refusal to sign an Association Agreement has triggered the wave of discontent with V.Yanukovich policy. It transformed into open protest and demonstrations against the policy of President. Firstly, it looked like the Orange Revolution. People were sure that peaceful demonstrations would lead to positive result. But circumstances have been changed. The new regime was not ready for any compromise. It used military power against demonstrators. As a result, bloody events in the centre of Ukraine, in its capital, fast escaping of V.Yanukovich out of Ukraine, new elections and new challenges to national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine and not only to it. 2013-2014 became a turn-point for Ukrainian society. It changed not only the political regime, the vector of political development of Ukraine, but first of all the self-identification of a number of Ukrainians. The ideas like "I'm Ukrainian and I proud of it", "Ukraine is not Russia" etc. became slogans of the Revolution and early post-Revolution period in Ukraine.

The next military aggression of Russian Federation, its annexation of Ukrainian Crimea demonstrated violation of all international agreements and main principles of international law. During and after the events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 Russia has shown its desire to establish world domination. Violation of ethno-political stability in the EU became the part of its' political strategy; ethnic and national identity was and still is used as a tool of achieving political goals.

3. Challenges for Ethno-Political Stability in Europe After 2014

The geopolitical situation at the beginning of second decade of the XXI century was complicated with the number events in different regions of the world. And, on author's point of view, the events in Ukraine were not only between them, but were ahead of the list. The confrontation in Ukraine in 2013-2014 on the vector of further political development led to the changes of political regime in Ukraine. The Russian aggression in Ukraine can be calculated as the continuation of the struggle for keeping Ukraine in Russian sphere of influence, as it was before the Revolution of Dignity. In winter 2014 Russian Federation brought so-called "green men" in Autonomous Republic of Crimea of Ukraine. On February 27, 2014 the Russian military troops occupied the buildings of the

Council of Ministers and Supreme Council of Crimea. The population of the Autonomous Republic was mostly Russian-speaking. The situation was critical and neither local authorities, nor national government had a clear and effective strategy to counteract that military aggression. The Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea voted for including Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 6, 2014 (Парламент Криму проголосував..., 2014). Till mid-March the whole peninsula was under the control of Russian troops. The local power passed to the self-proclaimed puppet government. The last started the preparations for the referendum on the status of the peninsula. The peaceful coexisting of different nations whose representatives lived here for decades or even for centuries was interrupted by the military intervention and the next information company for entering the Russian Federation. During the agitation (it is difficult to find other words for characteristic of that company) the well-known for post-Soviet space images were used. The most popular were the images of the World War II, where the possibility to live in Russia was opposed to the Nazi Germany. On images below we can find some examples of them:



“On March 16 we choose...” *Source:*

<http://www.ostro.org/general/politics/articles/440058/>



“Fascism will not pass. Everyone is on referendum” *Source:*

<https://www.ostro.org/general/politics/articles/440058/>

The result of March, 16 referendum was predictable. It was announced by organizers that 96% of voters supported integration with Russia. By independent data those results were falsified. Soon after that the Crimea peninsula was included into the Russian Federation. On March 18, 2014 such decision was accepted by Russian authorities. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine was violated. As it was told by Boris Johnson, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, “Russia broke so many international agreements that listing them all is a challenge”, probably meaning not only the Ukrainian case, but also the situation in Georgia in 2008 etc. Taking into account that “the security of every nation depends on the essential principle that countries should not borders or acquire territory by force” (Johnson, 2018), the situation in 2014 punished the EU states to make some principle decisions.

After such “returning to practise of interwar period” by Russia, the European Union agreed the first diplomatic measures to Russian aggression in Ukraine in March, 2014. European Council agreed the first diplomatic measures to Russian aggression in Ukraine (EU sanctions...). Russia was condemned by the EU for aggression over Ukraine. The EU introduced a wide range of economic sanctions, asset freezes, visa bans etc. For next years the world witnessed the joint forces of European leaders in their attempt to stop Russian aggression through sanction mechanism. This question is still actual. And almost every year after 2014 it is discussed both by politicians and scientists during common

conferences, seminars, meetings etc. And contemporary media is constantly drawing attention to this problem.

In September, 2014 in frame of North Atlantic Council in Wales the Heads of State and Government signed the Wales Summit Declaration. It was stressed there that “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace” (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014). That was the turning point in relationship NATO – Russian Federation.

All these steps didn’t stop Russian authorities in their attempt to maintain Russia’s influence in Ukraine and strengthen its positions in worlds’ politics. After 2014 the attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of European states have become systematic. One of the first was done in Great Britain in September, 2014. It is possible to suppose that Scottish independence referendum was aimed to answer the question not only on perspectives of the United Kingdom as separate state, union of different nations and states. Its results could influence on further relations between the United Kingdom and the other world. Ben Nimmo, an analyst for the US think-tank the Atlantic Council, stressed, “pro-Russian propagandists used Twitter, fake news on YouTube and Facebook accounts to make and then spread false allegations that votes were interfered with to ensure victory for pro-UK campaigners”. The main purpose of such activity was to destabilize social and political situation in particular in the UK and in the EU in general. The attempt to influence or at least to discredit the results of the Scottish referendum was done. And the small difference (just 2%) between numbers of those who were in favour of independence and against could be used as a base for further activities in provoking interethnic instability inside Scottish and British societies. The political consequences of that could be different and the appearance of a new national state on the political map of the Europe looks possible.

Spain is the European state with the complicated history, especially in the interethnic sphere. Basks, Catalonians have strong visions concerning their place and role in the state. In 2017 the situation in Catalonia became threatening for the Spain national authorities. In autumn, 2017 the Parliament of Catalonia passed the Law on the Referendum of Self-Determination of Catalonia. It was declared unconstitutional by central authorities. But the Catalan parliament approved it holding. The only question was “Do You want Catalonia to become an independent state in the form of Republic?” More than 92% of voters supported that idea. Around 8% were against it (Catalonia referendum..., 2017). The situation was aggravated by external interference. By the words of Spain defence and foreign ministers, there is evidence “that state and private private-sector Russian groups, as well as groups in Venezuela, used Twitter, Facebook and other Internet sites to massively publicize the separatist cause and swing public opinion behind it in the run-up to the Oct. 1 referendum” (Robin, 2017). The relations between Madrid and Barcelona are still uncertain and need additional efforts for peaceful solution. This challenge to interethnic peace in the centre of Europe is like a time bomb that must be neutralized.

Those suggested several examples of interethnic coexistence in contemporary Europe are demonstrating the destroying the peace development of European states. The question of interethnic interaction is extremely sensitive. And manipulation by it of political powers can lead to the instability in all spheres of human life.

Conclusions

After 2013 the political development went otherwise, specially, in the sphere of international relations and geopolitical preferences. The geopolitical construction of the

world, made in recent decades, has undergone significant changes. These changes demonstrated the weaknesses of the geopolitical construction and the significance of common efforts on keeping democracy.

During last decades the question of national identity and state belonging has been becoming more actual in worlds' politics. Every human has not only to decide who he/she is but also to make a political choice on the future of his/her own national community and state. This choice can be controversial and it is really difficult to predict the consequences of it both to the individual and to the community. In all cases it is made because of the wish of better life. But the last rarely happens. Only if interethnic interaction is provided in peace channel, through negotiation it is possible to hope for keeping the level of life on the same or even higher level. But if the interethnic problems are moving into the plane of warfare, the devastating consequences come immediately. The last we can see on the example of Ukraine.

The new challenges to interethnic stability demonstrate that the double or even triple standards in political behavior are the weakest sides of democracy. And the main problem of contemporary democracy is developing a common vision of the future, common standards in politics that will be followed by all political players.

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IV. Security Studies and European Society

Mircea BRIE ⇔ *Population aging. A demographic vulnerability for the societal security of the European Union*

Cristina EJOVA ⇔ *Counter-Terrorism Capacity of the Republic of Moldova*

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POPULATION AGING. A DEMOGRAPHIC VULNERABILITY FOR THE SOCIETAL SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION¹

Mircea BRIE*

Abstract. *For centuries, important geopolitical, social-economic or scientific factors have contributed to the progress of European societies. An important effect of this progress was the improvement of the perspectives and the demographic context. The positive evolution of important demographic indicators, including population growth, urbanization, decreased mortality (including infant mortality), increased life expectancy, population mobility, etc. have contributed to Europe's success worldwide. Europe proved to be an important demographic source that allowed for the golden era of colonialism when the Christian-European civilization spread across the globe. However, the trends have changed in the meantime. If during the period of sharp increase in the birth rate in the years after the Second World War, the European population reached up to 22.8% of the world's population, Europe subsequently experienced a reduction down to zero of the population growth. Today, the European population represents only 9.6% of the world's population. In the current geopolitical and economic context, this tendency of population decline is an important demographic vulnerability of the European space, and particularly of the European Union. Not only the quantitative dynamics of the population is in decline. Its structure reflects more and more vulnerabilities that impose new public policies, including in the field of social protection, of social services. The increase of life expectancy in the last decades has not been corroborated with the maintenance or increase of the birth rate, so we are witnessing an increasingly visible phenomenon of population aging. These imbalances create strong pressures on the pension systems of EU member states. In this context, some states have chosen to progressively open their doors to the foreign workforce. The increasingly massive migration is a demographic phenomenon entailing several problems that require a delicate approach through the rethinking of public policies. Immigrant integration has proven to be toilsome and costly. Moreover, this increasingly raises issues related not only to societal security but also to national security. Methodologically, without analyzing the full range of demographic vulnerabilities that the European Union is facing, we intend to monitor the main demographic indicators that refer to the age group structure of the population of the 28 EU Member States. This paper aims to capture the phenomenon of population aging in Europe, with its various regional peculiarities. To carry out this analysis we propose to use the data provided by Eurostat for the last 10 years.*

Keywords: *The European Union, population aging, demographic vulnerability, societal security*

¹ This paper was made by completing a revised edition of the study *Population aging. A demographic vulnerability of the European Union* (Mircea Brie, 2019).

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Conceptual and methodological contextualization

From a historical perspective, we can see that Europe, compared to other geographical areas, has been noted for its more balanced evolution of the population structures. For centuries, important geopolitical, social-economic or scientific factors have contributed to the progress of European societies. An important effect of this progress was the improvement of the perspectives and demographic context. The positive evolution of important demographic indicators, including population growth, urbanization, decreased mortality (including infant mortality), increased life expectancy, population mobility, etc. have contributed to Europe's success worldwide. Europe proved to be an important demographic source that allowed for the golden era of colonialism when the Christian-European civilization spread across the globe. Eurocentrism, from this perspective, is not just a philosophical current or a worldview from a European perspective, but a reality given by the demographic force of the European continent.

This demographic reality, associated with technological and economic progress, has allowed the great European states to be in a dominant position compared to the rest of the world. However, the trends have changed in the meantime. At the beginning of the 20th century, the population of Europe was close to 20% of the world population². If in the period of sharp increase in the birth rate during the years after World War II the European population reached up to 22.8% of the world's population³, Europe then experienced a reduction down to zero in population growth. In the last decades, the natural growth has been negative, and the maintenance of the number of the European population has been due to the massive immigration from the western states. Contemporary Europe has lost, compared to other geographical areas. Today, the European population represents only 9.6% of the world's population⁴. Comparatively, throughout this period, Africa went from 9% in 1950, to 17.1% at present, and has the potential of exceeding 25% in 2050⁵. Quantitatively, the European population has grown from almost 550 million inhabitants to a little over 743 million to date. At the same time, Africa has grown from 228 million to over 1.3 billion inhabitants.

In the current geopolitical and economic context, this *tendency of population decline* is an important demographic vulnerability of the European space, and particularly of the European Union. The internal market, European affairs, but also the social services are affected by this evolution of the population.

Not only the quantitative dynamics of the population is in decline. Its structure reflects more and more vulnerabilities that impose new public policies, including in the field of social protection, of social services. The increase of life expectancy in the last decades has not been corroborated with the maintenance or increase of the birth rate, so we are witnessing an increasingly visible *phenomenon of population aging*. These imbalances create strong pressures on the pension schemes of EU member states. Conceptually and methodologically, we consider that the threshold of aging is 65 (the EU operates with this age), despite the fact that in many UN publications and reports there are

² R. Cameron, *Concise Economic History of the World*, New York, O.U.P., 1993, p. 193.

³ *Worldometers*, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/europe-population/>, accessed on 15.10.2018.

⁴ *Ibidem*, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-region/>, accessed on 15.10.2018.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

two thresholds: 60 and 65 years old. The age of 65 is more relevant from the perspective of social policies, as well (most European states have set the retirement age around 65).

The decline in the birth rate within the EU does not even provide the hope of rebalancing the demographic deficit and reordering the age pyramid.

In this context, some states have chosen to progressively open their doors to the foreign workforce. The increasingly massive *migration* is a demographic phenomenon that brings with it many problems that require a delicate approach through the rethinking of public policies. Immigrant integration has proven to be toilsome and costly. Moreover, this increasingly raises issues related not only to societal security but also to national security. Then, the Open-Door Policy in the west has depleted Central and Eastern European countries which have recently joined the EU of young people and the labor force. During this period, countries such as Romania or Poland, but also the other former communist states, strongly feel the effects of emigration as a hindrance to their development.

Methodologically, without analyzing the full range of demographic vulnerabilities that the European Union is facing, we intend to monitor the main demographic indicators that refer to the age group structure of the population of the 28 EU Member States. *The aim* of this paper is to capture the phenomenon of population aging in Europe, with its various regional peculiarities, and of the derived effects that constitute a vulnerability for the societal security of the EU. In order to carry out this analysis, we intend to use the data provided by Eurostat for a period of 10 years, starting from 2007 up to 2017. As the phenomenon of population aging has different causes and different degrees of expression in the western states compared to the eastern ones, we intend to highlight the trends recorded from this regional perspective throughout this analysis.

Aging of the EU population. Demographic analysis

The age-related change in the population structure is one that can be observed globally. This change always has the same meaning: population aging. According to a UN report on the analysis of changes in the age structure of the population in the years 1950-2050, the current period is one characterized by a sharp increase in the aging rate. Thus, even in countries where the birth rate continues to be high (above the reproduction rate), the share of the elderly population is increasing. Such a tendency, as long as it is associated with the increase of life expectancy, cannot be considered as a negative one. With few exceptions, however, most states are experiencing a decline in the share of other age groups, especially in the youth population. Naturally, in this case, the medium and long-term demographic premises lead to social/economic and societal vulnerabilities. "It is estimated that Europe has already reached a critical stage: after a century of natural demographic growth, the prospect for this century is, on the contrary, a natural decline and excessive aging of the population. Many of the Eastern European countries are already experiencing the demographic decline and many Western countries will experience it in the near future"⁶.

Even if differences in intensity may be noticed between different European regions, the trend is the same: population decline and aging. In some countries which recently joined the European Union, there is still a balanced population structure, but


⁶ Ana Bălașa, *Îmbătrânirea populației: provocări și răspunsuri ale Europei*, în *Calitatea Vieții*, XVI, nr. 3-4, 2005, p. 275.

according to the forecasts, the aging of the population here will be even more pronounced in the coming decades. This phenomenon is largely determined by the association of an additional factor to the two already mentioned above: the massive migration, especially of the youth population of fertile age. Thus, migration contributes even more to declining birth rates. The much faster improvement of socio-economic indicators, in general of those related to the quality of life, contributes to a rapid increase in longevity. Therefore, there is an accumulation of factors that have the effect of a more obvious process of an increase in the aging rate of the population in these Central and Eastern European states.

Throughout the European Union as a whole, the aging tendency of the population is maintained as the average. The share of the elderly population is increasing. Thus, as Figure 1 shows, the share of population aged at least 65 increased from 17% in 2007 to 19.4% in 2017. An increase of 2.4% in just 10 years is quite large. However, we can easily note the more pronounced trends in some European states (See Figure 2).

In countries such as Germany, Italy (22.3% - the highest level in the EU), Greece, Portugal, but also Bulgaria, the share of the population over 65 has exceeded 20%. By analyzing Figure 1, we find two realities: 1. "Old Europe" seems to have experienced this aging trend much earlier; 2. "New Europe" is following the same trend at a much faster pace. In conjunction with the migration mentioned before, the population aging here tends, in a not too distant future, to exceed in share the one in the western and northern states.

Figure 1: Population age structure, 65 years old or over, 2007 and 2017 (% of the total population)




(1) Break in time series in various years between 2007 and 2017

(2) The population of unknown age is redistributed for calculating the age structure.

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019

The more pronounced tendency of aging of some countries' populations is shown in Figure 2. Thus, compared to a 2.4% increase in the share of the population over 65 years old throughout the European Union in just 10 years, growth rates of over 4% can be noted in Malta (4.9%), Finland (4.4%) and the Czech Republic (4.3%). The only state where the growth rate of the elderly population is below 1% is Luxembourg (0.2%).

Figure 2: Increase in the share of the population aged 65 years or over between 2007 and 2017 (percentage points)



(1) Break in time series in various years between 2007 and 2017.


(2) Provisional.

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019

The increase in the share of the aging population is associated with the need to reorganize public policies related to social protection, the reformation of the labor market and last, but not least, the development of a new institutional and legal framework in the social-demographic field.

The increase in the share of the population aged 65 and over is accompanied by an obvious increase during the 10 years under review. Thus, in just 10 years, between 2007 and 2017, the median age of European citizens increased by 2.7 years, from 40.1 years old (2007) to 42.8 years old (2017) (See Figure 3).

Figure 3: Median age of population, EU-28, 2002-2017 (years)




Note: 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017: break in series. 2017: provisional.

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019

This evolution is not consistent throughout the European Union. In some states, the trend is more obvious, while in others it is slower. In this latter case, we are discussing states that either mitigated this trend through various policies, or previously experienced an increase in the age of the population.

Among the states with a sharp increase in the median age of the population between 2007 and 2017, we mention Romania (4.5 years), Portugal (4.4 years), Greece (4.3 years), Lithuania (4.2 years) or Latvia (4.2 years). If in some states this process is due to natural demographic trends, in Central and Eastern Europe the process is intensified by the massive migration of the youth population. In countries such as Romania (41.8 years old), even if there is a marked increase in the median age, the median age still remains below the EU average one (42.8 years old). In countries such as Italy (45.9 years old) or Germany (45.9 years old), despite the obvious aging of the population, the process of increase in the median age is still high (an increase of 3.5 years in Italy and 3.1 years in Germany for the period under review). The only states with an increase of less than one year in the period 2007-2017 are Sweden (0.3 years) and Luxembourg (0.9 years).

Figure 4: Median age of population, 2007-2017 (years)



(1) Break in time series in various years between 2007 and 2017.

(2) Provisional.

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019

An analysis of the degree of dependency of the population (youth and elderly) reveals to a large extent the demographic vulnerability of many of the European states. In the table below we identify several groups of states whose trends are different from the EU average (24% youth population and 53.9% elderly population).

Table 1: Population age structure indicators, 1 January 2017 (%)

	Young-age dependency ratio	Old-age dependency ratio	Total age dependency ratio	Share of population aged 80 or over
EU-28 ⁽¹⁾	24.0	29.9	53.9	5.5
Belgium	26.3	28.6	54.9	5.5
Bulgaria	21.6	31.8	53.4	4.8
Czech Republic	23.7	28.6	52.4	4.0
Denmark	26.0	29.7	55.7	4.3
Germany	20.5	32.4	52.9	6.0
Estonia	25.2	30.0	55.2	5.3
Ireland	32.2	20.7	52.9	3.2
Greece	22.6	33.6	56.2	6.7
Spain	22.8	28.7	51.6	6.2
France	29.3	30.7	60.0	5.9
Croatia	22.1	29.8	51.8	5.0
Italy	21.0	34.8	55.8	6.8
Cyprus	23.9	22.8	46.8	3.4
Latvia	24.1	30.8	54.9	5.2
Lithuania	22.5	29.3	51.8	5.5
Luxembourg ⁽¹⁾	23.4	20.5	43.9	3.9
Hungary	21.7	27.9	49.7	4.3
Malta	21.1	28.1	49.1	4.1
Netherlands	25.0	28.4	53.3	4.5
Austria	21.5	27.6	49.1	4.9
Poland	22.1	24.2	46.3	4.2
Portugal	21.6	32.5	54.1	6.1
Romania	23.4	26.7	50.1	4.4
Slovenia	22.6	28.6	51.1	5.1
Slovakia	22.2	21.5	43.8	3.2
Finland	25.8	33.2	59.1	5.2
Sweden	28.1	31.6	59.7	5.1
United Kingdom	27.8	28.2	56.0	4.9

(1) Break in time series


Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019

In our analysis, we identify 5 categories of states with a higher share than the EU average of the population dependency ratio (in total or by age group categories) (See Table 1):

1. states with a high rate of dependent population due to population aging. The states with a high rate of dependent population due to the elderly are: Greece - 56.2% (33.6% elderly population), Italy - 55.8% (33.8% elderly population) and Portugal - 54.1% (32.5% elderly population);
2. states with a high rate of dependent population due to the aging of the population but also corroborated with a high rate of the youth population - in this case, the trends can be positive in the medium and long term by a reduction in the percentage of the aging population. In this category of states with a high rate of the dependent population, the following can be mentioned:

- Estonia - 55.2% (30% elderly and 25.2% youth); France - 60% (30.7% elderly and 29.3% youth); Latvia - 54.9% (30.8% elderly and 24.1% youth); Finland 59.1% (33.2% elderly and 25.8% youth) and Sweden - 59.7% (31.6% elderly and 28.1% youth)
- states that have succeeded through various mechanisms and policies (e.g. birth rate, positive migratory balance) to maintain a high rate of the youth population. States with a high rate of dependent population due to young people are Belgium – 54.9% (26.3% youth population), Denmark – 55.7% (26% youth population) and the United Kingdom – 56% (27.8% youth population);
 - states with a high rate of dependent population due to the aging of the population, without exceeding (yet) the total average rate of the dependent population. This category includes states such as Bulgaria – 31.8% elderly population.
 - states with a high rate of dependent population due to the (still) high share of the youth population, without exceeding the total average rate of the dependent population. This category includes states such as Netherlands - 25% youth population. In this case, if the trends of growth or conservation of the percentages of the youth population are maintained, in the next period we will be able to detect a slight process of reversing the trend of population aging.

Figure 5: Young and old age dependency ratio, 1 January 2017 (%)




(¹) Break in time series

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019

The age pyramid of the population of the states of the European Union in the period 2002-2017 is presented as a fundamental conclusion of this process that has not even remotely reached the turning point of reversing the trend. Thus, a simple visualization of the two pyramids of the population captures the high share of the elderly population which EU "has earned", particularly through the increased life expectancy and by the fact large cohorts of the population born in periods with a much higher birth rate

than the current one live past the age of 45. Moreover, another conclusion is given by the reduction of the share of the youth population, a phenomenon due mainly to, as I mentioned above, the birth rate decline.


Figure 6: Population pyramids, EU-28, 2002 and 2017 (% of total population)



Note: Break in series. 2017: estimated, provisional.

Source: Eurostat, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>, accessed in 15.05.2019


The demographic forecasts, calculated based on Eurostat data for the not too distant future maintain the same trend of population aging. By 2080, if the demographic indicators taken into account will not be sharply and radically reversed compared to the observed trends, the share of the aging population will have increased considerably. Thus, according to the projection presented in Figure 7 below, from a share of 5.5% of the age group over 80 years old (2017) the trend will reach 5.9% in 2020, 7.2% in 2030, 9.1% in 2040, 11.1% in 2050, 12.1% in 2060, 12.5% in 2070 and 12.7% in 2080. The increase in the share of this age group is therefore expected to be sharp between 2020-2060. After this period, the growth rate will become more moderate. The other age groups follow the same pattern. The 65-79 age group is also experiencing an increase of the share from 14% in 2017 to a maximum of 17.9% in 2040, so that after this period a reduction of the share to 16.4% will be seen in 2080. This reduction, expressed strictly in terms of percentage (not in terms of quantity) is explained, in our view, not by a reduction in the share of the elderly population but, on the contrary, by an increase in the critical mass of reference provided by a sharp increase of the population over 80 years old. The increase of the share of the aging population (a phenomenon clearly heightened by the constant increase of life expectancy), can only be understood in the light of the steady birth rate decline. This process, which began in the second half of the 20th century, could not be stopped as a general trend, and was therefore the reason why the mass of the "young" population started to decrease as compared to the total population.

Figure 7: Population structure by major age groups, EU-28, 2017-2080 (% of total population)

Note: 2017: break in series, provisional. 2020–2080: projections (EUROPOP2015).

Source: Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_15ndbims&lang=en, accessed in 15.05.2019

The active population, aged between 15 and 65, is steadily decreasing throughout this period. From 65% in 2017 to 55.6% in 2080. A 10% reduction in the share of the population available to be employed in the EU economy leads to an even greater vulnerability of the economy/labor market. An encouraging fact is the reversing trend of the evolution of the share of the population aged between 0 and 14. The downward trend is reversed around 2040.

Figure 8: Projected old-age dependency ratio, EU-28, 2017-2080 (% of total population)

Note: 2017: break in series, provisional. 2018–2080: projections (EUROPOP2015).

Source: Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=proj_15ndbims&lang=en, accessed in 15.05.2019

From the standpoint of the active population, in relation to the dependent population (youth and elderly), this period coming up in the short and medium future is a critical one. The upward trend in the dependent population is evident and sharp until 2060. After this year, there is a relative stabilization, with a reduction in growth rate of this share. This reality triggers a constant pressure on social policies and social insurance, questioning the whole architecture of the social system of the European Union. New social policies, in conjunction with preventive and associated demographic policies, will have to be taken into account by national governments, obviously supported by Brussels.

Effects on societal balance

We mention that the security and societal balance, within the meaning of the concept that we are using throughout this analysis, refers to the balance within society, between different community forms constituted on various criteria, including identity (ethno-national, linguistic, religious, cultural, etc.).

Among the demographic trends that make the space of the European Union vulnerable, one factor that is centrally present is the population decline. The process is not a recent one, and its causes can be seen in the behavior of the European population in the post-war period. Among the effects of this demographic reality we can identify the narrowing of the EU internal market, the unsettling of the social system and the deterioration of the business environment. From a demographic perspective, the population decline is not a unique phenomenon. It is determined, in this case, by the declining birth rates. Furthermore, the population decline is also shown in the context of the continuous increase of the life expectancy of Europe's population. The corroboration of these two indicators leads, as expected, to the aging of Europe's population.

The phenomenon of population aging has even more complex effects than the population decline alone. An aging population calls for speedy public policy adjustments. Under the effect of these demographic realities, European states are constrained to undergo reform. The social insurance systems must be adjusted. Some states are preparing the reform of the public pension systems by raising the retirement age (others have already done so). Then, the authorities are forced to increasingly encourage alternative private pension systems, precisely to reduce future social pressures generated by a need for the financial adjustment of public systems.

The population decline, associated with the population aging, has a direct effect on the labor market, which is narrowing and no longer responding to the growing demand for labor from European companies that want to be globally competitive. To compensate for this imbalance in the labor market, companies, with the help of governments, have engaged in a process of recruiting labor from outside the EU. Actually, for European companies, this hasn't been a difficult thing to accomplish. The level of immigration has been major, given the success that has been achieved in Western Europe for decades. Moreover, in areas of geopolitical proximity, there have been no improvements of the macro-economic indicators, of the living conditions indicators or of those arising from the social-political climate. Europe has basically been stormed by immigrants for decades.

Immigration was therefore a solution born out of a need, but also a problem that had to be solved. Immigrants had to be integrated, helped to enter the labor market, thus responding to Europe's need for labor force. But the apparent equation of the redeeming solution that would please everyone was much more complicated.

Immigration has also brought with it the need to transform European societies and model them to the new realities. Growing communities of immigrants could no longer be considered groups of individuals; they increasingly represented communities. These communities, founded on the basis of various forms of identity solidarity, demand rights and privileges. Apparently all this cannot be an imbalance, a vulnerability, as long as it does not disturb anyone. Against the successive crises that European states have had to face, the societies of many states have had to face new challenges. Restructuring many businesses has led to unemployment and uncertainty. The societal vulnerability was born also by associating the pessimistic social-economic landscape with the increasingly massive immigration generated by the humanitarian crises at the borders of the EU (in the last decade, Europe's neighboring territories have been the scene of numerous conflicts in the north of Africa, in the Near East and even in Ukraine).

Numerous forms of cleavage could be identified between the newcomers and the old citizens (regardless of their origin). European societies had to further prepare themselves to identify the means and resources to contribute to the societal balance. The authorities of many states have responded positively by seeking solutions, while others have simply refused to do so. This is why in many states the issue of anti-migration has become a central topic of populism. Associated with xenophobia and nationalism, this type of discourse has given rise to uncertainty and fear.

Increasing immigration, as it can be easily understood, will not be enough to solve the demographic deficit and the deterioration of the optimal ratio of age groups. Moreover, migration provides a demographic plus in the short and medium term. In time, immigrants develop the same demographic model based on a low birth rate.

The role of the European institutions in this context can and should be much stronger and clearer. It is time for a coherent demographic policy to be discussed in Brussels that will benefit all Europeans, citizens and European states. However, a common demographic policy is far from being implemented as long as the east has almost always been seen as a demographic reservoir for the west. Central and south-eastern European states, with lower levels of development and pay, have had to accept the departure of a large part of the highly skilled young workforce. This has further widened the development gap, limiting the prospects for real convergence.

Conclusions

The demographic realities within the states of the European Union reveal population decline and aging as general trends, despite certain discrepancies in intensity between different European regions. In some countries which recently joined the European Union, there is still a balanced population structure, but according to the forecasts, the aging of the population here will be even more pronounced in the coming decades. This phenomenon is largely determined by the association of an additional factor to the two already mentioned above: the massive migration, especially of the youth population of fertile age. Thus, migration contributes even more to declining birth rates. The much faster improvement of socio-economic indicators, in general of those related to the quality of life, contributes to a rapid increase in longevity. Therefore, there is an accumulation of factors that have the effect of a more obvious process of an increase in the aging rate of the population in these Central and Eastern European states.

The aging of the European population can, therefore, be associated with both a steady and consistent increase in life expectancy and a worsening of the ratio of the share of the youth and working-age population. Thus, in terms of percentage, the population

over the age of 65, including over 80, is continually growing. This reality calls for increased attention from national states and European institutions. They must find sustainable solutions as quickly as possible to ensure the demographic balance and sustainability of the current European social system.

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COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPACITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

*Cristina EJOVA**

Abstract. *This article explores the prevention measures and international cooperation of the Republic of Moldova in the field of combating terrorism. The terrorist organization The Islamic State mentioned the Republic of Moldova among the 60 countries that they consider enemies, the question regarding the measures for preventing terrorism on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and the subject of the international cooperation of Moldova in the fight against terrorism become relevant.*

In the article the author also focuses on legislative measures introduced in the Republic of Moldova in response to the spread of terrorist activity in the European Union.

Keywords: *terrorism, security, countering terrorism, preventing terrorism, anti-terrorism activities, anti-terrorism cooperation*

At the current stage, the threat represented by terrorism has become one of the most current problems, dictating the global agenda. It can not be denied that even a particular case of terrorist attack presents in itself a danger to society, because it is a multi-objective crime that endangers people's life and health, as well as economic, social and cultural relations, and also aggravates the existing contradictions in society, demonstrating the possibility of solving them by violent means.

Following the terrorist attack in New York on September 11, 2001, terrorism is perceived as a major threat to security at all levels of the global system functioning - local, national, regional and global. The global public opinion is aware that terrorism can not be eradicated because of its interpretation as an isolated issue and only by violent means. This phenomenon has to be approached as part of the complex of global socio-economic, political and spiritual problems which for its solution require the efforts of all mankind (Attari, 2014: 3). Under conditions of globalization processes intensification, when terrorism has transformed in a serious threat to the security of states or entire regions of the world, the world community has become more insistent in seeking legal measures that would ensure the effectiveness of the fight against international terrorism. The Republic of Moldova is a full rights member of the international system and, under the conditions of globalization, of its economic and political unity, and can not remain passive to the issue of combating terrorism, including international terrorism. The problem in question is also related to the fact that "Moldova is more and more in the interest of various terrorist organizations", but in our country there are no terrorist-oriented groups, terrorism is confined just as a threat.

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Terrorism as a negative phenomenon is a dangerous threat to any state and society. Thus, the Republic of Moldova National Security Strategy Draft emphasizes that the activization of terrorist organizations through organization of some resonance attacks in the region, reveals concerning trends of this phenomenon in the European space, what is a major challenge to regional security. Instability and military conflicts in the Near East increase the terrorist risk on the European continent. The regional security context, as well as the unresolved conflict in the Transnistrian region, place the Republic of Moldova in a risky framework with an increase in extremist terrorist aspect (Draft National Security Strategy...).

In 2015-2018 there was registered a considerable worsening of the anti-terrorist security state in most countries of the world. Instability and military conflicts in the Near East increase terrorist risk across the European continent, generating flows of refugees from conflict zones. The regional security context places the Republic of Moldova in a risk framework with a potential of ascending in terrorist aspect (Infotag: Interview...). Over the past four years, Europe has suffered a series of terrorist attacks committed by lonely terrorists with the use of cars and other means at hand.

The possibility of terrorist attacks in the Republic of Moldova is reduced, given that our country does not participate directly in the fight against the Islamic State and there is no a religious confrontation. Experts believe that terrorism in the Republic of Moldova does not have conditions for development, and the country itself is not a major interest for such an activity (Echo of Attacks...). Although the Republic of Moldova has been receiving refugees for several years, there is a small number of seekers aspiring asylum compared to the situation created in the EU member states where the policy towards migrants obviously increases the number of potential executors of terrorist acts. In the annual rating presented by the "Global Index of Terrorism", which analyzes the situation in 160 states of the world, Moldova is ranked 123rd among the states categorized as safe. At the same time, the neighboring Ukraine is ranked 12th, and the Russian Federation is ranked 23th. Research estimates the level of terrorist activity and shows which states and to what extent collide with such risks. Among the countries with the highest threat of terrorist attacks are Iraq, Afghanistan and Nigeria.

In this context and in connection with the fact that the terrorist organization The Islamic State mentioned the Republic of Moldova among the 60 countries that they consider enemies, the question regarding the measures for preventing terrorism on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and the subject of the international cooperation of our country in the fight against terrorism become relevant. Realizing the imperative of combating terrorism, the Republic of Moldova promotes its own anti-terrorist policy. In order to prevent and not admit terrorist acts, the Intelligence and Security Service continuously monitors the situation in the country, both at its borders and in the region, in order not to permit and prevent the emergence of dangers and risks (Antiterrorist Center of SIS...).

The international legal framework of the Republic of Moldova's cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism consists of: a) the universally recognized principles and norms of international law, the agreements concluded between states: universal conventions, regional agreements, bilateral treaties on legal assistance in criminal matters, international treaties of the Republic of Moldova; b) documents of international organizations (UN conventions, UN Security Council resolutions, conventions of the Council of Europe, etc.), as well as the national legislation of the Republic of Moldova. Counterterrorism co-operation is a set of principles and norms governing the work of state bodies in international counter-terrorism co-operation. According to Article 48 of Law no.120 of 21.09.2017 on the prevention and combating of terrorism, the Republic of Moldova, in

accordance with the international treaties to which it is a party, cooperates with the law enforcement agencies and with the special services of other states, as well as with the international organizations working in this field. In order to ensure the security of the person, the society and the state, the Republic of Moldova pursues in its territory the persons involved in terrorist activities, including in cases where these activities were planned or committed outside its territory, but also harmed in other cases provided by the international treaties to which the Republic of Moldova is a party.

The First Law on Combating Terrorism was adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on 12 October 2001 (the Law on Combating Terrorism), followed by the Law on Countering Extremism Activity adopted on 21 February 2001 and the Law on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism adopted on 23 June 2017. The international conventions on the fight against terrorism and organized crime were also ratified: the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (6 March 1996), Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (6 March 1996), the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (6 March 1996), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (16.07.1997), the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (18.07.2002), the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (18.07.2002), the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (18.07.2002), the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (16.09.2005), the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (28.02.2006), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (18.04.2008), European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (04.05.1998). The Republic of Moldova also signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (16.05.2005), the Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, (27.07.2001) and the formation of the Anti-Terrorism Center (ATC) of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed by the Presidents of these States on 1 December 2000.

The basic principles in fight against terrorism in the Republic of Moldova were determined by art. 1 of the "Law on Combating Terrorism" (2001). This law for the first time in the history of our country set up a system of measures to counteract this threat from a legislative point of view. According to art. 1 of the given law, the legal basis of the fighting activity against terrorism is constituted by the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the European Convention on the Fight against Terrorism, the generally recognized principles and the norms of international law, the international treaties to which the Republic of Moldova is a part, the present law and other normative acts regulating the relations of the given domain. For the first time in national legislation, article 2 defined terrorism as the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing through violence the decision-making by public authorities or international organizations, accompanied by intimidation of the population and/or other violent illegal actions (Law on Combating Terrorism).

The Republic of Moldova is not seen as a target for terrorist groups, but the intensification of international and regional negative processes requires national law enforcement bodies to step up early prevention and screening of potential risk situations for national security (Combating Terrorism...). In order to fight against terrorism, the Republic of Moldova improves the legal basis and the existing institutional system and

also improves the interinstitutional cooperation and coordination, establishes cooperation relations with the respective subunits. In connection with the terrorist attacks in the years 2015-2016 on the territory of the EU Member States, on September 21, 2017, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted the Law nr. 120 on the prevention and combating of terrorism (Law on Preventing and Combating Terrorism). The Law was elaborated by the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova, which considers that terrorism has become a serious threat for the Republic of Moldova. The adoption of the new Law is yet another step towards ensuring citizens' security.

The document contains 11 chapters and determines the legal and organizational framework of the activity for preventing and combating terrorism in the Republic of Moldova, the mode of coordinating the activities of specialized subdivisions in the prevention and combating of terrorism, the actions undertaken by central and local public authorities, by public associations and organizations, and by responsible persons. The Antiterrorist Operational Command will be set up to coordinate and carry out anti-terrorist operations. The Law emphasizes that "Detection of terrorist activity will be carried out through information and counter-information actions by collecting, analyzing and processing data on factors that could endanger the security of the state."

The Law provides for the establishment of a local terrorist crisis management body - the Antiterrorist Territorial Council, which will be composed of district councilors, territorial representatives of the Security and Intelligence Service, the General Police Inspectorate of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations of the MIA. The Law establishes the introduction of a new concept, implemented in the EU regarding the verification of airline passengers, which aims to detect attempts to leave, enter or transit the territory of the country by persons involved in the terrorist activity.

Airline companies operating flights to/from the Republic of Moldova have the obligation to hand over to the SIS the passenger list, the route information and other data. Special services will check this data until the moment the air passengers pass border control in the destination country. This fact, as the SIS mentions, will allow identification of attempts to enter, leave or transit through the territory of the country of the persons affiliated to the terrorist organizations Al-Qaida, ISIS, the Taliban, etc. Transmission of passenger lists will be done according to the following schedule: initially 24-48 hours before departure, then immediately after the aircraft's landing preparing for the take-off. Once the lists are transferred to the SIS, no passenger should be able to get on or off the board. In other exceptional cases, special services are provided with updated information. Passenger data transferred to the SIS will include the name, surname, gender, nationality, date of birth and other personal data such as the passport number and series, the country that issued it and the document's term of validity. Special services receive information about luggage, planned route and flight dates, any change of initial reservation, seat number, ticket's date of issue and number. In addition, information about the form of payment, including the credit card billing address, as well as the profile of the "permanent client", if the person is registered in the airline's loyalty program, will be transmitted to the SIS. It is mandatory to provide data about flight record, missing passengers or attempts to get on the board right before the departure without prior ticket reservation. The law prohibits the processing of information revealing the racial or ethnic origin of the passenger, religion, political beliefs, social affiliation, data on his/her state of health or sexual life. Should the Security and Intelligence Service receive such information, they will not be processed and will be destroyed immediately. These rules are also applied in

the regulation of air transport in the EU. In order to verify the information, the Moldovan special services have, in real time, remote access to the databases of the foreign special structures (Special Services...).

It should also be noted that the new Law offers another definition of the term terrorism. In the 2001 Law, as has been shown above, terrorism is defined as the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing by violence decisions made by public authorities or international organizations, accompanied by intimidation of the population and/or other violent illegal actions, while in the new Law terrorism is defined as a phenomenon with a high degree of social danger, characterized by a radical ideology and a practice of influencing by violence the decision-making by public authorities and institutions or international organizations, accompanied by intimidating the population and/or other violent illegal actions.

The law clearly delimits the restrictive measures that may be imposed in the area of the anti-terrorist operation. It also provides for the public opinion to be informed about terrorist acts, regulating the conduct of the communication means and the prohibitions imposed during and outside the anti-terrorist operation. The document contains indications regarding the necessity of provisions regarding the liability of the public or religious association or another organization for carrying out the terrorist activity; the responsibility of the media for the dissemination of materials calling for terrorist activity or justifying the pursuit of such activity; the inadmissibility of using electronic communications networks to carry out terrorist activity (New Law...). At the same time, there was established the mass-media's accountability for the dissemination of the materials that expel or justify terrorism. In other words, the media has an obligation to control the information it publishes - if it meets the requirements of the new Law.

In accordance with Article 2 of the Law, the authorities with powers in the field of preventing and combating terrorism are the following:

- Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova - coordinates the entire activity of preventing and combating terrorism.
- Government of the Republic of Moldova - the main authority responsible for organizing the activity of preventing and combating terrorism, as well as ensuring it with the necessary forces, means and resources.
- Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova - is directly involved in preventing and combating terrorism.

Authorities that directly engage in counter-terrorism work within the limits of their mandate are the following: General Prosecutor's Office; Ministry of Interior Affairs; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Economy and Infrastructure; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration; Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Protection; State Protection and Guard Service; Customs Service; Public Services Agency; National Agency for Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities; Department of Penitentiary Institutions of the Ministry of Justice; Money Laundering and Prevention Service.

It should be mentioned that the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe published in October 2018 its findings related to the Law of the Republic of Moldova no. 120 regarding the prevention and fight against terrorism, passed on September 21, 2017. The report mentions that the Republic of Moldova, under the conditions of a terrorist threat, has the right to take emergency measures, but these measures must be consistent, predictable and in line with the obligations that the Republic of Moldova has in the field of human rights in accordance with the international and European human rights law. The Venice Commission is

convinced that it is necessary to revise the list of measures that the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova can take in order to prevent terrorism. In this respect, it is necessary to clearly define the areas of application of the special measures, and the law should provide for an external authorization (court order, prosecutor's resolution, etc.), detailed measures and respective procedures (The Venice Commission...).

The report also stresses that the Speaker of Parliament should not have the right to coordinate anti-terrorist activity; this should be the prerogative of the executive branch. Instead, the mechanism of parliamentary control should be strengthened with the participation of the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova or a joint committee of experts, but with the broad participation of the opposition in both structures. In addition to examining general reports, these bodies should have access to concrete cases. An adequate record keeping system should be implemented within the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova.

Venice experts believe that counter-terrorism operations should have a limited period and cover a limited geographical area; any extension of the geographical area or the duration of the operation should be accompanied by increased parliamentary control. In addition, the law should provide for criminal and disciplinary liability for security service personnel in the case of extremely disproportionate actions and in the case of inappropriate planning and conduct of counter-terrorism operations. The Commission emphasizes that the state should bear civil and legal liability for the injuries caused by these disproportionate actions. Unplanned use of weapons, as required by the situation, should be prohibited by law, and the actions of security personnel that led to death or serious bodily injury should be subject to an independent investigation.

Also, if restrictions are introduced for mass media during the terrorist crises, they should be short-term and should only cover certain specific topics (data on services involved in the fight against terrorism, their positions and methods etc.). Journalists should be free to inform the public about the state of affairs during the terrorist crises in accordance with their duties and under the European Convention on Human Rights. Likewise, the Venice Commission notes that the "blacklists" of terrorists made in the country should not be blindly based on the decisions of foreign courts and governments.

An effective appeal process, accessible to all persons affected by terrorist attacks, must be applied in practice. Moldovan courts must have the possibility to verify whether the person concerned is indeed a terrorist in accordance with national law and international law. Expulsion and extradition of alleged terrorists is possible only if this does not contravene the obligations of the Republic of Moldova under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights (The Venice Commission...).

Combating and preventing terrorism in the Republic of Moldova is also aimed at the financing of terrorism. The legal framework for the prevention of terrorism financing is Law no. 308 of 22.12.2017 on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing; the Law of Financial Institutions no. 550-XIII of 21.07.1995; Regulation on Requirements for Prevention and Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in Banking Activity no. 200 of August 9, 2018; Recommendations on Risk-Based Approach to Customers by Banks in Order to Prevent and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, approved by the Decision of AC of NBM No. 96 of 05.05.2011; Recommendations on Banks' Monitoring Customers' Transactions and Activities to Prevent and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Nr. 96 of 05.05.2011; Regulation on Measures to Prevent and Combat Money Laundering and

Terrorism Financing on the Non-Banking Financial Market No. 49/14 of 21.10.2011; documents elaborated by the Basel Committee and the International Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

The new Law on preventing and combating money laundering and terrorism financing (2017) transposes the provisions of European Parliament and Council 2015/849 of 20 May, 2015. The Law provides establishment of a Service for Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering that will be an independent public authority. The responsibilities of the Service are receiving, recording, analysis and processing of information on activities and transactions suspected of money laundering, crimes related to money laundering and terrorism financing. The information will be forwarded to the competent organs. At the same time, the authority shall notify the competent law enforcement authorities as soon as it establishes suspicion of an offense and conduct financial investigations to identify the origin of the suspicious goods.

In the analysis of the anti-terrorist legislation of the Republic of Moldova, it is also necessary to mention Regulation no. 277-284 (2018) concerning counter-terrorism protection of critical infrastructure, which was developed by SIS and aims at improving the identification, designation and protection of critical infrastructure and counter-terrorism objectives to optimize procedures for identification and inclusion of critical infrastructure targets in The National Critical Infrastructure Nomenclature, as well as to strengthen national mechanisms in the field of terrorism prevention, identification and elimination of potential risks to critical infrastructure. The actuality of approving the Regulation is based on the need to implement the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2341 (2017) of 13.02.2017 and Law no. 120 of 21.09.2017 on the prevention and combating of terrorism.

The major importance in the process of combating and preventing terrorism in the Republic of Moldova represents also the counteraction to cyber terrorism. According to the data of research by the United States Institute for Peace, the Internet for Terrorists is an ideal sphere for carrying out their activities, given that access is simple and it is very easy to assure users anonymity when the network is uncontrolled, there are no laws and there is no police. If in 1998 nearly half of the 30 terrorist organizations listed by the US had their own sites, now all the known terrorist groups publish their materials in 40 languages. Terrorist groups create poligon sites to influence people who are not directly involved in the conflict (Nigmatullina, Chernova, 2015).

In 2015, the number of cyber attacks on state institutions in the Republic of Moldova increased by 30%. Throughout 2015, the SIS identified and countered 27 attempts to penetrate or disrupt the functionality of state information systems. The majority of attacks are mostly from outside the country, and as tools are used the malware programs, which are placed on state networks through infected web pages, social networks, e-mails, and various IT applications, with the goal of disrupting the functioning of computing techniques, illicit collection of data of government interest and about state prospective policies. To exemplify some large-scale attempts, we can mention the attempt to infect from outside the country computer networks in 12 state-owned institutions through "CTB-Locker" malware arriving at employee email addresses during 2015. There has also been registered an increase in such types of cyber attacks attempts as DoS (Denial-of-Service), DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) and a new one - DrDoS (Distributed Reflection Denial of Service) (SIS...).

In 2016 by Government Decision no. 811 of 29.10.2015 was adopted the National Cyber Security Program of the Republic of Moldova for the years 2016-2020, which aims to create a cyber security management system of the Republic of Moldova. The document is based on the provisions of the National Strategy for Development of the Information Society "Digital Moldova 2020" and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova and includes 7 areas of intervention:

- safe processing, storage and access to data;
- security and integrity of electronic communications networks and services;
- preventive and emergency response capabilities (CERT);
- preventing and combating cybercrime;
- strengthening cyber defense capabilities;
- education and information;
- cooperation and international interaction (Cyber Security...).

On October 26, 2018, the *National Terrorist Alert System (SNAT)* entered into force. This system represents a unique platform for coordinating measures in case of terrorist threats. The territorial units authorized to fight against terrorism will be assigned to the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova. Their duties will include the exchange of data and the investigation of cases that present a threat.

SNAT consists of 4 levels, distinguished by 4 codes (expressed in colours), which reflect the degree of risk depending on the intensity of the terrorist danger manifestation: low level (blue color); moderate level (yellow color); high level (orange color) and critical level (red color). It should be mentioned that, at each alert level, the competent public authorities will take specific measures to ensure national security. On March 25, 2019 the Information and Security Service (SIS) declared on the whole territory of the Republic of Moldova, for an indefinite period, the low level (blue code) of terrorist alert. The establishment of the blue code provides a series of mandatory measures for the relevant institutions, but also recommendations for the population.

In the case of the low level of terrorist alert (blue code), the authorities with expertise in the field of prevention and combating terrorism, within the limits of their competences, take the following measures:

- accumulate, evaluate and verify information and data on terrorist risks; liquidate and diminish the action of the factors that cause the emergence and spread of extremist-terrorist ideologies;
- conduct prevention activities;
- improve the legal and organizational bases for the fight against terrorism;
- develop and implement new methods and tools to combat terrorism;
- conduct actions to inform and raise awareness of the terrorist dangers and threats, as well as the rules of behavior in situations of terrorist crisis;
- form public opinion in order to promote the state policy in the field of prevention and combating terrorism;
- develop international cooperation on the level of preventing and combating terrorism.

The Counterterrorism Centre takes the following measures:

- monitors the operational situation regarding the counterterrorism security situation at national and regional level;
- collects and evaluates the information in the area of expertise in order to prevent and combat extremist and terrorist tendencies on the national territory;

- determines and analyzes the causes and conditions that contribute to the occurrence and spread of terrorism manifestations;
- provides methodical support and offers recommendations to bodies empowered to prevent and combat terrorism in identifying and annihilating the causes and conditions that lead to the occurrence and spread of terrorist manifestations;
- coordinates the activities of the authorities with expertise in the field of terrorism prevention and combating by extending cooperation with law enforcement bodies and special services of other states, anti-terrorist structures and international organizations involved in the fight against terrorism under international treaties (Blue code...).

The Republic of Moldova cooperates closely with the UN, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union and the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS) in the development of democratic reforms, ensuring the rule of law and the compliance of national human rights law and practice with relevant international standards in the fight against terrorism. The bodies responsible for combating and preventing terrorism draw up and submit to the external partners (UN, CODEXTER, OSCE) national reports on measures taken in the field of preventing and combating terrorism.

An important moment in the field of combating terrorism, spread of the mass destruction weapons and illegal arms trade was the signing of the Republic of Moldova - European Union Action Plan (adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on April 22, 2005). Point 14 of this Plan highlights the importance of working towards strengthening the role of the United Nations in combating terrorism, as well as the practical application of the UN Convention to Stop Terrorism Financing and Assure Human Rights Against It. In order to achieve an efficient collaboration with EU structures, the Delegation of Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova participated in the 4th SEEIC plenary session (South-East European Intelligence Conference). As a result of this collaboration, the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began to use the “Antiterror” program that gathers information on terrorist and terrorism financing in the EU and CIS countries.

At the present stage, the National Action Plan for the implementation of the Moldova - European Union Association Agreement for the years 2017-2019 is of major importance. Point 11 of the Plan states that the Parties agree to cooperate bilaterally, regionally and internationally to prevent and combat terrorism in accordance with international law, UN resolutions in the field, international human rights standards, refugee law and humanitarian law. In this regard, the Parties shall cooperate in particular with a view of deepening the international consensus on the fight against terrorism, including through the legal definition of terrorist acts and by taking steps to reach an agreement on the General Convention on International Terrorism. In the context of the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) and other relevant UN instruments as well as applicable international conventions and instruments, in accordance with international law and the legislation of the Parties, the Parties shall exchange information regarding terrorist organizations and groups, their activities and support networks.

In accordance with the Report on the Implementation of the National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Republic of Moldova - European Union Association Agreement in counter-terrorism domain, the draft law on the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the EC Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was drafted and approved in the first reading. In the same context, *the Counterterrorism Guide* and *the Potential*

Terrorist Profile Guide for Law Enforcement Officers have been developed. Also, the Law on National Defense was adopted; constant exchanges of data and information with partners, regional and international specialized structures with reference to terrorist entities involved in international “jihad” have been made; steps have been taken to enforce special measures to ban entry into the territory of the Republic of Moldova and to declare certain foreign citizens undesirable from national security considerations; an Agreement has been signed between the SIS and the State Security and Protection Service in the field of preventing and combating terrorism; the draft interinstitutional normative act between the Security and Intelligence Service, the General Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the field of preventing and combating terrorism was elaborated, etc.

With the help of the EU, the Border Police of the Republic of Moldova implements a series of external assistance projects through the medium of the European Union Border Agency (FRONTEX) (Securing Moldova's Borders...). Thus, during the period 2009-2013, the Republic of Moldova received 22 million euros of financial investments from the EU for the establishment of an efficient communication and border monitoring system. Also in the field of counter-terrorism, the Border Police takes additional measures at the crowded border crossing points. The number of the staff was increased, certain cargoes and goods are checked, as well as personal luggage, including with help of dogs. An intense anti-terrorist training of employees is carried out with the involvement of specialists from other enforcement subdivisions and structures. Recently, in June 2018, the Border Police, in cooperation with the special services of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, participated in the anti-terrorist exercise “BUCOVINA - 2018”. The operation took place in the border town of Lipcani, Briceni district. The purpose of tactical applications organized at regional level was to test, evaluate and improve the procedures and mechanisms for interaction and interoperability between authorities in situations of terrorist crisis.

An important role in securing the border of the Republic of Moldova has also the EUBAM Mission. Through this mission, the EU plays a decisive role in ensuring effective and transparent border control, what contributes to strengthening regional security.

According to the Report on the implementation of the National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Moldova – European Union Association Agreement in the field of combating terrorism for 2018, we mention the following measures:

- In order to implement Law no. 120 of 21.09.2017 regarding the prevention and combating of terrorism, the relevant authorities elaborated the draft Government Decisions regarding the approval of the Regulation on the organization and conduct of the anti-terrorist exercises, on the approval of the Regulation on the anti-terrorist protection of the critical infrastructure, regarding the National Terrorist Alert System, as well as regarding the approval of the Regulation of the operational counter-terrorism command;

- The continuous exchange of information with the partners on preventing and combating terrorism is ensured. At regional and international level, there is interaction with: GUAM, CODEXTER, INTERPOL, UN, SEEIC;

- On March 14, 2018, within the framework of the Police Cooperation Program of the Eastern Partnership jointly with experts from Poland and France, at the initiative of the Republic of Moldova, the tactical exercise “Simulation of a terrorist attack during a football match” was organized on the territory of “Zimbru Stadium” from Chisinau. At the same time, experts from the Republic of Moldova participated in the anti-terrorist exercise “BUCOVINA-2018”.

– The exchange of information and data of common interest with the foreign special services on topics related to terrorist groups, foreign travelers, persons expelled/allowed to return for security reasons, crimes related to terrorism, mercenary etc., was ensured. During the reference period, consultations were organized on the partnership line in order to take over the practices of implementing the mechanism for verifying the air routes passengers (PNR / APIS).

– With the support of EUROJUST, the activity of the joint investigation teams (3 with Romania, 1 with the Czech Republic, 1 with Belgium, 1 with France and 1 with Germany) and the cooperation on 20 concrete cases with Romania, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Holland was negotiated, signed and facilitated.

– In cooperation with Europol, the participation in 11 joint meetings under Europol's aegis, participation in Europol operations (eg OPSON VII, SILVER AX III, 30 DAYS AT SEA) was ensured, as well as the active exchange of information through the secured channel SIENA of the EPO Europol on the cyber crime segment was equally established (Report on the implementation...).

Of particular importance in the field of combating and preventing terrorism for the Republic of Moldova is the Moldova-NATO Individual Action and Partnership Plan (IPAP), which was first approved by the Government of the Republic of Moldova on 24 May 2006. Point 1.4.1. of this Plan was devoted to the fight against terrorism and organized crime. In this point was envisaged the strengthening of the Republic of Moldova's potential in the fight against terrorism, including the capacity to manage the consequences of crises caused by acts of terrorism. IPAP provided for the creation of the anti-terrorist center beside the Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova, the improvement of the national legislation and the improvement of the interdepartmental cooperation on the fight against terrorism, as well as the "improvement of the interaction between military units and special anti-terrorist subdivisions, their preparation for possible participation in operations under the NATO auspices, in accordance with the appropriate decisions of the Moldovan authorities." According to the current Individual Action Plan of the Moldova - NATO Partnership for the years 2017-2019, in Chapter I, point 1.6. it is stipulated that the Republic of Moldova will continue to implement, in accordance with international norms and commitments, programs and strategies to combat terrorism, strengthen cooperation and coordination between its institutions and develop cooperation relations with NATO allies and partners on this issue. The Republic of Moldova will strengthen its control mechanisms on strategic and dual-use exports and will continue to take action to combat money laundering, terrorism, organized crime and trafficking in human beings.

As a result of our research, we draw the following conclusions and recommendations:

The issue of the fight against international terrorism also falls into that formula when some countries have not yet entered into conflict with it, have not fully evaluated the seriousness of the threat it represents. In this regard, as possible directions of the international cooperation which the Republic of Moldova can join, we mention the following: the joint training of the anti-terrorist special services subdivisions; the exchange of technologies and experience in anti-terrorism measures; elaboration and improvement of the legal base and of the international legal norms regarding the antiterrorist cooperation; the elaboration of the mechanism for extradition by the state of its citizens or foreign nationals

on its territory and accused of terrorist acts; determining the role of the media in shaping world public opinion in the sphere of intolerance towards terrorism.

The anti-terrorist activity of the Republic of Moldova should include the following measures: the creation of an efficient system of enlightening the citizens of the country on cultural and confessional diversity, their historical unity, the history of religious intolerance, genocide and other crimes generated by extremism; condemnation of ideology and extremist and separatist practice; ensuring the effectiveness of measures aimed at counteracting the propaganda of violence and extremist ideology in the media; developing legal consciousness; creating the conditions for solving social, national and spiritual problems for all social and ethnic-ethnic groups of the population in order to reduce the social basis of terrorism; strengthening the role of the state in ensuring the moral and ethical norms in relation to the competing parts of society.

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THE HUMAN SECURITY DISCOURSE: BALANCING DEONTOLOGY WITH TELEOLOGY

*Marius-Daniel BAN**

Abstract. *The human security discourse has mostly been concerned with a deontological approach to security. In this paper I consider a more basic foundation for human security, where the response to insecurities of the other is mediated by a critical hermeneutical ethics. In this way the paper aims to supplement the standard conception of human security, so as to take account of the phenomenological treatments of an ethics of action, and to give more prominence to the hermeneutical appropriation of the language of evil, of the unfamiliar other and the teleological quest for justice.*

Keywords: *human security, teleology, human development, ethics, deontology.*

1. Introduction

The debate around the concept of human security has dominated the international peace and security discourse for the past three decades or so. The first approach to human security can be traced back to the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This approach operates on the assumption that individuals must be free from both fear and want. If freedom from fear examines the security of the individual in the context of threats of violence (as generated by genocide, slavery or death), freedom from want recognises security as a means to empower the individual to overcome the insecurity resulting from underdevelopment (lack of health, social, economic, and political security). Given the underlying epistemology, I should call this the “optimistic” model of understanding human security. That is to say that the threats to human security are bound to manifest themselves within the diversity of human practice. There is no uneasiness when it comes to identifying and labelling threats to human security.

Another basic idea of the United Nations (UN) approach is that if you are truly committed to a broad understanding of human security you must respond to all vulnerabilities and insecurities an individual might experience. A notable contribution to the broadening of the concept of security from the responsibility to protect (freedom from fear) to the development dimension (freedom from want) of human security was that of Amartya Sen. By drawing on the concept of freedom Sen, has been able to shift the focus of security analysis and policy development from personal income and growth of gross national product to people’s capabilities to access the substantive freedoms and opportunities rooted within their social, economic and politic environment. As a result, Sen’s has called for the ‘removal of major sources of unfreedom’ such as, poverty and autocracy, lack of economic opportunities and systematic social deprivation (Sen, 200: 4). This theory is well documented by the Commission of Human Security (CHS) in the Human security now report (HSN), which broadens the scope of human security by

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embracing the obligation ‘to protect the vital core of lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment’ (HSN, 2003:3).

For many political theorists, such as MacFarlane and Kohng, UN’s optimistic approach to human security seems conceptually ‘overstretched’ (MacFarlane and Kohng, 2006: 231-243). The underlying assumption here is that by broadening the concept of security to include every conceivable insecurities of the individual, human security may end up hampering a proper coordination between its security policies and their practical implementation. Hence, the very idea that human security could address the totality of human vulnerabilities is indicative of a rather muddled theoretical framework.

2. The EU Approach to Human Security

A rather different trajectory to human security has been stimulated by the EU. This is predicated on, what might be called, a “a deontological” model of speaking about the threats and the responses they may require. What is at work in validating its trajectory of meaning is a Kantian deontology of moral norms, where security is offered to the most vulnerable out of a sense of duty and the closely related idea that construes human beings as ends in themselves. In as far as human security is understood within the EU system, Martin and Owen argue that by adding more conceptual depth and rigour to the concept, EU avoids the drawbacks of the UN’s model of human security (Martin and Owen, 2010: 221). From the Barcelona Report (2004) onwards, the EU’s policymakers have sought to add more definitional depth to the concept of human security and to embed it within the EU practice. To this end, the study group, led by the LSE scholar Mary Kaldor, laid down the ‘doctrine’ that enabled the EU to implement human security as a foreign policy paradigm (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, Barcelona Report, 2004: 3).

The interlinking relation between threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts call into question the clear separation between internal and external threats. The theorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (New York) and 11 March 2004 (Madrid) as well as the ‘new wars’ resulting from state collapse in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus bring under pressure the clear-cut distinction between ‘human rights violation’ (by state) ‘abuses’ (by non-state actors) and conflict (between armed combatants) (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004:8; Kaldor, 2012: 27). Moreover, the global character of threats reinforces the view that insecurity is elusive and it requires a holistic security policy that focuses on the individual, instead of a state-driven approach that focuses on borders and the ‘containment’ of threats (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004).

2.1. The EU’s Human Security Doctrine

The Report lists three reasons why the EU security narrative should coordinate its policies in accordance with human security rather than a state-driven security: Morality - everyone has the right to live a secure and fulfilling life; Legality – predicated on the view that human security and human rights are part of the same spectrum; and Enlightened Self-interest- which makes the case that in a world as interconnected as ours, EU’s security cannot be met by turning a blind eye on the insecurities around the globe (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004: 9-10). In this new global context, the EU has drawn on a series of interwoven and mutually reinforcing principles, which guide its effort of implementing the concept of human security in situations of severe insecurity. In addition to the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, regional focus and the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force, the report places

significant value on the bottom-up approach to human security. For Christou, a bottom up approach to security stands in contrast with the detachment of hierarchical, top-down frameworks of dealing with security concerns. As such, a bottom up framework of addressing insecurity seeks for ‘appropriate actions to solve the security problems on the ground’ (Christou, 2014: 370). This is important, particularly as it opens the process of devising the right policy to a collaborative effort between the policy experts and the vulnerable they seek to attend (Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004: 14-19).

As for the operational framework of human security, the report encourages a holistic alleviation of insecurity and the stabilization of the situation. This has led to the creation of a Human Security Task Forces (HSTF) composed of both military and civilians (15.000 personnel). Implicit here is the belief that within a human security framework the military response is of limited value. What is required instead is a “flexible” effort between the deployment of civil and military capabilities (Solana and Kaldor, 2007). But then, again, the consultations and the increasing dialogue with the local population are essential to ensure the efficiency of the operations. The Madrid Report (entitled, *A European Way of Security* 2007) has continued to add depth to the conceptual framework of human security by emphasising an individual-centred approach to security (understood both, as freedom from fear and want). In essence, it seems right to suggest that EU’s focus on the doctrinal and the military-civilian response can help shape a less confusing and therefore a more practical approach to human security than the UN narrative.

And it certainly becomes clearer from examining the optimistic approach that an overstretched appropriation of human security will give rise to false priorities and hopes, to causal confusion and inappropriate solutions to security issues. In practice, it matters greatly that the policymakers have the capacity to discriminate the threats that can wait a response from those that may require immediate intervention. Also, it is important that policymakers rightfully identify the cause of an insecurity threat. Especially as this will enable the security agencies to deploy the right means for solving the threat at hand. Involving the army into a security issue which calls for a non-military response may lead to increasing threats against individuals and communities (MacFarlane and Kohng, 2006: 239). Such criticism has had the negative effect of shifting the rhetorical practices at the UN from a broad reading of human security towards a narrower conception of security, commonly associated with the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Martin and Owen, 2010: 213). The immediate benefits of a narrow reading of security are associated, among other things, with clear security priorities, which require (almost exclusively) military support against an external threat. Whilst a deontological approach to security offers a viable alternative to a state-driven security narrative, it is still not clear how a human security response should be translated into the concreteness of life. Nor is it clear how it might be seen as both a goal and a means to freedom from fear and want (Martin and Owen, 2010: 221). On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the practices of the EU remain grounded in the human security doctrine, some might worry that the narrative of human security has lost its traction in EU’s current institutional milieu (Christou, 2014: 371; Martin and Owen, 2010: 222).

3. Human Security: Towards a Critical Hermeneutical Ethics

If the EU’s discourse about human security is to address the insecurities and vulnerabilities in the concreteness of an individual life it may very well be in need of a certain supplementation. The worry here is that the interpretative component of the EU’s

human security discourse is too narrowly conceived. And so, it may fail to translate into practice policies that could help alleviate suffering and restore justice. Let me point out that there can be no proper understanding of human security in the absence of its deontological component; but in spite of this, I would like to argue nevertheless that a critical hermeneutical ethics, via the hermeneutical tradition of Ricoeur and Gadamer, supplements EU's human security discourse with a necessary layer of meaning that will make its bottom up approach more productive in its attempt to understand the vulnerable and enhance security. This argument will be developed around the three foundational components of a bottom up approach to human security: a) the identification of the threat; b) together with and for the local population; so that, c) justice is enforced. All these elements are quintessential for solving the problem on the ground. I should now look at three promising ways of supplementing the bottom up approach within the EU's human security theoretical framework.

3.1. The Linguistic Paradigm of Human Security: Getting the Threat Right

The linguistic paradigm of a critical hermeneutical ethics is primarily interested in the capacity of language to mediate between the vulnerable person and the meaning of the threat she is opposing. To begin with, it might be said that a bottom-up approach to human security provides, first, a basis for a hermeneutics of the language of evil. Before moving on to spell out in more details Ricoeur's language of evil, it is essential to point out that hidden within the mechanisms of human security is a hermeneutical struggle of 'getting right' the nature of the threat endangering various individuals. What this means is that a proper articulation of evil enables us to reconfigure and adjust our modes of engagements. Political theorists such as Michael Shapiro, places the ability to say the proper thing under the label of a 'discursive defence' and is best illustrated in Etocle's insistence that '[...] speech must be fitted to the times' (Shapiro, 2002: 223-41).¹ Again, the underlying assumption here is that our model of engagement relies on our abilities to conceptualise evil in the clearest of terms. Likewise, Susan Neiman's compelling book, *Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy*, establishes that what makes the discourse around evil the driving force in philosophical thought is the fact that this is a discourse about 'the intelligibility of the whole' (Neiman, 2002: 7). More importantly, Neiman opines that, beginning with the early Enlightenment, the approach to both natural and moral evil has been primarily motivated by ethical, rather than epistemological considerations. In fact, she goes on to say, that it is precisely this ethical underpinning of evil that compels us to make evil intelligible (Neiman, 2002: 8). Writing in the immediate aftermath of September 11, she rejects any "crude" or "simplistic" forms of thinking about evil - such as the ones embodied by the Bush administration. This is reflective of a shift away in politics and international relations from the liberal internationalist view of evil as "other" towards a framework in which the naming processes of evil are instrumental in helping us craft a "mechanisms of proportionality" between our means and ends of dealing with evil (Mona K. Sheikh, 2014: 492-3).²

¹ Plato, 'Euthyphro' in *Dialogues of Plato: With Analyses and Introductions*, vol. 1, trans. by J. Owett, B. (New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), pp. 279-301 (p. 291, 8a), <<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/13728-008>> [Accessed 25 January 2017];

² Sheikh's recourse to a performative approach to evil is shaped by the way performativity is conceptualised in the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School of security studies.

For Ricoeur the prospect of making sense of our experience of evil must be grasped first at the level of imagery. Drawing on the anthropological myth of the Fall, he reads the primary expressions of evil (the symbol of defilement, sin and guilt) as a text analogue for a hermeneutics of being and its capability to cultivate an ethics of action against an impending threat. The continual reconfiguration of evil through an iconoclast movement of symbol (from defilement to sin and guilt), introduces evil as an elusive phenomenon. Implicit here is the possibility of blurring a clear-cut border between the external reality of evil (an evil which is already there before any choice is made) and the moral evil (evil within). What is particularly important about this language paradigm is that it stands for a much broader conception of meaning. According to Taylor, Ricoeur's symbolism of evil is reflective of an expressive-constitutive theory of language, which serves not so much to designate objects as to enhance reflection (Taylor, 2016: 4).³ It also understands language as being capable of generating new purposes and new modes of action. This theory of language departs from a designative theory of language, in which the words we speak are mere "designators", employed in order to describe the world. While the designative theory of language might be of great support in helping us identify the evil of severe insecurities (e.g. genocide or slavery), it would have little to offer in the process of naming a more elusive phenomenon of evil and the insecurities it generates. Hence, any attempt of getting right the vulnerabilities of the local population within a bottom up approach to human security must be linked to:

a) The deciphering sequence in which the language of evil is being articulated. The object of description is being "deciphered", as opposed to just being labelled. In this sense, we are confronted with a linguistic model that attempts to describe a phenomenon that is not yet within its grasp. By its very nature, the effort of giving a meaningful shape to the object of description requires linguistic "give and take". For George Steiner, such linguistic capabilities must be seen not in their ability to ascribe but to accommodate and form new meanings. Consequently, he claims that the linguistic of "give and take" defines the way we learn to inaugurate "the existence of l'autre," and our existence for him (Steiner, 1971: 64). On this account, the narrowest and most precise meaning of words has been substituted for their full range of interpretations.

b) The emotional substratum of the language of evil. Ricoeur's symbolism of evil emerges in a context in which grasping the meaning of the object coincides with the possibility of experiencing it. As a result, we are expected to understand something that we are inter-connected with. The dismissed alternative is that of a self-standing object. In our case, the point of contact between the expression of evil and language has been the field of affection. The threat that appeared first as a chaotic cluster of feelings has been shaped, by means of articulation, into a less confusing form of meaning. One is reminded here that, although chaotic, when seen from a rationalistic perspective, the realm of feelings presupposes an 'evaluative' framework (Nussbaum, 2001: 19-33). That is to say that feelings have an intentional object, which is being figured out by the interpreter in the interconnectedness between the realm of affect and that of meaning articulation.

³ Taylor is drawing here on Humboldt's belief that man in general articulates less of what he is aware of, or of what he would end up expressing.

c) The effects the deciphering of evil has on our practical engagements with evil. By the same token, the impetus for action generated by the discriminations obtained into the sphere of meaning opened up an abundant mode of recognition and involvement with evil. In her work on the evaluative framework of emotions, Martha Nussbaum hints at the connection between the articulation of a set of beliefs and their effects on our responses to the world (Nussbaum, 2001: 29). All things considered, Nussbaum's epistemology appears to endorse a strong correlation between the nature of meaning distinction and its impact on our centring and re-centring in the world.

Drawing on Ricoeur's expressive-constitutive theory of meaning is instrumental in helping us understand the mechanisms that filter the experience of evil and the rhetorical practices of the insecure and vulnerable individuals. The problem that prevents the human security personnel from deciding which course of action to follow in order to solve the problem on the ground might have something to do with the multifarious description of evil. Accordingly, the multifarious nature of the threat ought to be clarified in conversation with a speech-partner. For this reason, it should be said that a bottom-up approach to human security provides, second, a basis for what might be called, following the tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology, a "party-dependent" model of understanding evil and its underlining insecurities (Taylor, 2002: 127).

3.2. The Dialogical Paradigm of Human Security: Understanding the Threat with a Speech-Partner

So far, we have seen that the possibility of understanding the insecure and the vulnerable is always clouded by the elusiveness of evil and the language in which it occurs. The very idea of objectivity which underlines the principle of proportionality of response to insecurities seems difficult to combine with the manifold meanings that evil might take across the cultures. It is here that Gadamer's model of understanding appears most fruitful. In his landmark study, *Truth and Method*, Gadamer shows that the most productive way of construing an event or a text is by means of a conversation, where the speech-partners come to an understanding. (Gadamer, 1989:180; Taylor, 2002: 127).⁴ Gadamer opposes the "party-dependent" understanding to the Romantic hermeneutics, whose central exponent was Schleiermacher. The aim of interpretation during that age was nothing short of infallible knowledge. Thus, knowing a text is always conclusive. So much so, that understanding 'ceases when the text is perfectly understood' (Gadamer, 1989: 293).⁵ More important is the fact that such privatisations and formalisations can generate a fixation of meaning. It is always the private path to the author's mind that would grant us access to the absolute meaning.

In contrast to classical hermeneutics, Gadamer holds the view that our access to truth must take us beyond the author's mind. This will find its central expression in the "party-dependent" hermeneutic he has developed, but before that the question of what justifies Gadamer's model of understanding must be addressed. We should do so by taking

⁴ In contrast to Taylor, who deals with Gadamer in the context of the human sciences, our interaction with his thought is primarily placed within the realm of textual hermeneutics.

⁵ Gadamer suggests that by conceiving hermeneutics in a 'way that is *formally* universal' the Romantic hermeneutists "were able to harmonize it with the natural sciences" ideal of objectivity'; See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 293.

our cues from the principle of prejudice (Vorurteil).⁶ The prejudice or the guess is that which initiates the act of hermeneutic understanding. This means that the truthfulness of our guesses can only be grasped in light of the succeeding stages of understanding. Now, one might like to question Gadamer's reliance on prejudice by arguing that given the endless number of guesses at our disposal, it seems unlikely that we would manage to choose the right ones. So, as long as choosing the right prejudices benefits the right interpretation, this seems like a serious objection to hermeneutical understanding. Seen from a different perspective the main worry here is that Gadamer's model of understanding might be sliding into relativism.

However, it seems very unlikely that Gadamer can be placed in this position. For one, the structure of conversational understanding itself, allows us to see whether our prejudices are enabling or blinding our understanding of the issue at hand (Bernstein, 1989: 128). In this sense, the fact that all human knowledge is permeated with prejudices does not mean that one cannot discriminate between the more enabling and the blinding prejudices. More to the point, Hirsch has persuasively shown that one's chances of making a correct preliminary guess increases when the limitations imposed on meaning through cultural norms and conventions are considered (Hirsch, 1967: 262). For instance, Hirsch goes on to say that, given the conventions in place, two persons can ascribe an identical meaning to a single linguistic sign, sentences and genre. An important place in his evaluation is afforded to genre, which given its vast usage had acquired a "partly fixed nature". More importantly, Hirsch thinks that, since there is no radical new genre, every spoken utterance must fit within boundaries of genre so conceived. But this is a rather different perspective on the likelihood of being able to make the right guesses from the one advanced by its sceptical counterpart.

This, I suggest, leads us to the unavoidable conclusion that the issue in dealing with the principle of prejudice at this stage is not one of making the right guesses but one of having an incomplete knowledge of its meaning. What is needed then is a dialogical space where one hopes to detect and eliminate error by allowing our prejudices to be criticized and corrected and by criticizing and correcting the prejudices of our speech-partners. This is where the "party-dependent" understanding comes to the surface: first, as a language that has been corrected and tested by the whole spectrum of relevant data, and second, as the willingness to understand the other within her tradition, language and culture (Taylor, 2002: 133). The corollary of a party-dependent understanding, according to Gadamer is a "fusion of horizons", which suggest that the speech partners have expanded their understanding to the point where they can name, in a language that both parties understand, that which was previously the unfamiliar other. For Ricoeur this fusion of horizons is well reflected into his concept of "linguistic hospitality", which is primarily seen as 'the act of inhabiting the word of the other paralleled by the act of receiving the word of the other into one's home, one's dwelling' (Ricoeur, 2006: xvi; Kearney, 2007: 151).⁷ In sum, my point in using Gadamer's account of the other and the "fusion of horizons" is also relevant to our attempts to understand the insecure and the vulnerable,

⁶ In his earlier work Hirsch has been very critical of Gadamer's hermeneutics and its move beyond the authorial intentionality. Though, he speaks in positive terms about the doctrine of the prejudice, whose importance he thinks, extends to all forms of textual interpretation; See: pp. 258-265.

⁷ Linguistic hospitality as such, means that we can never achieve a perfect translation; there is always something that resists translation and so, we are continually seeking to find the right word for it.

however alien they might be. What Gadamer's theory of interpretation has thought us is that the process of understanding their insecurities is difficult to achieve and will certainly involve a change in the horizon of our responses. Also, it is worth reminding ourselves that both Ricoeur and Gadamer's attempt of figuring out the experience of evil and its underlying violence against humans is pursued within a larger concern for an ethics of action. For Ricoeur the rich meaning of symbol should not be dispelled, but translated into a coherent discourse about our responsibility to recognize and oppose evil. Likewise, the rationale underlying the EU's attempt to adjust its security policies to fit a bottom up approach to human security is bound up with certain moral commitments to properly name and transform the unjust structures of the world. This, we have seen, may occur within the space created by a "fusion of horizons" between the human security representative and the vulnerable individual. What I want therefore to move on to do in this concluding section is to offer some of Ricoeur's remarks about the realm of ethics and justice. This will give us a better appreciation of the concept of justice as understood through Gadamer's "fusion of horizons" (Ricoeur's 'inter-linguistic hospitality').

3.3. The Ethical Paradigm of Human Security: Towards a Teleological Appreciation of Justice

In a significant study entitled *The Self and the Ethical Aim*, Ricoeur develops a novel theory of ethics, starting from a definition that reads ethics as 'the aim of the good life, with and for others, in just institutions' (Ricoeur, 1992: 172). We should look at each component of this definition in turn.

a) The "Good" Life

First, the object of an ethical life is the "good life." Ricoeur understands this through the Aristotelian concept of the good, which is always a "good for us". As a result, Ricoeur's entire ethical project is based on a concept of good that is oriented in praxis (Ricoeur, 1992: 172). More importantly, the aim of the "good" life is never fully attained. The best we can do is to continually strive to achieve it. In the end, it is this teleological quest for the good life and its implicit instances of good moral actions that enables moral thinking. In this sense, Ricoeur teaches us that the full shape of a good life is always mediated by main narratives and "life plans" which incorporate the totality of our moral practices. It is at this juncture that hermeneutics becomes particularly relevant for a coherent ethics of action. More precisely, Ricoeur's critical hermeneutical ethics invites for the translation of the sometimes discordant goods into a plot that gives life its narrative unity. In addition, narratives offer a context in which new moral and social practices can be imagined and acted upon. Ricoeur's favourite model of figuring out the meaning and the practical implications of these potentially new moral practices is that of practical wisdom (*phronesis*). To see the hermeneutical circle underlying Ricoeur's ethical project we could think of a text in which the whole explains the part of the text and vice versa. It is precisely "back-and-forth" motion between the most important decisions in life and the idea of a "good life" or the text as a whole and its parts that shape our ethics of action (Ricoeur, 1992: 179).

b) The "Good" Life with and for Others

Second, aiming at the "good life" is always "with and for others." This second component of Ricoeur's ethical project is already implicated in the first. For the person who strives for the "good life" cannot strive in isolation from other people and their moral

interests (Nussbaum, 2002: 272). For Ricoeur the trajectory of an ethical plan in which one wishes for the “good” life “with and for others” is best reflected in the term solicitude. Under the influence of Aristotle, Ricoeur reads solicitude in the context of friendship and its focus on the mutuality of giving and receiving that occurs between friends. Hence, to embark on a quest for the “good” life under the guidance of solicitude is to think of intersubjectivity as being more fundamental than one’s obedience to duty and one’s obligation to take responsibility for the insecurities of the other. (Ricoeur, 1992:180). To avoid confusion Ricoeur demarcates his account of solicitude from Levinas’s concept of interpersonal communication. For Ricoeur, Levinas’s initiative towards the other establishes ‘irrelation’ instead of a genuine interpersonal relationship. This is mainly because the other is grasped only as absolute exteriority. And so, the face of the other “does not appear; it is not a phenomenon; it is an epiphany” (Ricoeur, 1992: 188-89). What this really means is that Levinas’s development of interpersonal communication can occur only under the condition of norms and obligations towards the other. In contrast, solicitude unfolds as “benevolent spontaneity” towards the other, and it is centred on the midpoint of a spectrum between giving and receiving (Ricoeur, 1992: 188).

It is crucial to recognize here that solicitude manifests itself in a dialogical relation with self-esteem. It therefore prevents us from thinking of it as a virtue added unto self-esteem from exterior. More importantly, Ricoeur links up self-esteem to “capacity”, understood as the ability of an individual to think of herself to be good. But then, to move from capacity to realization one needs the mediation role of the other. This mediating role is essential to understand Ricoeur’s departure from the philosophies of natural law that ‘presuppose a subject, complete and already fully endowed with rights before entering into society’ (Ricoeur:1992, 181). The flaw with these philosophies, Ricoeur concludes, lies in the assumption that the individual appears as a subject of law, before any social bond is constituted and so, they fail ‘to recognize the mediating role of others between capacities and realization’ (Ricoeur:1992, 181). This mediated capacity is significant for Ricoeur’s ethical project and it remains closely interlinked with the development of a just society.

c) Just Institutions

Finally, the quest for the good life is always oriented towards “just institutions”. In this sense, Ricoeur extends the ethical plane from the personal and the interpersonal to that of the public domain, which involves the idea of legal constraints. By institutions, Ricoeur understands ‘the structure of living together as this belongs to a historical community [...] a structure irreducible to interpersonal relations and yet bound up with these’ (Ricoeur:1992, 194). One major implication of this is that the subjects of ethics are both individual and collective. In which case, the good of individuals necessitates an ‘action that is common to both the collective and individuals’ (Deneulin, 2006: 38). Since the action within these structures of living together contains the possibility of violence, produced either by (agents over agents, or by institutions over institutions) some ways to limit or to legitimate just coercion need to be found. It is here that Ricoeur understands the Kantian principle of universality and the idea of seeing man as an end in itself to be particularly efficient in limiting and legitimizing the use of force. It also builds the epistemological framework in which the agent can use the idea of obligation in its pursuit of morality, instead of using the idea of the good (Nussbaum, 2002: 271).

Let me draw together the ways in which Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutical ethics may appear to supplement a bottom up approach human security discourse. Having

defined Ricoeur's ethical project in terms of the individual's wish to live a good life with others in just institutions, I have briefly indicated that justice enters the ethical plane as a component of a teleological desire for the "good" life. In this sense, the ethical search for justice is more fundamental than the deontological responsibility for transforming the unjust structures of individuals (Deneulin, 2006: 35). By positing the search for justice within the ethical search for the good life, Ricoeur supplements the security policies adopted to protect the valuable capabilities of the individual with an overall framework of good, that falls beyond human's power to choose a certain course of action or not. Moreover, since much in the process of finding the right security policy rests on an understanding of the individual as development, Ricoeur's critical hermeneutic ethics appears to supplement the EU human security discourse with a recognition of collective subjects. Hence, one's quest for good is always mediated by the "structures of living together" formed in tradition and community. These structures may shape the process of decision making to listen more carefully to the socio-historical narratives of the individuals when devising security measures.

Concluding remarks

I have put forward an account of the "bottom up" approach to human security which is rather differently focused from the EU's doctrine. Specifically, we have been considering how the discourse around human security may involve not so much a direct grasp of a deontological theory of moral rules, or some juridical institutions, as the recognition of a hermeneutical-phenomenological ethics of action. I have suggested three levels of analysis of a hermeneutical-phenomenological ethics, based on the opportunities that are afforded by a bottom up approach to human security and its focus on the linguistic paradigm of the threat, the dialogical paradigm and the concern for justice. I have then moved on to investigate these three cornerstones of human security from the perspective of a hermeneutical-phenomenological model of understanding. I have emphasised that a proper articulation of evil is instrumental in helping clarify our modes of engagement. I have then pointed out that in order to have a clear grasp of the insecurities and the threats of the individual we will need a language paradigm that is able to accommodate and form new horizons of meaning rather than just labelling the threats at hand. I have also proposed that a "party-dependent" model of understanding can help expand our understanding of the unfamiliar other and her insecurities. In addition, I have hinted at the idea that a "party-dependent" epistemology and its rejection of relativism and ready-made presuppositions is crucial to ensure a just reaction to the security threats. Lastly, I have explored Ricoeur's teleological approach to justice and its fundamental concern for the good of the individual rather than the protection of their rights. Problematising the issue of security along the lines of a critical hermeneutical ethics has given us access to an anthropological, pre-juridical foundation in which our quest for a more secure world is mediated by tradition and community, is open to the multitude of ways that the unfamiliar other and the elusiveness of insecurity may take, and is oriented in practice. This account, I have argued will not be of merely hermeneutical and phenomenological interests. It is meant first of all to supplement the deontological level of the quest for justice and human development with a teleological quest for justice, as a wish for the "good" life. In this way justice and security cannot be envisaged in purely institutional terms. Hence, if this supplementation of an institutionalised view of human security with a more basic form of grasping our quest for the "good" is plausible, it implies that any viable human security policy must not only be holistic and open to the unfamiliar other, it must also

acknowledge that its scope and its underlying ontology will be most productively expressed by means of a “double-voiced” discourse (deontological and teleological). This supports the idea that the policies are destined to have a content, which is always about the distribution of good things to vulnerable and insecure individuals.

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ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL FIELD IN THE BOLIVIAN CONFLICT OCTOBER NOVEMBER 2019

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Abstract. *The conflict in Bolivia can be understood from different perspectives. The work presented here aims to provide the reader with precise inputs with which to form their own interpretation. To this end, it is proposed to combine a genealogy of power over the fourteen years in which the Movement to Socialism directed the destinies of the Bolivian State. This as historical knowledge referred to the struggle and socio-political conflict adense description of the Bolivian political field, and an analytical model based on the spatial analysis of the exercise of communicational political power devices. This work raises the following objectives: to describe the agents faced, their alliances, their rivalries as well as the strategies that follow each one of the agents; disaggregate conflict scenarios in geographical and political spheres - including symbolic-discursive, as well as provide reference bibliographic material for future conflicts or hypothetical intermediation and dialogue missions.*

Keywords: *Bolivia, Political field, Power devices, Hegemony, Conflict.*

1. Introduction

The pages of the history of nations are written with blood and conflict. No official historiography of any nation-state can affirm that its history was managed in harmony and social justice, since the utopia of equality usually dissolves when ideology comes into contact with the reality of the exercise of political and social power. Bolivia is no exception to this statement. The narrative of our identity, often distressing and meaningless, was chiseled through centuries of contradictions and suffering, whose germ is found in the colonial condition of the peoples that today continue to struggle to forge a political community of its own, with representativeness and legitimacy for the common of its inhabitants.

The main objective of the article presented here is to describe the dynamics of the conflict in relation to the social and geographical space implied by the political exercise, in order to understand the reason for the loss of the once indisputable hegemony that the Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.) has enjoyed in Bolivia for almost fourteen years. In this sense, given the difficult conditions that exist for the collection of data from primary sources, the research methodology was reduced to the bibliographic and hemerographic¹ review with a special focus on analysis of the discourses for the identification of the variables that make up the analysis of the hegemonic conditions and the progressive loss of legitimacy and confidence that the Evo Morales Ayma's political party has suffered since 2014.

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¹ Understood as a methodic analysis of the newspapers on a specific theme

For this purpose we propose to make use of two theoretical currents: Firstly, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of political fields. Secondly, the concept of the power devices and its analysis exercised by the Movement to Socialism during the three government efforts –in order to understand the agents involved.

In the presentation of the historical-political antecedents we resort -as theoretical and conceptual basis- to the work of the Bolivian political scientist Ph.D. Fernando Mayorga (2019) referred to the analysis of the Bolivian political field and the description of the power devices of the Movement to Socialism (MAS), systematized² according to the three government periods, complementing said analysis with contributions accrued from both Political Sociology and Political Science, specifically what refers to hegemony and trust as an analytical category.

3. Historical background

The Bolivian State was born to independent life in 1825 with an enormous territorial extension, (2,336,670 km²) that conferred a direct route to the Pacific Ocean, and through the Paraguay River waterway to the Atlantic Ocean.

This territory provided the State with access to the watersheds in which the main hydrographic basins of the South American continent originate: the Amazon basin, that of the Río de La Plata, that of the Paraguay River and part of the interior basin that make up Lake Titicaca and the Desaguadero river. Another interesting aspect to highlight is the varied range of ecological floors that were -and are still included-in the Bolivian territory, a variety that, in theory, allowed the Bolivian State to dispose of various natural and agricultural resources.

However, territorial immensity also meant the origin of the main problem of the Bolivian State: the difficult social, economic, transport infrastructure and, above all, institutional integration between the various regions that comprise it, genesis of a social and regional fragmentation whose consequences are still exist in the social conflicts that, at the same time, make the historical-political vicissitudes of their economic and social formation. In other words, the abundance of the original territory of the Bolivian republic was not accompanied by the foundation of strong institutional and social organizations. Due to this, the construction of the identity of the original Bolivian State can be described as exclusive, destined to reproduce the hegemony of the social-caste-white class, relics of the colonial hierarchy inherited by the Republic that denied access and political participation to the immense indigenous and half breed majority.

Renowned Bolivian sociologist and historian René Zavaleta Mercado describes the organic institutionality of the Bolivian Republic for the first century and twenty-five years of its existence as an 'apparent State'³, marked by the contradiction of being a racist and excluding State in a country of immense indigenous and mestizo majorities (Antezana: 1991).

Said State, historically little or nothing had been concerned with the welfare of indigenous majorities but was based on its exploitation as a semi-slave labor force and subjected, through the control of land and territory, to a domination of ethnic, socioeconomic nature and, above all, symbolic: the 'feudal mining' or system of mining elites that, in concomitance with agrarian elites, supported the State through a system of exploitation of indigenous labor until the mid-twentieth century. The same State asked

² Observe ANNEX I Comparative matrix of the Bolivian Political Field

³ Name given by the said author to the Bolivian State in the period between the wars of the Pacific (1879 – 1883) and the Chaco (1932 – 1935)

these original populations to participate in the defense of territorial integrity, both in the War of the Pacific (1879 - 1883) and in the War of the Chaco (1932 - 1935). Only in the Federal War (1898 - 1889) the central role of indigenous populations in state conflicts can be considered as a legitimate struggle, due to interest in the control of the land-territory factor, as an ancestral demand of indigenous peoples in Bolivia⁴.

The set of geographical and social contradictions conditioned the historical evolution of the Bolivian State, including the conformation of the identity imaginary: a citizenship in spite of the State -that is, the imaginary of Bolivian 'citizenship' can hardly be understood only as belonging to a political community, but as a participant of an informal political process, one that is resolved in the streets, in the conflictual social negotiation- and that will negatively impact throughout its history, both when mobilizing resources and human capital in its constant internal conflicts, as in the inability to maintain territorial cohesion and integrity through countless war conflicts that have stripped Bolivia of 51% of its original territory.

This territorial and social fragmentation -36 ethnic groups are currently recognized- contrasted with the unitary and monolithic form of the republican-colonial state⁵, resulting in a state density -institutional presence-almost nil at Bolivian borders throughout the country's history, a diluted political and social unity that is reflected in a large number of short-term governments and the continuing reforms of the constitutional letters of the Bolivian State throughout its history.

3. Political hegemony of the Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)

Evo Morales Ayma directed the destinies of the Bolivian State during three steps of government: a first period of implementation of the MAS as a ruling party (2006 - 2009), a second moment that meant the expansion and hegemonic zenith of the Evo Morales Ayma party (2010 - 2015) and finally, the progressive decline of the hegemonic condition of the political party (2015 - 2019). Consequently, the present investigation proposes to describe the specificities of the Bolivian political field by government management, paying special attention to the last government management, specifically to the immediate antecedents of the conflict (2015 - 2019)⁶.

3.1. Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (I.P.S.P.) – Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)

The Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, social and ideological base of the Movement to Socialism, is formed by the Single Central of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (C.S.U.T.C.B.), the 'Confederation' of six Coca Sowers Unions in Chapare, and the 'Bartolina Sisa Federation' –Women in Bolivia. These organizations of a peasant union nature form the hard core of the Movement to Socialism.

Since 2006, the National Confederation of Rural Teachers, the National Confederation of Rentiers and Senior Citizens of Bolivia (which will later leave the party)

⁴ The indigenous struggle against the so called Ex-link Law (*Ley de exvinculación*) of 1874 was the immediate antecedent of indigenous participation in the so called civil war or federal revolution of 1898 – 1899, and throughout the social and political process between 1898 and 1903 (Choque: 2017=

⁵ Giving rise to the historical demand for autonomy, as a form of management that, theoretically, would allow the territories away from urban and political centers to manage the public apparatus together with the redistribution of resources.

⁶ Observe ANNEX I

and the National Confederation of Micro and Small Enterprises (Conamype) have joined. On the other hand, in 2009, trade union organizations of corporate nature, such as the Central Obrera Boliviana (C.O.B.), the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives (Fencomin), the Central Obrera Regional (C.O.R.) of El Alto, and the National Council from Ayllus and Markas de Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) - which brings together indigenous and indigenous unions from the Andean area of the country.

3.2. Historical-political process: from the 'democracy agreed' to the 'Plurinational State': The rise of social movements

Juan Evo Morales Ayma assumed the presidency of the Bolivian State on January, 22 – 2005, after a historical period of political and social instability (2000 – 2004) (cf. *Infra*), characterized by the strong social rejection of economic policies of structural adjustment –of orthodox neo-liberal court- imposed in Bolivia since 1985, through Supreme Decree N° 21060- and reaffirmed at the continental level by the Washington consensus in 1989. This anomic period was characterized by a progressive loss of representativeness and legitimacy of the then multiparty political system, manifested in an acute social crisis, due both to the loss of purchasing power and the low participation of less favored social sectors in the political life of the country.

Three periods of social and political upheaval can be recognized prior to the start of the Morales government: the 'Water War' (2000), the 'Gas War' (2003) and, finally, the social conflicts of 2004 that derived in the resignation of the then president Carlos Mesa Quisbert and the subsequent call for general elections. It is necessary to observe the catalytic speeches of the social revolt and the scenarios of the conflict: the privatization and access of Water and basic services (2002) with epicenter in Cochabamba, the exploitation and usufruct of hydrocarbon resources (2003) with epicenter in the city of 'El Alto' (La Paz), coupled with the demand for a 'Constituent Assembly' -what would later be known as the 'October Agenda'.

This system of political parties came to include up to 13 acronyms that fought for access to the executive and legislative power, the so called 'agreed democracy', a presidentialism of coalition, centered on a system of political parties and congressional agreements⁷ that based its model of governance in the subordination of parliament to the executive branch and the weakening of unions (Mayorga: 2019)

The assumption of the presidency of Evo Morales on January 22, 2005 marked the beginning of a period of charismatic leadership⁸ typical of 'Bolivian populism', as it articulates elements of the 'national-popular'⁹ project with traits of trade union indigenism,

⁷ In this political system, the presidency was defined among the three candidates with the highest vote and the congressional agreements were based on quotas of institutional power mechanism such as government and municipal ministries, which until then were designated by the president of the state

⁸ According to Mayorga (2019), situational charisma: the combination of power resources (union and political party), based on the indigenous status and humble ancestry of Mr. Morales. Benefactor that promotes and executes the redistribution of wealth for unprotected and historically excluded majorities

⁹ René Zavaleta Mercado's own concept, which refers to the political culture of the mining union leadership as a historical actor in Bolivian social formation and which contemplates the presence of union leaders in areas of political representation (Parliament) as a mechanism for participation and channeling of demands social since the mid-twentieth century. The union is understood as a mechanism of mediation between the State and society, by transcending trade unionism towards the political arena

such as anti-imperialist discourse, the search for indigenous autonomy and the defense of the coca leaf.

Said 'indigenism' cemented the construction of the legal and ideological frameworks that shaped the Plurinational State¹⁰ in various ways: under the discursive premise of the '*Suma Qamaña*' or 'live well' in Quechua language, as a programmatic and ideological principle; through the inclusion of indigenous-native autonomies, the recognition of indigenous justice and the traditional forms of indigenous-native management -use and customs (cf. *Infra*)

The sphere of citizenship constitutionally included the concept of peasant-indigenous-originator a specific entity of citizenship and specific subject of law. In this sense, the Environment -*Pachamama* or mother earth- is also transformed into a subject of law by opening, with this background a new chapter in the use and management of Bolivian natural resources - at least in formal discourse and institutionality.

3.3. Political field during the three governmental efforts of Evo Morales Ayma

Evo Morales Ayma focuses his first political management on a refundational discourse, the transformation of the Bolivian-colonial Bolivian socio-political matrix that had lasted until the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

The legitimacy of origin and the implementation of the 'October agenda' managed to strengthen the charismatic leadership figure of Evo Morales (Mayorga: 2018) within the social movements and peasant unions that will constitute the hard vote of the Movement to Socialism.

As a governance model, a pact based on negotiation and inter-union consensus was developed. Bolivian governance takes the form of a government coalition formed by social organizations with a peasant-native trade union base, progressively expanded through the incorporation of the Bolivian Workers' Central and other trade union entities of regional scope.

The reforms face in the first management of Evo Morales were immense and were guided by indigenism ideology, under the principle of '*Suma Qamaña*' or 'living well' (Walsh: 2008) as a discursive core of political-legal reforms that they reflected in a new political Constitution of the State, approved in February 2009.

In the economic field, the Bolivian State began a progressive recovery of the actions of its strategic companies –hydrocarbons, energy, services and telecommunications. Giving way to a new relationship dynamics with global capitals.

The main transformations in the political field occurred when inaugurating the dispute over the vertical dimension of power, that is, the democratic election of governors. Regional autonomy and indigenous autonomy began to complement municipal autonomies as scenarios of management and political dispute.

The Plurinational Electoral Body was also established as the fourth state body. Deepening the democratic process through the implementation of 'Intercultural

¹⁰ The promulgation of a new Political Constitution in February 2009, dated February 7, 2009. After being approved, by referendum, on January 25 of the same year with 61.43% of the vote. The promulgation was made possible through a political pact in the congress that modified several articles. On the other hand, the constituent assembly finalized and approved the new text in November 2008 after strong social conflicts.

Democracy'. Model which complemented representative democracy with direct democracy via referendum, and community democracy –as a formal recognition of traditional forms of political management of indigenous and native peoples. The expansion of the democratic process was reflected in the holding of elections for authorities in the judiciary –with poor participation and high percentage of null and blank votes.

The political field varied significantly between 2006 and 2010, consolidating the M.A.S. in his second term as a hegemonic party. The support and legitimacy that the then thriving UNASUR gave Morales during conflicts with elites and regional political parties in 2008 were key to ensuring the exercise of a hegemonic capacity after the 2009 elections. Despite taking great risks, the MAS political planning ensured the continuity of the 'process of change' by expanding the consensus and legitimacy of origin, this was reflected in the electoral processes. According to Mayorga (2019) Radical rhetoric and moderate decisions characterized the government of Evo Morales Ayma during this period.

The hegemonic period of the M.A.S. (2010 - 2016) involved the dissolution and fragmentation of the Bolivian political opposition in a cluster of political parties and regional political groups without the capacity for cohesion or articulation in a national representation. In this period, the main hegemonic strategy of the ruling party was to broaden the consensus capacity it enjoyed, through the realization of social summits that led to the expansion of the pact within the M.A.S. to include in the concertation sectors as unlikely as the agricultural business of eastern Bolivia, traditional bastion of liberalism in the country.

An aspect that can be rescued is the institutionalization of women's participation in political life, under the principle of political alternation and indigenous dualism that implants 50% of female participation in the lists of representatives of political parties.

Over the years, the M.A.S., as the hegemonic political party, has included demands of high aggregation in Bolivian civil society, such as maritime demand before Chile in the International Court of Hague (2014) and the 'patriotic agenda 2020 – 2025', which reiterates conventional goals, leaving aside its refundational and de-colonizing discourse and recovering historical continuity with the Republic founded in 1825.

After ten years of 'change process' (2014 – 2016) –the hegemonic zenith of the Movement to Socialism- a higher state density was established (*Ciudadanía*, LAPOP: 2018) due to the expansion of the representative capacity of political institutions and the citizen participation –always under the protection of the government party and its decisive instance of informal negotiation between union groups and their power differentials. In the political field, the concentration of power in the ruling party had deepened. The political opposition –a precarious and dispersed system of opposition parties- lacked bargaining power in a predominant or hegemonic party system –a political party controlling the instances if the decision-making process, very characteristic of Latin American presidentialism.

3.4. Hegemonic Decadence of the Movement to Socialism (2016-2019)

Although the 2014 general elections were a resounding success for the Movement to Socialism in the horizontal dimension of power, in the vertical dimension they meant the loss of very important municipal governments and governments such as La Paz, El Alto and Santa Cruz. In this sense, the articulation of 'citizen groups' - forms of non-union political and collective management - meant the emergence of new political actors, whose varied origins made it very difficult to apply the principle of opposition or contingency by the Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.).

The referendum of February 21, 2016 constitutes the biggest electoral defeat suffered by the M.A.S. as a political force and show the impossibility of finding an enemy for the operationalization of political identity. This referendum tested the counter-majority control that the different State organs should exercise over the executive body –since multiparty control was not exercised, due to 2/3 of the Movement to Socialism in the Legislative Assembly. It also meant a very hard test for the institutionality that requires the socio-political viability of ‘intercultural democracy’. This electoral process evidenced the exacerbated hegemonic condition of the M.A.S. as a political party: the electoral and judicial bodies not only validated a third re-nomination –under the surrealist speech of Political Rights as Human Rights- but it also did unconstitutional, according to the ruling of the Plurinational Constitutional Court, several articles of the political Constitution approved in 2009 by the same Movement to Socialism

This series of contradictions, together with the re-articulation of the political opposition in the form of citizen movements with regional representation and whose main stage of action were the streets, prevented the M.A.S. achieve an effective articulation and representation of the real interests of the Bolivian middle classes -that incidentally had 'widened' due to the inclusion of a significant percentage of vulnerable population, mostly migration settled in the main urban centers of the country (Ciudadanía: 2018, Brújula digital: 2018). In other words, the hegemonic capacity of M.A.S. had serious problems dealing with the emerging urban middle classes, reluctant to reproduce union management as a form of representation or political participation, due to the country's bitter experiences with corporate interests and the consequent corruption within the ruling party.

On the discursive level, the opposition built a new discourse around an empty signifier: corruption and prebency of the M.A.S. as an old Bolivian 'political *habitus*', represented by the sum of corporate interests, that did not identify the economically informal and entirely dissimilar majorities of the peasant union identity, and although the Bolivian political opposition did not exist in the vertical dimension of power distribution, it did existed - and in a very strong way- in the streets of the main urban centers, articulating interests around an anti-corruption discourse, which indicated the 'cult of personality' that the hegemonic party had developed for almost fourteen years, the political opposition, divided and diluted he found in the negative aspects of the Morales government his principle of opposition.

On the other hand, the demand for improvements in the health system, together with a forest fire of magnitude, managed to unite the common of the middle classes as a political collective, a 'chain of equivalences' (La Clau: 2000) that it was much more representative than the 2025 agenda than the M.A.S. had developed within his own ranks with the participation of 'opportunistic' private sectors that, like the social and union movements that made up the M.A.S. as a political party, sought to satisfy their own interests -control of land and territory- through the political management.

We believe that the statement of Benjamin Arditti (2007) pointing out that the State has lost the monopoly of politics –when it refers to the inability of the political party system to achieve effective representation within the social fabric and its agents- is particularly true in the multitude variety of interests and antagonisms that make the Bolivian political field: not only has the satate/market cleavage been overcome, but the union/political cleavage does not seem to be sufficient to achieve an effective representation of collective interests beyond the interests of corporative/union nature.

1. Conflict Development

The 2019 elections were presented as the only scenario in which the hegemonic condition of the M.A.S. it could be challenged. After almost 14 years in power all state apparatus had been co-opted and included in the sphere of influence of the powerful ruling government party. The continuous legal and electoral arguments -including the election of magistrates in different constitutional courts where the null vote far exceeded valid votes- along with several corruption and nepotism scandals, as well as the various conflicting interests within the corporate union fabric of the then the government party undermined the image, legitimacy and credibility of the Bolivian electoral organ, taking with it much of the support for the M.A.S. by the urban middle classes within the Bolivian electorate

Although the elections of October 20, 2019 were peaceful and with broad electoral participation, the background presented here seriously undermined the credibility of the Plurinational Electoral Tribunal (T.E.P.). This resulted in serious consequences when the said electoral body suspended the Fast Transmission of Preliminary Results (TREP) late at night with an advance of 84% and with results that suggested the inevitability of a second electoral round. However, the statistical trend of said count varied significantly the next day, with notable delay in the counting of the votes and a tendency of evident favor to the percentages of the M.A.S. that led Mr. Morales Ayma to declare himself a winner without the need for ballot, even before the quick count (95% of the count) was concluded and without having known the final official results by the T.E.P. Detonating civil protest movements and allegations of "shameless fraud" by members of the Bolivian political opposition.

The social protest spread progressively after Monday, October 21, when several civic, trade union and social leaders stand apart from the M.A.S. calling for an indefinite national strike with the request for the execution of a second electoral round between the first two political forces in the elections. On Tuesday, October 22, the then president Morales denounces a 'coup d'etat' with racist dyes against him, calling on his social bases to mobilize in defense of the legitimacy and legality of a hypothetical fourth term. Reporting on Wednesday, October 23, the first clashes between civilians and trade unionists, against and in favor of a new Morales government, respectively.

On October 24, the Organization of American States recommends holding a second electoral round, adding to this request the governments of the United States, Colombia and a Argentina the next day. On October 25, Morales Ayma declares himself winner of the elections challenging the Bolivian political opposition to a review of the results of the election 'vote by vote' and, at the same time, requesting the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) to carry out an audit to the electoral process with biding character, something that is rejected by the political opposition.

On November 1, the Plurinational Electoral Tribunal formalizes the official results of the vote count, declaring Morales Ayma a winner in the first round. This generated a generalized rejection that was visible in the form of an ultimatum by eight of the nine civic committees of the country, demanding the resignation of Morales Ayma in a term not exceeding 48 hours.


On Wednesday, November 6, the conflicts intensify with those killed in the towns of Montero and Vila Vila, in which there are also acts of torture and sexual abuse of protesters by followers of the M.A.S. The fire of the offices of the Municipal Autonomous Government of Vinto (Cochabamba) is reported by opponents of the regime - as a result of the death of two teenagers at the hands of Morales Ayma's followers.

The catalyst for Morales's resignation from the presidency was the police riot initiated in the city of Cochabamba on November 9 -preceded by the refusal of the Police of the city of Sucre, a day before, to repress the protesters- that it spread rapidly to all the capital cities of the country, except the city of Pando. On the other hand, on November 11, the presentation of a final report advance of the O. A.S. which pointed to fraud and serious irregularities, along with the refusal to repress and subsequent 'recommendation' of resignation made on November 10 by the Bolivian Armed Forces with the aim of pacifying the country, they finished sealing the end of the government of Evo Morales Ayma and the political hegemony of M.A.S.

4.1. Geographical Scenarios Of Conflict

At the height of the conflict, according to the newspaper '*Página Siete*' –La Paz, November 18, 2019- the main points of confrontation were four, with La Paz as epicenter -the city of 'El Alto' and the locality of '*Río Abajo*' surrounding the north and south, respectively. In Cochabamba the tension was manifested by the police and military barrier that prevents the passage of the coca leaf peasants through the center of the city. While in Ypacaní (Santa Cruz) the pacification agreements are not made effective. The total number of blockages are: 25 in La Paz, along the roads to *Oruro* city, and the localities of *Desaguadero* and *Charaña*. Another 28 blockages are in Cochabamba and prevent the passage between the Andean and Amazonia zones of Bolivia. In Santa Cruz, six conflict points are reported for transport on the route that connects the eastern capital with Cochabamba. Finally, in Oruro, seven blockades are identified and in Potosí five. With a total of 71 road blocking points. Almost all concentrated around the backbone of the country:

Graph n 1. Main conflict zones and road blockades



Source: Bolivian Highway Agency, road map 18 / XI / 2019

It can be inferred that the objective of the peasant union movements is to isolate both the seat of government (La Paz), and the city of Cochabamba, geographical and road center of the country. In this sense, the reissue of the 'siege of La Paz' as a conflict strategy (cf. supra) seems to make sense when analyzing the road map of the Murillo Province (La Paz city):

Graph n 2. Road map - murillo province (la paz city)




Source: Scielo - Bolivia

The blockade demonstrates effectiveness because the Aymará peasant unions control both the road that connects the city of La Paz with Cochabamba (and the rest of the country), as well as the roads that link the urban spot with the valleys located south of the same, traditional source of legumes and vegetables for the demand of almost 1.5 million inhabitants. On the other hand, the control of the city of Alto allows those mobilized to deny access to the supply of fuels, since the distribution center is located in district 8 of the other city, specifically in the area called 'Senkata '. In the same way, the control of the city of Alto and its international airport greatly hinders the air supply that the possible government authorities proposed as an alternative to the progressive shortage of the city's informal markets during the conflict.

4.1.1. Cochabamba, geographic and road center of Bolivia

The importance of the city of Cochabamba as road and celavage center in Bolivia should be highlighted. In terms of classical geopolitics, this department could be called the 'heartland' of Bolivia, due not only to being the Bolivian highway center, but to be a reflection of the country's ethnic and geographical wealth:

Graph n 3. Cochabamba - road communication

Source: Scielo - Bolivia

The city of Cochabamba has considerable geopolitical importance, since its control allows or denies access to the different roads of Bolivia's highway communication. On the other hand, the region called the 'Tropic of Cochabamba' or the 'Chapare' is between the departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz - two of the three pivots of the so-called 'Bolivian gold triangle' (Hoffman: 2011) - and it includes the two main roads that connect not only the two departmental capitals already mentioned, but also a territory very rich in water resources, flora, fauna and minerals. However, perhaps the most important feature of this geographical area is the habitat and main housing area - since many of its inhabitants practice multi-residence as a life strategy - of the six coca leaf producer unions - of which Morales Ayma has served as executive secretary since July 1988 and is president since 1991 (Lessman: 2005) - constituting the political base and the 'hard vote' of the Movement to Socialism. Another one of the sectors that constitutes the hard vote of the M.A.S. (cf. *Infra*)

4.1.2. Santa Cruz, Bolivian 'hinterland'.

With regard to the city of Santa Cruz, it is unlikely that this city will be besieged by peasant-syndicalist movements related to the Movement to Socialism (MAS), because despite relying on the road infrastructure of the 'trunk axis' for trade towards the Pacific Ocean, the supply of essential products does not depend, as in the case of La Paz and Cochabamba, on agricultural communities related to former President Morales Ayma, but rather on considerable agro-industrial production and a well-supplied demand for the areas of existing agricultural vocation around the urban axis:

This department has a fairly developed road infrastructure, not only because of the extensive interprovincial highway network it has, but also because it has access to the Paraguay-Paraná waterway and is the center of international air flow both Bolivian and Latin American - it is one of the main intermediate stops for destinations in South America:


According to the National Statistics Institute (INE: 2018), the region produces 70% of the country's food. Also according to what is indicated by INE, this region contributes with 28,5% of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), surpassing La Paz (25,2%), Cochabamba (14,2%), Tarija (13,7%), Potosí (5,43%), Oruro (4,77%), Chuquisaca (4,97%), Beni (2,41%) and Pando (0,86%).

The economy of Santa Cruz is based mostly on private activity, mainly agricultural and agro-industrial, in addition to its energy and hydrocarbon potential, the latter in the hands of the State. The private base is driven by 40,398 companies, which, since the middle of the last century, has been leading a vertiginous development process. The CAINCO document "*Desafíos del Siglo. XXI*" (CAINCO: 2016), identifies four main factors:

- i) the discovery and production of hydrocarbon resources;
- ii) the linking of the cross-border economy with the rest of Bolivia and with the world;
- iii) the expansion of agricultural and agro-industrial production; iv) an effective scheme for planning and execution of public works

Given this background, it seems logical to point out that this department has been characterized by a position reluctant to the "leftist" discourse of M.A.S. It has also become the visible vanguard of the civil and civil 'resistance' resistance movement.

Graph n 4. Road network department of Santa Cruz



Source: Scielo - Bolivia

Graph n 5. Department of Santa Cruz, access to international communication routes.

Source: Scielo - Bolivia

4.1.4. Potosí, the Imperial Imperial Villa 'in backwardness and forgetfulness

Another prominent scenario to consider in the conflict was the city of Potosí. Distance from the government of the M.A.S. Since 2016, it has been characterized as one of the regions that most resisted the fourth re-election of Mr. Evo Morales Ayma. Formerly a first-class mining center, the Potosí department has its hopes set on the industrialization of lithium because the salaries present within its territory comprise, according to different estimates, about 30% of the world reserve of that element.

According to Olivera (2014), the project of industrialization of evaporitic resources was born within several local social organizations –but not departmental- and was implemented in stages, reaching discrete levels of success in achieving its objectives. The aforementioned author also points out that a series of inconsistencies in the execution of the project, together with the specific characteristics of the Bolivian pickles, combined with little reliable information regarding the conditions of exploitation of this light metal among the potosine population have defenestrated the project of exploitation and industrialization of an exclusively state nature; In other words, the imperative need for technology transfer, the dubious competitiveness of Bolivian lithium against Chilean and Argentine private production, as well as the social and environmental unsustainability of the exploitation of this resource made this project unfeasible. For these reasons, the government of Mr. Evo Morales Ayma boldly sought out business partners willing to transfer technology, signing commitments with Chinese companies Xinjiang Tbea Group-Baocheng and German ACI Systems - the latter being the most benefited by an operating agreement at 70 years of shared risk - with the aim of producing lithium hydroxide and manufacturing lithium-ion batteries for European and Asian markets respectively.

The aforementioned agreements, together with an agenda composed of a series of mining union claims, as well as the progressive depletion of mineral resources and hydrological basins, have been the pivot of the civil and political resistance discourse


wielded by the departmental civic leadership in the conflict that led to the resignation of Morales Ayma to the presidency

4.1.4. The Chapare region and 'General Coca Law' (2017).

Enacted on March 8, 2017, the 'General Law of Coca' benefits the coca growers of Chapare, since it establishes 22,000 Ha of coca, of which 14,220 are from the Yungas and 7,700 from the Tropic of Cochabamba, defending the Law 1,008 of the Regime of Coca and Controlled Substances, which only allowed 12,000 Ha in La Paz territory and considered illegal production in Chapare because it was not ancestral - in other words, legalizes coca crops in the Cochabamba Chapare. According to the agency, most of the production of coca from Los Yungas is marketed in the legal market, while in the case of Chapare¹¹, slightly less than 10% is destined for legal human consumption. (UNDIOC: 2018):

The Confederation of Producers of Coca of Chapare comprises 965 unions and 50 thousand families' affiliates -with a total of about 200 thousand producers (BOLPRESS: Trade union genealogy of the coca leaf peasant. Feb 17 – 2018). Covering almost all of the municipalities of this province. This is reflected in the composition of political power, holding the M.A.S. local governance positions can easily mobilize resources, with the State's apparatus to guarantee logistics supported by the representation and legitimacy granted by unions as social organizations.

Graph n 6. Bolivia: Coca leaf production areas



Source: UNDIOC 2018


According to UNDIOC (2018), global coca production in Bolivia has increased significantly since 2016, contrary to the declining trend of the previous five years. Between 2016 and 2017, production increased 17 percent in Chapare and only 1 percent in Yungas,

¹¹ Coca growers unions in Cochabamba can be described as an organic power structure, based on the organizational and cohesive strength of the union. As noted above, they constitute the political base and main electoral support of Mr. Morales Ayma. These unions include around 50 thousand families organized in six provinces of the department of Cochabamba - and one of the department of Santa Cruz.

while in 2018 it decreased by a small percentage. This led to Chapare concentrating up to 34 percent of coca crops in Bolivia. Due to the higher productivity of Chapare crops, UNODC (2018) estimates that the region produces almost half of the country's coca, allocating just over 91% of that production to the illegal market or cocaine production.

On the other hand, as can be seen in the map presented under this lines, coca production areas comprise not only the two main communication routes between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, but also include territories framed in protected areas, whose legislation does not include sowing and production of coca leaf:

Graph n 7. Coca sembrades in relation to communication routes and protected areas



Source: UNDIIOC 2018

The UNDIIOC report (2018) highlights that 22% of coca leaf crops in Cochabamba are found in National Parks –both in TIPNIS and Carrasco National Park. The figures indicate that 12% of the coca crops planted in the department of Cochabamba are in the TIPNIS, the other 10% in the Carrasco Park, and the remaining 78% in Chapare region, and the municipalities of Tiraque and Yapacaní (Santa Cruz). It should be noted that important conflicts took place in these natural reserves –the TIPNIS conflict (2011) being one of the first political defeats of the Movement to Socialism.

4.1.5. El Alto as agent and political-social scenario

This bustling city of more than one million inhabitants, the majority indigenous - established immigration - is located in an Andean plain over 4,000 meters (13,100 feet) above sea level. The population of the city is made up mostly of young people, seven out of every 10 inhabitants are under 25 years old. The Public University of Alto (UPEA) now has more than 40,000 students.

It should be noted that it is the entrepreneurial capital of the Andean area of the country, with 119,000 companies, 93% of them small and medium, according to Roberto Alba Monterey, director of the business development network of El Alto,

in an interview with the journalist Barbassa (2019). The aforementioned author also notes that El Alto has become a kind of dry port, the link between the vast indigenous plains and La Paz, characterized by being a free zone and its business climate. That is, a city with its own agenda and specific needs.

This population played a crucial role in the popular demonstrations that brought Evo Morales Ayma - the first Bolivian president of indigenous descent - to power in 2005 and was the main bastion of resistance to the civic movement that ended with said government: El Alto was part of the hard voting core obtained by the MAS in the elections, with 77% in 2005, 87% in 2009 and 72% percent in 2014.

5. The nature of the conflict: Particularities of the struggle for the meaning of democracy.

The conflict resulting from the presidential elections held on October 20, 2019 entails the effective re-articulation of a political opposition -deeply conservative in Catholic and evangelical moral and ethical values and, paradoxically, extremely liberal in the sense of citizenship and political rights. As we pointed out in the previous subtitle, the opposition discourse creates its identity from the denial or differentiation of its collectivities with the set of peasant and labor unions that make up the M.A.S. In this sense, a demand for high common aggregation -the quality of health services and their eventual collapse- constitutes the discursive core that what will later take the form of a strong criticism of Morales's political management, especially what its third consecutive re-postulation implies for the institutionality of the organs of the State and the subjection that these organs showed before the political hegemonic quality exerted by the M.A.S. since 2010: there was a common enemy before which to unite a collage of political-regional identities that had nothing to do with the union peasant corporate interests.

On the contrary, Morales's party was not sure who his political rival was. The heterogeneous composition of the new opposition camp and the little formal political representation they had radically contrasted with the significance of 'neoliberal and imperialist' political figures presented as antagonists to the common imaginary of socialist militancy, already accustomed to the hegemony and protection of repressive apparatus of the State.

However, beside the background of the referendum of February 21, 2016, three historical moments can be recognized within the conflict that resulted in the resignation and subsequent abandonment of Mr. Morales Ayma's duties: a first period that includes since the elections of October 20 until the resignation of Evo Morales from November 10. A second moment of power vacuum and negotiation of political forces between November 10 and 12. And, finally, a third period that includes from the self-proclamation of the Senator Yeanine Áñez to the presidency of the Plurinational State (November 12) -which unleashed protests and mobilizations by the peasant union base, the 'hard vote' of the MAS- until the eventual pacification of the country (November 23), thanks to a new political and social pact, achieved between the hitherto inconsequential Bolivian political opposition and the social and trade union movements still loyal to Morales Ayma

The first moment was a deep questioning of 'intercultural democracy' because the absence of counter-majority control by the electoral and judicial bodies was found. On the other hand, the scenarios of the conflict at this stage showed that although in the political field the opposition is diluted and dispersed, it conglomerates different urban sectors in the main cities of the country, through a high capacity of aggregation from the priority

attention demands to the health system, the environment and, above all, the institutionality of the democratic and political process.

Even more, the fact that several regions and unions –including peasant unions- have been gradually unraveling from the M.A.S. during the trance it demonstrates the conjunctural character of the political bond that unites Morales with that ‘organic’ militancy of corporatist court. The very fact that the once powerful Bolivian Labor Center (*Central Obrera Boliviana*) requests the resignation of Morales –almost in parallel with the Bolivian Armed Forces- demonstrates that the conflict over political legitimacy tests any type of loyalty that means the elucidation of political pacts in function to sectorial interests.

Similarly, the role of the Organization of American States and its secretary general were central to conflict management, because, although they had endorsed the third presidential re-nomination of Morales, the report resulting from an electoral audit - with binding character, requested by Morales himself to placate the social protests- completely defeated the cornered executive power, whose 2/3 in the legislative assembly little or nothing meant for political and social legitimacy in the streets. On the other hand, the mutiny of the Bolivian Police demonstrated what Foucault already pointed out: the police state is essentially mercantilist and urban.

The Police, as an institutional organization consisting mainly of indigenous migrants settled in the cities -that is, a population of vulnerable middle classes- can hardly be expected to go against the people they are supposed to provide protection and service. A long list of demands -which has more to do with its institutionality and its historical relationship with the Bolivian Armed Forces- made the riot police the catalyst of a domino effect that ended any institutional support that left Morales in the country's urban centers.

A second moment demonstrated the socio-political myopia of the M.A.S. as a political party, who bet on social confrontation as a conflict resolution strategy, which main scenario was in the streets of the country's urban centers. The demonstrated inability to mobilize the urban middle classes by the then ruling party, contrasted with a speech that sought a more active role for the country's rural populations, causing deaths in specific conflict scenarios: intermediate cities and peripheral urban centers that serve of entry for the migratory flows and for the provision of goods and services to the cities, main economic centers of the country. This strategy was committed to generate a continuous and progressive shortage in the cities, product of a sustained blockade of roads carried out by the agrarian populations.

The power vacuum and the subsequent ungovernability of the Bolivian State put the primeval institutions of the State (the Armed Forces) in uncertainty. Even more, the ghost of a coup d'etat fell deeply into the political and social classes of the country: the institutionality and hierarchy of the Armed Forces were compromised by the political loyalties of the high military command towards Evo Morales and his political project. However, despite the vast majority of the troops being made up of young conscripts coming from the rural sectors and from the less economically and politically favored urban classes, the group of junior and senior officers demonstrated commitment to the political system of representative democracy, which is not the same as 'intercultural democracy' and acted in concomitance with the opposition civic movements, facilitating pacification in urban centers by recognizing the self-proclamation of President Áñez.

The overcoming of the conflict implied the creation of a new Bolivian political field in two different but interdependent scenarios: formal and social. Formal as the pacification of the country had involved a negotiation between the government party and

the Bolivian political opposition to make viable in first place the assumption of Añez to the presidency (November 12), and later the promulgation of a 'Law of Exceptional and Transitional Regime of Call for Elections', approved on Saturday, November 23, 2019 through the mediation of the European Union, the Episcopal Conference of Bolivia (Catholic Church) and the delegate of the UN, who consolidated the constitutional transition by installing working tables to the election of new authorities of the Plurinational Electoral Body.

The other scenario took place through a direct dialogue and subsequent agreement with the leaders of the mobilized sectors in support of former President Morales Ayma, on the same Saturday, November 23. This pact was gestated, negotiated and approved with live television broadcasting in between. The role of some young political figures stood out to achieve consultation and exchange between the trade union and political spheres: cease civil confrontation in exchange for a 'Constitutional Guarantees Law' that protects union leaders, compensation for the families of the deceased and injured during the conflicts and, above all, the repeal of the Supreme Decree that legally protected the repressive forces of the State.

This denies the Marxist assumption that identity is a hiatus between effective consciousness and attributed consciousness, through the party as an embodiment of class objectives. The economic successes of the M.A.S. they not only assumed internal competition for resources, but also showed the affirmation of the effective identity of the agents that compose it against national and historical interests'.

In the second place, the identity of the union agents was strongly questioned by the same success of the political project and the subsequent historical process, since the identity in the homogeneity - it pleases the pleonasm - is an illusion: the historical subject is essentially off-center, since its Identity is an articulation of changing positions and interests.

As a prelude to the conclusions we allow ourselves to quote Ernesto La Clau (: 2000), who affirms that the character of all identity is relational, an infinite set of differences whose meaning must be fixed in the discourse, when he states that:

The ideological consists in the recognition of the precarious character of all positivity, the impossibility of a final suture. In those discursive forms by which it tries to institute itself, on the basis of the closing, the fixation of the meaning and the non-recognition of the differences (...) must be seen as a constitutive of the social and the social only exists as the attempt of instituting society. (: 105-106)

6. Conclusions

There are many conclusions that can be inferred regarding the Bolivian conflict that occurred between October 20 and November 23, 2019. However, this article intends to focus its epilogue on the conformation of the Bolivian political field and its particularities

The loss of the hegemonic condition by the Movement to Socialism was entirely the responsibility of its cadres and political leadership. Believing that civic leaderships - essentially representing regional business elites and their interests- could have articulated social movements of such overwhelming nature based solely on their limited legitimacy is to belittle the critical capacity of the urban middle classes. The progressive loss of legitimacy was mainly due to the handling of the legal frameworks that were made to facilitate a fourth period of government, although it was Morales himself who said that if he lost the referendum on February 21- 2016, he will decline the possibility to present himself as a presidential candidate in a new electoral process. The Political Constitution of the State cannot be treated as a letter of utopian intentions, much less malleable or

instrumentalized by reason of political interests, as this generates a framework of legal uncertainty and destabilizes any type of political management. In this same sense, it is evident that legal legitimacy is neither synonymous nor rival for legitimacy of origin.

On the other hand, the political field theory -along with its subsequent conceptual operationalization- presented by Dr. Fernando Mayorga in his dense description of the governments of Evo Morales Ayma, suffers from a serious limitation: he omits the informal field that the socio-dimension Politics imposes on Bolivian politics. Deeply different from what representative democracy implies, 'intercultural democracy' was an attempt to formalize the negotiations and subjective relations that move under the curtain of the formality of the party system, since understanding Bolivian politics imposes a series of categories necessary to think about an informal policy characterized by fluctuating, ephemeral and, above all, short-term scenarios, which far exceed the legal aspects that bureaucratic formality implies.

The Bolivian conflict has demonstrated a crisis of representativeness of the political party system, denoting, at the same time, an exhaustion in the exercise of citizenship through trade union entities. This overcoming of the party/union system cleavage implies the formation of heterogeneous political entities, in which 'the empty signifier' is shaped by the demands of high aggregation or, even more worrying, by the cohesion of identities through religious referents.

The hegemonic articulation -that is, the ability to generate cohesion through consensus- is not only formalized in the political party system, since the scene of the dispute and political negotiation is the streets of the main cities and the road infrastructure that furrow the rurality of the Bolivian identity¹². In our opinion, something that the hegemony of the Movement to Socialism has shown is that these interaction scenarios, in Bolivia, social capital makes political capital viable -at least in the formal stages of state management, especially when it comes to political coalitions formed by trade union coalitions: the informal scenario of politics implies an interaction stripped of all legal parsimony and is, often, of a playful and even festive nature.

In other words, the Bolivian socio-political fabric is intertwined away from the corridors of the 'Burned Palace' or the 'House of the People'. On the contrary, the legitimacy necessary to maintain any hegemony originates in the streets and in everyday life living among populations that, although they are dissimilar, show an intense attachment to what they consider democracy and institutionality: either in the form of pacts, agreements and exchanges between formal agents or in tacit agreements of interaction and social coexistence between groups that, even rural or urban, recognize the plurality born of its rural Andean roots.

The Bolivian conflict also undressed the precariousness of the institutionality of multilateral organizations in South America. The poor discursive coherence that the Organization of American States showed towards Morales' third re-nomination to the presidency contrasts with his restrained disposition to exercise technical control through audits of the democratic process. This demonstrates that political interests affect the decision-making process within the Organization of American States. It is also evident in the existence of two reports with profoundly different ideological tendencies: the audit of the Bolivian electoral process with a technocratic and liberal tendency, contrasts sharply with the report of the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) that

¹² Observe graph 1 at the final notes

omitted the deaths caused by the violence exercised by the followers of Morales and focused exclusively on the description and treatment of the deaths after the resignation of Morales. The disparity with which the Bolivian conflict was treated denotes poor coordination between two interdependent multilateral entities, as well as the preeminence of the ideological factor in the exercise of multilateral functions of vital importance for the political and social legitimacy of the American States.

Furthermore, the role of multilateral organizations was vital for the abandonment of functions of the M.A.S. On November 10, then, unlike the conflicts of 2008, there was no South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) that internationally endorses the electoral legitimacy that the 2019 election meant for Morales.

Finally - and perhaps most worrisome - the conflict showed that the imaginary of territory, identity and belonging have a profound effect on Bolivian politics. Social belonging was a key factor for the cohesion of the different antagonistic groups, the scenarios of the conflict demonstrate this. In this same sense, it should be noted that the narratives with which the discourses were constructed have elements of the most 'primitive': the Christian religion and the Andean worldview - often syncretic - were confronted by representativeness in a supposedly secular State. These scenarios include the virtual field or 'the network' that the internet implies, as a locus of social interaction with its own discursive dynamics, which escape the many times nineteenth-century codes of traditional Bolivian politics and even more of peasant unionism, whose interaction is based on the communion that work implies, far exceeding the communicative capacity of traditional power devices in the exercise of politics and its representations.

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			FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009		SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015		THIRD PERIOD 2015 - 2019		CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2019	
VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION	COMPONENTS	Establishment of the Process of Change and the Cultural Democratic Revolution		Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)		SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014		CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	
							Dominant Political Party.		Polarization of the Bolivian middle classes – Strive for the meaning of democracy	
			M.A.S.	Senate: 12 Congress: 72	Divided Government	Senate: 26 Deputies: 88 Qualified majority (2/3)	Senate: 25 Deputies: 88 Qualified majority (2/3)	Formal and institutional consolidation of the political hegemony of the M.A.S. (subordination of the legislative branch)	Subordination of legislative, judicial bodies. Anti- majority control exercised by the Plurinational Electoral Body	Non-existent counter-majority control: the political hegemony of the M.A.S. overwhelms the organs of the Bolivian State
POLITICAL FIELD	HORIZONTAL	Opposition	Senate: 15 Congress: 58 Senate veto capacity	Opposition divided, fragmented and diluted	Senate: 10 Deputies: 42 Four political parties: Opposition divided, fragmented and diluted	Presidential decisionism was strengthened, weakening multiparty controls	Two political parties: Opposition divided, fragmented and diluted	Plurinational Electoral Body	Multiparty control non-existent by 2/3 of the M.A.S. No state power or body has legitimacy in the main cities of the country	
		M.A.S.	3 Prefectures		Six Governors	Six Governors	Emergence of informal political organizations without party affiliation, using the figure of citizenship to define themselves. ('Collectives' and 'platforms')	Consolidation of citizen groups and platforms as local political actors at the level of the main urban centers. Approach of political parties to these organizations	The legitimacy of civic and civil movements has no competence on the part of the central power, whose only margin of action exists in rural areas and in intermediate cities	
	VERTICAL	Opposition	6 Prefectures Governors coalition	Power Struggle	Regional political parties without cohesion	Multiplicity of political forces without parliamentary representation, without cohesion or consultation				
		M.A.S.								

VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION	COMPONENTS	FIRST PERIOD 2006 - 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015 - 2019		
					SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 2019
GOVERNANCE MODEL	Establishment of the Process of Change and the Cultural Democratic Revolution		Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Expansion of the government coalition, including the <i>Central Obrera Boliviana</i> (Bolivian Labor Central) and Mining Cooperatives.	Dominant Political Party.	Politicization of the Bolivian middle classes - Strive for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
	Coalition of government formed by social organizations with a peasant-native union base.	PACT			Absence of multiparty control The more. It is the only party with a national presence. Seeks the reproduction of government conditions	The social legitimacy of the pact in the political field is called into question by the failure of counter- majority control	Disabling constitutional succession of dissenting sectors of the M.A.S. with political representation of opposition parties and civic and civil movements. The call for elections is feasible among the M.A.S. and the new executive body
	Treatment between officialism and opposition makes the enactment of the C.P.E. February 2009, on condition of replacing articles	AGREEMENT		They are carried out within the social and union organizations that articulate the M.A.S. due to the precariousness and diversity of the opposition field	The M.A.S. bases its management on the exchange of mutual benefit with the social and union forces that conform it	In the opposition field there is an approach between the political participation of regional elites as political and civic actors with citizen platforms and groups	Political dissent of the M.A.S. with opposition political parties and representatives of regional civic movements. The agreement that pacifies the country is through direct contact between the new president and the social movements and peasant unions related to Morales
	Coalition of union politician with core in peasant and indigenous unions (peasant- indigenous-native organizations with union base)	EXCHANGE		The Movement to Socialism broadens the exchange through social summits to define economic and political agendas, including the pact to business and agricultural sectors	Agenda 2020 - 2025. Prioritization of Health system and Citizen Security	Since the February 2016 referendum the opposition field has been modified, including parliamentary political actors at regional and local (urban) level	Constitutional succession in exchange for facilitating the exile of Morales Ayma and his immediate political circle. The pacification of the country is achieved by granting compensation for the victims of repression and repealing the supreme decree that exempts the military and police from legal responsibilities.

VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION	COMPONENTS	FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 – 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015– 2019		
					SUB-NATIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 – 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2019
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT	STRATEGIC ACTORS		Establishment of the Process of Change and the Cultural Democratic Revolution	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Dominant Political Party.	Politicization of the Bolivian middle classes – Strive for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
		M.A.S.	Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (I.P.S.P.) founded by: Single Central of Peasant Workers of Bolivia. Confederation of 6 unions: association of wholesale producers of Coca - APROMPOCA). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMIOB-BS). Stick (2006): National Confederation of Rural Teachers. National Confederation of Micro and Small Business (CONAMYPE).	In 2009 union organizations join: Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras (Fencomin). Central Obrera Regional (COR) de El Alto. Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ).	CONALCAM: Single Central of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (C.S.U.T.C.B.). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMIOB-BS). Trade Union Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (Coca growers of Yapacani - Santa Cruz; the T.I.P.N.I.S. and Carrasco National Park). Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East (C.I.D.O.B.). Confederation of Factory Workers of Bolivia.	M.A.S.'s Hard Core: Confederation of 6 unions: association of wholesale producers of Coca - APROMPOCA). National Confederation of Peasant- Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMIOB-BS). Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (Coca growers in Yapacani Santa Cruz, the T.I.P.N.I.S. and the Carrasco National Park).	Núcleo 'duro' del M.A.S. Confederation of 6 unions: association of wholesale producers of Coca - APROMPOCA). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMIOB-BS). Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (Coca growers in Yapacani Santa Cruz, the T.I.P.N.I.S. and the Carrasco National Park).
			Legislative Presence: - Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - Unidad Nacional - PODEMOS	Legislative Presence: - Convergencia Nacional - Frente de Unidad Nacional - Alianza Social	Legislative Presence: - Frente de Unidad Nacional - Partido Demócrata Cristiano	Political coalition: "Demócratas" - Gobernador of Santa Cruz, Rubén Costas. - Alcalde de La Paz, Luis Revilla (Solbo). - Carlos Mesa (ex MINR). - Jorge Quiroga por (ex ADN, ex PODEMOS). - Víctor Hugo Cárdenas (ex MINR). - Samuel Doria Medina (UN).	Citizen Platforms: - Bolivia dijo No (Santa Cruz). - 21F (Cochabamba – La Paz). With central prominence of university students - Potosí mining cooperatives National Police Union

	FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009		SECOND PERIOD 2010 – 2015		THIRD PERIOD 2015– 2019	
	DESCRIPTION		SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014		CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 – 2018	
VARIABLES	COMPONENTS		Dominant Political Party.		CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2019	
	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)		Hegemonic decline of the M.A.S. political party Sociopolitical polarization Strive for the meaning of democracy		Anomie	
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT	Pact Mechanism	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	- Armed forces - NATIONAL Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Armed forces - National Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Plurinational assembly - Armed forces - National Police Universities - Universidad Pública del Alto - Universidad Mayor de San Simón	- Plurinational Legislative Assembly - Municipal Autonomous Governments
GOVERNMENT STYLE	Pact Mechanism	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	- Armed forces - NATIONAL Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Armed forces - National Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Plurinational assembly - Armed forces - National Police Universities - Universidad Pública del Alto - Universidad Mayor de San Simón	- Plurinational Legislative Assembly - Municipal Autonomous Governments
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VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION	FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 – 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015- 2019	
				SUB-NATIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018 CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTOBER – NOVEMBER 2019
SPEECH	COMPONENTS	Pact Mechanism	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Dominant Political Party.	Hegemonic decline of the M.A.S. political party Sociopolitical polarization Strive for the meaning of democracy
	M.A.S.	Refundational National / popular and Indigenous: Indigenous and peasant Autonomies Sovereignty Anti-imperialist Ethnic-cultural Indigenous Autonomies Environmental Defense	National / Popular Historical Continuity for the Bicentennial Developer	Guarantee of economic and social stability Need for continuity of the 'Change Process' Abandonment of the indigenous trait to include middle classes	Guarantee of economic and social stability Need for continuity of the 'Change Process' "Neoliberal" return risk
	Political opposition	Departmental Autonomies Citizenship and Democracy	Environmental Defense (TUP.N.I.S.) Rejection of the reduction of the subsidy to hydrocarbons	Respect for the rule of law Validity of the constitutional norm Authoritarian Government Exercise	Descontento político Respeto al estado de derecho Vigencia de la norma constitucional Ejercicio de gobierno autoritario Rechazo al código Penal (Demanda de alta agregación y policéntrica)
MAIN GOVERNMENT MEASURES	M.A.S.	Convocation to the Constituent Assembly, Nationalization of strategic companies, Promulgation of the Political Constitution of the State Expulsion of the State Expulsion D.E.A. and U.S.A.I.D.	Expansion of state density, Judicial reform election through democratic process Expulsion of the North American diplomatic mission Maritime Demand Urea Industrialization Lithium Industrialization Incentives for oil investment General Law of coca leaf	Call for Referendum	Call for external audit of the elections. Call for political summit between parties with parliamentary representation. Call for new elections with new Electoral Body
LEGITIMACY	M.A.S.	Original	Of origin and performance Exchange and agreement are made within the social and trade union organizations that articulate the M.A.S.	Legal Legitimacy of origin questioned by performance evaluation Legitimacy of the electoral body in question	Anomie

V. Event

Mircea BRIE ⇔ *The Role of Intercultural Communication in
Adapting Ethnic Groups to the European Union Social Space*

Florentina CHIRODEA ⇔ *Regional Development at the Borders of
the European Union*

THE ROLE OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN ADAPTING ETHNIC GROUPS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION SOCIAL SPACE

Mircea BRIE*

University of Oradea, Faculty of Social-Humanistic Sciences and Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences organized on April 04-06, 2019, the International conference *The Role of Intercultural Communication in Adapting Ethnic Groups to the European Union Social Space*. This conference was financed through the Jean Monnet project Intercultural Communication or Civic Integration. Daily Challenges in the European Social Space.



The International conference addressed the issue of multicultural social space, interethnic and intercultural relations. European society must overcome any trace of interethnic and national conflicts that have ravaged Europe for centuries. Only in this way will the path to prosperity and civilization be assured. Intercultural communication in the context of university education has the role of preparing individuals and societies to pay more attention to the cultural dimension of their existence. As a result, the European Union relies on increasing contacts and interactions between citizens of different ethnicities, religious denominations or national groups, which make up the social space of the European Union today.

The Role of Intercultural Communication in Adapting Ethnic Groups to the European Union Social Space is based on three gnoseological dimensions that the

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authors develop from different perspectives, using interpretative models and knowledge strategies specific to the humanistic and social scientific field:

1. "*Intercultural dialogue and interethnic coexistence in the European Union*" is a general theme that emphasizes the forms of interaction of the ethnic groups found in different geo-social spaces of the European Union.

2. "*The Role of Intercultural Communication and European Education*" is the second dimension, emphasizing European education and its role in the development of the global society.

3. "*Social values, integration and multicultural compatibility in Europe*" is the third thematic basis of this conference.

"*The Role of Intercultural Communication in Adapting Ethnic Groups to the European Union Social Space*" addresses the problem of European multiculturalism from different perspectives. The ideological conflicts manifested in the context of the migration phenomenon, are presented as not negligible aspects that are mainly found in the most economically developed societies. We also find analyzes that emphasize the desire for socio-cultural unification in the European Union. Concrete models for stimulating socio-cultural unification are presented, more precisely; the role and impact of Erasmus mobility programs as a direction of educational and professional development are discussed. The phenomenon of labor force migration is presented from an analytical perspective, being exposed concrete cases in this direction. These perspectives are complemented by the interest for the process of social integration at European Union level. All these analyzes show that the forms of self-motivation of the ethnic, national or religious groups for the homogenization of the European social space depend to a large extent on the economic policies and on the common market of the labor force, which offers the European citizens broad possibilities, in relation to the professional development, but at the same time increasing the standard of living.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE BORDERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

*Florentina CHIRODEA**

The Department of International Relations and European Studies from University of Oradea, in partnership with The Oradea City Museum and Whizcoffee Pick Up, Smile&Co, organised the International Conference *Regional Development at the Borders of the European Union*, between 5-7 november 2019, as part of the Jean Monnet Module „Development of the Border Regions in Central and Eastern Europe countries”, coordinated by lecturer Ph.D. Florentina Chirodea.

For two days, experts, professors, researchers, consultants, civil society activists, doctoral students, post-doc fellows, students and many others had the opportunity to debate the issue of modernization and development of regions located near the internal or external borders of the European Union. Participants from Sweden, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Kosovo, Albania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary and Romania presented papers that addressed topics related to historical, socio-economic and geopolitical factors, determinants for the development of regions from Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the specialists presented numerous examples of good practice in the field of cross-border cooperation mechanisms, highlighting the contribution of cooperation programs in increasing the development indicators. The participants also witnessed an exciting exchange of ideas regarding the "soft" development factors, which can attract and retain capital (economic or human) in a certain area.



The ideas were internationally extrapolated by professor Richard Sakwa, the guest of honor of the conference, who received the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Oradea. On this occasion, the distinguished professor from the University of Kent, UK, stated that Europe ends a 30-year cycle, which began with the events of 1989.

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"The mistakes and achievements", "the changes in international policy" and "the social changes" during all these years have been categorized as being challenges for the development of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The British guest also stated that "in the current context, for Europe, the challenge is two-fold: to find significant forms of human solidarity within the European Union, and thus the EU to become a true instrument for emancipation and peacekeeping; to find ways to engage significantly in the biggest challenge of all - the formation of a post-Atlantic West, where Europe can combine social and human solidarity, from one end of the continent to the other."



The event, circumscribed to the series of European events celebrating 30 years of Jean Monnet activities, was not only limited to debates and exchanges of ideas, the participants having the opportunity to visit the main sights of the city and to become acquainted with the local gastronomy.

VI. Honoured Personality

LAUDATIO

Pour le Professeur Paul Allies Avec l'occasion de recevoir le titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* de l'Université d'Oradea

Le Conseil de la Faculté d'Histoire, Relations Internationales, Sciences Politiques et de la Communication a le plaisir de proposer le distingué Professeur Paul ALLIES, de l'Université de Montpellier pour le titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* aux structures administratives de l'Université d'Oradea. L'initiative du Département de Relations Internationales et études européennes a la base la reconnaissance d'une extraordinaire biographie intellectuelle du professeur Allies dans trois domaines majeures : recherche, éducation et vie publique.


En suivant ces pas, l'Université d'Oradea a invité le professeur Paul ALLIES à Oradea pour lui rendre le titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa*, aujourd'hui, le 6 juin 2019. Certes, l'administration du Département des Relations Internationales et études européennes a eu des arguments subjectifs, symboliques et objectifs.

D'une part, en parlant de manière subjective, en honorant professeur Paul ALLIES avec ce titre, nous essayons en fait de rendre un hommage à une école européenne de prestige du domaine des Sciences Politiques, l'école française, qui a un rôle très important dans la vie intellectuelle de la sphère des sciences politiques de Roumanie.

En parlant du point de vue objectif, il faut mettre en évidence le fait que Monsieur le Professeur Paul Allies est une personnalité marquante des sciences politiques, non seulement en France, mais en Europe aussi. Ainsi, il a été membre du Conseil National Universitaire de France pour 20 ans (l'équivalent du CNFIS) et du Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique de France (CNRS) (section sciences politiques). Il est membre dans des organisations scientifiques du domaine des sciences politiques des plusieurs pays comme le Portugal, la Grèce et l'Italie.

Il a occupé des importantes fonctions administratives dans le cadre de l'Université de Montpellier, il a été doyen de la Faculté de Droit, Economie et Gestion et ensuite de vice-recteur de l'Université de Montpellier.

Il a mené des missions diplomatiques dans sa carrière, en étant adjoint au directeur de l'Institut Français de Naples et ensuite il a eu des missions dans le cadre des ambassades de la France de Mexique et de la Chine.



Le Professeur Paul Allies a aussi une diverse activité scientifique, en étant le directeur de la revue *Pôle Sud*, fondée en 1982, une des cinq premières revues françaises de sciences politiques. Il a 8 livres comme unique auteur qui se concentrent sur l'action des collectivités locales et le spécifique du système des partis en France. Il a écrit plus de 100 chapitres de livres et articles dans des revues de la France et de l'étranger qui envisagent les mêmes thématiques mentionnées en haut. Il est directeur de doctorats en sciences politiques.

Le Professeur Paul Allies est un collaborateur fidèle de la Faculté d'Histoire, Relations Internationales, Sciences Politiques et de la Communication à partir de l'année 2003, quand il a facilité la conclusion des accords Erasmus avec l'Université de Montpellier, desquels de dizaines d'étudiants et professeurs des domaines de sciences politiques, relations internationales et études européennes et droit ont bénéficié. A partir de l'année 2008, il participe annuellement aux conférences organisées par l'Université d'Oradea. Egalement, il a créé la possibilité d'échanges de revues entre *Pôle Sud* (Montpellier) et *Eurolimes* (Oradea).

Avant de présenter d'autres détails de la personnalité du professeur Paul Allies, j'aimerais bien remercier aux collègues Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, de l'Université de Coimbra, George Contogeorgis de l'Université Pantheon d'Athènes et Thomas Perrin de l'Université de Lille qui ont fait de très beaux portraits du professeur Paul Allies et qui ont enrichi la panoplie des arguments qui ont fait possible l'organisation de l'évènement d'aujourd'hui.

Paul ALLIES est né le 8 juin 1945 à Pézenas dans l'Hérault (France). Il a fait ses études à la Faculté de Droit de Montpellier. Il est titulaire d'un DES de droit Public (1968), d'un DES de science politique (1969).

Il devient Docteur d'Etat en science politique (mars 1977) avec une thèse sur : « Le Territoire dans la formation de l'Etat National » (Jury : M. Miaille, F. D'Arcy, J.P. Queneudec, N. Poulantzas, M. Guibal).

Après un service militaire en Allemagne où il devient lieutenant (1970), il est assistant en droit public (1970-1978) puis maître de conférences (1979-1991), enfin en 1991 professeur de science politique dans la même Université de Montpellier I. Entre-temps, il a été délégué auprès des services culturels de l'Ambassade de France en Italie (Adjoint au Directeur de l'Institut Français de Naples) en 1985-86. Il a effectué plusieurs missions de longue durée à l'étranger (Mexique en 1982, Pékin en 1987).

Il a été élu Doyen de la Faculté de Droit, Economie, Gestion et Vice-Président de l'Université de Montpellier 1 (de 1989 à 1994), membre du Conseil National des Universités de 1982 à 1995, du CNRS (section science politique) de 1987 à 1991 et de 1995 à 2000. Il a été dans cette période, membre du conseil de la Faculté de Droit, des Commissions de spécialité de Science Politique de Montpellier, Perpignan et Aix-en-Provence ainsi que du Conseil scientifique de l'Institut de la Décentralisation.

Il a été le fondateur et le directeur du Département de science politique de l'Université de Montpellier I de 1999 à 2007 ainsi que d'un Master professionnel sur les « Métiers du journalisme » en collaboration avec le groupe La Vie -Le Monde ouvert en 2005 et jusqu'en 2014. Il a représenté l'Université de Montpellier ((2002-2015) dans le Master Etudes Européennes délivré par dix universités européennes et dont le siège était à Sienne. Il était membre du conseil scientifique du diplôme.

Il a enseigné en licence et master de science politique l'histoire politique et la sociologie des partis politiques. Ces matières ainsi que celles concernant les institutions politiques et l'Europe politique font partie de ses thèmes de recherche.

Il a été nommé professeur émérite en octobre 2014 et a été régulièrement renouvelé dans ces fonctions depuis (en 2015 et 2017).

Parmi les plus représentatives travaux écrits par le professeur Paul Allies, nous mentionnons quelques-uns :

- a) *L'invention du territoire*, P.U.G, 1981, travail de référence concernant le processus de régionalisation et systématisation du territoire ;
- b) *Une Constitution contre la démocratie? Portrait d'une Europe dépolitisée*. Castelnau-le-Lez, Climats, 2005, 228p.
- c) « *Le grand renoncement. La gauche et les institutions de la V^e République* ». Paris, Textuel, 2007, 239 p.
- d) *Le rêve d'autre chose. Changer la République ou changer de République*. Paris. Don Quichotte. 2017. 408 p.

Dans son activité didactique, Monsieur le Professeur Paul Allies a fait des cours concernant : « Les régimes politiques de l'Europe du Sud » ; "Sociologie historique des partis politiques dans la France contemporaine" ; « Histoire politique de la France contemporaine » ; « Histoire du journalisme » ; « Journalisme et politique ».

Monsieur le Professeur Paul Allies a été impliqué dans des multiples contacts de recherche, desquels nous mentionnons :

- Contrat MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES : Pilotage des 3^e Assises de la Coopération Décentralisée. Institut du Monde Arabe. Novembre 2001. Rapport 2002 ;
- Contrat DARES (MINISTÈRE DE L'EMPLOI ET DE LA SOLIDARITÉ) : L'EFFORT FINANCIER DES COLLECTIVITÉS LOCALES DANS LA LUTTE CONTRE LE CHOMAGE ET POUR L'AIDE À L'EMPLOI. Rapport de recherche/ Document d'études DARES n°32, octobre 99.
- Avec l'ICPS et l'Université autonome de Barcelone, mise en place d'un *Observatoire du changement politique en Catalogne et Languedoc-Roussillon*. L'O.C.P. se définit comme une structure de travail regroupant des équipes universitaires appartenant à l'Université de Montpellier (UM) et à l'Université Autonome de Barcelone (UAB.).

Monsieur le Professeur a dirigé plusieurs thèses de doctorat qui se sont remarquées par la profondeur des recherches dans la sphère des sciences politiques :

- Fabien NICOLAS : Ressources privées et mobilisation politique: la construction du Parti Radical et Radical-socialiste à Béziers (1901-1939)
- Walid SAFI : La 2^e République Libanaise : institutions étatiques et dynamiques communautaires.
- Philippe SECONDY : La droite extrême dans l'Hérault (1890-1944). Sociologie historique d'une configuration politique.
- Maud VUILLARDOT : La presse comme forum lors du référendum sur la souveraineté du Québec de 1995
- OSSI Rodrigue: Les élections politiques en Afrique noire francophone : contribution à l'élaboration d'une problématique de l'alternance. (1990-2000)
- GNASSANGOYE Arcade : « Elites sociales et élites politiques : changement et transition au Gabon (1985-2005)
- GHAZZAWI Khalil : « Le rôle des nouvelles technologies d'information et de communication dans le développement de l'administration au niveau local »
- KPOTON Jean-Claude, Mobilisations partisans et stratégies de conquête du pouvoir au Bénin
- GHASSAN Melhem. « Capitalisme et confessionnalisme au Liban »

- GEORGIOU Christakis. : « Le rôle des réseaux économiques et financiers en France dans la construction européenne (1985-2005)»
- ISSA Numeir. « Système politique et délibération au Parlement Européen, du Traité de Nice au Traité de Lisbonne».

Le Professeur Paul Allies, comme un Professeur qui se respecte, a été présent à des multiples conférences organisées en France, Portugal, Grèce, Italie, Espagne, Cuba, Liban, Maroc et évidemment Roumanie (Oradea). De son riche agenda personnel, nous avons extrait les plus importantes :

- Centre de Droit Constitutionnel - Université Jean Moulin-Lyon 3. « *Actualité des Primaires* ». Communication sur : « *Les primaires et leurs contestations internes* ». 10 mars 2017
- Programme Jean Monnet. « *Achievements Contemporary Approaches and Perspectives in the Evaluation of Cross-Border Cooperation* ». Université d'Oradea (Roumanie). 1-2 juin 2017. Communication sur : « *L'Union Européenne et la question de la frontière* ».
- 2^o Journée Jean Monnet. Université de Lille. « *Eurorégions et régionalisme dans l'union Européenne* ». Communication sur « *Un comparatisme est-il possible pour évaluer le régionalisme ?* » 26 juin 2017
- « *Liberté de conscience et d'association dans les échanges internationaux. Le cas du Protocole d'entraide judiciaire franco-marocain du 23 juin 2015* ». Centre Ibn Roch de formation des journalistes. Rabat, 11 octobre 2017
- Colloque international « *Federalismo em Tempos de Renacionalização* ». Communication sur : « *Les théories du Fédéralisme à l'épreuve de la construction de l'Union Européenne* ». Universidade dos Açores (Portugal). 2-3 novembre 2017
- Colloque Politique et culture. Université de Coïmbra (Portugal). Communication sur : « *le « modèle » français et l'intégration européenne.* » 17 février 2016
- Conférence Internationale Jean Monnet. *The Evaluation Cross-Border Coopération in Europe*. Université d'Oradea (Roumanie). 6-8 Juin 2016. Communication sur : « *Une coopération régionale problématique: l'Union pour la Méditerranée* ».
- 1^{ère} Journée Jean Monnet. Université de Lille "Diversité régionale dans l'UE" .table ronde : « *Régionalisme et régionalisation : identité, légitimité, capacité* ». 21 avril 2016.
- Colloque *Philosophie et Travail*. Ministère des Finances. Paris-Bercy. 23 novembre 2016. Communication : « *Changement social et institutions politiques: le cas de la V^o République* »
- l'Université d'Oradea, Faculté d'Histoire, Relations Internationales, Sciences Politiques et de la Communication, Département de Sciences Politiques et Sciences de la Communication, Département des Relations Internationales et Etudes Européennes, Institut d'études Euro-regionales. Oradea-Roumanie : *The evaluation of cross-border cooperation in Europe*. Communication sur : « *Une coopération régionale problématique : la Méditerranée et l'Union Européenne*. 1-3 juin 2016
- Colloque de l'Université de Coimbra. (Portugal). "Europa, Atlântico e o Mundo. Mobilidades, Crises e Dinâmicas Culturais". Communication sur : « *Politique et culture: le "modèle" français et l'intégration européenne* ». 15-16/02/2016
- Colloque del'Université d'Annaba (Algérie), Département de Droit : « *Le Quatrième pouvoir et l'opinion publique dans un Etat démocratique* ». 18/19 novembre 2015. Communication sur : « *La révolution de l'information : innovations techniques et changements culturels* ».
- IEP Toulouse. Conférence : « *Les partis de gouvernement et la V^o République* ». 28-01-15
- Cercle Ramadier. Assemblée Nationale, Paris. « *Le statut des assemblées constituantes* ». Conférence 16-03-2015

- XI Encuentro Internacional de Estudios Politicos y Sociales. Universidad de La Habana. (Cuba) 7/11-04-2014. Conférence inaugurale : « *Actualidad de Michel Foucault* » - Services culturels de l'ambassade de France, cours au Lycée français de La Havane sur « *les principaux courants intellectuels de la France contemporaine* »
 - 1^o colloque international « *Coopérations, intégrations régionales et géopolitiques entre l'Union Européenne, la Russie et leur voisinage* ». Université d'Etat d'économie et du droit du Baïkal ; Ikoutsk (Russie). 11/13-09-2014 Communication : « *L'Union pour la Méditerranée : logiques étatiques et politiques régionales* ».
 - « *Quels enseignements français pour une 2^o République en Tunisie ?* ». Colloque Ettajdid Hôtel Ibn Kaldoun. Tunis. 26 février 2011.
 - « *La régionalisation en France : un bilan* ». Colloque « *La régionalisation avancée* Marrakech. Ecole des Hautes Etudes Economiques et Commerciales. 3-5 Mai 2011
 - *Consultation sur le projet de révision constitutionnelle en Jordanie*. Explanatory Memorandum. On the Review of the 1952 Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan . 6 octobre 2011
- Direction et jurys de soutenance de Mémoires du Master en Administration Publique des Fonctionnaires Internationaux (Ndiaye, Rebolledo) – ENA Strasbourg. 2008- 2009
- « *Réforme des collectivités locales : un retour de l'autoritarisme* ». Université de Perpignan. 27 mai 2010 – Marseille 9 décembre 2009
 - « *Robert Lafont et le mouvement régionaliste* ». Colloque « *Robert Lafont, la haute conscience d'une histoire* ». Nîmes. 26-27 septembre 2009
 - *Traité Constitutionnel Européen : leçons d'un échec*. III^o congrès de l'Association portugaise de science politique. Lisbonne (Portugal), 30-31 Mars 2006
 - *Le dissensus dans l'Europe post-référendaire*. Séminaire international : Il consenso all'integrazione europea. Formazione e sviluppo storico. Université de Sienna/CRSE. 18/26 septembre 2006
 - *Traité Constitutionnel Européen : leçons d'un échec*. III^o congrès de l'Association portugaise de science politique. Lisbonne, 30-31 Mars 2006
 - *Demain la VI^e République ?* CERCP-Université de Toulouse 1. 6,7 avril 2006.
 - *Le dissensus dans l'Europe post-référendaire*. Séminaire international : Il consenso all'integrazione europea. Formazione e sviluppo storico. Université de Sienna/CRSE. 18/26 septembre 2006
 - *La coopération décentralisée a-t-elle un avenir ?* Université Paris I et Cités Unies France. 22-23 novembre 2006.
 - *Constitution et construction politique de l'Union Européenne*. Université de Coimbra. Février 2005
 - *Quelle Constitution européenne ?* Institut Marc Bloch, Université libre de Berlin. 19/20 Mai 2005
 - *La constitutionnalisation de l'Europe*. Maison des Avocats, Paris 21 mai 2005
 - *Citoyenneté nationale et citoyenneté européenne : une nouvelle identité politique ?*. Université de Lisbonne .Centro de Historia. 2/12 novembre 2005
 - *Nationalismes et citoyennetés*. Université de Coimbra. 22/23 novembre 2005
 - Discutant. « *Des administrations périphériques ? Regards comparés sur les administrations de la Coopération et de la Culture dans le Sud Européen* ». Journées du LaSSP-IEP Toulouse. 25 juin 2004
 - *Quelles frontières européennes ?* Université de Coimbra. 14-21 février 2004

- *L'expérience française du transfert de compétences aux Régions*. Colloque Pouvoir régional et développement local. Tripoli (Liban), Centre Universitaire Franco-Libanais. 18/19 septembre 2004
- *Laïcité, citoyenneté, République*. Les Rencontres de la Cité. Marseille 15 novembre 2003
- *Etat et mondialisation*. Université Landivar, Guatemala. 4/5 septembre 2003
- « *Les usages politiques de l'histoire en France : la République face au régime de Vichy et à la guerre d'Algérie* ». Colloque Mémoire et Histoire. Université de San José de Costa Rica. 8/10 septembre 2003 et de Managua (Nicaragua) 11 et 12 septembre 2003.
- *L'espace politique dans l'histoire de l'intégration européenne*. Université de Sienne. Centro di Ricerca sull'integrazione Europea. 26/29 novembre 2003
- *Les autorités locales face au cumul des mandats et des fonctions*. CREAM. MONTPELLIER. 27 février 1998.
- *Le destin des découpages issus de la construction nationale*. X^e Entretiens Jacques Cartier. LYON. 7-8 décembre 1997.
- *Régionalisation et coopération transfrontalière*. Faculté de Mohammadia, RABAT, 15/16 avril 1997
- *La construction européenne*. Séminaire intensif Socrates, Université de Macédoine-Salonique, LEFKAS (Grèce), 19/28 septembre 1997
- *Premières assises de la Décentralisation*. Institut de la Décentralisation, LILLE, 8/9 février 1996
- *Le pouvoir régional en Europe*, Centre d'Observation Européen des Régions, Université d'HELSINKI, 25/27 janvier 1995
- *Finances locales, Europe et Aménagement du Territoire*, DATAR et Crédit Local de France LYON, 21 avril 1994

En même temps, dans son entière activité, il a soutenu beaucoup de conférences à la radio, à la télévision et devant le public. Nous en mentionnons quelques-uns :

4 – Missions, Colloques

- Centre de Droit Constitutionnel - Université Jean Moulin-Lyon 3. « *Actualité des Primaires* ». Communication sur : « *Les primaires et leurs contestations internes* ». 10 mars 2017
- Programme Jean Monnet. « *Achievements Contemporary Approaches and Perspectives in the Evaluation of Cross-Border Cooperation* ». Université d'Oradea (Roumanie). 1-2 juin 2017. Communication sur : « *L'Union Européenne et la question de la frontière* ».
- 2^e Journée Jean Monnet. Université de Lille. « *Eurorégions et régionalisme dans l'union Européenne* ». Communication sur « *Un comparatisme est-il possible pour évaluer le régionalisme ?* » 26 juin 2017
- « *Liberté de conscience et d'association dans les échanges internationaux. Le cas du Protocole d'entraide judiciaire franco-marocain du 23 juin 2015* ». Centre Ibn Roch de formation des journalistes. Rabat, 11 octobre 2017
- Colloque international « *Federalismo en Tempos de Renacionalização* ». Communication sur : « *Les théories du Fédéralisme à l'épreuve de la construction de l'Union Européenne* ». Universidade dos Açores (Portugal). 2-3 novembre 2017
- Colloque Politique et culture. Université de Coïmbra (Portugal). Communication sur : « *le « modèle » français et l'intégration européenne.* » 17 février 2016

- Conférence Internationale Jean Monnet. *The Evaluation Cross-Border Coopération in Europe*. Université d'Oradea (Roumanie). 6-8 Juin 2016. Communication sur : « *Une coopération régionale problématique: l'Union pour la Méditerranée* ».
- 1ère Journée Jean Monnet. Université de Lille "Diversité régionale dans l'UE" .table ronde : "*Régionalisme et régionalisation : identité, légitimité, capacité*". 21 avril 2016.
- Colloque *Philosophie et Travail*. Ministère des Finances. Paris-Bercy. 23 novembre 2016. Communication : « *Changement social et institutions politiques: le cas de la V^o République* »
- l'Université d'Oradea, Faculté d'Histoire, Relations Internationales, Sciences Politiques et de la Communication, Département de Sciences Politiques et Sciences de la Communication, Département des Relations Internationales et Etudes Européennes, Institut d'études Euro-regionales. Oradea-Roumanie : *The evaluation of cross-border cooperation in Europe*. Communication sur : « *Une coopération régionale problématique : la Méditerranée et l'Union Européenne*. 1-3 juin 2016
- Colloque de l'Université de Coimbra. (Portugal). "Europa, Atlântico e o Mundo. Mobilidades, Crises e Dinâmicas Culturais". Communication sur: "*Politique et culture: le "modele" français et l'intégration européenne*". 15-16/02/2016
- Colloque del'Université d'Annaba (Algérie), Département de Droit : « Le Quatrième pouvoir et l'opinion publique dans un Etat démocratique ». 18/19 novembre 2015. Communication sur : « *La révolution de l'information : innovations techniques et changements culturels* ».
- IEP Toulouse. Conférence : « *Les partis de gouvernement et la V^o République* ». 28-01-15
- Cercle Ramadier. Assemblée Nationale, Paris. « *Le statut des assemblées constituantes* ». Conférence 16-03-2015
- XI Encuentro Internacional de Estudios Politicos y Sociales. Universidad de La Habana. (Cuba) 7/11-04-2014. Conférence inaugurale : « *Actualidad de Michel Foucault* » - Services culturels de l'ambassade de France, cours au Lycée français de La Havane sur « *les principaux courants intellectuels de la France contemporaine* »
- 1^o colloque international « Coopérations, intégrations régionales et géopolitiques entre l'Union Européenne, la Russie et leur voisinage ». Université d'Etat d'économie et du droit du Baïkal ; Ikoutsk (Russie). 11/13-09-2014 Communication : « *L'Union pour la Méditerranée : logiques étatiques et politiques régionales* ».
- « *Quels enseignements français pour une 2^o République en Tunisie ?* ». Colloque Ettajdid Hôtel Ibn Kaldoun. Tunis. 26 fevrier 2011.
- « *La régionalisation en France : un bilan* ». Colloque « La régionalisation avancée Marrakech. Ecole des Hautes Etudes Economiques et Commerciales.3-5 Mai 2011
- *Consultation sur le projet de révision constitutionnelle en Jordanie*. Explanatory Memorandum .On the Review of the 1952 Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan . 6 à octobre 2011

Direction et jurys de soutenance de Mémoires du Master en Administration Publique des Fonctionnaires Internationaux (Ndiaye, Rebolledo) – ENA Strasbourg. 2008- 2009

- « *Réforme des collectivités locales : un retour de l'autoritarisme* ». Université de Perpignan. 27 mai 2010 – Marseille 9 décembre 2009
- « *Robert Lafont et le mouvement régionaliste* ». Colloque « Robert Lafont, la haute conscience d'une histoire ». Nîmes. 26-27 septembre 2009
- Traité Constitutionnel Européen : leçons d'un échec*. III congrès de l'Association portugaise de science politique. Lisbonne (Portugal),30-31 Mars 2006

- *Le dissensus dans l'Europe post-référendaire*. Séminaire international : Il consensoall'integrazione europea. Formazione e sviluppostorico. Université de Sienne/CRSE. 18/26septembre 2006
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Le Professeur Paul Allies a rempli aussi beaucoup de missions administratives au niveau de l'enseignement supérieur, mais aussi dans l'espace public. Nous en mentionnons quelques-unes :

- Directeur de l'Unité de Formation et de Recherches DROIT ET SCIENCES SOCIALES de l'UNIVERSITE de MONTPELLIER I de 1990 à 1993 ;
- Vice-Président de l'Université MONTPELLIER I/Doyen de la Faculté de droit-économie-gestion de 1993 à 1995
- Directeur du Département de science politique de l'Université de Montpellier I(1999-2007).
- Membre du conseil de la Faculté de Droit de Montpellier (1972-1993 et 1998-2008)
- Membre du Conseil scientifique de l'Université de Montpellier I (2001-2005).
- Membre élu du Conseil National des Universités (Section Science Politique), (PARIS) de 1982 à 1995.
- Membre élu du Comité National du CNRS (Section Science Politique), (PARIS) de 1987 à 1991 et de la section 40 de 1995 à 1999.
- Membre des Commissions de spécialité de Droit Public à Montpellier et Perpignan, et de Science Politique à Montpellier. Président de la commission de spécialité Sociologie-Ethnologie-Anthropologie de l'Université Montpellier I.
- Membre du Conseil Scientifique du Plan Urbain (Ministère de l'Equipeement, du Logement, des Transports et de la Mer), (PARIS) 1989-1995.
- Membre du Comité d'Orientation de l'Observatoire Interrégional du Politique, (OIP) (PARIS) 1987-1991.
- Membre du Conseil Scientifique de l'IDATE (Institut de l'Audiovisuel et des Télécommunications en Europe), (MONTPELLIER) 1985-1995 et du Bureau 1993-1999.
- Membre du Conseil scientifique de l'Institut de la Décentralisation, (PARIS) 1990-1999.
- Membre du Conseil scientifique du GRALE (Groupement de Recherches sur l'Administration Locale en Europe), (PARIS)1995-2002.
- Membre du Comité de programme du PIR-Villes (PARIS) de 1995 à 1997.
- Directeur du module du master Etudes Européennes, représentant de l'Université de Montpellier I au Comité scientifique (Sienne).
- Directeur du Master Professionnel « Métiers du Journalisme » (2005-14)
- Membre de Comités de Lecture ou de rédaction de Revues : *Pouvoirs Locaux* (PARIS) ; *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine* (PARIS) ; *Sciences de la Société* (TOULOUSE) ; *Etude et Réflexion (revue de l'Observatoire de la fonction publique territoriale-PARIS)* ; *Page Deux* (LAUSANNE) ; Eurolimes (ORADEA).

En tenant en compte de la qualité de sa personnalité, mais également les liaisons très étroites avec les membres du Département de Relations Internationales et Etudes Européennes, nous proposons à Monsieur le Professeur Paul Allies pour le titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* de l'Université d'Oradea.

Le Sénat de l'Université d'Oradea

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Paul Allies

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VII. Book Reviews

Renata-Marilena MUSTA ⇔ *A Liberal Approach Towards Migration and Integration in European Welfare States*

Simona BĂLAN ⇔ *The State, Antisemitism, and Collaboration in the Holocaust: the Borderlands of Romania and the Soviet Union*

Bogdan RUS ⇔ *Book review: New Researches in International Relations*

Anca IUHAS ⇔ *Human Trafficking. A Global Perspective*

Lucia PANTEA ⇔ *Uncertainty: Strategic Thinking and International Relations in 21st Century*

Dan APĂTEANU ⇔ *Postcommunist Societal Changes in the Balkans*

A LIBERAL APPROACH TOWARDS MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES

Renata-Marilena MUSTA*

Review of: Farer, Tom, *Migration and Integration: The Case for Liberalism with Borders*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Migration has always been present in the history of mankind. Harsh living conditions, generated mainly by poverty, exploitation, conflicts and natural disasters, have made people flee in search of protection and better life opportunities in other parts of the world. Many of them have found refuge in Europe, an area of continuous economic, social and cultural development. European leaders have always managed migration as they considered appropriate. In recent years, many European states have signed several documents regarding the protection of human rights such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.



This development in the field of human rights has stimulated migration towards Western European welfare states since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century. Western Europe has been the destination of many economic and political migrants who left their homes for a more prosperous and secure life. Western European states have managed to deal with migration until now but the massive waves of refugees coming from the Middle East and North Africa and claiming asylum in Europe in the last decade seem to destabilise politically the region as many European citizens begin to perceive refugees and migrants as a threat to their security and many European leaders begin to see them as a burden on the receiving states.

The huge flows of refugees originating from the Middle East and North Africa are the result of large-scale conflicts characterized by high-intensity intra-state violence following the initial pacific popular mobilization against authoritarian regimes in states such as Libya and Syria, known as the *Arab Spring*. These internal conflicts provided the perfect ground for terrorism to emerge and become the greatest threat to human life through the massive atrocities and immense suffering produced to civilian populations. Fearful for their lives, millions of people have fled these countries, many of them seeking refuge in Europe. Confronted with this overwhelming situation, sovereign European states begin to think of their responsibility to protect in other ways.

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On the one hand, sovereignty makes European states' main responsibility the protection and prosperity of their own populations, as they should act as the guardians of their own citizens, and enables them to control immigration through their power over their own territories as they consider appropriate according to their beliefs, identities, capabilities and interests. On the other hand, European states cannot remain indifferent to the extreme human suffering produced to innocent people, regardless of their religions, nationalities, beliefs or other grounds. With so many threats to human security, European states have the responsibility to protect populations at risk as guardians of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, sovereignty and responsibility to protect should go hand in hand when talking about migration.

The recent massive refugee flows and the spread of terrorism to the international scene have created a series of controversies among the European populations and European leaders regarding the acceptance of migrants and refugees on European territories. While some European leaders, such as the German chancellor Angela Merkel, have mostly been in favour of receiving refugees from the Middle East and North Africa not only for humanitarian reasons but also for economic ones including the labour force brought in and acting as an engine of economic development, other European leaders, such as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, have been against their reception invoking security issues.

Political scientist Charles Martin-Shields believes that the European community's migration strategy should be more human-oriented than it is today and should include the creation of places where people would feel like home.

¹Researcher Clare Castillejo thinks that Europe can benefit from labour migration from Africa if the two continents work together.² Political scientists Annabelle Houdret and Mark Furness believe that the European Union should give more access to North African countries to its single market.³ Nevertheless, researchers Luigi Scazzieri and John Springford consider that the only way the European Union should deal with migration is to further help improve living conditions in the migrants' countries of origin.⁴

In his masterpiece *Migration and Integration: The Case for Liberalism with Borders*, the American author Tom Farer offers a complex analysis of migration and integration in Western European welfare states and possible solutions to their recent problems regarding migrants and refugees. The author sustains his ideas of policies that these states should adopt for the best management of migration and integration with well-

¹ Charles Martin-Shields, "Forced Displacement and Development - Supporting a place to call home?", in *The Current Column*, German Development Institute, 11 July 2018, https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/German_Development_Institute_Martin-Shields_11.07.2018.pdf, accessed on 13.01.2020.

² Clare Castillejo, "EU Engagement with Africa on Migration: A Change of Approach Required", in *Europe's role in the world: from development policy towards a policy for global sustainable development?*, German Development Institute, Bonn, 2018, https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/BP_9.2018.pdf, accessed on 13.01.2020.

³ Annabelle Houdret and Mark Furness, "Germany and Europe cannot give up on North Africa", in *The Current Column*, German Development Institute, 26 February 2018, https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/German_Development_Institute_Houdret_Furness_26.02.2018.pdf, accessed on 13.01.2020.

⁴ Luigi Scazzieri and John Springford, "How the EU and third countries can manage migration", Centre for European Reform, November 2017, https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pbrief_amato_migration_1nov17.pdf, accessed on 13.01.2020.

grounded arguments. The book is structured into three main parts dealing with the objects of analysis. The writer declares his liberal position towards mass migration from the very beginning of the book. He justifies his choice of writing about migration in wealthy European states rather than in the United States through a comparison between Western Europe and the United States in terms of identity formation, living conditions and composition of the migration flow.

In the first part of the book, the author uses economic data to show that economic growth has fallen after 2000 in European countries such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom and that there are high youth unemployment rates in European countries such as Sweden and Italy. He is convinced that migration can be restrained and presents some conditions that receiving states might require migrants to fulfil in order to be accepted. There are presented the moral arguments for and against the right to enter of migrants in sovereign states. Some key concepts in Farer's analysis of the migration phenomenon are *nationalism*, *sovereignty*, *responsibility to protect* and *multiculturalism*. The American writer shortly describes the current migration crisis hitting Europe, the emergence of terrorism on European territories, Brexit, the cultural conflict between natives and immigrants over issues of gender, free speech and worship, minority rights provided by the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and ways of dealing with some minority-community claims.

In the second part of the book, the author presents the cases of five European states: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom and France, in their management of migration and integration. He shortly describes their recent histories of migration and strategies of integration. While Sweden and Norway have been keener on accepting migrants and adopting integration policies, Denmark has mostly been against the reception of Muslim migrants, it hasn't really welcomed them. According to Farer, integration policies have to serve a fiscal purpose, public safety and defence of society's core values. Britain's approach towards non-Western, especially Muslim, migrants has shifted from a multicultural one in the first years of this century to an anxious one in recent years, migration being one of the main drivers of the 2016 Brexit vote.

France's position towards Muslim migrants is presented through Nicolas Sarkozy's changing attitude towards them. The author makes a comparison between France and the United Kingdom according to their stands towards Muslim migration. For him, distinguishing features include dress-code issues, interest in religion and moment of adoption of anti-discrimination laws, and similarities include reception of post-war migrants from their former colonies and a history of migrant integration and asylum provision. Farer sees British history as one characterised by continuity and French history as one marked by political struggle. He explains the French majority's toxic response to the Muslim minority as a result of the recent terrorist attacks taking place in France.

In the last part of the book, the author mentions the difficulties that need to be address edurgently, including the real causes of Islamic terrorism. He states that his highest priority is that liberal democracy survives and gives some policy ideas that European states should adopt for a better management of migration and integration. For him, communication is a principal mean for eliminating or, at least, easing friction between the native population and the newcomers and make newcomers feel at home in the host country. Farer's plan according to which Western European welfare states should address the current challenges produced by migration is to accept primarily young adults needed on their labour markets, to use a biometric identity-card system to locate individuals present in the country without authorisation and deport them, to establish

special places abroad for entry and asylum applications, to create a migration point system to limit entry, to select immigrants according to their ability to internalise a heroic national narrative, to offer adult immigrants citizenship only if they sign and respect individualised agreements comprising actions they are expected to take, to use schools to inculcate patriotism, to make national service compulsory, to improve the relations between the police and the community and to treat Muslims respectfully.

Tom Farer's book offers a unique view on the current migration and integration crisis that European welfare states experience and some useful advice on the way they should act to deal best with the situation. His bold and challenging ideas maintain the reader's interest and make them question the present migration and integration strategies adopted by several European states. The book is worth reading not only by researchers in the field but also by policymakers for some interesting ideas of policies and everybody interested in finding out different views on the migration phenomenon in European welfare states.

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THE STATE, ANTISEMITISM, AND COLLABORATION IN THE HOLOCAUST: THE BORDERLANDS OF ROMANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

*Simona BĂLAN**


Review of: Dumitru, Diana, *Vecini în vremuri de restriște: stat, antisemitism și Holocaust în Basarabia și Transnistria*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2019. ISBN 978-973-46-7666-8

The period of World War II was a disturbing experience for the history of all the societies that were involved in this major conflict. The subject of the Holocaust is an inexhaustible one and has been studied by many researchers. Over time, its various perspectives have been captured, but most studies have revealed its historical-political side, of antisemitic political regime.

As the author reveals in the *Introduction*, this book extends the Holocaust research in Romania, researches presented in studies written by, for instance, Jean Ancel, Radu Ioanid, Dennis Deletant, Vladimir Solonari, who analyzed the policies of annihilation of the Jews under the Antonescu regime, but did not emphasize on the attitude and the relations formed among the general population between Jews and other populations or minorities.

Few studies have analysed the interethnic relations formed between the Jews and the other majority or minority populations in the common space in which they lived during, before or after the Holocaust. The present book is one of these studies, in which the author intends to study the relations between Jews and non-Jews during the Second World War in Bessarabia and Transnistria, and especially the factors that shaped these relationships.

The author, Diana Dumitru, is a historian, university lecturer at the Department of History and Social Sciences of the State Pedagogical University "Ion Creangă" in Chisinau. The idea of writing this book came after reading in 2003 a "disturbing book" (p. 11, translated), written by Jan Gross, an American historian of Polish origin, entitled "Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland", which made her wonder what kind of relations were between Jews and Christians in the place where she was born and why, as a historian, she knows so little about the history of the Bessarabian Jews.



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The book is a comparative study of the interaction of civilians with Jews during the Holocaust in two neighboring regions, Bessarabia and Transnistria, each with its political history, and not a study of the "overall lethality of the Holocaust" (p. 19, translated). Bessarabia and Transnistria correspond approximately to the present territories of the Republic of Moldova and of the southwest of Ukraine, respectively. Transnistria in this study refers not to the current self proclaimed separatist republic, but to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR, current territory of today's Ukraine and partly of Russia.

The difference from other similar studies is that it focuses exclusively on the actions of civilians and not those of the state apparatus or in military institutions, army, police or other officials. The study wants to demonstrate the difference in behavior between Jews and non-Jews in the two territories by emphasizing the role of state policies prior to World War II and in "stimulating either animosity or goodwill at the level of various population groups" (p. 17, translated). The author is of the opinion that previous research has not clarified or explained the attitude of the general population in the former Soviet territories, much less to compare them with the neighboring western territories. Although the two groups acted in similar contexts, however, between 1941-1944 there was a difference in how they could exercise their own will in relations with the Jewish minority. The purpose of this study is to understand how they behaved on their own initiative, during the Holocaust "the relatively free agents of society and the factors that determined their behavior" (p. 20, translated).

In the chapters of the book, the author redraws the historical route of the two territories, Bessarabia and Transnistria and presents "their divergent evolutions" (p. 39, translated), chronologically describing the situation of the Jewish minority in these regions starting with the period of the Tsarist Empire, when both territories were under this empire characterized by antisemitism, then the period after the first World War when Bessarabia was united with Romania, Transnistria during this period being under Soviet occupation (the new post-tsarist regime, a Bolshevik communist regime, which implemented policies to combat of antisemitism). In 1940, Bessarabia was taken by the Russians for a short period, and then from 1941 both territories came under the Romanian regime Antonescu, allied with the Nazi Germans, until 1944. It also describes, historically, after a good documentation (archives, documents, testimonies of the survivors or older witnesses, interviews) the evolution of the relations between the Jewish minority and the majority population or the other minorities in the studied region.

The *first chapter* of the book analyzes the period prior to the First World War and the relations between Jews and non-Jews both in Bessarabia and Transnistria, both territories being under the Russian Empire at that time. The Tsarist regime of that period applied contradictory policies towards Jews in these regions, from attempts to include, assimilate or convert them to orthodoxy, to legal discrimination and exclusion, and to force them to settle in an area reserved especially for them somewhere on the western edge of the empire, including in the territories of the future Bessarabia and Transnistria. The period of over a century in which they were under the Tsarist Empire has left its mark on both territories, sharing a similar socio-political history. Being border areas, on the outskirts of the Tsarist Empire, both territories were characterized by ethnic and linguistic diversity: Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, etc. The Jews became much more urbanized than the rest of the population, meaning that a large percentage were in Chisinau or Odessa. Being excluded from the state apparatus or public functions, they came to dominate the commerce, the

manufacture, the banks, positions that aroused the envy of the non-Jewish population, largely ruralized and agricultural. Tsar Nicholas I himself (1825-1855) noted in his journal: "The disaster for the peasants in these provinces are the Jews ... They shatter the force of the unfortunate white Russians ... They are permanent lepers and they get involved in these miserable regions to the brim" (p.52, translated), a speech that became common for the autocratic regime. The revolt of the intellectuals but also of the common people against the Jews, the pogroms of that period were condemned verbally by the power, but approved tacitly and unpunished, which intensified the wave of antisemitism and general hatred of the population against the Jews, leading to very tense relations between Jews and other nationalities at the beginning of the 20th century.

The *second chapter* captures the relations between the Jewish minority and the other populations in Bessarabia after 1918, within the Romanian state. The author analyzes the role of the elites, the intellectuality, the political structure and parties in maintaining and amplifying anti Jewish attitudes and feelings within the Romanian society, society and state that were confronted, once the new territories were united, with the problem of socio-cultural integration of the diverse population of these new territories in order to strengthen national identity. In this way, a nationalist discourse was outlined, and the minorities were seen as a threat to the territorial unity of the state, which fueled the traditional Bessarabian antisemitism, overlayed on the "fear of Bolshevik infiltration" of "many communist Jews" (p. 71, translated). In the testimonies of the respondents interviewed by the authors, the non-Jews invoked economic reasons (Jews dealing with trade, crafts and various professions) leading to inequalities between groups and influencing their relations with the Jews. The well-being of the Jews created envy and revolt among the Moldovans. There were major tensions, violence against the Jews, their situation in the interwar Bessarabia resembling their condition in the Tsarist regime. Although Romania's constitution of 1923 guaranteed equality by law, the Jews remained secondary citizens, and they hardly obtained citizenship to occupy positions in the state apparatus.

The *third chapter* provides an image of Soviet integrationist policies, implemented by the new Soviet communist regime, after the fall of the Russian Empire. The new socialist society, under the leadership of the Communist Party, made efforts to integrate minority nationalities, as part of the policies of the new party, especially under "pressure from multiple ethno-national claims" (p. 105, translated), leading a fight against the manifestations of antisemitism, not only for ideological but also pragmatic reasons, many leaders of the Bolshevik state being of Jewish origin. The antisemitic integration policies were carried out in the form of real propaganda through the cinema, newspapers, literature, art, education system, the antisemitic acts being condemned.

The implementation of these policies was slow and difficult, and the changes were not made to each and every individual, but more a general tendency, so that antisemitism was not eliminated, but it was majorly reduced, reaching to amiable relations between Jews and non-Jews, even increasing the number of mixed marriages.

In the *chapters 4, 5 and 6*, the author describes the situation in Bessarabia and Transnistria as it was in 1941, when the two territories came under Romanian control during the Second World War, during the Holocaust. The situation is described by a comparative study of the relations of Jews with the majority Christian population in the two regions. The Romanian politics, under the Antonescu regime, allied with the Germans, was a supporter of the antisemitic struggle, through mass killings of the Jews or their imprisonment and deportation to Transnistria.

These chapters encompass *the very essence of the study*: the comparison of the interethnic relations between the general population towards the Jews in Romanian Bessarabia, and in Transnistria, which came out from under the Bolshevik regime and joined, for a short period, Romania, and the possible factors that shaped these behaviours.

From the analysis of the documents, archives, but also from the interviews applied to the survivors, both Jews and non-Jews, it appears that the general public treated Jews differently in Bessarabia compared to Transnistria. If in Bessarabia, there were still violent and powerful antisemitic attitudes, which under the Antonescu regime, allied with the Nazis, intensified, in Transnistria the population was more reserved to anti Jewish actions, both because of the fear of the return of the Soviet regime, which condemned antisemitism, and especially as a result of the integration policy of the Jews carried on for two decades, which had a positive effect. The book shows the results of these Soviet policies and their contribution to establishing better interactions between Jews and non-Jews.

In Bessarabia, when the Romanian and German troops entered, the civilian population plundered, killed Jews and even killed them in groups (the so-called pogroms).

The study is well designed and documented with the testimonies of the survivors. In Transnistria, the surviving Jews remember the civil attitudes towards them differently from those in Bessarabia. Even though the regime persecuted them, most of the ordinary people, often their neighbors, helped them by providing food and clothing to the deportees, sometimes even hiding them, risking their lives. The study recounts the "absence of pogroms" (p. 152, translated). in Transnistria in 1941 or later, different from the experience of the Jews in Bessarabia. The archival materials and the hundreds of testimonies of the survivors do not indicate episodes of anti Jewish public violence initiated by the civilians in Transnistria after the invasion, as opposed to the attacks in Bessarabia in 1941 against the Jews. One of the participants in the 1941 pogroms from Hirova associated these attacks with the political environment and the xenophobic ideology of the interwar period. He explained his participation in the Jewish massacre as follows: "During the whole [interwar period] the Romanian government educated the population, including myself, in the spirit of hostility and hatred towards other nationalities" (p. 154, translated). The difference in Transnistria was precisely the education of the population during the Bolshevik regime towards the acceptance and inclusion of the Jewish minority. A possible explanation could also be the fact that the Ukrainians in Transnistria during the Bolshevik regime went through hunger and suffering, the Soviet power taking their assets and properties, which formed an attitude of pity towards those who suffered as they suffered.

The author points out that the implementation of state policies regarding the integration of minorities may have a beneficial effect, but at the same time, it does not deny the faults of the Soviet regime and that it has persecuted other minorities. It highlights the role of the state in interethnic policies, which demonstrates the constructive character of antisemitism and that state policies play an important role both in enhancing animosities between populations and minorities, as well as in minimizing conflicts and improving relations between them.

Other researchers also noted that Soviet civilians generally did not participate in anti Jewish violence, unlike populations in neighboring eastern European territories (especially those the Soviet Union had recently occupied). For example, as noted in the book, Yitzhak Arad, believes that in the regions that have been under Soviet rule for 23 years "civilians were less hostile to their Jewish neighbors" than in the territories acquired in 1939 and 1940 (p. 229, translated). Also, Jan Gross, an American historian of Polish

origin, believes that "the role of the neighbors, of the locals, was a crucial factor in the genocide committed on the Jews" (p. 231, translated).

The present study, unlike other researches on the problem of Jews and the Holocaust, analyses the interethnic relations formed during the Second World War between the populations present in these territories and the Jewish minority, and especially the behavioral differences of the inhabitants of these two territories, explaining the factors that may have shaped these different attitudes. Comparing the interethnic relations among common people between the majority population and the Jewish minority in the two regions, the study reveals some basic tendencies and common features of the categories of population, some general patterns, however not applicable to each individual.

In the end, the research offers possible explanations of the differences in attitude towards the Jews in the two regions, showing that hate speech and exclusion have negative effects on interethnic relationships, and inclusive discourse can improve interethnic relationships. But the public discourse is not enough, however, it must be implemented through integration policies, which the Soviet Union made during the interwar period in its territories. The fact that the communists in the Soviet Union took over the properties and the assets of the Jews (expropriations) may have smoothed the envy and resentment of the poor. As Jan Gross points out the intentions of the Communist Party only at the level of discourse were not sufficient to counteract the antisemitic acts done by the inhabitants of Poland immediately after the war and this because they were not "accompanied by application procedures", remained at the stage of intention and minimal gesture (p. 242, translated). However, after the World War II, antisemitism flourishes in the area, under the effect of Nazi propaganda, the Soviet states following their own antisemitic course.

And as for the situation in Romanian Bessarabia, at the beginning of the 20's, the Romanian state did not have the major cultural influence in the newly allied territories, even though it had the political power over the entire population. The nationalist ideology of that period for the preservation of national integrity led to actions of expulsion or restriction of national minorities, especially of the Jews, the most urbanized ethnic group in the area, the cause for which it was seen as far more threatening, so that "antisemitism was in the center of Romanian nationalism" (p. 244, translated). The poverty of the Romanian peasants had the effect of resentment towards the more wealthy and urbanized Jews, which somehow explains the thefts and robberies of the Romanians against the Jews, which Diana Dumitru calls a "mental mechanism" (p. 246, translated) that justifies attitudes and behaviors, which in other situations would be condemnable.

In conclusion, the book is a well-documented study (archival documents, interviews, surveys, memoirs, other studies and analyzes), using comparison as the main method of analysis. The study reveals possible unpleasant truths about the history of the Jewish minority in Eastern Europe, perhaps more difficult to admit and digest by certain historians and researchers and remained partially unknown to the general public, whose image of Jewish persecution remains centered around German Nazi policies, being demonstrated, however, the extended size of this problem in Europe or Eastern Europe. Of course, the study leaves room for other possible interpretations as well, I would say perhaps even wider interpretations of social psychology than the ones that are mentioned and described here.

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BOOK REVIEW: NEW RESEARCHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Bogdan RUS*

Review of: Melania-Gabriela Ciot, *New Researches in International Relations (Coordonator)*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2018, ISBN: 978-606-37-0394-2, 238 p.

In an increasingly interconnected world with an exponential changing pace, where a tremendous amount of data is flowing in real time to any individual that holds an internet connection, the complexity of any large segment across the globe has reached a level above any human understanding. In such an overwhelming context, many of our daily areas have started to suffer as a side effect of this inability to control all our running and upcoming processes in an effective manner, and let to many disputed situations – among them, the human relationships themselves. Whether we're talking about large societal groups, main economic sectors, political spheres with their intra or inter-state relations – they are all facing new challenges with each passing day. Now it would be easy to blame technology with its capitalist and political interests, or the abusive regimes and the civil wars, or even the terrorist and their extreme actions; but unfortunately that is not all, and to some extent we are all contributing to many of these factors – such as the environmental and climate change, for example. But as dramatic as it may seem, all these issues have a solution that eventually finds its answers in the political field, where only the appropriate support and legislation are the key tools that can really make things right.

Therefore, to objectively address a contribution to this domain, deeper studies of the current situations are often extremely useful, and the scholars and academic researchers can clearly bring a decisive participation share to it. In this regards, Associate Professor Dr. Melania-Gabriela Ciot brought through her book *New Researches in International Relations* – where she owned the role of coordinator – an exceptionally wide perspective into the International Relations field, by bringing together the researches of eleven doctoral students and managing to cover several specific topics, such as: *idiosyncrasies of decisions made by political leaders, decision-making models identified*



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*in certain decisions, the role of culture in the future of Europe, case-studies of leadership models and so on.*¹

Melania-Gabriela Ciot (born in 1975) is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of European Studies of Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca – one of the leading universities of Europe – and also the Director of “European Paradigm” Doctoral School within the same faculty. Throughout her career, she published ten books as sole author, three books as coordinator, over 30 studies with the recognition of prestigious national and international publishing houses and over 50 articles indexed in the international database.²

The current volume is structured on 10 chapters, each one of them containing a research from up to two doctoral students, elaborated during their first year of study within the European Paradigm Doctoral School.

The first chapter is written by **Alexandru C. Apetroe** and approaches the topic of **North Korean’s decision-making process: Is Kim Jong-un a rational leader?** In his research the author is analysing the North Korean leader’s brutal dictatorship actions in relation to Donald Trump’s administration and tries to portrait Kim Jong-un from the *rational leader*³ point of view, based on his actions during the 2007 nuclear crisis on the peninsula. His arguments are also pointing to the entire region perspective, addressing not only the US relations, but also South Korea, China and Japan ones, where the North Korea’s actions were actually part of a greater plan that deliberately inflated the situation in the first place, in order to reach a quick de-escalation process through the already known measures of diplomatic protocols, and eventually settle to a safe zone in relation to all these international players – actions mainly inspired by the nuclear crisis situations of his father (2002) and grandfather (1993-1994).

The second chapter highlights **Emmanuel Macron vs. Jean-Claude Juncker** topic, written by **Andreea Stretea**. In focusing on two of the most important figures of nowadays European political arena – such as the President of France and the President of the European Commission – the author took the challenge of debating how their decisions (especially from an idiosyncratic point of view) can make an impact or even decide the future of a Union and eventually of a whole community. Her article approaches the perspective of both *rational model* and *psychological profile*⁴ analysis of each leader and reaches throughout her argumentation to an objective description of the key roles these figures play in reforming the complex structure of the European Union. The need of such a research comes in the context of UK’s decision to leave the Union and also holds as a base the number of public interventions made by these two leaders.

The third chapter was elaborated by **Evangelos Liakouris** containing the **Culture and its role in the future of Europe** topic. His research is structured on three main topics and tackles the European Union existential crisis:

1. *The evolution of European cultural policy*
2. *The “White Paper on the Future of Europe”*
3. *Justifying the absence of culture in the 5 scenarios*⁵

¹ Melania-Gabriela Ciot, *New Researches in International Relations*, Cluj University Press, Cluj-Napoca, 2018, p.10

² *Ibidem*, cover description

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 15-39

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 45-73

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 77-105

The main focus of the study remains the culture and the future of the European culture in the context of economic priorities and stresses the importance of the immediate intervention of the European Union into this sphere, to continuously aim for its own sustainable future.

The fourth chapter, written by **Ioana Constantin Bercean** tackles the theme **High representative, high expectations: Federica Mogherini's rational behavior on Iranian nuclear deal**. The study is very a comprehensive one and presents the EU's top diplomat Federica Mogherini playing fully rational in the Iranian nuclear deal, *by maximizing the EU's power as a global actor and protecting the JCPOA accord*.⁶ Her step-by-step analysis of the costs and benefits of each action confirmed her diplomatic abilities, particularly because she needed this success since she was facing her second international crisis, after the Middle East and Africa migration issue.

The fifth chapter, **President Charles de Gaulle's decision-making model** by **Claudiu Degeratu** offers a very interesting analysis on NATO's worst crisis – the withdraw of France from the Alliance, in March 1966, with its focus on the President Charles de Gaulle and his anti-Americanism attitudes and measure. The approach uses the *rational actor model*⁷ framework and aims to conclude if those measures brought back France among the great powers of the world and reduced the American hegemony.

The sixth chapter is written by **Iulia Anamaria Ghidui** on **Political leader Theresa May in the context of Brexit negotiations**. Her study focuses on the British Prime-Minister Theresa May's speeches and aims to reach a reasoned opinion on her negotiation style – since she *pledged to accomplish both and economic and illiberal, cosmopolite elite, inflexible to alternative perspectives*⁸ – especially throughout all the theatrical attitude that the British parliament is also asking in relation to Brussels' negotiations.

The seventh chapter, **Decision-making models - an analysis of 2007 cyber-attacks in Estonia** by **Radu Constantin Muresan**, approaches the very controversial situation that Estonia faced within the 2006 - 2007 period, by offering a view point on how seriously this situation has actually impacted governments, businesses, media of even common people, and how the *political leader's rational pattern managed to diminish these effects*.⁹ The study also rises the awareness on the significance of such attacks and how they can lead not only to huge amounts of money and data losses, but also to human chaos situations.

The eighth chapter, containing **Mihai I, King of the Romanians. The decision from 23 August 1944** topic was written by **Adrian Tolca**. In his study the author approaches four main areas to structure his argumentation:

1. *The national and international time context;*
2. *Who Michael the 1st is from different perspectives: origin, education, leader in training, cognitive and personality abilities;*
3. *The analyses of the Kings' decision-making process, taking into account the context, the psychological perspective, time, complexity and his capacity and the identified idiosyncrasies;*

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 109-124

⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 127-138

⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 141-158

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 161-175

4. *Sentence regarding the correct interpretation of the decision-making process and different opinions regarding the national political context, repercussions of the truce between Romania and the Allies.*¹⁰

Through this approach, he reaches a strong standpoint over the idiosyncratic typologies that influenced Kings' decisions, especially the one from 23rd of August 1944.

The ninth chapter, Anca Anda Sîrca – An evaluation on the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offers in the first part a very wide perspective over the concept and general rules of leaders and leaderships, based on Max Weber's views – such as *Political Dimensions, Political Image and Leadership Typology in the Context of Power and Authority*.¹¹ The second part of the research focuses on 15th of July events in Turkey and argues on how Recep Erdoğan, the president of the Republic of Turkey, managed to use his skills and charisma along with all its available tools in order to handle the *July 15th coup attempt process*.¹²

The tenth chapter, the last one, is written by **Diana Gligor and Dacian Pustea** and approaches the subject: **Idiosyncrasies in the foreign policy of the leaders Angela Merkel and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from the perspectives of parliamentary elections in Germany 2017**. The study is centered on the communications process as a whole, but also on the personal attacks made by Recep Erdoğan, the president of the Republic of Turkey, against the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Angela Merkel. With no coincidence, the period matches with the election period for the members of the parliament (September 2017), when Recep Erdoğan intervened in the process by trying to block the re-election of Angela Merkel. Throughout their argumentation, the authors succeed in highlighting the idiosyncrasies of the actors, where Erdoğan acts as an *imperialist that communicates only with a strong sense of personality (like a self-centered actor)*;¹³ while on the other part Angela Merkel manages to remain a rational actor that communicates only at a state level, using different diplomatic tools.

In concluding our review, we claim the volume to be a very comprehensive one – especially from topic coverage point of view, well-structured and entirely specific oriented. The arguments sustaining the research are also objectively elaborated and always backed up by recognized academic bibliography. By pursuing such an approach, the authors succeed in offering a broad perspective over specific events that occurred in the European political arena during its recent past.

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¹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 178-198

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 199-214

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¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 217-229

HUMAN TRAFFICKING. A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Anca IUHAS*


Book review of Louise Shelley, *Human Trafficking. a Global Perspective*, Cambridge University Press; 1 edition, 2010, ISBN-13: 978-0521130875

Louise Shelley's book on the subject of human trafficking, *Human Trafficking – A Global Perspective*, was published in 2010 and is still an invaluable source of insights into this global issue.

The book examines all forms of human trafficking and smuggling on a global scale, focusing mainly on sex trafficking, but also touching upon labor trafficking, child pornography and other forms of trafficking. It analyzes the operations of the trafficking business and the nature of the traffickers themselves, as well as the causes and consequences of human trafficking from a social, political, health and labor point of view. The author makes a historical and comparative in-depth analysis, describing the different ways that this phenomenon has developed across the main regions of the world, dedicating separate chapters to each region: Asia, Eurasia and Eastern Europe, Europe, United States, and lastly, Latin America and Africa.

The main point of focus in this book is that there is more than one business model of human trafficking and that there are enormous variations in human trafficking in these different regions and, therefore, solutions that have worked for one region will not necessarily work for the other. One sensitive aspect she explains is that, especially in the former communist states of Europe, high law enforcement officials in source countries are protecting criminal groups and supporting human trafficking, which is one of the main problems of combating human trafficking. She militates for a multilateral perspective, combining united efforts from the part of the business world, national governments and international bodies, the civil society, the academic world, and even the consumers, providing several examples of best practices and giving suggestions of possible solutions.

Dr. Louise Shelley is a University Professor at George Mason University and an expert on the relationship between terrorism, organized crime, and corruption as well as human trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorism. She is in the Schar School of Policy and Government and directs the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) that she founded. From 1995-2014, Dr. Shelley ran programs in Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia with leading specialists on the issues of organized crime and corruption. She has also been the principal investigator of large-scale projects on money laundering from Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and of training of law enforcement persons



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on the issue of trafficking in persons. Professor Shelley also served on the Global Agenda Council on Illicit Trade and Organized Crime of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and was the first co-chair of its Council on Organized Crime¹.

The author uses a wide body of academic research - actual prosecuted cases, testimonies and fieldwork and interviews conducted by the author over a period of sixteen years in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and the former socialist countries. The extensive range of sources used also include books, magazine and newspaper articles, films and documentaries, analyses of national governments, parliamentary hearings, publications of multinational organizations, such as IOM, UNICEF and the United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs (UNODC), The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Labor Organization (ILO), to name just a few, activities and analyses of NGOs, such as Anti-Slavery and Free of Slaves, research and case studies, as well as numerous interviews with law enforcement personnel, journalists, peacekeepers, policymakers, and activists in the human trafficking area and occasionally with a victim of human trafficking or member of a human trafficking organization.

The author aims to contribute to the issue of human trafficking mainly by researching and describing the role of organized crime in human trafficking, the economics of human trafficking, and the money laundering of the traffickers and smugglers and by insisting upon a multilateral approach to combating this phenomenon on a global scale. One particular area in which the book could be improved would be further explaining the reasons why existing programs and policies of combating human trafficking have failed to work and proposing more specific solutions to the issue.

Dr. Shelley's book offers a timely and invaluable perspective on the numerous aspects of human trafficking, which scholars, policymakers and practitioners in this field could widely benefit from.

¹ *Louise I. Shelley*, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, <<https://schar.gmu.edu/about/faculty-directory/louise-i-shelley>>

UNCERTAINTY: STRATEGIC THINKING AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN 21ST CENTURY

*Lucia PANTEA**

Review of *Uncertainty: Strategic Thinking And International Relations In 21st Century* By George Cristian Maior, Editura RAO, București, 2014

Clearly analyzing the context of the present world, the author brings several definitions, concepts and approaches regarding the development of international relationships and he uses conceptual expressions such as network-state, non-state, post worlds by analyzing certain events that have influenced the historical paths from different perspectives.

As George Cristian Maior is a career diplomat and he used to be at some point secretary and head of the Department for Euroatlantic Integration and Defence Politics within the National Defence Ministry, as well as head of Romanian Information Service, the topics of his book are approached from the perspective of his experience and his practice. This is the reason why the conclusions are well anchored in reality and his proposals for the development of international relationships are pertinent within the context of uncertainty notion, and the possibility to discover what is hidden behind the appearance leads to possible to be applied solutions.


The tone of the book is an open one, touching the human nature of the reader through cited literature in connection with the topics of the chapters. This helps to reach a heartfelt participation in understanding the described situations.

At the very beginning of this edition, in the introductory part, the author offers quotations from David Mitchell: “What wouldn’t I give now for a never changing map of the ever-constant ineffable! To possess, as it were, an atlas of clouds”.

The author presents three maps representing the fundamental problems of the main strategic challenges Europe and the whole world has confronted, in three different moments of the history: first and second World Wars, The cold war and Globalization. Anyone can clearly see the difference between traditional strategic thinking and the diversity of globalization era.

Idealism has manifested itself during the freedom dreams of individuals and collectivities in 1989 revolution. The idealism is content within the much awaited changes with beneficial consequences and it has led to the idealization of transformation of the international political universe.

Realism has arrived with the 9.11. attack from 2001, when a non-state organization was able to attack the most powerful state in possession of supremacy in all



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points of view: political, technological, cultural and military. This situations lead to creation of new alliances and to proclamation of “global war against terrorism” as a common purpose.

The greatest paradox of 21st century reside in the fact that as much as technology, knowledge and progress offer more and more opportunities, all these bring also more vulnerabilities. Life during this century is one with a higher potential of unpredictability and unknown and this uncertainty reflected in intellectual world, will lead to a different strategic thinking, to new and diverse approaches. Some of these thinking ways could be scenarios and possibilities based on accurate, actual and precise information.

The dynamic universe in unforeseen. The post notion – such as post Cold War epoch, post 9.11., post-industrialization, post 2008 financial crisis – has found its use as a conceptual instrument for exploring the international political universe as a result of a certain situation. Fareed Zakaria’s book “The Post American World” has lead to a series of debates regarding the theory released by the author. Zakaria supports the fact that there were three major changes within international relationships world, as follows: increasing the influence of Western world (15th century), the imposition of America as a global power (19th century) and the decline of the power of America and the emergence of new powers-Europe, China, India and Brazil (21st century). The author’s scenario is presenting a new world that is not anti-American but one in which in many areas (industrial, financial, cultural, educational and social) the power is getting further from the “American domination”.

The Europe of the European Union has succeeded to replace the power politics with consensus politics, a notion explained as “the paradox of willingness of a state to give up some of traditional attributes of sovereignty, in order to become stronger in promoting purposes related to the interests of the society which it governs”.

Development of the technology, access to information and to the most recent discoveries in all domains as forms of progress, did not necessarily lead to moral or politic progress within the international relationships.

It’s more and more difficult for the states to control transmission of ideas, goods, people over national frontiers. The role of traditional state can be transformed, as Manuel Castells theory states, in a network-state generating a “complex structure for communications, built around objectives that ensure the purpose unity and its adaptability to the operational environment”.

There are already some networks created which develop accordingly to their purpose, level of interest, level of content. These networks are international, with the main interest in their development and easily exceeding the physical borders between states, i.e. cultural, art, internet for communication, scientific and technological networks.

For instance, the social media such as Facebook or Instagram have transformed any user into an information source, even into a reporter or influencer.

Any formation, organization, entity that are not politically or strategically defined, that do not have the powers of a state, without a physical definition and that represents the common interests of individuals could be assimilated to the notion of “non-state”. International relationships were based in the past on similarity, rules, stability codes, diplomatic codes, cooperation and reason. After the emergence of the non- state identities, these international relationships have changed. The non-state identities are not respecting any rules, create international tensions and their actions are violent and unforeseen. Terrorist attacks have existed before but they were smaller sized. In the present, globalization has lead to greater influence of these kind of attacks and greater impact.

Within the new configuration of the new international relationships, the roles of diplomats, soldiers and strategists are changing. The soldier's role becomes more complex because he is the one who carries out an order in direct connection with the citizen. So, it is necessary for him to be aware of more details, to be trained regarding his behavior mode. In the same way, the diplomats have to change roles with strategists and the strategists with the diplomats, all of them have to dispose new abilities. Different countries have different approaches. For instance, regarding the military diplomacy, France embraces a wider vision of maintaining the peace, whereas Denmark and Switzerland promote stability and security.

The important thing is that efficiency should be offered by the general reaction capacity, by approaching and creating mixed capabilities to ensure, in crisis, managing the situation, even in new situation where the roles and risks can change permanently, where the information and knowledge are vital.

Europe and America represent an alliance between two worlds that are thinking their mission and identity differently, within the international context. Europeans prefer negotiation, the diplomacy and dealing with politics for international issues, and this is an ideational approach. Americans consider that the best approach is based on using their very big power and force to deal with problems. The alliance between them is possible due to the fact that, treated with wisdom, their unification of forces leads to a very powerful united capacity.

Is it possible to foresee the future, taking in consideration all factors involved, those that are known and those that can occur, so that we could be prepared with scenarios and possibilities for all the unpredictable?

The book written by George Cristian Maior ends with a very suggestive quote: "You don't have to predict the future. Just choose the future-a better future, a useful future- and make that prediction that will alter the emotions and the human reactions so that the future you've predicted will actually happen. It is better to build a good future than to predict a bad one".

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POSTCOMMUNIST SOCIETAL CHANGES IN THE BALKANS


*Dan APĂTEANU**

Review of Bieber, Florian and Dario Brentin (eds.) *Social Movements in the Balkans. Rebellion and Protest from Maribor to Taksim*. New York: Routledge, 2019, ISBN 978-1-138-05214-7

The first chapter belongs to Heiko Wimmen, *Divided they stand: peace building, state reconstruction and informal political movements in Bosnia-Hertegovina, 2005-2013* (Wimmen, 2019, pp.9-29). After the 1990s, there was the conception that liberal democratic systems are the best remedy for post-conflict societies; hence there were international attempts to intervene in these societies to prevent them from falling into violence. Bosnia-Hertegovina represents such a case where there was external intervention for the democratic state reconstruction. By the mid 2000s, civil society organizations have been developed and were involved in the governance process. They tried to generate a broad bottom-up involvement of the people in the public affairs, through initiatives such as GROZD - Citizens organize for democracy, that tried to move the focus from the nationalist rhetoric to public policies. A new generation of activists have also been involved in the public sphere. The recent events in BiH show that there is a normalization of civic life, with many non-formal political movements.

The second chapter is *Maribor's social uprising in the European crisis. From antipolitics of people to politicisation of periphery's surplus population*. It analyzes the mass uprisings that were in winter 2012-2013 in Maribor, city coined as a periphery, that should be seen as a sign that questions the case of Slovenia as a "success story". Maribor was already a city where protests broke during the communist regime in 1988 announcing the end of the regime. Again, more than two decades later, the author suggests it might happen the same as the people are disappointed with the post-socialist transition and the changes it brought. The author shows that the mass uprisings in Maribor were unexpected, using Ranciere political theory of dissensus and *demos*. The political discontent generated a crisis of the existing political representation on one hand, but on the other hand, it led to the formation of new political parties and groups (Kirn, 2019, pp. 30-47).

Valentina Gueorguieva, in her article *The 'stronger' state and counter-democracy. Bulgarian street protests, 2012-2013, in the accounts of participants*, makes a chronology of the civil society manifestations against some decisions of the authorities, that transformed eventually into a critique of overall activity (Gueorguieva, 2019, pp. 48-65). The movements experimented with different forms of organization and expression, hence



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there is no standard form for their involvement in the political process. However, their actions began as simple intentions to stop a certain decision or law but afterwards it transformed, seeking measures and policies that they were trying to be accepted by the authorities. The methodology of the study includes in-depth interviews and anthropological observation, with data collected between 2009 and 2014. The text analyzes the concepts of the state, the public good and the citizens control, in light of the Bulgarian reality, showing that the protesters demand a stronger state to defend the public goods.

The spaces of social mobilization in Greece by Kostis Plevris presents the social movements from Greece in the last decade, that arose especially from the economic crisis, or against the restraint of domestic liberties, oppression or fascist views in society (Plevris, 2019, pp. 66-78). The author does not simply describe the manifestations, but tries to interpret them. The social mobilizations had a strong spatial analogue regarding the way they were expressed. The development of human society takes place in space and time, hence they are being connected. Understanding how space is produced is connected to the comprehension of the social activities but, on the other hand, we should not regard it as an independent factor. Social claims have been historically developed in spaces that played an important role. The author analyses the connection between space and human activity in the case of different Greek places.

In the article *At the crossroads of cultural and ideological exchange - behind the visual communications of 2012 - 2013 Slovene protests*, Ksenija Berk presents how the visual communication - such as posters, flags, banners, puppets, masks and artworks - transmits the ideological message of the protesters (Berk, 2019, pp. 79 – 95). This was comprised from elements of the national history, stemming from revolutions and from the socialist period, forming a unified message that criticized the corrupted politicians. To analyze the visual material, the author uses a diverse research methodology, from areas such as aesthetics, political theory, visual culture, history of art and design.

Lekic-Subasic shows the importance of Web 2.0 - Facebook, Twitter and Youtube - usage in the organization of the protests in Southeast Europe (Lekic-Subasic, 2019, 96-112). The content uploaded on these websites have been analyzed in order to investigate their role in social movements. Social media and new media technologies brought concrete changes in people's lives. However not all researchers agree with this idea, pointing towards the *slacktivism*, referring to political activities that have no impact on real life politics, serving only to increase the feel good factor of the *activists*. The author presents a case study on the "baby revolution", the protests that took place in 2013 in Sarajevo and other towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in 2012 in Slovenia, as a response to the actions of the Maribor mayor. Social media - especially Facebook - was crucial in spreading information and organizing protests.

Chiara Milan and Leonidas Oikonomakis analyze the transition from single-issue protests to mass-movements in Greece, Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina, trying to determine its causes (Milan and Oikonomakis, 2019, pp. 113-130). These movements have similarities as participants expressed dissatisfaction with the political system that did not represent them or the fact that they were triggered by one event such as the austerity measures in Greece - named the Movement of Squares in the 2011 summer, Turkey's Occupy Gezi Park in May 2013 and the #JMBG movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 2013. But they evolve differently as those in Turkey and Greece transformed into large movements protests, while that in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not. The authors argue that this can be attributed to the resonance of the overarching frame with the target group

and society culture and to the lack of experienced local and transnational movement networks.

Marius Tătar tackles the issue of protest politics in post-communist Southeastern Europe (Tătar, 2019, pp. 131-157). He is offering a theoretical perspective, that conceptualizes and explains the protest participation, as a way to influence the decisions perceived to be negative for themselves or for the society. There are perspectives from different areas, such as political sciences, sociology, political economy, social psychology or history. The author underlines that most protest events are not solitary acts, but rather collective actions. He is analyzing European Values Survey and World Values Survey datasets to measure the involvement of people in protest activities. Country-aggregated levels of economic development and quality of democracy are not good explanatory variables for the level of protest actions. When it takes into account socio-demographic and cultural variables, most of the predictors of protest activity have an equal influence in the East and in the West; what performs as explanatory variables are interest in politics, threatened values and mobilizing contexts.

The international context of mass political unrest in the Balkans is analyzed by Mark Kramer. Many studies have shown the importance of the mass media in framing the goals and activities of the protesters. In general, these studies have been focused on the media within the countries where protests took place, but we should also consider foreign media. Western government agencies, NGOs and social groups have provided training and assistance to NGOs, informal groups and individuals in Balkan countries, that could be used by anti-government protesters. The literature on transnational advocacy networks show how transnational activism affects and is affected by domestic political opportunity structures. The international dimension of mass political protest can be seen in the cross-national spread of social movements, the external diffusion of protest speech and the potential for cross-border *demonstration effects*. International organizations have an important influence on political protests from one country (Kramer, 2019, 158-187).

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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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


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


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


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